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ABSTRACT 
The pioneers of financial liberalisation, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) argue that inter-
est rates determined by market forces have a positive effect on economic growth rates. Inter-
est rates that are kept at low levels through the intervention of a central bank discourage sav-
ings and capital accumulation, and distort the allocation of resources. Interest rate liberalisa-
tion results in higher real interest rates which could have a positive effect on savings, invest-
ments and economic growth (Ang & McKibbin 2007). Interest rate liberalisation also reduces 
capital flight and encourages capital inflows by increasing return for investors which supple-
ments domestic investments. Shaw (1973) argued that interest rate liberalisation promotes 
financial development by encouraging savings and increasing the availability of funds for 
lending purposes.  
The study provides an empirical analysis of the channels through which interest rate 
liberalisation impacts on economic growth in SADC countries for the period 1990 to 2015. 
The study is motivated by the concerns on the impact of interest rate liberalisation on eco-
nomic growth in the period after the 2008-’09 global financial crisis as well as concerns that 
interest rate liberalisation increases the likelihood of financial crises. Higher interest rates 
resulting from interest rate liberalisation may increase the likelihood of financial crises by 
encouraging risk-taking on the part of banks in an attempt to take advantage of higher returns.  
Authorities in most countries have reduced interest rates in an attempt to boost aggregate 
demand, which is expected to speed up the recovery from the crisis. However, the lowering 
of interest rates may result in a decrease in savings and investments, which are the main 
drivers of long-term economic growth. Real interest rates below equilibrium may encourage 
banks to take more risks in their lending practices in order to earn higher returns which may 
result in an increase in non-performing loans. The influence of interest rates on financial 
crises has thus received considerable attention since the onset of the 2008-’09 global financial 
crisis and this thesis contributes to the literature by determining how interest rates impact on 
economic growth in SADC countries and whether interest rate liberalisation increases the 
likelihood of financial crises.  
The study examines the relationship between interest rate liberalisation and economic growth 
through different channels. These include savings and investments, capital flows and finan-
cial development. The study uses the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator proposed by 
Pesaran et al (1999) to estimate the effect of interest rate liberalisation on economic growth 
through the abovementioned channels. The study also examines whether interest rate 
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liberalisation increases the likelihood of financial crises. This is estimated using the logit 
model, due to the binary nature of the dependent variable.   
The results provide limited support for the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis. Interest rate 
liberalisation has a positive effect on economic growth through higher savings and 
investments. Interest rate liberalisation has a positive outcome on capital inflows, which 
indicates that the prospect of earning higher returns encourages foreign investors to invest in 
the domestic economy. However, capital inflows do not enhance economic growth. This 
could be due to the low levels of human capital in SADC countries.  
Interest rate liberalisation boosts financial development through higher savings and invest-
ments. However, financial development has a negative effect on economic growth because of 
the link between financial development and financial crises. The results show that interest 
rate liberalisation decreases the likelihood of financial crises directly, however, it increases 
the probability of financial crises indirectly through financial development. This suggests that 
the major cause of financial crises in the region is the low levels of institutional quality and 
lack of adequate supervisory frameworks to monitor the functioning of the financial system. 
Therefore, the results imply that the negative impact of interest rate liberalisation may 
outweigh the positive effect of higher savings and investments in SADC countries. 
A number of policy recommendations can be drawn from the study. Liberalisation of interest 
rates has a positive effect on economic growth through savings and investments. However 
improving the levels of institutional quality is vital for preventing financial crises. Interest 
rate liberalisation may not have a direct influence on financial crises, but higher levels of fi-
nancial development emanating from higher interest rates increase the likelihood of financial 
crises. Therefore, a sound monitoring framework is necessary for the benefits of financial 
liberalisation to be realised. Also, investment in education, training and research and 
development is a necessity so as to increase levels of human capital, which in turn may allow 
the region to reap the benefits of capital inflows. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
1.1  Introduction 
This chapter provides the background, motivation, significance, objectives and hypotheses of 
the study. Economic theories of competitive and efficient markets suggest that financial liber-
alisation is positively related to economic growth and development and thus in recent 
decades, there have been increasing calls for developing countries to liberalise their financial 
sectors (O’Toole, 2012; Commission on Growth and Development 2008).  
The pioneers of financial liberalisation were McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), whose rec-
ommendations are often referred to as the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis. This hypothesis 
states that interest rates determined by market forces have a positive effect on economic 
growth rates. Interest rates that are kept at low levels through the intervention of a central 
bank discourage savings and capital accumulation, and distort the allocation of resources. The 
negative effect of below-equilibrium interest rates on economic activity prompted calls for 
interest rate liberalisation, which is defined as the removal of interest rate controls and 
allowing market forces to determine domestic interest rates. Interest rate liberalisation results 
in higher real interest rates, which could have a positive effect on savings, investments and 
economic growth (Ang & McKibbin 2007). Interest rate liberalisation also reduces capital 
flight and encourages capital inflows by increasing return for investors, which supplements 
domestic investments. Furthermore, Shaw (1973) argued that interest rate liberalisation 
promotes financial development by encouraging savings and increasing the availability of 
funds for lending purposes. The finance and growth nexus was also discussed extensively by 
Schumpeter (1912) and Levine (1997), who argued that financial sector development has a 
positive outcome on economic growth through savings mobilisation and capital 
accumulation, risk management and reducing transaction costs. A developed financial sector 
would enable an economy to mobilise funds effectively from sectors with surpluses to sectors 
with deficits and hence increasing investment (Woldie & Kalowoleadeniji, 2008). A 
developed financial sector would also increase investment funding good business 
opportunities, creating a good environment for saving, enhancing trading and allowing 
investors to hedge risks by diversifying their portfolios (Akingunola et al, 2013).   
The views of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) are supported by Kapur (1976), Mathieson 
(1980), Galbis (1977) and Fry (1980), among others, who argued that interest rate reforms 
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have a positive effect on the quantity and quality of investments which in turn boost eco-
nomic growth. The Austrian school of thought proposes that interest rates should be deter-
mined by the market for loanable funds. By controlling interest rates, authorities may exert 
negative effects on an economy such as preventing market forces from providing accurate in-
formation and causing misallocation of capital in an economy (Snowdon & Vane 2005). Pro-
duction processes may be lengthened and thus too many capital goods end up being produced 
at the expense of consumer goods which would be against consumer preferences, as consu-
mers would desire to make more expenditures in the current period. This would result in idle 
production capacities which in turn can cause financial crises.  
Critics of the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis include the Neo-Structuralist school of thought 
and also the Keynesians, including the New-Keynesians and the Post-Keynesians, who argue 
that interest rate liberalisation affects economic growth negatively by reducing the availabili-
ty of funds in the economy and reducing aggregate demand, which is a major component of 
gross domestic product. Stiglitz & Weiss (1981), Mankiw (1986), Stiglitz (1994), and Arestis 
& Demetriades (1999) argue that financial markets are prone to market failures due to imper-
fect information. So government intervention in the market is necessary to prevent financial 
crises. Financial crises may also prevail if there is inadequate institutional quality. 
In the light of the above, there are two strands of literature, one advocating for, the other 
against interest rate liberalisation. This study is motivated by the need to determine whether 
interest rate liberalisation has a positive influence on economic growth in the SADC region. 
The region is plagued by low economic growth rates which have prevented a rise in em-
ployment and standards of living. Furthermore, a number of financial crises have occurred 
down the years, so determining the cause of these is necessary. The global financial crisis of 
2008-’09 has prompted most central banks to reduce interest rates in an attempt to boost in-
vestment and economic growth. This study sheds light on whether interest rate liberalisation 
promotes or hinders economic growth.   
1.2  Background to the study 
Most of the countries in the SADC began a process of liberalising their financial sectors du-
ring the late 1980s and early ’90s in line with the proposals of McKinnon and Shaw, so as to 
boost investment and economic growth levels (Mowatt, 2001). Prior to this liberalisation, 
most of these countries had repressed financial sectors with interest rates kept at negative 
rates by the state, exchange controls being employed, and financial institutions subject to 
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portfolio restrictions (Nyawata & Bird 2004). Financial liberalisation in SADC involved 
increasing real interest rates to positive levels, allowing the market to allocate credit, streng-
thening prudential regulation and the supervision and restructuring of state-owned banks.  
 
Table 1.1: Real interest rate trends in SADC countries 
Country 1990-’99 2000-’09 2010-’15 
Botswana 3.81 7.82 3.53 
Lesotho 6.37 6.76 5.14 
Madagascar 9.93 19.66 46.11 
Malawi 4.01 14.76 13.23 
Mauritius 11.34 12.65 6.06 
Namibia 8.97 4.98 2.94 
Seychelles 12.92 0.03 8.77 
South Africa 6.98 5.04 3.25 
Swaziland 3.97 4.22 0.25 
Tanzania 6.75 5.24 6.86 
Zambia -1.16 11.76 5.03 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
 
As shown in Tables 1.1, real interest rates rose into positive territory in most SADC countries 
over the period 1990 to 2015. Savings and investments also increased during the same period 
as indicated by table 1.2 which suggests that there could be a link between interest rate 
liberalisation, savings and investments. However, there were several financial crises recorded 
in the period after the interest rate reforms, so whether the effect of interest rate liberalisation 
on growth is positive is still inconclusive. 
 
Table 1.2: Trends in savings and investments in SADC countries 
Country 1990-’99 2000-’09 2010-’15 
 Savings Investments Savings Investments Savings Investments 
Botswana 39.64 29.69 39.02 30.73 39.74 33.92 
Lesotho 27.97 61.20 39.69 29.23 23.64 33.10 
Madagascar 4.84 12.53 17.41 24.89 12.55 17.85 
Malawi 4.62 8.67 10.46 16.09 7.50 14.01 
Mauritius 19.91 30.28 22.39 24.17 17.41 24.70 
Namibia 24.37 21.82 26.53 21.70 21.16 26.99 
Seychelles 23.74 29.45 12.66 25.80 17.74 36.39 
South Africa 17.77 17.80 16.35 18.73 15.76 19.78 
Swaziland 14.78 26.85 22.47 24.78 6.82 7.37 
Tanzania 19.95 25.79 18.31 21.27 20.23 30.27 
Zambia 8.20 14.72 23.12 28.21 35.74 33.14 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
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Higher savings and investment rates are crucial for long-term growth and reductions in unem-
ployment and poverty levels. However, in most emerging economies in African countries, the 
investment rates are too low to have any significant influence on economic growth rates (Ndi-
kumana, 2014). Inadequate savings levels could explain the low investment levels. Invest-
ments can be boosted by allowing interest rates to be determined by market forces which 
could have a positive effect on savings. Interest rate liberalisation could also result in the de-
velopment of the financial sector as more individuals take part in economic activity through 
saving (Spratt, 2009). Foreign direct investment may increase due to a rise in returns for in-
vestors, which results in job creation and brings greater expertise to firms in the domestic in-
dustry. Higher levels of investments, financial development and foreign direct investments 
could have a positive outcome on economic growth, which in turn would reduce 
unemployment and poverty levels.  
Figure 1.1: Growth rates in sub-Saharan Africa and other developing countries 
 
Source: World bank (2016) 
Figure 1.1 shows that average growth rates in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have been, on aver-
age, higher than in other regions since the early 2000s. What is more, the growth rates have 
been higher than the world average. However, Southern Africa is the slowest-growing region, 
as shown on Figure 1.2, which depicts per capita GDP growth rates in SSA. GDP per capita 
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growth rates over the period 1990-2015 have averaged 4.23% in East Africa, 4.12% in West 
Africa, 3.24% in Central Africa and 2.54% in Southern Africa.  
Figure 1.2: Economic growth rates: Southern Africa and other African regions 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2016) 
Savings and investment rates are lower in SSA countries compared with other developing and 
emerging countries. As shown in figures 1.3 and 1.4, savings and investment levels in SSA 
have been the lowest in the developing regions considered for the period 1990-2015. Savings 
and investment have also been lower than the world average.  
 
Figure 1.3: Savings: sub-Saharan Africa and other emerging countries 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
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Figure 1.4: Investments: sub-Saharan Africa and other emerging countries 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
 
Policies that promote savings and investments may be vital for ensuring that the high 
economic growth levels in SSA are sustainable and so need to be implemented. Interest rate 
liberalisation may have a positive influence on savings by increasing returns for savers, 
which in turn would boost investment levels. Interest rate reform may also encourage the 
development of the financial sector, which will ensure that households and firms have access 
to secure channels for saving.   
 
On the other hand, interest rate liberalisation could result in widening spreads between 
lending and deposit rates and narrowing the focus of banks faced with increasing 
competition. Interest rate liberalisation can also destabilise the financial system and cause 
financial crises if not carried out appropriately (Ang & McKibbin, 2007). High interest rates 
may not have a positive effect on savings, investments and economic growth in countries 
with low income levels, as substantial amounts of the income would be devoted to 
consumption. So any increase in the interest rate would have no effect on savings. This is 
particularly true for most countries in SADC and sub-Saharan Africa, where a large number 
of people earn very low incomes. Stiglitz (1994) also argues that although a moderate 
increase in interest rates can result in an increase in savings and lending rates, increases in 
interest rates above a certain level would result in lower levels of lending, as this would 
favour borrowers in the high-risk category. 
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1.3 Problem statement 
The 2008-’09 global financial crisis has brought the issue of interest rates into the spotlight. 
According to the advocates of the Austrian school, like Kates (2010) and Templeman (2012), 
the crisis was caused by a decrease in interest rates below equilibrium, which resulted in mal-
investments, a situation where the activities of producers and consumers are not coordinated. 
Also, maintaining low interest rates during a crisis slows the recovery process. However, the 
Keynesians argue that the financial crisis was caused by a drop in aggregate demand as well 
as the savings glut resulting from excess savings in Asian economies (Kotios & Galanos, 
2012; Tridico, 2011). So the Keynesians advocate for low interest rates so as to boost aggre-
gate demand. Authorities worldwide have reduced interest rates to low levels in an attempt to 
boost aggregate demand and economic growth. Lower interest rates are also purported to in-
crease investment levels by reducing borrowing costs. The recovery from the global financial 
crisis has been slow despite the lowering of interest rates conducted by most authorities 
around the world. Investments and economic growth rates continue to be at low levels in 
most parts of the world. So there is an urgent requirement for new policies to be implemented 
that would result in higher long-term economic growth. Interest rates kept low for too long 
can have a negative influence on an economy by reducing savings – a vital determinant of in-
vestments. However, there is no conclusive evidence on whether the effect of higher interest 
rates on savings outweighs the negative outcome of higher interest rates on investment 
through rising borrowing costs.  
 
Investment is one of the major determinants of long-term economic growth in an economy. 
Realising that, the SADC region set targets for savings and investments ratios as a percentage 
of GDP at 30% and 35% respectively. However most countries have not been able to reach 
those levels, and reducing real interest rates may reverse the progress made. The ratio of in-
vestment to GDP is low for most developing countries and this is mainly due to low savings 
rates (Ndikumana, 2014). Historically the fastest growing countries in the world, like China, 
have had investment rates in excess of 30% – this can be made possible by an increase in 
savings (Commission for Growth and Development, 2008). 
 
Despite the improvements in economic growth in SSA over the years, there are still high rates 
of unemployment and poor standards of living. Poverty rates are still close to 50%, 30% of 
the population is undernourished and inequality still remains a big problem (Schaffnit-Chat-
terjee, 2013). One of the reasons for the high unemployment rates and low living standards is 
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undeveloped financial systems in developing countries (Forowe 2013). Lowering interest 
rates may have a negative effect on financial development by reducing savings levels. Ac-
cording to Shaw (1973), interest rate liberalisation promotes financial development by increa-
sing savings and financial intermediation.  
 
Based on World Bank publications, the average credit-to-GDP ratio in 2010 for sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) was below 20%, although higher in some countries (Griffith-Jones, 2013). In 
addition, World Bank surveys revealed that only 17% of the small enterprises in SSA have 
access to credit, which is the lowest among all emerging country regions. In Latin America 
and the Caribbean 41% of the small enterprises have access to credit, while in SSA 48% of 
small enterprises and 41% of medium enterprises state that lack of funds is a constraint for 
their investment and report that it is the major obstacle to their investment ambitions (Grif-
fith-Jones, 2013). Interest rate liberalisation would increase the savings rate, which would 
make funds available for investment purposes and hence increase economic growth.  
 
Critics of interest rate liberalisation argue that it increases the likelihood of financial crises by 
encouraging banks to take more risks in their lending practices, as well as reducing franchise 
values through a rise in competition. Also, a number of households are heavily indebted and a 
drastic or sudden increase in interest rates could result in an increase in defaults on borrowed 
funds, which in turn could result in a financial crisis. For example, in South Africa, due to the 
rise in private sector credit between 2003 and ’06, the ratio of household debt to income was 
83% in 2008 (IMF, 2014). This ratio decreased from 83% to about 75% in 2013 due to the 
global financial crisis, but this figure is still high by historical standards, and when compared 
with other countries. It was estimated that a 100-basis-point increase in the interest rate 
would increase the household interest-only debt service ratio of income to just over 9% from 
7.9%. This figure is higher than that experienced during 2002-’03, when there was significant 
household debt distress (IMF, 2014). However, reducing interest rates to very low levels may 
encourage banks to undertake risky lending so as to earn higher returns, which also increases 
the probability of financial crises.   
An increase in interest rates could also increase borrowing costs, which in turn could de-
crease the amount of investments undertaken by domestic firms. This outcome would be 
greater for small businesses than larger firms, which have greater profitability and higher 
cash flows. Higher interest rates could also reduce the demand for goods and services due to 
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the rise in borrowing costs. Private consumption represents a considerable amount of GDP in 
SADC, so a reduction in private consumption could have a negative effect on the economic 
growth rate.  
The analysis above highlights that interest rate liberalisation has two opposing influences on 
economic growth, the growth-enhancing and growth-retarding effects, through financial cri-
ses. So this thesis will examine the channels through which interest rate liberalisation affects 
economic growth in eleven1 SADC countries so as to draw conclusions on whether 
implementing the policy is vital for sustainable long-term growth in the region.    
1.4 Study objectives 
The broad objective of the thesis is to examine whether interest rate liberalisation has a posi-
tive influence on economic growth in SADC countries. The specific objectives of the thesis 
include: 
i. Providing an overview of interest rate liberalisation in SADC countries; 
ii. Surveying the theoretical and empirical literature regarding interest rate liberalisation; 
iii. Examining the relationship between interest rate liberalisation, savings and invest-
ments; 
iv. Investigating whether interest rate liberalisation has a positive influence on capital in-
flows; 
v. Examining whether interest rate liberalisation results in the development of the finan-
cial sector; 
vi. Determining whether interest rate liberalisation increases the likelihood of financial 
crises. 
vii. Investigating the effect of financial development and institutional quality on financial 
crises. 
1.5         Significance of the study 
Understanding the influence of interest rate liberalisation on economic growth is critical for 
policy-makers, especially during this period when economies are recovering from the 2008-
’09 global financial crisis. The study is conducted at a time when different growth strategies 
                                                          
1 Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania 
and Zambia. Angola, DRC, Mozambique and Zimbabwe are omitted due to insufficient data. 
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need to be adopted as expansionary monetary policy has had limited success in influencing 
savings, investments and economic growth. Lowering interest rates to below equilibrium lev-
els may increase investments and aggregate demand. However, savings may be reduced, 
which in turn retards investments. There is no conclusive evidence on whether interest rate 
liberalisation has a positive or negative effect on investment levels. Determining whether the 
effect of higher real interest rates on investments outweighs that of lower real interest rates is 
crucial for sustainable long-term growth, as investments are a major driver of economic 
growth.  
There is scant evidence on the channels through which interest rate reforms influence 
economic growth in SSA countries. Studies by Odhiambo (2009a, 2009b, 2010), Odhiambo 
& Akinboade (2009), Akinboade & Kinfack (2013) and Ahmed (2013) focus mostly on the 
effect of interest rate/financial liberalisation on financial development and economic growth. 
These studies use individual measures of financial development like credit to the private 
sector, liquid liabilities, broad money and bank deposits. This study incorporates other 
channels in which interest rate liberalisation may influence economic growth, namely savings 
and investments and capital inflows, as well as the influence of interest rate liberalisation on 
financial crises. This study also constructs financial development indices using principal 
components analysis (PCA) in order to mitigate the effect of collinearity among individual 
financial development indicators.  
There is scant evidence on the effect of interest rate liberalisation on financial crises in SSA 
countries despite the frequency of financial crises in the region over the years. Misati & Nya-
mongo (2012) use the Chinn-Ito index as a measure of financial liberalisation in examining 
the influence of reforms on financial fragility. However, most of the problems in the banking 
sector are caused by interest rates, which influence bank risk-taking and competition. This 
study contributes to the literature by investigating whether interest rates and financial de-
velopment affect financial crises. Higher levels of financial development, and in particular, 
bank credit and credit to the private sector in an environment of low institutional quality, re-
sult in an increase in the number of non-performing loans, which in turn increases the prob-
ability of financial crises.   
A number of studies on financial reforms focus on the direct influence of financial liberalisa-
tion on economic growth. This study contributes to the debate by examining the channels in 
which interest rate liberalisation has an effect on economic growth.  
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Most studies on interest rate or financial liberalisation in Africa have focused mainly on sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole, such as Fowowe (2013), Ahmed (2012), and Misati & Nyamongo 
(2012). Region-specific studies, for instance studies focusing on SADC countries, are crucial 
since there are disparities between regions with regards to economic growth. The studies that 
have examined the influence of interest rates or financial liberalisation on economic growth 
in SADC countries are Odhiambo (2009a, 2009b, 2010 2011), Odhiambo & Akinboade 
(2009), Nyawata & Bird (2004) and Mowatt (2001). The empirical studies by Odhiambo and 
by Odhiambo & Akinboade focused only on the financial deepening channel of interest rate 
liberalisation as stated above, while those of Nyawata & Bird (2004) and Mowatt (2001) 
include no econometric estimation. This study incorporates more channels in which interest 
rate liberalisation affects economic growth, and uses econometric estimation techniques.  
1.6 Study hypotheses 
 𝐻1: Interest rate liberalisation has a positive effect on savings 
 𝐻2: There is a positive relationship between savings and investments 
 𝐻3: Investments and economic growth are positively related 
 𝐻4: Interest rate liberalisation has a positive effect on capital inflows 
 𝐻5: Capital inflows and economic growth have a positive relationship 
 𝐻6: Interest rate liberalisation has a positive effect on financial development 
 𝐻7: Financial development and economic growth are positively related 
 𝐻8: Interest rate liberalisation increases the likelihood of financial crises 
 𝐻9: Financial development increases the likelihood of financial crises 
 𝐻10: Institutional quality reduces the likelihood of financial crises 
  
1.7 Organisation of the study 
The thesis is organised into eleven chapters, structured as follows: 
Chapter one provides the introduction, background, problem statement, motivation and ob-
jectives of the study. 
 
Chapter two provides an overview of selected SADC countries, including the history of fi-
nancial/interest rate liberalisation. Trends in savings, investment and economic growth for the 
period 1990-2015 will be presented.  
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Chapter three reviews the literature on interest rate liberalisation, including the views of 
both supporters and critics of the policy. Furthermore, theories of financial crises are also 
provided. 
 
Chapter four reviews the literature on growth theories which place emphasis on savings and 
investment. Theories relating financial development and capital flows to economic growth 
are also discussed.  
 
Chapter five surveys the empirical literature on the relationship between interest rate liber-
alisation and economic growth through savings and investments, capital inflows, financial de-
velopment and financial crises. The chapter also provides a survey of the estimation 
techniques in the literature.  
 
Chapter six outlines the methodology of the study. A discussion of the estimation techniques 
as well as model specifications is provided.  
 
Chapter seven examines the relationship between interest rate liberalisation, savings, 
investments and economic growth.  
 
Chapter eight examines the relationship between interest rate liberalisation, capital inflows 
and economic growth. 
 
Chapter nine examines whether interest rate liberalisation results in the development of the 
financial sector, which in turn promotes economic growth. 
 
Chapter ten examines whether interest rate liberalisation has a positive effect on financial 
crises.   
 
Chapter eleven concludes the study. The chapter summarises the main issues and findings of 
the study and also provides recommendations and suggestions for future research.  
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1.8 Conclusion 
This introductory chapter set out the background, discussed the objectives, problem state-
ment, significance, hypotheses and the organisation of the study. The study is motivated by 
concerns about the influence of interest rate liberalisation on economic growth in the period 
before after the 2008-’09 global financial crisis. Authorities in most countries have reduced 
interest rates in an attempt to boost aggregate demand, which is expected to speed up 
recovery from the crisis. However, the lowering of interest rates may result in a decrease in 
savings and investments – the main drivers of long-term economic growth. The influence of 
interest rates on financial crises has received considerable attention since the onset of the 
2008-’09 global financial crisis. Interest rates below equilibrium are regarded as a major 
cause of the crisis, so this study examines the influence of interest rate liberalisation on 
economic growth through channels like savings and investments, capital inflows and 
financial development in SADC countries. The study also investigates whether interest rate 
liberalisation increases the likelihood of financial crises.  
The chapter showed that SSA is lagging behind other developing countries with regard to 
saving and investments, which may hinder the achievement of sustainable long-term growth. 
Lowering real interest rates so as to boost aggregate demand may have the negative effect of 
reducing savings and investments. With regard to specific regions in SSA, the chapter 
showed that SADC countries, on average, have had the lowest economic growth levels in the 
region, which necessitates a survey of growth-enhancing policies like interest rate liberalis-
ation.  
The chapter also points out that interest rate liberalisation may increase the likelihood of fi-
nancial crises (Stiglitz, 1994). So an investigation into the influence of interest rate liberalisa-
tion on financial crises is considered. The study deviates from other studies by examining the 
channels in which interest rate liberalisation affects economic growth, instead of its direct re-
lationship. There is also scant evidence on the influence of interest rate liberalisation on eco-
nomic growth in SADC countries.  
The following chapters comprise analyses that assist in achieving the objectives of the study. 
Chapter two provides an overview of interest rate liberalisation in the selected SADC 
countries, as well as the trend in savings, investments and economic growth, with emphasis 
placed on the period 1990-2015.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION IN SADC COUNTRIES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
SADC was established in 1980 as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Confer-
ence (SADCC) in order to curb the dependence of the other Southern African countries on 
South Africa. South Africa later joined the union in 1995 and to date there are 15 countries in 
SADC2 (Mowatt, 2001). SADC countries have a history of repressed financial systems, low 
economic growth and high poverty levels. Financial liberalisation was implemented in the 
late 1980s to early ’90s in most SADC countries, which resulted in an increase in interest 
rates from negative to positive territory, an increase in savings and investments as well as an 
increase in bank sector performance in most countries.  
However, in some countries, like South Africa and Lesotho, financial reforms did not have 
the desired effect, as savings and investments have not been responsive to the increase in 
interest rates. In some countries, like Lesotho, financial reforms resulted in bank failures 
which had a negative effect on savings and investments (Matlanyane, 2002). The purpose of 
this chapter is to discuss the history of financial liberalisation in SADC countries, with partic-
ular focus on interest rate liberalisation and its effect on savings, investments and economic 
growth. The chapter also discusses briefly the SADC objectives, including the targets set by 
the region with regard to economic growth, investments, public debt and inflation.  
In what follows, a discussion of the SADC objectives and targets is provided. This is fol-
lowed by a discussion of the history of financial liberalisation in the SADC region, and lastly 
a conclusion.  
2.2 SADC TARGETS 
The major priorities of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) include 
trade, economic liberalisation, poverty eradication and infrastructure development in support 
of regional integration (SADC 2011). It is evident from these objectives that SADC countries 
view financial liberalisation as crucial to economic growth and development. SADC has set a 
number of policies or targets to foster regional and economic integration among member 
countries. These targets include having a SADC free trade area, a customs union, a common 
                                                          
2 Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
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market and the establishment of a monetary union (Bank of Botswana 2013). To achieve 
these targets, SADC has proposed greater co-ordination between its member countries with 
regard to macroeconomic variables like inflation rates, current account deficit as a percentage 
of GDP, fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP, and public debt as a percentage of GDP. 
SADC has also set other macroeconomic targets for the period 2008-’18, like achieving eco-
nomic growth rates of 7%, increasing domestic savings as a percentage of GDP to about 35% 
and domestic investment as a percentage of GDP to 30% by 2018 (Bank of Botswana 2013). 
Other targets set by the region include reducing the public-debt-to-GDP ratio to less than 
60% and reducing the inflation rate to less than 3% by 2018. Achieving these targets contin-
ues to be a huge challenge for most of the SADC countries. Financial liberalisation with its 
effect on savings, investment and economic growth could be the catalyst to achieving the 
targets set. 
According to the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan trade 2005-’20, 
industry, finance and investment (TIFI) is a crucial sector for regional and economic integra-
tion. TIFI was devised to facilitate trade, financial liberalisation, poverty reduction, industrial 
development and increased investment (SADC, 2011). 
2.3 HISTORY OF FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION IN SADC COUNTRIES 
This section discusses the history of financial liberalisation in selected individual SADC3 
countries with the aim of making comparisons between the countries and assessing whether 
interest rate liberalisation has had a positive influence on savings, investments and economic 
growth. The period of the analysis is 1990-2015. 
2.3.1 Botswana 
When Botswana attained independence in 1966 it was one of the poorest countries in the 
world (Chakrabarti 2004). However, since independence the country has achieved substantial 
economic growth which has propelled it into being a middle-income country (Harvey, Shi-
phambe & Segosebe, 2000). After independence Botswana had two commercial banks – Bar-
clays Bank and Standard Chartered Bank – which were largely British-owned (Makgetla, 
1982). The two banks were managed and regulated in South Africa and did not provide any 
credit to businesses or small-scale farmers. The government did not establish a central bank 
                                                          
3 Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania 
and Zambia. 
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or issue its own currency at the time of independence (Harvey, 1996). Botswana used the 
South African rand and so had no autonomy with regard to monetary and exchange rate 
policies.  
The National Development Plan published in 1968 raised a few concerns with regard to the 
financial system at that time (Ahmed, 2006). The plan also noted that over 50% of the com-
mercial banks’ assets were invested outside the country, but despite these concerns the gov-
ernment did not intervene. In 1976 the government established a central bank and issued its 
own currency, the pula (Harvey et al, 2000). This was made possible by the good perform-
ance of the economy, buoyed by the growth in the mining industry; the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU) decision to raise customs revenue received from mining imports; 
and the ability of Botswana’s government to balance its budget without assistance from the 
British government (Harvey 1996). Despite the creation of a central bank, the authorities con-
tinued their non-intervention policy in the allocation of commercial lending, choosing only to 
use indirect instruments (Ahmed, 2006). 
In the late 1970s the government introduced exchange controls on dealings with South Africa 
(Ahmed, 2006). Botswana residents were required by law to sell their South African rands 
and hold Botswana currency. The liquid assets of commercial banks were held in pula and 
deposited at the central Bank of Botswana (Harvey, 1996). Non-residents could not borrow 
from Botswana banks an amount greater than the foreign currency they had brought to the 
country. This was done to encourage foreign capital inflows and to increase the availability of 
credit to Botswana residents (Ahmed 2006). This new financial legislation enabled the central 
bank to set all interest rates in the economy, including the deposit and lending rates of com-
mercial banks. The central bank set interest rates below those in South Africa so as to in-
crease bank lending, and also set interest rates on its call account below those of commercial 
banks and those in South Africa, which increased its profits at the expense of commercial 
banks (Harvey 1996). The low interest rates did not have the desired effect and often led to 
capital outflows due to lower returns.  
The Botswana government became the major lender in the economy in the 1980s – this was 
the most significant form of government intervention in the financial sector (Harvey, 1996). 
This government lending was made possible by foreign borrowing and budget surpluses. 
Funds were often lent at lower rates than commercial banks and at longer terms. However, 
this lending was directed mostly to public sector borrowers, with limited amounts lent to the 
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private sector (Ahmed, 2006). Government lending continued to increase in the 1980s and 
reached 57% of total lending in the economy (Harvey, 1996). 
Since 1972 Botswana’s economy has to a large extent been market-oriented, compared with 
other African countries (Ahmed, 2006). However, the authorities further liberalised its finan-
cial sector in the mid- to late 1980s so as to improve the efficiency of the financial system in 
using financial surpluses that existed in the economy (Chakrabarti, 2004). Unlike in other 
African countries these reforms were not initiated due to balance of payments or external debt 
problems. Foreign exchange reserves increased from six months to two years of import cover 
during the 1980s, and the ratio of external debt to exports was only 4% in 1990 with no gov-
ernment debt in the domestic economy (Harvey, 1996). The reason for these excess reserves 
was rapid growth in GDP, which in turn was caused by the performance of the diamond 
mining sector.  
The National Development Plan published in 1985 suggested that the financial sector per-
formed well and also outlined that total credit growth was 11% a year – twice the size of the 
growth in the economy excluding mining (Harvey, 1996). However, in 1986 the central bank 
noted that the growth of credit was not sufficient as excess reserves increased further. So the 
central bank thus reduced commercial bank lending rates from 11.5% to 10% and the ex-
change controls, levied on borrowing by foreign nationals, were abolished (Harvey 1996).  
In 1988 the central bank noted that real interest rates were negative and well below those in 
South Africa (Harvey, 1996). In 1989 the government announced that real interest rates 
would be increased until they reached positive territory (Ahmed, 2006). The increase in 
interest rates was also meant to increase bank competition and financial deepening. In 1991 
the central bank introduced Bank of Botswana certificates which had higher interest rates 
than the commercial banks’ three-month deposits (Mowatt, 2001; Chakrabarti, 2004). These 
certificates were introduced so as to make short-term interest rates market-determined and to 
increase financial deepening. Financial liberalisation by the authorities resulted in an increase 
in the entry of new foreign-owned commercial banks in the 1990s (Ahmed 2006). Bank com-
petition increased substantially, despite a minimal increase in the type of bank finance pro-
vided by the economy. The profits of Barclays Bank and Standard Chartered fell considerably 
during the 1990s (Harvey, 1996). 
Figure 2.1 shows the trend in the real interest rate in Botswana. The real interest rate was 
negative during the mid- to late 1980s but increased. However after the reform initiated by 
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the authorities, real interest rates reached positive territory in the early 1990s. Following the 
1997-’98 Asian financial crisis, there was a downward trend in the real interest rate, possibly 
due to the attempt to boost the economy. A similar trend is observed in the period after the 
2008 global financial crisis.   
Figure 2.1: Botswana real interest rate trend 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
Figure 2.2 shows domestic savings and investments as a percentage of GDP in Botswana. 
The country has had one of the highest savings and investment rates in the SADC region. 
During the period from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s, savings fluctuated around 30% and 
40% of GDP before increasing to just under 50% in 2007, while investments have fluctuated 
around the 30% mark during the same period. Between 2007 and ’09 there was a reduction in 
savings due to the global financial crisis. However investment exhibited an upward trend 
during that period. The period after the financial crisis was characterised by an increase in 
savings as the economy recovered from the crisis, but since 2013 there has been a downward 
trend in both savings and investments.  
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Figure 2.2: Botswana trends in savings and investments 
 
 Source: World Bank (2016) 
The economy performed well from the mid- to late 1980s, with GDP above 10% during that 
period. This coincided with the initiation of financial reforms, suggesting that financial re-
forms had a positive effect on GDP growth. As shown on figure 2.3, economic growth de-
creased in the early 1990s, mostly due the drought that affected some Southern African coun-
tries. GDP decreased from the late 1980s to the early ’90s and reached 1.92% in 1993 before 
increasing to just over 8% in ’97. The period 1997 to 2001 was characterised by low econom-
ic growth, mostly due to the Asian financial crisis, despite a rise to 9.67% in 1999. GDP in-
creased from 0.25% in 2001 to 8.68% in 2007 before declining during the period 2007-’09 
(the global financial crisis). The period 2010-’13 saw an upward trend in GDP growth. How-
ever, there was a sharp decrease from 9.86% in 2013 to -0.25% in 2015. 
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Figure 2.3: Botswana GDP trend 
 
 
 Source: World Bank (2016) 
2.3.2 Lesotho 
Lesotho is a member of the Common Market Area (CMA) of Southern Africa, together with 
South Africa, Namibia and Swaziland (Mowatt, 2001; Central Bank of Lesotho, 2004). This 
arrangement integrates the financial and capital markets of the four countries. The Lesotho fi-
nancial system uses the South African rand and the Lesotho currency, maloti, in a dual cur-
rency system (Matlanyane, 2002). The rand and the maloti have the same value, as the ex-
change rate is one to one between the currencies. Lesotho and South Africa have cross-border 
trade in financial services to a large extent.  
Prior to financial reforms in Lesotho, the banking sector comprised one state-owned commer-
cial bank, two foreign banks, two specialised banks and two development finance institutions 
owned by the government (Matlanyane, 2002). The involvement of the government in the fi-
nancial sector was to ensure that a vast amount of credit was channelled to domestic invest-
ments, especially in the industrial and agricultural sectors (Matlanyane, 2002). However, this 
was not the case, as most of the domestic credit was held by the government in the early 
1990s. 
The limited number of financial institutions, coupled with the significant state involvement, 
resulted in low levels of competition in the financial sector (Matlanyane, 2002). The govern-
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ment banks were exempt from tax while the foreign banks were taxed, and this further re-
duced the level of competition in the financial sector. Interest rates were determined by the 
state and capital controls were set between Lesotho and the countries outside the CMA 
(Odhiambo, 2011). Financial institutions were only allowed to borrow an amount equal to 
15% of their total liabilities, to ensure that most of the financial institutions’ assets were do-
mestic (Matlanyane, 2002). 
The substantial amount of state involvement in the financial sector resulted in poor perform-
ance by the financial sector (Matlanyane, 2002). As a result, the government initiated a num-
ber of financial sector reforms in 1988 (Motelle & Masenyetse, 2012). In 1992 the Central 
Bank of Lesotho introduced an auction market for treasury bills and all interest rates were de-
regulated in 1993, with the exception of the savings deposit rate (Odhiambo, 2011). In 1994 
the Central Bank introduced its own commercial paper, but in 1996 the issuing of this paper 
was abolished (Odhiambo, 2011). The aim of the reforms was to increase the number of mon-
ey market instruments available and to limit the restrictions on cross-border banking so as to 
enhance the level of competition in the financial sector (Matlanyane, 2002).  
However, these reforms did not have the desired effect on the banking sector as its per-
formance worsened (Matlanyane, 2002). The Lesotho Bank experienced a decline in net in-
come by 6% and operating costs increased by 1.4% in 1990. The performance of the Lesotho 
Agricultural Development Bank (LADB) deteriorated significantly in the 1990s due to a rise 
in operating costs and bad debts, which resulted in its closure in 1998 (Mowatt, 2001). The 
LADB was liquidated in 1998 and the Lesotho Bank was partially liquidated and restructured 
in ’99 (Motelle & Masenyetse, 2012). 
The economy was characterised by significant capital outflows due to the loss of confidence 
in the banking sector as investors decided to shift their funds in the more developed financial 
system in South Africa (Central Bank of Lesotho, 2004). The bank failures also resulted in 
the growth of the interest rate spreads between lending and deposit rates and a reduction in 
the credit to the private sector in the 1990s (Odhiambo, 2011). The financial sector in general 
performed poorly after the reforms as the share of financial and insurance services to domes-
tic output declined from 11% in 1991 to 5% in ’96 (Matlanyane, 2002). The reason for the 
poor performance of the financial sector after the reforms was the lack of robustness in the 
sector to deal with external shocks as well as inappropriate regulatory and legal framework at 
the time of the reforms.  
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The real interest rate in Lesotho increased to positive territory in the early 1990s due to the 
financial reform. Between 1990 and 2003 there was a fluctuating but upward trend in the real 
interest rate to a high of 14.69% in ’03. From the early to the mid-’90s there was a slight de-
crease in the real interest rate possible due to the poor performance of the financial sector at 
that time.  
Figure 2.5 shows domestic savings and investments as a percentage of GDP for the period 
1990-2015 in Lesotho. Savings decreased during the early to late ’90s. However investments 
increased and averaged close to 70% of GDP in the early to mid-’90s, which coincided with 
the rise in real interest rates during that period. 
Figure 2.4: Lesotho real interest rate trend 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
However, during the mid- to late ’90s there were substantial reductions in investments which 
could have been caused by the poor performance of the financial sector in general and the se-
ries of bank failures in the ’90s.  
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Figure 2.5: Lesotho trends in savings and investments
 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
Figure 2.6 shows the trend in GDP in Lesotho for the period 1990-2015. GDP fluctuated to a 
great extent during that period. The ’90s were characterised by a fluctuating but downward 
trend. This downward trend in GDP coincided with a drop in savings and investments which 
in turn was caused by the poor performance of the financial sector.  
Figure 2.6: Lesotho GDP trend 
 
 Source: World Bank (2016) 
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The poor performance of the financial sector as well as the growing fiscal and current ac-
count deficits resulted in the implementation of a structural adjustment programme in Le-
sotho with the aid of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
(Central Bank of Lesotho, 2004). This programme included financial reforms in the financial 
sector with more emphasis on the banking sector. The Financial Institutions Acts (FIA) of 
1999 and the Central Bank of Lesotho (CBL) Act of 2000 were introduced in an attempt to 
revamp the regulatory framework and ensuring the operational independence of the central 
bank (Central Bank of Lesotho, 2003). The CBL Act was also introduced to ensure the trans-
parency and accountability of the central bank to the government and the public.  
In addition to the FIA and the CBL Acts, the government established a commercial court and 
a credit bureau (Central Bank of Lesotho, 2004). The commercial court was established to 
provide judgment in financial cases which would encourage banks to lend more funds to the 
private sector as there was a legal system to prosecute defaulters. The credit bureau was 
established to increase the amount of credit to the private sector by providing information on 
the creditworthiness of borrowers (Motelle & Masenyetse, 2012). A post bank was estab-
lished to provide banking services to the rural communities who had seen a decline in bank-
ing opportunities due to the collapse of state-owned banks (Matlanyane 2002).    
Following the structural adjustment programme, the real interest rate decreased between 2000 
and ’02 before increasing in ’03. Between 2003 and ’12 there was a downward trend in the 
real interest rate despite slight increases in 2009 and ’12. Savings picked up after 1998 and 
reached a high of 51.05% in 2008, possibly due to the structural adjustment programme 
which included reforms to the banking sector, while investments remained stagnant around 
the 30% mark during the early to late 2000s. The 2008-’09 global financial crises resulted in 
the drop in savings. However the variable has averaged over 20% of GDP during the period 
2010 to ’15. Investments have exhibited an upward trend since 2005 and averaged over 30% 
of GDP during the period 2010-’15.  
Economic growth recovered from a low 0.4% in 1999 and fluctuated to just below 6% in 
2008, which was followed by a decrease as a result of the global financial crisis. The sharp 
increase in 2009 was short-lived, as economic growth has exhibited a downward trend since 
2011.  
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2.3.3 Madagascar  
During the 1970s the government in Madagascar controlled most of the large financial, trans-
port, marketing, mining and manufacturing firms (Brownbridge & Gayi, 1997). The state also 
controlled prices and restricted the repatriation of profits by foreign firms. Due to the sub-
stantial state intervention in the economy, economic growth was below the population growth 
in the 1970s (World Bank 2000). In the 1980s the balance of payments was in deficit territory 
and, this coupled with low economic growth, encouraged the government to request adjust-
ment loans from the IMF and World Bank (World Bank, 2000). The request was granted pro-
vided the government reduced the current account and budget deficits, reduced the growth of 
credit to the public sector, limited public sector salaries and devalued the currency. These 
policies were successful in increasing economic growth, but inflation increased in 1980s. 
In 1990 the government embarked on a structural adjustment programme with the aid of the 
World Bank (World Bank, 2000; IMF, 2005). The programme was referred to as the Finan-
cial Sector and Private Enterprise Development (APEX) project. The project was conducted 
to assist the government in its efforts to restructure the economy and improve the operation of 
the financial sector by liberalising interest rates, introducing a number of monetary policy 
instruments to increase competition in the financial sector and assisting small businesses in 
order to increase employment (World Bank, 2000).  
However, the newly elected leadership in 1992 decided not to implement the reforms fully 
and this had a negative outcome on the economy as macroeconomic imbalances and high in-
flation were the norm in the early 1990s (World Bank, 2000). In 1996 the government re-
quested assistance from the World Bank, which decided to restructure the APEX project to 
assist Madagascar in its privatisation plans to strengthen the private sector. The programme 
was again restructured in 1998 with an emphasis on bank privatisation, liberalisation of the 
financial system, the introduction of indirect instruments of monetary policy and 
improvements in bank legislation and supervision (World Bank, 2000; IMF, 2005). 
The project was successful, as the efficiency of the financial sector improved substantially 
and output increased (Brownbridge & Gayi, 1997). State-owned banks were privatised, and a 
number of new institutions were established in the late 1990s, including banks (IMF 2005). 
More jobs were created, and this had a significant effect in reducing the unemployment rate. 
Bank privatisation was successful in Madagascar, compared with many other African coun-
tries, as the level of competition in the banking sector increased (World Bank, 2000). The 
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competition in the banking sector was evident from the rise in bank lending to the private 
sector by the late ’90s (Brownbridge & Gayi, 1997). Interest rates and the exchange system 
were fully liberalised by the late 1990s, inflation was at low levels and indirect instruments of 
monetary policy were used (World Bank, 2000).  
Figure 2.7: Madagascar real interest rate trend 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
Figure 2.7 shows the trend in the real interest rate for the period 1990-2015, suggesting that 
Madagascar has had positive real interest rates for most of those years. However, during the 
period before 1996 when financial reforms were not fully implemented, the real interest rate 
was negative in 1994 and ’95. The reason for the negative real interest rate could have been 
the high inflation rate recorded before the implementation of the reforms. From 1996 on-
wards, the real interest rate increased and remained positive. The period 2005-’12 was cha-
racterised by a substantial increase in the real interest rate from 7.35% to a high of 51.23%.  
Domestic savings and investments as a percentage of GDP have followed a similar trend to 
the real interest rate, suggesting that there is a link between the three variables. Savings and 
investments increased in the mid- to late ’80s as shown by Figure 2.8, before declining in the 
early to mid-’90s. From the mid-’90s, both savings and investments increased and this coinci-
ded with the implementation of reforms in 1996. Between 2002 and ’08 both variables 
exhibited an upward trend. However, the increase was more profound in investments. The 
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global financial crises resulted in a drastic decrease in both variables, which have failed to 
recover in the post-crisis period. 
Figure 2.8: Madagascar trends in savings and investments 
 
 Source: World Bank (2016) 
GDP was low during the mid to late 1980s due to government intervention in the economy, 
which resulted in current account and budget deficits. However the late ’80s were character-
ised by a modest rise in economic growth. In 1990 and ’91, GDP growth dropped markedly 
from 3.13% to -6.31%. GDP exhibited an upward trend between 1992 and 2001 from 1.19% 
in ’92 to 6.02% in ’01. However, in 2002 there was a drastic reduction in GDP to -12.67%, 
which was followed by a sharp increase to 9.78% in ’03. GDP exhibited a downward trend 
between 2003 and ’09, despite a slight increase between 2005 and ’08. The global financial 
crises affected economic growth negatively to a large extent and the recovery has been 
modest.  
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Figure 2.9: Madagascar GDP trend 
 
 
 Source: World Bank (2016) 
2.3.4 Malawi 
Malawi attained independence in 1961, but the period after independence did not bring any 
financial prosperity in the economy despite government efforts (Kabango & Paloni, 2010). In 
1981 a number of reforms were initiated with the aid of structural adjustment and sectoral ad-
justment loans from the World Bank (Mlachila & Chirwa, 2002). The reforms included in-
dustrial licensing, deregulation, the abolition of monopoly rights and industrial price controls, 
and the privatisation of public enterprises (Kabango & Paloni, 2010). These reforms were 
conducted to increase the level of competition in the manufacturing sector. However, these 
policies did not have the desired effect and in the late 1980s the World Bank suggested that 
financial sector underdevelopment was responsible for retarding economic growth and de-
velopment in the manufacturing sector (World Bank, 1996a).  
In the late 1980s a number of financial sector reforms were initiated, like the liberalisation of 
lending and deposit rates, the removal of credit controls and the abolition of laws that pre-
vented the entry of new banks into the financial system (Bittencourt, Mwabutwa & Viegi, 
2012). Prior to the interest rate liberalisation, interest rates were controlled by the Reserve 
Bank of Malawi, which kept interest rates low in an attempt to support private investments 
and reduce government expenditure. The monopoly powers of the central bank were altered 
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by the Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM) Act and the Banking Act to ensure that it played 
more of a supervisory and regulatory role in the financial sector (Mlachila & Chirwa, 2002). 
The aim of the reforms was to encourage the entry of new banks into the financial system so 
as to increase the level of banking competition and to create an environment conducive for 
savings. Credit controls were abolished to increase the availability of credit, which in turn 
would encourage the growth and development of small businesses (Bittencourt et al, 2012). 
The central bank also introduced central bank and treasury bills as indirect instruments to 
utilise the excess liquidity in the economy (Mlachila & Chirwa 2002). Reserve requirements 
were introduced in 1989 as the main monetary policy instrument but in the mid- to late 1990s 
open market operations became the main monetary policy tool. In 1998 exchange controls 
were abolished and the country allowed a floating exchange rate regime with no intervention 
from the RBM (Mlachila & Chirwa 2002).  
Financial sector reforms had a positive impact on bank competition and financial develop-
ment in Malawi. Reinhart & Tokatlidis (2003) suggest that Malawi is one of the few coun-
tries that have made great progress in financial development since the implementation of fi-
nancial reforms, and financial crises have not resulted. Prior to the financial sector reforms, 
Malawi had only two commercial banks; as a result of the reforms three commercial banks 
and three non-banking institutions entered the financial system in the 1990s and by 2008 
there were nine banks in total (Kabango & Paloni, 2010). The development of the financial 
sector resulted in the establishment of the Malawi stock exchange in 1995.  
Interest rate liberalisation resulted in an increase in nominal interest rates, but due to high and 
fluctuating inflation the real interest rate remained low initially and was recorded at -16.86% 
in 1995, as shown in Figure 2.10. The real interest rate increased between 1995 and 2000 but 
was very volatile in the early 2000s. In ’01 the rate reached 24.31% before falling to -29.22% 
in ’02 and increasing in ’03 to 34.95%. Between 2003 and ’12 there was a downward trend in 
the real interest rate to 8.48% in ’11, which was followed by a gradual increase from ’12.  
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Figure 2.10: Malawi real interest rate trend 
 
 
 Source: World Bank (2016) 
Figure 2.11 shows Malawi’s trends in domestic savings and investments as a percentage of 
GDP for the period 1990-2015. Savings and investments followed a trend similar to that of 
the real interest rate. There was a decreasing trend in both variables from the early 1990s de-
spite a rise between 1994 and ’95. This increase was short-lived as a decrease followed be-
tween 1996 and ’97. Both variables remained stagnant from the late 1990s into the early 
2000s before increasing gradually until ’10. In 2008, however, there was a reduction in sav-
ings due to the financial crisis, which was followed by a recovery in 2009 before a sharp 
decline in ’11. Both savings and investments decreased in 2011 and remained till ’15 with the 
savings ratio averaging less than 5%.   
Figure 2.12 shows the trend in GDP between 1990 and 2015 in Malawi. The period 1991-’95 
was marred by considerable fluctuations in GDP, with 1992 and ’94 recording negative 
figures and 1993 and ’95 recording values of 9.69% and 16.73% respectively. Between 1995 
and 2001 GDP exhibited a downward trend from the high value of ’95 to -4.97% in 2001 
before increasing from the negative value in 2001 to just over 9% in ’07. The global financial 
crises resulted in a decrease in economic growth to 1.89% in 2012. Despite the recovery in 
GDP between 2012 and ’14 there was a decrease in 2015.  
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Table 2.11: Malawi trends in savings and investments 
 
 
 Source: World Bank (2016) 
Figure 2.12: Malawi GDP trend 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
2.3.5 Mauritius 
Mauritius gained its independence in 1968 and in the ’70s the economy was heavily depend-
ent on agriculture (African Development Bank, 2014). However, since the 1970s the eco-
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nomy has been transformed into a middle-income economy with diversified economic sectors 
like tourism, industrial and financial services. In the 1970s the government controlled the act-
ivities of the financial sector (Jankee, 1999). Interest rates charged by banks were controlled, 
cash ratios and liquid asset ratios were imposed on the financial sector and there were ex-
change controls on capital and current transactions. Controls on the financial system were 
conducted to regulate the growth of credit in the economy and to direct credit to the most im-
portant sectors of the economy (Bundoo & Dabee, 1999).  
Financial sector reforms were initiated in the early 1980s in preparation for global integration 
(Larose, 2003). The reforms were initiated with the aid of the Stabilisation Adjustment Pro-
gramme (SAP) monitored by the IMF. The programme was conducted to reduce inflation, the 
demand for consumption, budget deficit and public spending. The SAP agreement encour-
aged the Mauritian government to increase investments in productive sectors of the economy 
like agriculture, so as to increase economic growth and foreign exchange reserves (Larose, 
2003).  
The financial sector reforms initiated included the removal of controls on interest rates, credit 
and competition, as well as the privatisation of public financial institutions and the introduc-
tion of market-based securities (Jankee, 2003). The reforms were carried out to improve the 
efficiency of the economy and to increase the allocation of financial services to all sectors of 
the economy (Larose, 2003). Other reforms included the reduction of the cash ratio and liquid 
asset ratios, the abolition of exchange controls and the auctioning of Treasury bills. The Mau-
ritius stock exchange was established in 1989 to ensure that the financial system was mod-
ernised (Larose, 2003).  
At the time of independence in 1968, the financial sector in Mauritius was fairly developed, 
with 11 banks, but after the reforms more financial institutions entered the sector and by 2007 
there were 19 commercial banks and 14 non-bank deposit-taking institutions (Jankee, 1999; 
IMF, 2008). The financial reform of the late 1980s resulted in an increase in the real interest 
rate (World Bank, 2016). As shown on figure 2.13, there was an upward trend in the real 
interest rate from the early 1990s to a high of 18.3% in 2000. There was a downward trend in 
the real interest rate from 2001 to ’11 before a slight increase from 2012.  
Figure 2.14 shows the trends in domestic savings and investments as a percentage of GDP in 
Mauritius for the period 1990-2015. Both variables exhibited a downward trend during the 
’90s. Savings increased from the late 1990s to a high of just under 30% before exhibiting a 
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downward trend that has resulted in a savings-to-GDP ratio below 20% between 2005 and 
’15. Investments decreased from 32.17% in 1994 to 20.73% in 2001. The variable has fluctu-
ated around 25% since 2002.  
Figure 2.13: Mauritius real interest rate trend 
 
Source: World Bank (2016)  
Figure 2.14: Mauritius trends in savings and investments 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
Mauritius has been one of the best-performing countries in the SADC, as shown by the trend 
in GDP between 1990 and 2015 in Figure 2.15. Despite a decline in the early 1990s, GDP 
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averaged above 4%. Between 2000 and ’02 GDP declined from a high of 9.03% in 2000 to 
2.11% in ’02 before exhibiting an upward trend from 2003 to ’07. A decline in GDP was re-
corded between 2008 and ’12 due to the global financial crisis, despite a slight increase in 
2010. Economic growth has averaged below 4% since 2011.  
Figure 2.15: Mauritius GDP trend 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
2.3.6 Namibia 
Namibia gained its independence from South Africa in 1989 and the major sectors in the eco-
nomy are mining and agriculture (Mowatt, 2001). The financial sector in Namibia was liber-
alised to a large extent by the time of independence, so no major reforms were required. The 
economy has performed well since the 1990s due to high export earnings, high economic 
growth and prudent fiscal policies (Mowatt, 2001). As a member of the CMA, Namibia has 
free movement of capital between the CMA countries, which has ensured its close links with 
South Africa and benefited financial institutions (IMF, 2007). The Namibian dollar is pegged 
to the South African rand, which has had a positive outcome for the country, maintaining a 
low and stable inflation rate.  
The financial system over the years has been one of the best-performing such systems in Af-
rica, with a large number of private institutions and strong links with the South African finan-
cial markets (AFDB, OECD & UNDP, 2014). The Namibia Stock Exchange (NSX) was 
established in the early 1990s with most of the listed companies being dual-listed South Afri-
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can companies (Mowatt, 2001). By the late 1990s the market capitalisation of the NSX was 
one of the highest in Africa. The banking sector is developed to a large extent and by the ear-
ly 2000s there were already five commercial banks. 
Figure 2.16: Namibia real interest rate trend 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
Figure 2.16 shows the trend in the real interest rate in Namibia for the period 1990-2015. Du-
ring this period real interest rates have fluctuated to a great extent. In the early 1990s the real 
interest rate decreased substantially from a high of 16.38% in ’91 to -3.02% in ’94. During 
the rest of the ’90s the rate exhibited an upward trend and reached 12.37% in ’97. However, 
in 2000 the rate dropped significantly before rising to 13.56% in ’03. Between 2003 and ’12 
the real interest rate decreased from a high of 13.56% in ’03 to -3.75% in ’12 before recover-
ing from 2012 onwards.   
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Figure 2.17: Namibia trends in savings and investments 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
Figure 2.17 shows the trend in domestic savings and investments as a percentage of GDP for 
the period 1990-2015. Both variables increased from the early 1990s before decreasing from 
1999 to the early 2000s. During the early 2000s to ’05, both variables were stable with sav-
ings around 25% of GDP and investment around 20% of GDP. The period 2005-’07 exhibit-
ed a sharp increase in both saving and investments. However since 2008 both variables have 
been on a downward trend with the reduction more profound in savings, which fell from a 
high of 31.96% in 2008 to 19.65% in ’15. This reduction can to a large extent be attributed to 
the financial crisis. Investments on the other hand, have recovered since 2011. 
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Figure 2.18: Namibia GDP trend 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
Figure 2.18 shows the trend in GDP in Namibia for the period 1990-2015. Between 1991 and 
’93 GDP decreased substantially and reached a low of -2% in ’93 before rebounding to 
7.32% in ’94. The period 1994 to the 2000s saw economic growth averaging around 4% be-
fore a reduction to 1.18% in 2001. The variable recovered between 2001 and ’04 and reached 
a high of 12.27%. However, the period 2004 -’09 exhibited a downward trend in GDP from 
the high value of 2004 to -0.3% in 2009. GDP picked up in 2010 as the economy recovered 
from the financial crisis and has averaged more than 4%. 
2.3.7 Seychelles 
Seychelles attained independence in 1976 under President James Mancham but in 1977 he 
was removed by a coup and France-Albert René was elected president (World Bank, 2013). 
The new leadership had two main goals: to redistribute wealth in land and capital and to cre-
ate jobs. The government thus acquired a significant amount of land during his presidency, 
which was seen as a crucial resource for supporting economic growth in the economy (World 
Bank 2013).  
In an attempt to create jobs, the government established a number of public enterprises in a 
variety of industries including transport, hotel and hospitality, retail, manufacturing, banking, 
education and agriculture (IMF, 2004). State intervention became the norm in the economy as 
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the government controlled most sectors of the economy and was the major employer and reg-
ulator. The government also established a number of government-owned monopolies which 
produced a variety of goods and services (IMF, 2004).  
Tourism was key part of the economy before and after independence (World Bank, 2013). 
The state controlled most of the large hotels and service industries, with the private sector 
playing a minimal role in the economy. The government was heavily involved in the opera-
tion of the financial system by borrowing substantial amounts from banks and controlling the 
foreign exchange in the country (IMF, 2004). The financial system was also characterised by 
low levels of private sector credit, low demand for credit, surplus liquidity in the banking sys-
tem and large spreads between deposit and lending rates (IMF, 2004). Despite privatisation in 
some sectors of the economy, like tourism, manufacturing, schools and clinics, the govern-
ment still controlled most of the industries in the economy (Larose 2003).  
The economy performed well during the mid-1980s and into the ’90s with GDP averaging 
6% in the late 1980s (IMF, 2004). However, government borrowing and spending grew at ex-
tremely high levels and this resulted in a large public debt in the mid- to late ’90s. The Sey-
chelles rupee was pegged to a number of currencies in the ’90s, which had a positive effect 
on state borrowing and a negative effect on the amount of foreign exchange. From 1999 GDP 
and standards of living decreased (World Bank, 2013).   
During the period 1999-2001, a significant amount of the domestic credit from the banking 
sector belonged to the government (World Bank, 2013; IMF, 2004). Money supply was in-
creased in an attempt to reduce interest rates, but the inflation rate increased. Public external 
debt was recorded at US$320 million in 2001, which was 50% of GDP (World Bank 2013). 
So the government imposed tighter restrictions on foreign exchange to reduce the accumula-
tion of arrears on debt, but this did not have the desired effect, as arrears on debt continued to 
increase.  
The government realised that foreign exchange restrictions had a negative effect on the eco-
nomy and decided to introduce a structural adjustment programme with the support of the 
IMF, the World Bank and the African Development Bank (World Bank, 2013). The pro-
gramme included measures to shift the exchange rate regime to a crawling peg which would 
mimic the market rate, reducing the private sector and tightening fiscal policy. However, the 
government did not carry out the financial reforms and instead reintroduced exchange con-
trols (World Bank, 2013). Economic growth became negative in 2001 and this downturn wor-
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sened in 2003 and ’04 as exchange controls discouraged tourism. However, from 2005 the 
performance of the tourism industry improved.  
In 2007 the Finance Minister established a team with the aid of the IMF to initiate economic 
reforms designed to address the economic problems in the country (World Bank, 2013). Cur-
rency controls and state control of the major activities in the economy had not been success-
ful. The major reforms included abolishing currency and price controls, allowing the market 
to influence the economy and repaying public debt (World Bank, 2013). The exchange rate 
fluctuated after the reforms but stabilised in 2010.  
Figure 2.19 shows the real interest rate in Seychelles for the period 1990-2015. The rate fluc-
tuated slightly between 1990 and ’92 before increasing between 1992 and ’96 from 10.4% in 
1992 to 18.02% in ’96. The rate then declined from 1996 to a low of -11.78% in 2004, due 
mostly to the expansionary monetary policy conducted by the authorities, before rising to 
9.27% in ’05. Between 2005 and ’08 the real interest rate decreased to -17.16% in 2008 
before rising to 17.65% in ’10, due possibly to the reforms of 2007. Despite the reduction be-
tween 2011 and ‘12, the real interest rate has remained in positive territory since the financial 
reforms.  
Table 2.19: Seychelles real interest rate trend 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
Figure 2.20 shows the trends in domestic savings and investments as a percentage of GDP for 
the period 1990-2015. Both variables showed a similar trend to the real interest rate. There 
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was a slight increase in both variables from 1992 till the mid-’90s before a downward trend 
resumed into the early 2000s. The downward trend was substantial in savings, which fell 
from 35.459% in 1994 to -3.14% in 2001, while investments decreased from 39.85% in 1996 
to 10.90% in 2003. Both variables have since exhibited an upward trend since the early 2000s 
despite a slight decline between 2007 and ’08 due to the global financial crisis. This decrease 
during the financial crisis also coincided with the real interest rate drop into negative territo-
ry. So both variables have recovered since the global financial crises, with investments aver-
aging over 35% of GDP. 
Figure 2.20: Seychelles trends in savings and investments 
 
Source: World Bank, IMF (2016) 
Figure 2.21 outlines the GDP trend in the Seychelles for the period 1990-2015. GDP exhibit-
ed a downward trend from 1990 to ’94 before rising to a high of 11.96% in ’97. However, 
from 1997 GDP declined and reached -5.89% in 2003. Between 2004 and ’07 GDP increased 
and reached 10.42% in ’07 before declining in ’08 due to the global financial crisis. Between 
2009 and ’11, GDP rose to 7.89% before declining from 2012 onwards.   
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Figure 2.21: Seychelles GDP trend 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
2.3.8 South Africa 
Financial liberalisation in South Africa began as a result of the recommendations made by the 
De Kock Commission in 1980 (Aziakpono, Wilson & Manuel, 2007). Prior to 1980, South 
Africa had a repressed financial system under which credit, interest rates and foreign ex-
change were controlled by the state. During the 1960s and ’70s there were limits on the loans 
banks could make and credit controls were imposed on monetary and non-monetary banks so 
as to limit competition between these two types of banks (Odhiambo, 2011). Interest rates 
were also controlled during the 1960s and ’70s. There were limits on the maximum interest 
rates that banks could pay on deposits. This was implemented to protect building societies, 
which were in direct competition with banks (Odhiambo, 2011). After 1972 controls were 
enacted on direct deposits as well as lending rates.  
The De Kock Commission was appointed in the late 1970s to examine the South African 
monetary system and monetary policy, and to make recommendations with regard to interest 
rates, credit ceilings, cash reserves, liquidity asset requirements, exchange rates, government 
regulation and capital flows (Aziakpono & Wilson, 2010). The commission recommended 
the removal of credit and interest rate ceilings and also suggested that bank regulation should 
be guided by market forces, not the state (Schoombee, 2003). Interest rate liberalisation was 
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viewed as a crucial policy as it was linked to the exchange rate (Odhiambo, 2011). Higher 
interest rates resulting from interest rate liberalisation would cause a rise in the value of the 
exchange rate by making the currency more attractive to hold.  
In 1980 financial repression polices were abandoned and this, coupled with the removal of 
control on capital flows, resulted in an increase in the number of foreign banks, which came 
to 51 in 1997 (Chipote, Mgxekwa & Godza, 2014). Controls on capital were removed in 1980 
and reintroduced in the mid-1980s as capital flight was on the rise, but were later again abol-
ished. The removal of capital not only resulted in an increase in foreign banks in South Africa 
but also encouraged South African banks to open branches in other countries and increase the 
number of participants in the financial system (Odhiambo, 2011). The increase in the number 
of banks resulted in an increase in competition in the banking sector, which had a positive in-
fluence on financial development in South Africa (Chipote et al, 2014). 
Liberalisation of interest rates was carried out to encourage bank competition and to increase 
banks’ flexibility (Aziakpono et al, 2007). During the years of financial repression, deposit 
and lending rates were set at 2% and 2.5% respectively (Odhiambo, 2011). Real interest rates 
remained negative after interest rate liberalisation and turned positive only in the late 1980s. 
Figure 2.22 shows the trend in the real interest rate in South Africa for the period 1990-2015. 
The real interest rate declined from 1990 to ’93 before rising to a high of 12.99% in 1998.  
Figure 2.22: South Africa real interest rate trend 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
P
er
ce
n
t
Years
43 
 
Figure 2.23 shows the trends in domestic savings and investments as a percentage of GDP 
from 1990 to 2015. Both savings and investments remained stagnant from the early 1990s, 
with ratios below 20% despite the increase in the real interest rate from the early ’90s to the 
late ’90s. 
Figure 2.23: South Africa trends in savings and investments 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
Figure 2.24 outlines the trend in GDP in South Africa for the period 1990-2015. GDP de-
clined between 1990 and ’92, due mostly to the drought. Between 1992 and ’96 GDP rose 
from -2.14% in 1992 to 4.3% in 1996 before declining from 1997 to ’98 because of the Asian 
financial crisis.  
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Figure 2.24: South Africa GDP trend 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
In 1998 the SARB introduced the repo system as a new accommodation system to ensure 
more flexibility in the conduct of monetary policy (Small & De Jager, 2001:3). This system 
involves transactions between the SARB and the commercial banks on a regular basis. The 
repo rates could change daily depending on the repo tenders and as a result the repo rate 
played a major role in the determination of interest rates charged by the commercial banks to 
businesses and households (Aziakpono et al, 2007).  
In 2000 the SARB introduced inflation targeting as the dominant monetary policy tool to 
keep inflation at low and stable levels and set an inflation target of between 3% and 6%. This 
has helped in stabilising the inflation rate (Kaseeram, 2010:98). In September 2001 the 
SARB made an adjustment to the repo system to ensure that the repo rate had a more direct 
effect on the overnight interbank rate (Brink & Kock, 2009:5). This change was made to im-
prove the effectiveness of monetary policy, and with this system changes in the repo rate 
affect the overnight interbank rate, which in turn affects the money market and other interest 
rates in the economy (Absa, 2001).  
The real interest rate showed a decreasing trend from the late 1990s until 2015 despite slight 
increases in 2003 and ’08. The drop in the real interest rate can be attributed to the 
introduction of the repo system. Investments increased in the early 2000s and reached a high 
of 23.15% in ’08. However, because of the global financial crisis, the variable declined and 
remained stagnant around the 20% mark. Savings have remained stagnant at about 15% of 
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GDP since the 1990s. Between 1998 and 2007 there was an upward trend in GDP from 
0.52% in ’98 to 5.55% in ’07, despite declines in 2001 and ’03. The global financial crisis 
resulted in a substantial decline in GDP between 2008 and ’09, which was followed by a 
recovery between 2010 and ’11. Economic growth has been characterised by a declining 
trend since 2012.  
2.3.9 Swaziland 
Swaziland achieved high economic growth in the mid-1980s as a result of capital inflows 
(Dlamini, 2003). A significant amount of the capital inflows were a result of sanctions im-
posed on South Africa, and membership in the South African Customs Union (SACU) en-
couraged inflows from South Africa. Domestic investment levels were high, which had a 
positive effect on employment. Good fiscal management and high export growth were crucial 
in ensuring that the government budget and balance of payments were in surplus (World 
Bank, 1996).  
The financial system was small but diversified and liberalised to a certain extent by the 1990s 
and was regulated and supervised by the Central Bank of Swaziland (Elhiraika 2001). Interest 
rates were kept below those in South Africa so as to increase investment levels. The banking 
sector was relatively developed by the mid-1980s, with four privately owned commercial 
banks: Barclays Bank, Standard Chartered, Stanbic and First National Bank (FNB) (World 
Bank, 1996). The banking sector also included the Swaziland Development and Savings 
Bank, which was government-owned, as well as the Central Bank (World Bank, 1996).    
However, in the 1990s the economy’s performance was poor, with the economic growth rate 
averaging less than 2% (World Bank, 1996; IMF, 2008). This was caused by two droughts 
and the lifting of sanctions on South Africa in the early 1990s, which resulted in a significant 
drop in agricultural production and a drop in private investments as a percentage of GDP 
(Dlamini, 2003). This downturn in the economy resulted in an increase in unemployment and 
deficits in the government budget and the balance of payment. 
Due to the deteriorating performance of the economy, the Swaziland government introduced 
a stabilisation programme with the aid of the World Bank and the IMF (World Bank, 1996). 
In 1995-’96, representatives from the government and the World Bank prepared a report on 
Swaziland’s financial sector which outlined the role the financial sector could play in increas-
ing economic growth. The report suggested that the Swaziland authorities should create an 
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environment conducive for the development of the financial sector (Elhiraika, 2001). Lending 
and deposit rates were negative for most of the 1980s and ’90s, which had a negative effect 
on savings, investments, capital inflows and economic growth (Elhiraika, 2001).  
The report advised the government to supervise all the institutions in the financial sector 
(World Bank, 1996). During the 1980s and early ’90s, only deposit-taking institutions like 
banks, the Swaziland Development and Savings Bank, and Swaziland building societies were 
being supervised. The report recommended that supervision should be extended to other de-
posit-taking institutions, insurance companies and financial markets (World Bank, 1996). So 
the Swaziland authorities implemented a legal and regulatory framework which was up to 
standard with international practices. The other major reforms included the creation of a mar-
ket on which debt securities were used as investment and liquid management tools, and liber-
alising interest rates (World Bank, 1996). Interest rate liberalisation was required to foster 
positive deposit and lending rates, which would in turn increase savings and investments. 
Figure 2.25 shows the real interest rate in Swaziland for the period 1990-2015. The rate rose 
into positive territory in the early 1990s despite a drop to -2.59 in ’93. Between 1993 and ’99 
there was an upward trend in the real interest rate from -2.59% in ’93 to 11.43% in ’99, possi-
bly aided by the stabilisation programme introduced in 1995-’96. The real interest rate fluctu-
ated from the early 2000s to a high of 15.14% in ’10. In 2011 the rate dropped substantially 
to -20.84% before recovering modestly to 2.48% in ’15.  
Figure 2.25: Swaziland real interest rate trend 
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Source: World Bank (2016) 
Figure 2.26 shows Swaziland’s trends in domestic savings and investments as a percentage of 
GDP for the period 1990-2015. Investments exhibited an upward trend during the 1990s and 
early 2000s, from 14.55% in ’90 to 22.97% in ’01. However, after 2001 investments de-
creased, reaching 4.56% in ’11. Savings fluctuated around the 15% mark during the ’90s. The 
period between 2001 and ’03 was, however, characterised by a rise in savings. From 2003 to 
’11 savings reduced drastically, from 32.29% in ’03 to -2.26% in ’11, with major reductions 
recorded during 2008 and ’09 due to the global financial crisis. Savings have recovered mod-
estly since 2012. 
Figure 2.26: Swaziland trends in savings and investments 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
Figure 2.27 shows Swaziland’s GDP trend for the period 1991-2015. GDP exhibited an up-
ward trend from the early to mid-1990s before declining from ’95 to 2001. The period 2002-
’07 was characterised by an upward trend in GDP before a decline between 2007 and ’11 due 
to the global financial crisis. Despite a recovery in 2012, economic growth has been on a 
downward trend since ’13.  
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Figure 2.27: Swaziland GDP trend 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
2.3.10 Tanzania 
Financial reforms were initiated in Tanzania from 1986 into the early ’90s, following a period 
of declining economic growth that began in the ’70s (Muganda, 2004). This decline in eco-
nomic growth resulted in a rise in external debt arrears, fiscal deficits and inflation, as well as 
a reduction in real wages which in turn caused a financial crisis in the early 1980s. During the 
late ’70s the government intervened, setting prices in the economy, and a number of state-
owned institutions were established (Mowatt, 2001). The government also directed credit to 
state-owned institutions at low rates while real interest rates were negative, which had a nega-
tive effect on savings and investments (African Development Fund, 2000).  
So the financial sector was liberalised between 1986 and ’92, including the removal of con-
trols on prices, liberalisation of trade, a removal of restrictions on the participation of the pri-
vate sector in domestic trade, and the liberalisation of the exchange rate (Muganda, 2004; 
Yona & Inanga, 2014). These reforms formed part of the Financial Sector Adjustment Pro-
gramme (FSAP), initiated with the aid of the IMF and other donors in 1991, which sought to 
reduce state intervention in the financial system and to allow market forces to play a more 
significant role in determining transactions in the financial system (African Development 
Bank, 2000). 
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Financial liberalisation had a positive influence on the economy as reflected in GDP growth. 
Figure 2.30 shows Tanzania’s GDP trend for the period 1990-2015. GDP rose from the mid-
1980s to ’90 from 1.5% in ’85 to 7.05% in ’90. Financial reforms also had a positive influ-
ence on the financial sector (Yona & Inanga, 2014; Randhawa & Gallardo, 2003). The finan-
cial sector comprised four state-owned banks before the reforms, but afterwards the number 
of private institutions increased significantly and by 2013 there were 53 banks (Yona & Ina-
nga, 2014).  
In 1992 interest rates were liberalised with the exception of the maximum lending rate, which 
was abolished in 1993 (Odhiambo, 2010a). A bureau de change market was established in 
1993 to ensure that exchange rate determination was based on market forces, and Treasury 
bill auctions were set up so as to allow market forces to determine the operation of the finan-
cial system. Policies which prevented financial institutions from being established were also 
abolished in 1993 (Odhiambo, 2010a). 
The period between 1991 and ’94 was marred by deterioration in the performance of the Tan-
zanian economy as GDP decreased substantially and averaged below 2% during that period 
as shown in Figure 2.30. This was mainly due to poor management of the economy by the 
newly elected leadership (Gabagambi, 2013). The growth of credit to the public sector was 
not managed properly and there was a rise in tax evasion, combined with low revenue collec-
tions. The inflation rate increased in 1994 and donors like the World Bank were discouraged 
from lending to Tanzania due to these economic problems (Gabagambi, 2013).  
As a result of these economic problems the Helleiner process was established in 1994 with 
the aid of the Danish government (Muganda, 2004). The Helleiner process prioritised areas 
such as mending the relations between Tanzania and its donors, ensuring the credibility of the 
government and attempts to ensure that the government did not deviate from the reform pro-
gramme. In 1995 new leadership was elected and its main aim was to ensure that there was 
macroeconomic stability in the economy (Muganda, 2004). Since then reforms have been 
well managed and macroeconomic stability has been maintained. Inflation decreased from the 
mid-1990s to the early 2000s and the GDP growth rate increased from 3.57% in 1995 to 
7.83% in 2004. Poverty levels and the government deficit reduced significantly, and because 
of the macroeconomic stability and the strengthening of property rights, FDI inflows in-
creased (Muganda, 2004).  
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Figure 2.28: Tanzanian real interest rate trend 
 
 
 Source: World Bank (2016) 
Figure 2.28 shows the trend in the real interest rate in Tanzania for the period 1993-2015. De-
spite the liberalisation of interest rates in the early 1990s, real interest rates decreased sub-
stantially from 12.59% 1995 to -3.49% in ’98. The reason for the decline in the real interest 
rate could be the high inflation rate recorded in Tanzania during that period. Between 1998 
and 2001 there was a substantial increase in the real interest rate, due possibly to the drop in 
inflation in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The real interest rate exhibited a declining trend in 
the early 2000s and reached a low of -8.87% in ’05. The rate recovered to 9.57% in 2007 
before declining in ’08. The rate increased between 2008 and ’15.  
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Figure 2.29: Tanzanian trends in savings and investments 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
Figure 2.29 shows the trends in domestic savings and investments as a percentage of Tanza-
nia’s GDP for the period 1990-2015. Both variables decreased substantially from the mid-
’90s to the early 2000s. Despite a slight decrease from 2004 to ’07, savings picked up from 
2008 to 23.52% in ’12. Both savings and investments increased from the early 2000s despite 
the downward real interest rate trend. Savings and investment ratios have averaged 20% and 
30% respectively since the mid-2000s. As shown in Figure 2.30, economic growth increased 
substantially between 1992 and 2002.  
In 2003 an FSAP was initiated so as to assess and improve the performance of the financial 
sector (IMF, 2010). Despite the FSAP’s positive effect on credit to the private sector between 
2003 and ’09, Tanzania ranks below other African countries in that regard, which has slowed 
business growth (IMF, 2010). The FSAP had a positive effect on Tanzania’s GDP, which has 
averaged above 6% between 2003 and ’12.  
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Figure 2.30: Tanzanian GDP trend 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
2.3.11 Zambia 
Zambia gained its independence in 1964 and the newly elected government decided to natio-
nalise the most important sectors of the economy (Kalyalya, 2001). This process continued 
up until the late 1980s. By that time 80% of the economy’s financial activities were con-
trolled by the government and more than 150 parastatals had been established. The Zambian 
economy is dependent on its mining sector to a large extent, with copper the most important 
commodity (Mowatt, 2001). In the 1970s there was a drastic fall in oil prices worldwide, 
coupled with a drop in copper prices, which led to stagflation in the economy (Kalyalya, 
2001). 
The economic problems caused by stagflation persuaded the government to decide to imple-
ment some structural changes to the economy with the help of the World Bank and IMF (Ma-
imbo & Mavrotas, 2003). The structural adjustment programme, introduced in the late 1980s, 
was only fully implemented in the early ’90s. The structural adjustment programme included 
economic liberalisation, privatisation, improvements in the efficiency of the public sector and 
the introduction of monetary policy instruments to stabilise the economy (Saasa, 1996). 
Economic liberalisation was implemented to allow the market mechanism to allocate eco-
nomic resources instead of the state. Several other reforms were implemented during the 
1990s and the economy was liberalised to a large extent by the 21st century (Kalyalya, 2001). 
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Interest rates were liberalised in 1992, which allowed financial institutions to make their own 
decisions with regard to savings and deposit rates (Odhiambo, 2011). 
Exchange rate liberalisation was undertaken in 1994 after the abolition of the Exchange Con-
trol Act (Kalyalya, 2001). Exchange controls were removed so as to make the Zambian cur-
rency competitive in foreign markets and to eradicate rent-seeking. In 1993 the Treasury bill 
tender system was introduced (Chiumya, 2004). This system, used as one of the monetary 
policy instruments, was a major step towards allowing the market to determine the price of 
Treasury bills and government bonds. Treasury bill yield rates were used by commercial 
banks as an indicator of interest rates in the economy (Kalyalya, 2001).  
Prior to financial liberalisation, fixed interest rates, credit allocation, core liquid assets and 
statutory requirements were used as direct monetary policy instruments (Maimbo & Mavro-
tas, 2003). Real interest rates were negative and so discouraged individuals and businesses 
from saving and using the banking system (Chiumya, 2004; Mowatt, 2001). However, during 
the 1990s the new leadership decided to make the private sector the main driver of economic 
growth and development (Kalyalya, 2001). Market forces became the major determinant of 
activities in the economy and indirect instruments of monetary policy like open market opera-
tions, Treasury bills and government bonds were used more often than direct instruments 
(Maimbo & Mavrotas, 2003).  
In 1994 the Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE) was created as the first formal capital market in 
Zambia, which created an additional source of funding for businesses (Mowatt, 2001). The 
Banking and Financial Services Act was introduced in December 1994 to strengthen financial 
sector regulation (Kalyalya 2001). The Act was amended in 2000 in an attempt to align it 
with international standards for prudential regulation.     
The number of commercial banks increased following the reforms and in 2004 there were 13 
commercial banks, seven of which were foreign, four were domestic, one was government-
owned and one was a joint venture between the Zambian and Indian governments (Chiumya, 
2004). Prior to the reforms there were only three commercial banks, all foreign-owned (Ma-
imbo & Mavrotas, 2003).   
Figure 2.31 shows Zambia’s real interest rate trend in for the period 1992-2015. The rate was 
in negative territory in the early ’90s, which represented the period before interest rates were 
liberalised. Following the liberalisation of interest rates in ’93, the real interest rate increased 
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and has remained in positive territory since ’94. The real interest rate reached a maximum of 
23.67% in 1996 and declined in the late ’90s, reaching 6.15% in 2000. Between 2000 and ’02 
there was an increase in the real interest rate to 21.24%, However, the period from 2003 to 
’15 is characterised by a downward trend in real interest rates.  
Figure 2.31: Zambian interest rate trend 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
Figure 2.32 shows Zambia’s trends in domestic savings and investment as a percentage of 
GDP for the period 1990-2015. Savings declined from the mid- to late 1990s and reached a 
low of -0.27% in ’98. The period 1999 to 2006 as characterised by a substantial rise in 
savings, which reached a high of 41.34% in 2006. However, between 2006 and ’08 savings 
declined, possibly due to the global financial crisis, before recovering from ’09 onwards. 
Investments exhibited an upward trend during the late 1990s. Both savings and investments 
have averaged close to the 30% mark for more than a decade, which has had a positive effect 
on economic growth.  
Figure 2.33 shows Zambia’s GDP trend for the period 1990-2015. GDP fluctuated to a large 
extent in the early 1990s in the midst of the droughts that affected Southern Africa, and de-
creased during the Asian financial crisis. Between 1998 and 2010, GDP exhibited an upward 
trend despite a slight decline in ’02. This rise in GDP has coincided with an increase in sav-
ings and investments. However, there was a downward trend in economic growth in 2011 and 
’15 despite the high savings and investment levels.  
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Figure 2.32: Zambian savings and investments trend 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
Figure 3.33: Zambian GDP trend 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
The analysis above suggests that most SADC countries introduced financial reforms in the 
1980s and ’90s. Prior to the reforms, the financial systems of most of these countries were 
largely controlled by the respective governments, real interest rates were negative and there 
was a lack of competition, especially in the banking sector. However, since 1972 the Botswa-
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na economy has been market-oriented to a large extent, as government intervention in the 
financial sector has been minimal. The reforms initiated by the Botswana authorities in the 
late 1980s and early ’90s were conducted to further liberalise an already liberal economy. In 
the Seychelles, the authorities delayed the initiation of major reforms until 2007, when it be-
came clear that state control in the major activities in the economy had a negative effect on 
the economy’s performance. 
Financial liberalisation policies had a positive influence on the performance of the banking 
industries of most of the SADC countries as more banks entered the financial systems and 
increased the level of competition, with the exception of Lesotho. Financial reforms also had 
a positive effect in turning real interest rates from negative to positive territory, despite the 
obstacles of high inflation and increasing savings and investments in a number of countries. 
Financial reforms were, to a large extent, successful in Botswana and Mauritius. Due to a 
market-oriented economy, savings and investments have been high in Botswana, which has 
had a positive effect in increasing economic growth and propelling the country into middle-
income territory with a high standard of living. Financial reforms initiated in Mauritius had a 
positive effect on real interest rates, savings, investments and economic growth, so the econo-
my had the highest GDP per capita in the SADC region for the period 2000-’09 (Gorlach & 
Le Roux, 2013). 
Financial reforms had a negative effect on the Lesotho economy as banking sector perform-
ance worsened due to a series of bank failures. These failures were caused by weak regulato-
ry and legal frameworks, which suggests that financial liberalisation policies should be ac-
companied by the strengthening of regulation and supervision in an economy. In South Afri-
ca, financial reforms did not have the desired effect on savings and investments, which de-
creased and remained stagnant from the late 1980s onward, despite an increase in the real int-
erest rate. Reforms had a positive effect on the banking sector as a number of South African 
banks opened branches in other countries. Financial reforms in Swaziland had a similar effect 
to those in South Africa in terms of savings and investments. Savings and investments have 
exhibited a downward trend since the early 2000s. A summary of the liberalisation dates in 
SADC countries based on the above analysis is shown on table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1: Summary of liberalisation dates in SADC countries 
Country Interest rate liberalisation date Financial liberalisation date 
Botswana 1989 1989 
Lesotho 1993 1988 
Madagascar 1998 1994 
Malawi 1988 1988 
Mauritius 1981 1981 
Namibia 1989 1991 
Seychelles 1993 1993 
South Africa 1980 1980 
Swaziland 1996 1982 
Tanzania 1992 1986 
Zambia 1992 1992 
  
2.4 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to discuss the history of financial liberalisation in SADC 
countries, with more emphasis placed on the effect of interest rate liberalisation on savings, 
investments and economic growth, as well as to discuss briefly the targets set by the region 
with regard to economic growth, public debt, investments and inflation.  
The analysis revealed that most of the SADC countries initiated financial sector reforms in 
the 1980s and ’90s. Financial reforms included the removal of interest rate controls, exchange 
rate controls, credit controls, price controls and policies that prevented the entry of firms to 
the financial sector. Prior to the reforms, the financial sectors of most SADC countries were 
state-controlled, with governments making the major decisions with regard to the operation 
of the financial sectors.  
Financial reforms had a positive effect in most countries with regard to increasing banking 
sector performance, with the exception of Lesotho, where bank failures resulted. Real interest 
rates increased following financial reforms in all countries, despite the major obstacle of high 
inflation. Savings and investments increased in a number of countries after the initiation of 
reforms. Botswana and Mauritius in particular benefited from financial liberalisation to a 
large extent, as savings, investments and economic growth increased and remained high, 
which in turn has increased standards of living. This suggests that there is a link between int-
erest rate liberalisation, savings and economic growth, so the next chapter discusses in detail 
the link between these variables based on the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW: FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION HYPOTHESIS 
3.1 Introduction 
 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) initiated the discussion on financial liberalisation, which 
involves lifting restrictions or controls on economic activity by the state. Interest rate liberali-
sation involves the removal of controls on the interest rates in an economy and, represents the 
main focus of this thesis. Interest rate liberalisation results in an increase in interest rates, 
which exerts a positive effect on savings, as individuals are encouraged to consume less by 
the higher returns from saving (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). The increase in savings 
improves the availability of funds that can be used for investment purposes, which in turn 
improves long-term economic growth. Although higher interest rates result in an increase in 
capital inflows, they reduce the economy’s dependence on them, as domestic savings are 
higher (World Bank, 2011).  
Financial liberalisation has been supported on a theoretical basis by authors like Kapur 
(1976), Galbris (1977), Mathieson (1980), Fry (1980) and Mishkin (2001). However, it has 
also been criticised theoretically by a number of authors, like Stiglitz (1994), Van Wijnberg-
en (1983), Arestis and Demetriades (1999), Mankiw (1986) and Taylor (1983), who argue 
that it might not affect an economy positively, as suggested by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973), and often results in financial crises.  
The objective of this chapter is to introduce and explain the effect of financial liberalisation 
on economic growth from a theoretical perspective. The chapter also outlines the main argu-
ments for and against financial liberalisation and is organised into five sections. Section two 
discusses the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis. Sections three and four outline the theoretical 
arguments for and against financial liberalisation respectively. Section five discusses the 
effect of interest rate liberalisation on financial crises and Section six concludes the chapter. 
3.2 McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis 
 
Financial liberalisation is a process which involves the removal of financial sector controls by 
the government, namely credit and interest rate controls. It also involves the removal of barri-
ers to foreign financial institutions, privatising financial institutions, and eradicating restric-
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tions on foreign financial transactions (Guha-Khasnobis & Mavrotas, 2008). Research on 
financial liberalisation was initiated by Robert McKinnon and Edward Shaw in the early 
1970s (Abiad et al, 2008). These two economists argued that when prices and interest rates 
are controlled by governments, not market forces, this results in misallocation of resources in 
that economy. They also argued that credit controls shift the flow of credit to projects fa-
voured by the state, not those with the highest possible returns (Sulaiman et al, 2012). Mc-
Kinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) emphasised that allowing market forces to determine eco-
nomic variables would result in higher economic growth. Their findings are referred to as the 
McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis (Spratt, 2009). 
 
McKinnon (1973) argued that investments cannot take place prior to the accumulation of 
money balances by individuals. For this accumulation of money balances to take place, real 
interest rates have to be positive but not in excess of the real rate of return on investments. 
The model representing the McKinnon (1973) complementary hypothesis can be written as 
follows:  
𝑀
𝑃⁄ = 𝐹(𝑌, 𝑐, 𝑑 − 𝜋
𝑒)                                                                                                                         3.1 
where: 𝑀 𝑃⁄  = the demand for real money balances 
 𝑌 = the real income 
 𝑐 = the real average return on capital 
 𝑑 − 𝜋𝑒  = the real deposit rate (𝑑 = nominal deposit rate and 𝜋𝑒  = expected inflation) 
The model states that the demand for real money balances is positively related to the real in-
come, the real deposit rate and the real average return on capital. So the demand for real mon-
ey balances depends on the transactions and speculative motives for holding cash, as well as 
the need to finance the accumulation of capital. The demand for real money balances is com-
plementary to investments, because investments are positively related to the real return on 
money balances (real deposit rate), and the increase in the real deposit rate also increases the 
demand for real money balances. 
The investment function can be represented as follows: 
𝐼
𝑌⁄ = 𝐹(𝑐, 𝑑 −  𝜋
𝑒)                                                                                                                               3.2 
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where: 𝐼 𝑌 ⁄ = the ratio of investment to income 
Due to the difficulty of measuring the real return on capital, McKinnon (1973) suggested that 
the ratio of investment to income be used, as opposed to the real return on capital. The mod-
els that are often used in empirical studies can be represented as follows: 
𝑚
𝑝⁄ = 𝐹(𝑦,
𝑖
𝑦⁄ , 𝑑 − 𝜋
𝑒)                                                                                                                    3.3 
𝑖
𝑦⁄ = 𝐹(𝑑 −  𝜋
𝑒 , 𝑑𝑐)                                                                                                                             3.4 
where: 𝑚 𝑝 ⁄ = ln(𝑀 𝑃⁄ ) 
 𝑖 𝑦⁄  = ln(𝐼 𝑌⁄ ) 
 𝑦 = ln(𝑌 𝑃⁄ ) 
 𝑑𝑐 = ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP 
Shaw (1973) argued that financial liberalisation is crucial for financial deepening, and higher 
interest rates are vital for encouraging individuals and corporations to save. Shaw (1973) also 
states that higher real interest rates are critical for capital accumulation and this process oper-
ates through the increase in the level of financial intermediation. His analysis thus focuses on 
the role of financial intermediaries in promoting financial development and economic growth. 
The amount of funds that financial intermediaries can lend depends on the returns offered to 
savers, so the higher the returns, the greater would be the quantity of savings, which in turn 
increases the funds available for lending purposes. The greater the available funds for lending 
purposes, the higher would be the quantity of investments.  
Shaw’s (1973) model can be represented as follows: 
𝑀
𝑃⁄ = 𝐹(𝑌, 𝛾, 𝑑 − 𝜋
𝑒)                                                                                                                         3.5 
where: 𝛾 is a vector of opportunity cost of holding money in real terms. 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) both stress the importance of real the interest rate in in-
fluencing the accumulation of financial capital which is crucial for investment purposes. 
Interest rates that are kept artificially low by central banks prevent capital accumulation and 
61 
 
so reduce the amount of investments undertaken. Both authors suggest that financial 
repression has a negative effect on savings, investment and economic growth.  
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) suggested that financial liberalisation results in higher 
interest rates which equate the demand for and supply of savings. McKinnon (1973 argued 
that savings will rise as a result of higher interest rates reflecting social and private time pref-
erences. Higher interest rates increase the opportunity cost of consuming currently and so en-
courage the deferment of current consumption and an increase in savings.  
Shaw (1973) pointed out that a rise in interest rates sets in motion two opposing effects: the 
income and substitution effects. The income effect reduces savings and encourages consump-
tion, as individuals have higher expected future income, while the substitution effect has a 
positive effect on savings. He argued that savers may ignore an increase in the rate of return 
from 4% to 6%, for example, but would not ignore an increase from negative return to 10%.  
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) also suggest that interest rates below the equilibrium lev-
el result in capital flight, which limits the available savings for domestic investments, as sav-
ers search for higher returns in other economies. Shaw (1973) argues that the mobility of sav-
ings worldwide encourages savers to circumvent low interest rates by investing in foreign as-
set markets. McKinnon (1973) suggests that higher interest rates would increase the amount 
of savings and investments in the domestic economy, as funds would be shifted from foreign 
investments with low returns. 
3.2.1 Financial repression 
Financial repression is formally defined as a situation where direct government intervention 
replaces the market mechanism in determining the level of financial variables in an economy 
(Spratt, 2009). Williamson and Mahar (1998) suggest that financial repression includes six 
elements: the control of the interest rate by the government, credit controls, barriers to entry 
in the financial sector, banking operations controlled by the government, government owner-
ship of banks, and a situation where international capital flows are restricted. Agenor & Mon-
tiel (1996) define financial repression as a situation where the financial system is marginal-
ised by government interventions that often result in very low or negative interest rates which 
in turn reduce savings, investments and economic growth. Shane (2013) and Achy (2005) go 
a step further and define financial repression as a situation when the holding of Treasury bills 
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and bonds is compulsory, when the financial system is uncompetitive and segmented, and 
when monetary authorities impose high reserve requirements on banks.   
 
Financial repression is often conducted for a number of reasons. One is that it is a way of pro-
tecting domestic financial markets and ensuring financing for domestic firms. Interest rate 
controls that keep interest rates below the free market level are seen as a way to foster invest-
ment and economic growth, while interest rates above the free market level are seen as a way 
of keeping inflation low (Nyawata & Bird, 2004). Exchange rate controls are maintained by a 
number of developing countries to ensure that their exports are competitive in international 
markets and offset the problem of exchange rate volatility (Commission on Growth and 
Development, 2008). Capital controls are seen as a way to keep inflation low, and large capi-
tal inflows can result in currency appreciations which could also result in the central banks 
losing their monetary control. 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) highlighted the negative effects of financial repression on 
savings, investment and economic growth. The two authors argued that financial repression 
reduces the return on savings by keeping interest rates low and so encourages savers to retain 
their savings in unproductive assets like land, gold and foreign exchange. Financial repres-
sion affects the efficiency of the allocation of savings to investments negatively, as well as 
the level of savings and investments through the return on savings. High reserve requirements 
imposed on banks lower the cash levels available for lending purposes, which reduces invest-
ments. So financial repression affects the level of investment and economic growth nega-
tively, in two ways. Firstly, lowering the real interest rates would reduce savings, which in 
turn reduces the availability of funds for investment purposes. Secondly, credit rationing by 
the state prevents credit from flowing to projects with the highest returns, but rather to those 
favoured by the state. This in turn has a negative effect on investments and economic growth, 
as a number of firms would be discouraged from investing.    
 
Real interest rates determined by market forces or at equilibrium level eliminate investments 
with low returns and improve the efficiency of investments, which is crucial, as is the in-
crease in the quantity of investments (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). The two authors stress 
that financial repression results in self-investment, as opposed to saving and investing in the 
financial system. Shaw (1973) argues that due to low returns, savings may be diverted to in-
ventories, while McKinnon (1973) suggests that savings may be used to create excess capaci-
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ty in plant and equipment. The returns on such investments would be low or negative due to 
the high cost of maintenance, so resources would be allocated inefficiently in the economy. 
Higher real interest rates resulting from financial liberalisation not only increase the levels of 
savings, credit and investments, but also improve the efficiency of investments. Economic 
growth would rise because of the increase in the quantity and quality of investments, as well 
as through the increase in the average productivity of capital.   
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) also suggest that financial repression encourages the op-
erations of an underground or informal market where returns to savings would be higher. The 
underground market has higher risks since it is not supervised by the government and is more 
susceptible to economic shocks. The organised financial sector is more efficient compared 
with the informal market, so the greater the shift of savings to the organised sector, the 
greater the overall efficiency of investments.  
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) suggested that financial repression results in dualism in 
an economy, as firms favoured by the state would have a significant amount of available 
funds at low repayment levels, while the firms not favoured by the state would have limited 
access to such funding. The firms favoured by the state would invest in relatively capital-
intensive technologies, while the firms not favoured would only be able to invest in projects 
with high returns and short maturities, due to the high repayment costs. This dualism in an 
economy could result in an increase in rent-seeking behaviour by firms as they seek to access 
the subsidised credit. The social return to rent-seeking behaviour is zero, and this exerts a 
negative effect on economic growth (Romer 2012).  
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) argued that financial repression results in interest rates 
that are below the market clearing level and as a result, other non-market mechanisms have to 
be used to clear the market. These include a variety of ways used to allocate available credit, 
like restriction on the amount of credit undertaken and auctions which also result in rent-
seeking behaviour.  
In the analysis above, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) suggest that financial repression 
has a number of disadvantages which result in lower economic growth as compared with a 
situation where financial variables are liberalised (Ince, 2011). Low interest rates controlled 
by the state discourage saving by households and firms because current consumption would 
be favoured, compared with future consumption. Low interest rates also reduce the amount of 
bank deposits, as individuals would prefer to place their savings in unproductive areas like 
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gold and foreign exchange. As a result of low interest rates, there would be a considerable 
amount of capital flight in search of higher rates elsewhere and a greater reliance on external 
finance due to a low savings rate (Spratt 2009). A lower savings rate would eventually result 
in lower levels of investment and lower economic growth. Directed credit policies result in 
rent-seeking, as borrowers compete for the limited credit available which is a waste of 
resources (Galindo et al, 2002).  
3.3 Theoretical arguments supporting financial liberalisation 
The McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis is supported theoretically by a number of authors like 
Kapur (1976), Mathieson (1980), Galbis (1977), Fry (1980) and Mishkin (2001). The hypo-
thesis is also in line with the recommendation made by the Austrian school of thought. Kapur 
(1976) examined the effect of interest rate liberalisation and stabilisation in a closed economy 
with surplus labour and under-used capital. He argued that credit is the major source of funds 
for financing working capital and so has a positive effect on capital accumulation. He also 
suggested that the supply of credit is determined by the demand for broad money, which in 
turn is dependent on inflation and the deposit rate. A rise in the deposit rate, possibly due to 
interest rate liberalisation, has a positive effect on the amount of bank deposits, which in turn 
increases the supply of credit and capital accumulation. 
Kapur (1976) also argued that stabilisation programmes have a negative effect on output, due 
to the stickiness of prices and adaptive expectations. Stabilisation programmes that reduce 
nominal money supply in an attempt to reduce inflation result in a reduction in real money 
supply, which in turn reduces the supply of credit available. Increasing the deposit rate in-
stead would have the positive effects of reducing inflation through the rise in the demand for 
broad money and increasing the amount of bank deposits. The increase in the amount of 
deposits results in an increase in the quantity of credit available, which in turn has a positive 
effect on investments and output. Mathieson (1980) presented a model similar to that of Ka-
pur (1976), but went a step further and suggested that the supply of credit is a major source of 
funding for both working capital and fixed capital. He also assumed that fixed capital was 
fully used and suggested that the greater the amount of investment, the higher the economic 
growth rate.  
Kapur (1976) and Mathieson (1980) also argued that high reserve requirements have the 
same effect as interest rate ceilings. A fixed required reserve ratio prevents the deposit rate 
from increasing if inflation is assumed to be zero. Inflation increases the spreads between de-
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posit and lending rates. A reduction in the reserve requirements increases the amount of funds 
available for banks to lend and also raises the deposit rate, which in turn has a positive effect 
on the number of bank deposits. The greater the amount of deposits, the greater would be the 
size of the financial sector, so this would support financial development.  
The Kapur-Mathieson views can be represented by the following model: 
𝑌 =  𝜎𝐾                                                                                                                                                     3.6 
where: 𝑌 = real output 
 𝜎 = a constant for the output/capital ratio 
 𝐾 = total fixed and working capital 
In this model the financial sector has an influence on the quantity of investments, which in 
turn has a positive effect on real output.  
Galbis (1977) and Fry (1980) extended the model by Kapur (1976) and Mathieson (1980) and 
argued that the real deposit rate can affect both the quality (efficiency) and quantity of invest-
ments. Galbis (1977) introduced a two-sector model and suggested that financial repression 
results in the emergence of a traditional sector with a low rate of return to capital and a mod-
ern sector with a high rate of return to capital. A low deposit rate encourages a significant 
amount of investments in the traditional sector, as investing in the modern sector would offer 
lower returns. Increasing the deposit rate would increase the demand for money in the tradi-
tional sector, which in turn would increase investments in the modern sector. The shift of in-
vestments to the modern sector improves the efficiency of investments and thus leads to an 
increase in economic growth.   
In the models developed by Kapur (1972), Mathieson (1980), Galbis (1977) and Fry (1980), a 
deposit rate determined by market forces has the greatest influence on economic growth. 
These authors also suggest that interest rate controls and credit controls should be abolished, 
and reserve requirements reduced, so allowing market forces to determine prices in the finan-
cial sector. Kapur (1976), Mathieson (1980) and Fry (1988) also argue that interest rate liber-
alisation not only affects economic growth positively, but also reduces the contractionary ef-
fects of monetary stabilisation programmes.  
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Mishkin (2001) supports the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis by arguing that private institu-
tions have an incentive to minimise the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard issues 
due to the fear of making less profit, a series of bad debts and going bankrupt. So they can 
lend funds to those with the ability to pay back or those with high-yield investments. Govern-
ments have less incentive to solve the adverse selection and moral hazard issues, since they 
do not seek to make the highest profit possible. In most cases, state-owned banks are not 
profit-driven and so often make less profit and have the most non-performing loans.  
The Austrian school of thought also echoes the views of McKinnon and Shaw that interest 
rates in an economy should be determined by market forces. The Austrians advocate that int-
erest rates should be determined in the market for loanable funds, which includes the supply 
and demand for funds (Oppers, 2002). The supply of loanable funds constitutes savings by in-
dividuals and corporations (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). An increase in cash holdings that are 
not consumed may be regarded as savings, as this constitutes income that is not consumed, 
but this does not represent an increase in the supply of loanable funds and so is excluded 
from the analysis (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). So the supply of loanable funds represents that 
part of savings that is channelled to financial intermediaries like banks.  
The demand for loanable funds originates from the willingness of businesses to use the sav-
ings for investment purposes (Snowdon & Vane 2005). The greater the willingness to invest 
in plant and equipment, the greater is the demand for loanable funds. The interest rate is re-
sponsible for the coordination of the demand and supply of loanable funds and is often re-
ferred to as the natural rate of interest (Garrison, 2001). Figure 3.1 outlines the loanable funds 
market. 
An increase in the supply of loanable funds would result in a shift of the savings curve to the 
right, indicating that there is a greater supply of resources that can be used for investment 
purposes, thereby reducing the interest rate (Garrison, 2001). This would encourage business-
es to invest as the borrowing cost would be lower.  
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Figure 3.1: The loanable funds market 
 
Source: Snowdon & Vane (2005) 
The discussion above ignored the effect of resource constraints on the economy’s ability to 
undertake investment activities (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). The resource constraints can be 
represented by a production possibilities frontier (PPF) which indicates the number of invest-
ment activities that can be undertaken given the resources in an economy, as shown by Figure 
3.2. An economy can operate on its PPF if resources are used efficiently, and inside the PPF 
if resources are not used efficiently (Garrison, 2001). The economy cannot operate outside its 
PPF, as this requires more resources. 
The horizontal axis of a PPF represents gross investments, while the vertical axis represents 
consumption (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). If gross investment is greater than capital deprecia-
tion in the economy, economic growth would occur, so shifting the PPF outwards. If gross in-
vestment is equal to capital depreciation, no economic growth would take place. Fredrick Ha-
yek modelled the production activities in an economy as a sequence of inputs and outputs us-
ing a right-angled triangle (Hayekian triangle) (Garrison 2005). Output in one stage repre-
sents an input in next stage of production. The horizontal axis of the Hayekian triangle out-
lines the production time, while the vertical axis represents the value of consumable goods 
produced (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). This is shown in Figure 3.2. 
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An increase in savings in the economy would result in a shift of the supply of the loanable 
funds to the right, thereby reducing the natural rate of interest (Garrison 2005). A reduction in 
the interest rate results in an increase in the demand for funds for investment purposes, as 
borrowing costs would be lower. The increase in savings causes a reduction in consumption 
as shown by the PPF, but due to the rise in investments, the economy remains on the PPF 
(Snowdon & Vane, 2005).  
Due to the reduction in the demand for current consumable output, the prices of inputs in the 
late stages of production are reduced (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). The prices of inputs of in the 
early stages of production are increased because of the reduction in borrowing costs. Re-
sources would thus be shifted from the late stages of production to the early stages in re-
sponse to the changes in the input prices (Garrison, 2001). The changes are represented by 
the change in the slope of the Hayekian triangle’s hypotenuse. This capital restructuring, 
caused by a rise in the savings rate, would result in an increase in the output of consumable 
goods and services, and eventually the PPF would shift outwards to represent an economy 
experiencing secular growth (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). 
Figure 3.2: Savings-induced capital restructuring 
 
Source: Snowdon & Vane (2005)
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The Austrians argue that market forces have the capability of allocating resources efficiently 
with the aid of an interest rate determined by market forces (Oppers, 2002). Interest rates that 
are influenced by external forces like central banks distort the allocation of resources in an 
economy. The Austrians argue that financial crises are caused by central bank interventions 
in the setting of interest rates (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). This proposition is referred to as the 
Austrian business cycle – it is a theory of how external forces initiate a boom in the economy 
and a bust that occurs as the market forces attempt to correct the process.  
A boom caused by a rise in savings is genuine and requires no self-correction from market 
forces (Templeman, 2012). However, a boom resulting from the intervention of central banks 
is artificial and often results in financial crises, as low interest rates encourage producers to 
lengthen production processes when there are inadequate savings (Snowdon & Vane 2005). 
This process is illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 3.3. Initially there is no growth in the 
economy, with an equilibrium interest rate of 𝑖𝑒𝑞. An intervention by central banks which re-
sults in interest rates that are below the natural rate causes an artificial boom, as the supply of 
loanable funds is augmented by the aid of an expansion in credit (Garrison 2001). This ex-
pansion in credit and the resultant decrease in interest rates results in disequilibrium in the 
economy, as savings would decrease while the demand for borrowed funds would increase. 
The horizontal distance between the supply of loanable funds and the demand for credit de-
picts borrowing and investment that is undertaken without sufficient savings (Snowdon & 
Vane 2005). 
The low interest rates cause conflicts between consumers and investors (Snowdon & Vane, 
2005). Consumers would be consuming more and saving less, while investors would aspire to 
invest more and, as result of this conflict, the economy would operate outside the PPF but 
only temporarily (Kates, 2010; Garrison, 2001). The labour force would expand due to the fa-
vourable labour market conditions caused by low interest rates. However, this boom would 
be turned into a bust due to the changes in the structure of production, as shown by the clash-
ing Hayekian triangles (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). The low interest rates result in excessive 
production of capital goods and other activities, yet their payoffs are long-term. This exces-
sive allocation to long-term projects is called malinvestment (Bocutoglu & Ekinci, 2010).   
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Figure 3.3: Policy-induced recession 
 
Source: Snowdon & Vane (2005) 
Due to the lack of savings, the economy would be pushed backwards towards its PPF, as 
shown by the arrow in Figure 3.3 (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). The prices of consumer goods, 
as well as those of inputs, would increase because of the shortage of savings, and interest 
rates would rise as borrowers compete for the limited loanable funds. There would be a con-
siderable number of business closures, as most of the businesses created during the period of 
low interest rates would be unprofitable (Kates 2010). The economy would thus operate 
inside its PPF as unemployment increases, and this represents the bust in the economy.  
The economy could recover from this bust, as market forces work to correct the misallocation 
of resources (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). Employment would increase, and the economy would 
return to operating at a point on the PPF. However, expansionary monetary policies conduct-
ed by a central bank aimed at combating the recession could prolong the financial crisis or 
worsen it (Oppers, 2002). So the Austrians recommend that during a financial crisis, central 
banks should resist the temptation to boost the economy through expansionary monetary poli-
cies (Kates, 2010). 
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3.4 Theoretical arguments against financial liberalisation 
The major theoretical critics of the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis are the Neo-Structuralists, 
who include Wijnbergen (1983) and Taylor (1983) and the Keynesians, including the New- 
Keynesians and Post-Keynesians. The Neo-Structuralists argue that interest rate liberalisation 
results in the reduction of funds in the financial system, while the Keynesians suggest that a 
rise in the interest rates and the subsequent increase in savings cause a reduction in aggregate 
demand in the economy, leading to a decrease in economic growth. The New-Keynesians, in-
cluding Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Mankiw (1986), Stiglitz (1994) and Arestis and Demetri-
ades (1999), argue that financial markets are prone to market failures, due to imperfect infor-
mation. 
Van Wijnbergen (1983) and Taylor (1983) used Tobin’s portfolio theory for household sector 
asset allocation which states that households have three categories of asset: gold or currency, 
time deposits and informal market loans. An increase in interest rates on time deposits would 
encourage households to substitute time deposits for gold or cash and informal market assets. 
Van Wijnbergen (1983) suggests that the views of McKinnon, Shaw and other authors affili-
ated with them are based on the assumption that funds shifted into time deposits following a 
rise in interest rates come from an unproductive asset like gold, cash or commodity stocks. 
He then argued that it is not clear whether time deposits are closer substitutes to cash, gold 
and commodity stocks or are closer to loans on the informal markets. Taylor (1983) suggests 
that time deposits are closer substitutes to loans on the informal market rather than gold, cash 
and commodity stocks. A study conducted by Van Wijnbergen (1982) on Korea found evi-
dence supporting Taylor’s (1983) views.  
Van Wijnbergen (1983) also argued that following a rise in interest rates, the total supply of 
funds in the formal sector would decline as funds are shifted from the informal markets. The 
reason for this decline in funds is that the banking sector is subject to reserve requirements, as 
opposed to the informal sector. The greater the reserve requirements, the fewer would be the 
available funds for borrowing purposes. Taylor (1983) is in agreement with Van Wijnberg-
en’s views (1983) and argues that an increase in bank deposits following a rise in the deposit 
rate will have a positive effect on the available credit only if the increase in bank deposits oc-
curs due to a shift of funds from unproductive assets. Taylor (1983) went further and argued 
that an increase in savings results in a reduction in aggregate demand, which in turn causes a 
contraction in the economy. This view is in line with the Keynesian viewpoint.  
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Van Wijnbergen (1983) and Taylor (1983) assume that the efficiency of investments is simi-
lar whether loans are financed by the banking sector or the informal market. This view con-
trasts with that of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), who suggest that the efficiency of in-
vestments is lower if the loans are financed by the informal market as compared with the 
banking sector. 
The Keynesians argue that investments are the main driver of economic growth, not savings 
(Keynes, 1936). Therefore, interest rates should be kept low or negative to reduce the cost of 
borrowing and promote investments. Keynes (1936) argued that saving is the amount left 
over after consumption spending, which is dependent on income. Despite low and/or negative 
interest rates, households would still save as interest rates have no (or minimal) effect on sav-
ings, and increasing the rate of interest results in an oversupply of funds which can destabilise 
the financial system (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). Keynesians also argue that an increase in sav-
ings does not result in an increase in investments because movements in the interest rate do 
not equal savings and investments.  
The major argument against the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis emanating from the Keynesians 
is that an increase in savings results in a decrease in aggregate demand, which in turn results 
in a contraction in the economy which could lead to a recession (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). 
This argument is represented by Figure 3.4 below. The initial savings schedule is 𝑆(𝑌0) with 
the income level at 𝑌0 (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). An increase in savings shifts the savings 
schedule rightwards to 𝑆 ,(𝑌0), which reduces interest rates. The market process that restores 
equilibrium between savings and investments is prevented from taking place by the income 
effect which dominates the substitution effect. The increase in savings results in a decrease in 
spending which in turn reduces the available income for those who sell consumer goods (Gar-
rison, 2001). The demand for inputs that are used to produce consumer goods is also reduced. 
The reduction in income results in a decrease in savings which shifts the savings schedule 
leftwards from 𝑆 ,(𝑌0) to 𝑆
,(𝑌1), where income 𝑌1 is less than 𝑌0. Both savings and invest-
ments return to their original levels, but the reduced consumer spending would result in a re-
cession as shown by the economy moving inside its production possibilities frontier (Snow-
don & Vane, 2005).  The reduction in income or profits for firms that sell consumer goods 
would in turn decrease investments and, as a result, investments would be lower in an econo-
my with a liberalised financial system as compared with one with a repressed financial sys-
tem (Dutt & Burkett, 1991). 
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Figure 3.4: Savings-induced recession 
 
Source: Snowdon & Vane (2005) 
The negative effect of a reduction in aggregate demand outweighs the positive effect of an in-
crease in savings due to the perceived lower future profits, which result in a decline in sav-
ings, investments and economic growth.  
The New-Keynesians argue that credit rationing can still occur in perfectly competitive mark-
ets even without government intervention. Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) argue that despite equili-
brium in the market for loanable funds, credit rationing can still exist. The two authors begin 
their argument by stating that when making loans, banks consider the interest rate they re-
ceive on the loan as well as how risky the loan is. The interest rate that banks charge has an 
influence on the riskiness of these loans due to the adverse selection effect, which involves 
sorting potential borrowers, and the incentive effect, which affects the actions of borrowers. 
These effects occur because of imperfect information in the loan market. The two authors 
then argue that borrowers prepared to pay high interest rates may be high risk as they view 
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their probability of repayment to be low. So as interest rates rise, the riskiness of borrowers 
increases and so lowers bank profits. As a result, banks have an incentive to ration credit and 
so not to increase the interest rate to its market clearing level.  
Mankiw (1986) presented a model similar to that of Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) and argued that 
the equilibrium resulting from financial liberalisation is inefficient, so government interven-
tion is warranted. He also argued that changes in interest rates can result in large and ineffi-
cient changes in credit allocation. He also suggested that the recommendations provided by 
Stiglitz & Weiss (1981), that there should be interest rate controls, does not solve the problem 
of market failure. According to Mankiw (1986) a credit subsidy has the ability to improve 
market allocation, and restrictive monetary policy can result in a financial crisis.  
Stiglitz (1994) argued that financial markets are prone to market failures and thus certain 
forms of government intervention are necessary to improve the functioning of the economy. 
He argued that economies have imperfect information and incomplete markets and thus are 
not Pareto-efficient. As a result, there are possible government interventions that can make all 
individuals better off. The removal of any barriers to entry will not result in fully competitive 
markets due to the existence of costly information. He also argued that financial repression 
has a positive effect on the economy by improving the pool of loan applications, lowering the 
cost of capital and thus increasing firm equity, and increasing the availability of credit in 
profitable sectors, like exporters, or sectors with high technological spill-overs.  
Hellmann et al (2000) suggest that a Pareto-efficient outcome can be achieved by financial 
repression policies including deposit rate controls and capital requirements, and freely deter-
mined deposit rates are inconsistent with Pareto efficiency. The authors develop a model of 
moral hazard problems of banks in a dynamic setting and argued that increased competition 
in the banking sector encourages banks to invest in inefficient gambling assets that yield high 
private returns if the gamble pays off, but costs depositors in the case that it fails. Prudential 
regulation is warranted to force banks to invest prudently. Capital requirements force banks 
to risk their own capital when investing, and thus encourage efficient gambling. Deposit con-
trols can be used to create franchise value for banks, and if a bank fails in its gambles the 
franchise value reduces. Banks with high franchise values would invest prudently and so 
avoid taking gambles.  
Arestis & Demetriades (1999) argue that the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis is based on 
three assumptions that realistically cannot be met. These assumptions are perfect information, 
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profit-maximising competitive behaviour by commercial banks and institution-free analysis.  
Arestis & Demetriades (1999) argue that imperfect information is the norm in financial mark-
ets due to unequal or asymmetrical distribution of information between the agents in any fi-
nancial transaction. Asymmetric information leads to adverse selection and moral hazard is-
sues. The two authors also argue that banking sectors in many developing countries are not 
perfectly competitive and thus large spreads between lending and deposit rates would occur 
as a result of financial liberalisation. Asymmetric information could also result in imperfect 
competition, even if the number of banks is high. They also argued that McKinnon (1973) 
and Shaw (1973) ignored the issue of institutions like bank supervision and central banks. 
Due to weak institutions and poor regulatory framework, financial liberalisation results in fi-
nancial crises like those that occurred in Latin America and Asia. This view is line with the 
recommendation of the Post-Keynesians. The McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis also failed to 
address the issue of stock markets which result in financial instability, especially in develop-
ing countries.    
The Post-Keynesians argue that the supply of bank credit is not exogenous, as suggested by 
the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis, but rather endogenous (Odhiambo, 2011). If banks can 
create credit without a subsequent increase in deposits, credit in the financial sector would 
remain unchanged even in the event of an increase in savings. They also argue that an in-
crease in real interest rates leads to stagflation due to the high costs of borrowing, a reduction 
in aggregate demand which is the main driver of an economy, and causes financial stability 
(Gibson & Tsakalotos, 1994). 
The Post-Keynesians also argue that the financial liberalisation thesis of McKinnon (1973) 
and Shaw (1973) omitted the role of institutions like the state, firms, banks and trade unions, 
which collect information and reduce uncertainty in financial markets (Sarialioglu-Hayali, 
2000). They also argue that developing countries should supplement financial liberalisation 
policies with the development of institutions so as to improve relations between economic 
agents (Gibson & Tsakalotos 1994). Without the development of institutions, financial liber-
alisation policies would have a negative effect on savings, investments, inflation and eco-
nomic growth.   
Despite the arguments against it, the financial liberalisation hypothesis continues to be an 
issue of debate because of its links to savings, investments and financial development which 
are crucial for economic growth. Furthermore, if implemented in an environment with high 
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levels of institutional quality, financial crises will be mitigated.  This is discussed in detail in 
the next section.  
3.5 Interest rate liberalisation and financial crises 
Criticism of financial liberalisation discussed in the previous section highlights that reforms 
in the financial sector should be undertaken with caution since they increase the risk of finan-
cial crises. This is true for developing countries, which are characterised by low levels of in-
stitutional quality (Spratt, 2009).  
Financial liberalisation increases a country’s exposure to international shocks and results in 
an increase in capital flight, so when considering the benefits of financial liberalisation, the 
possibility of financial crises should be taken into account (Tswamuno et al, 2007). Capital 
inflows caused by financial liberalisation can affect countries’ trade balances by causing an 
appreciation of the domestic currency. An appreciation of the currency would result in a de-
crease in the demand for exports, which in turn would result in balance of payments prob-
lems. Rapidly rising capital inflows can also result in an increase in consumption, which can 
cause a rise in the inflation rate and current account deficits. Capital inflows in a country with 
an underdeveloped financial system can cause a rapid increase in bank lending, which can in 
turn result in a financial crisis if the lending is to unworthy candidates (McLean & Shrestha 
2002). 
 
Liberalisation of financial markets usually results in the relaxation of bank supervision and 
regulation, which in turn results in irresponsible practices by banks. These imprudent bank 
practices, coupled with credit insurance, result in lending to individuals who are not credit-
worthy. This lending boom can result in an increase in non-performing loans caused by 
banks’ inability to check the credit-worthiness of borrowers and monitoring the loans effect-
ively (Fowowe, 2013). Non-performing loans increase the likelihood of banking crises.  
The major causes of banking crises are macroeconomic instability and structural weaknesses 
in an economy (Mezui, Nalletamby & Kamewe, 2012). Macroeconomic instability results 
from fiscal and current account deficits, currency devaluations, high inflation and high inter-
est rates. Structural weaknesses emanate from weak regulatory and supervisory frameworks, 
a significant proportion of government or state ownership of banks, an increase in banking 
competition which reduces the franchise values of banks, and high non-performing loans 
(Mezui et al, 2012). The other cause of banking crises is financial liberalisation, which is as-
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sociated with moral hazard problems and a rise in capital inflows (Arestis & Demetriades, 
1999). Financial liberalisation is also related to the major causes of both macroeconomic 
instability and structural weaknesses in the economy.  
Financial liberalisation has been criticised by a number of economists and adjudged to be the 
main cause of the East Asian financial crises of 1997-’98 and the 2008 global financial crisis 
(Arestis & Demetriades, 1999). On the other hand, financial repression policies like interest 
rate controls and excessive state ownership of banks may also cause financial crises. A sound 
regulatory and supervisory framework reduces the likelihood of financial crises (Mishkin, 
2001). 
This section discusses the relationship between interest rate liberalisation and financial crises. 
In what follows, a discussion of how financial liberalisation and in particular interest rate lib-
eralisation results in financial crises is provided, as well as how a sound regulatory frame-
work reduces the likelihood of financial crises. This is followed by a discussion of the link 
between financial liberalisation and the Asian financial crisis, as well as the 2008-’09 global 
financial crisis.  
3.5.1 Interest rate liberalisation and risky lending 
Financial liberalisation, and in particular interest rate liberalisation, encourages banks to take 
a more expansive approach in lending activities due to higher interest rates (Misati & Nyamo-
ngo, 2012). The number of risky and low return projects increases as the prospect of earning 
more returns entices banks to relax their monitoring or screening mechanisms (Angkiand, Sa-
wagngoenyuan & Wihlbong, 2010). The increase in interest rates resulting from interest rate 
liberalisation causes financial instability in an economy, as borrowers with higher credit risks 
would be willing to borrow, compared with those with lower credit risks (Mishkin, 1997). 
The possibility of financial institutions, like banks, lending to borrowers with high risks in-
creases with higher interest rates. So banks become vulnerable to banking crises due to ad-
verse selection and the surge in non-performing loans (Misati & Nyamongo, 2012).   
The period under financial repression prevents banks from financing risky projects because of 
the limits imposed on lending rates (Demirgüҫ-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998). Controls on inter-
est rates limit the profits earned as well as the problems of adverse selection, so preventing 
banks from financing risky projects. However, controls on interest rates which result in low 
returns also encourage banks to undertake risky projects in an attempt to earn higher profits 
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(Snowdon & Vane, 2005). This view is suggested by the Austrian school of economics, 
which argues that low interest rates recorded in the United States in the early 2000s were the 
major cause of the 2008 global financial crises.    
 3.5.2 Interest rate liberalisation and bank competition 
Daniel & Jones (2006) developed a model which outlined how financial liberalisation increa-
ses the likelihood of banking crises. The immediate period after financial liberalisation is cha-
racterised by low levels of capital stock and high marginal productivity of capital. Following 
financial liberalisation policies, foreign banks enter the market and at the initial stage lend at 
high interest rates so as to discourage projects with low returns. Returns earned by banks 
would be high as a result of higher interest rates and risks are low at this period. After the ini-
tial period, the capital stock increases, which in turn reduces its returns. Foreign banks be-
come more experienced in the economy, so foreign debt becomes less costly. Interest rates on 
loans decrease, thereby encouraging both domestic and foreign banks to undertake riskier 
projects so as to preserve their competitive advantage.  
The entry of new banks and financial institutions following the liberalisation of the financial 
sector reduces the profits earned by banks as well as their franchise values, which encourages 
them to undertake risky projects in an attempt to earn more profits (Demetriades, Fattouh & 
Shields, 2001). Entry of new banks into the financial sector also increases the bidding for 
bank deposits, so causing a further rise in interest rates (Chowdhury, 2010). Banks pass this 
rise in deposit rates to borrowers through higher lending rates, which attract borrowers with 
greater risks. The increase in bank competition following the liberalisation of the financial 
system decreases the franchise values of banks, which in turn makes banks less incentivised 
to avoid risk (Demetriades et al, 2001). The erosion of monopolistic profits due to the entry 
of new banks reduces the costs of insolvency, like losing a banking licence, and so encour-
ages banks to finance risky investment projects (Demirgüҫ-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998).  
The traditional view on the relationship between bank competition and financial stability sug-
gests that an increase in bank competition has a negative effect on financial stability, as the 
diminishing franchise values of banks encourage them to take more risks in their lending in 
an attempt to earn higher returns (Cubillas & Gonzalez, 2014). However, there is another 
view on the relationship between bank competition and financial stability which suggests that 
the increase in bank competition fosters financial stability if banks charge lower interest rates 
to borrowers, as risks would be reduced (Boyd & De Nicolò, 2005). This view assumes that 
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the increase in the number of banks and other financial institutions prevents excessive lend-
ing rates, as borrowers have a wide range of lenders to choose from. A concentrated banking 
sector with a small number of banks could result in collusion, with borrowers forced to pay 
higher interest rates.  
3.5.3 Interest rate liberalisation and moral hazard issues  
The availability of implicit or explicit government bailouts in the event of a crisis makes the 
banking system more prone to crises due to moral hazard issues (Daniel & Jones, 2007). 
Government bailouts encourage banks to fund riskier projects than they would if such bail-
outs were not available. Government guarantees to deposits, or deposit insurance, often re-
duce the liability of banks when bad debts emerge (García-Páez & DelaCruz, 2012). Because 
of these government guarantees, banks engage in risky lending by financing risky projects 
and often relax some of the standards set in terms of screening borrowers and monitoring 
loans made.   
The reduction in bank franchise values due to interest rate liberalisation, and the removal of 
barriers to entry in the banking sector, could contribute to moral hazard problems (Demirgüҫ-
Kunt & Detragiache, 1998). Furthermore, the prospect of making high returns from higher 
interest rates exacerbates moral hazard problems by encouraging banks to lend to borrowers 
without adequately assessing the riskiness of the borrowers (Demetriades et al, 2001). Finan-
cial liberalisation coupled with implicit deposit insurance causes a surge in lending, which 
could have a negative effect on the banking sector in the long run if the rate of defaults on 
loans increases.  
3.5.4 Interest rate liberalisation and bank balance sheets 
Interest rate liberalisation often increases the volatility of nominal interest rates, which may 
have a negative effect on the ability of banks to perform one of their functions, that of bor-
rowing short and lending long, so deteriorating the bank’s balance sheets (Demirgüҫ-Kunt & 
Detragiache, 1998). Banks borrow short and lend long so as to make profits and so have more 
long-term assets than short-term liabilities (Mishkin, 1997). A rise in interest rates reduces 
the value of long-term assets and increases the value of short-term liabilities. The drop in the 
value of longer-duration assets outweighs the increase in the value of short-term liabilities, so 
decreasing the net worth of those banks (Mishkin, 1997). The rise in bad debts resulting from 
non-performing loans also causes a deterioration of bank balance sheets.  
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Lending booms initiated by capital inflows also increase the risk of banking crises by widen-
ing the maturity mismatch between banks’ assets and liabilities, as well as increasing the 
risks associated with movements in exchange rates (Demetriades et al, 2001). Short-term ca-
pital inflows denominated in foreign currency, coupled with long-term loans made by banks 
in the domestic economy, result in bank balance sheets with long-term assets and short-term 
liabilities, which in turn increases the risk of banking crises, especially if capital inflows are 
reversed. The reversal of capital inflows depreciates the currency and increases the costs of 
clearing the banks’ liabilities (Demetriades et al, 2001).  
3.5.5 Interest rate liberalisation, banking and currency crises 
Evidence has revealed that there is a link between currency and banking crises in emerging 
and developing countries (Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999). Countries like Thailand, Indonesia, 
Korea, Chile, Finland, Mexico, Norway and Sweden experienced both types of crises at the 
same time. One view suggests that the causality runs from banking crisis to currency crisis, as 
maturity mismatches and currency disequilibriums in the banking sector are among the major 
factors that initiate currency crises (Mezui et al, 2012). 
Another view suggests that currency crises usually precede banking crises (Cubillas & Gon-
zalez, 2014). The increase in domestic interest rates following interest rate liberalisation, 
coupled with the removal of capital controls, increases capital inflows in search of higher re-
turns. Domestic banks might be encouraged to raise foreign currency funds abroad and lend 
to domestic borrowers due to the higher domestic interest rates (Cubillas & Gonzalez, 2014). 
This exposes such banks to foreign exchange rate risks as devaluation or depreciation of the 
domestic currency could reduce the franchise value of the banks if a significant amount of 
their liabilities are in foreign currency. It also sheds light on how currency crises often pre-
cede banking crises (Cubillas & Gonzalez, 2014; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999). 
Stoker (1994) also argued that banking crises result from balance of payments problems, such 
as an increase in foreign interest rates during a period when an economy is seeking to main-
tain a fixed parity. Capital outflows increase in search of higher returns in an economy with 
higher interest rates, which in turn could result in a credit crunch and bankruptcies.  
3.5.6 Interest rate liberalisation and the regulatory environment 
Despite the proposed benefits of financial liberalisation, like encouraging capital inflows 
which supplement domestic savings, lower the cost of capital and foster high levels of invest-
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ment and economic growth, many critics argue that it exposes banks to financial risks due to 
its association with weak regulatory and supervisory frameworks and inexperience of banks 
in operating in a liberal financial environment (Mishkin, 1997; Mezui et al, 2012). A surge in 
capital inflows in a banking environment that is not effectively managed and supervised in-
creases the risk of banking crises due to the rise in risky banking lending. Lack of a sound 
and effective regulatory and supervisory framework also has a negative influence on the bal-
ance sheets of banks, as it fails to prevent excessive lending on the part of banks (Mishkin, 
1997).  
Prudent practices, like monitoring the credit-worthiness of borrowers, are often relaxed as 
banks focus more on earning higher returns (Angkiand et al, 2010). Another reason why bad 
debts increase is that banks might not have the skills or managerial expertise to evaluate and 
monitor risky projects (Chigumira & Makochekanwa, 2014). The skills that were required to 
operate a bank in the period of financial repression might be redundant or outdated. As men-
tioned above, the prospect of earning higher profits as a result of relaxation of controls on int-
erest rates encourages the entry of new banks into the banking sector. However, most of the 
new banks often lack the expertise required to operate in such a liberalised environment and 
the growth in the banking sector is often initiated before major reforms in regulation and su-
pervision (Demirgüҫ-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998). Bank failures thus become the norm as the 
lack of expertise and weak regulation and supervision encourages excessive risk-taking in 
bank lending.   
According to Mishkin (2001), in order for financial liberalisation to reduce the likelihood of 
financial crises, these institutional/governance prerequisites should be in place: 
 
1. Adequate prudential supervision 
2. High accounting and disclosure standards 
3. Effective legal and fiduciary system 
4. The facilitation of market-based discipline through entry and exit policies and competi-
tion policies 
5. The reduction of the role of state-owned financial institutions 
6. Elimination of too-big-to-fail in the corporate sector 
 
The probability of financial crises after financial liberalisation is low if the level of institutio-
nal development is high in a country (Galindo et al, 2002). Financial liberalisation requires 
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improvements in the domestic economic governance framework so that it is in line with inter-
national standards, especially in developing countries, and the adoption of a system of pru-
dential regulation and supervision (Walter, 2002). Such a framework could, for example, 
include mechanisms that ensure that borrowing is undertaken by individuals and companies 
that can afford to pay back the borrowed funds. A country without such mechanisms would 
experience a large number of defaults in payment of borrowed funds, which could result in a 
financial crisis.  
 
On the other hand, a study performed by Lee (2005), on whether financial liberalisation indu-
ces regulatory governance reforms, revealed that the probability of regulatory governance re-
forms increases after partial and full liberalisation. This suggests that financial liberalisation 
should be implemented without such reforms, as financial liberalisation itself may prompt 
regulatory governance reforms. The financial liberalisation process may encourage govern-
ments to implement regulatory reforms that prevent market failures. Financial liberalisation 
increases the number of participants in the financial market, including those from other coun-
tries (Lee, 2005). This may also put pressure on the government to upgrade the regulatory 
standards to international levels. The pressure could also come from external sources, like the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank.  
 
3.5.7 East Asian financial crisis 
Financial liberalisation has been criticised by a number of economists who argue that it was 
the root cause of the East Asian financial crises of the mid- to late 1990s (Bustelo, 1998; Gar-
cía-Páez & DelaCruz, 2012). Between the 1960s and the mid-’90s, East Asian countries4 re-
corded high and sustained economic growth which translated into a high standard of living. 
During the period 1990-’96, East Asia’s share of world gross output and global investments 
was a fifth and two-thirds respectively. Between 1990 and ’96 East Asia had sound macro-
economic fundamentals like GDP growth rates in the region of 6% to 8%, fiscal surplus, 
single-digit inflation, savings and investment rates above 30% of GDP in all countries (with 
the exception of the Philippines) as well as large foreign exchange reserves (Hussain, Mla-
mbo & Oshikoya, 1999). The East Asian countries also received a significant amount of capi-
tal inflows attracted by low labour costs, high interest rates and an environment that was con-
ducive for investments (Bustelo, 1998). The capital inflows were largely directed at invest-
                                                          
4 Hong Kong, Japan, China, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Philippines 
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ments, as opposed to consumption, and thus assumed to be sustainable (Arestis & Demetria-
des, 1999).  
Prior to the eruption of the crises, some of the East Asian countries suffered from a number of 
structural weaknesses which could possibly provide an explanation for the financial crises 
(Hussain et al, 1999). Large current account deficits, currency appreciations, rapid expansion 
of domestic credit and accumulation of foreign debt were experienced in some of the coun-
tries in the region (Zhuang & Dowling, 2002). However, despite the large current account 
deficits, there was sufficient capital inflow required to compensate for them. East Asian 
countries pegged their currencies to the US dollar and thus had overvalued currencies (Buste-
lo, 1998). The overvaluation was less than 10%, with the exception of Indonesia and the Phil-
ippines, which had currency overvaluations of around 25% from 1993.  
From the analysis above, it can be deduced that the East Asian countries did not satisfy the 
requirements specified by the first-generation and second-generation models of currency cri-
ses. The first-generation models of currency crises associated with Krugman (1979) argue 
that crises are caused by macroeconomic imbalances, like large public sector deficits, which 
affect the exchange rate negatively as investors assume that the reserves required to maintain 
the currency peg would be depleted. Second-generation models associated with Obstfeld 
(1994, 1995) suggest that currency crises are caused by “herding” behaviour on the part of 
investors who assume that the government’s ability to maintain a pegged exchange rate 
would be severely affected by future deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals and high 
costs in terms of high interest rates required. The major causes of the East Asian crises put 
forward by economists include declining investments returns, banking crises, macroeconomic 
imbalances, financial liberalisation and reversals of capital inflows due to panics on financial 
markets (Bustelo, 1998).  
Krugman (1997) argued that the East Asian crises resulted from a burst in the financial bub-
ble which had been building due to capital inflows. Capital inflows were directed at specula-
tive assets like real estate, which caused overinvestments in those assets. So investment re-
turns declined when the bubble burst, leading to a substantial amount of capital outflows. So 
a boom-and-bust cycle was evident in investment and asset prices. Krugman (1998) also ar-
gued that banking crises caused by moral hazard issues were responsible for the East Asian 
crises. Liberalisation of major banking activities and implicit government guarantees encour-
aged banks to take excessive risks in their lending practices, which in turn resulted in a surge 
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in non-performing loans and over-indebtedness. Evidence suggests that most financial institu-
tions had political connections, which propelled the notion that the government would protect 
them in the event of financial trouble. 
Imprudent macroeconomic policies, like fixed exchange rates, large current account deficits 
and excessive growth in credit, were also blamed for the East Asian crises (IMF, 1998; Cor-
setti, Pesenti & Roubini, 1998). Asian countries had large current account deficits at the onset 
of the financial crises and, coupled with capital inflows, this resulted in real exchange rate ap-
preciation. All the East Asian countries pegged their exchange rates to the US dollar, a policy 
which mitigated the risks faced by investors and hence encouraged capital inflows (Hussain 
et al, 1999). The pegging of the exchange rates to the US dollar also resulted in currency ap-
preciations, which in turn made exports uncompetitive in international markets. The current 
account deficits expanded as a result of the slowdown in export growth, the surge in imports, 
as well as the investment boom, which widened the gap between savings and investments 
(Zhuang & Dowling, 2002). Pegging the currencies to the US dollar proved to be one of the 
major causes of the crises as the US dollar appreciated in 1995, forcing the Asian countries to 
devalue their currencies, as foreign exchange reserves were insufficient to maintain the pegs 
(Hussain et al, 1999). The rapid growth in domestic credit caused a significant rise in asset 
prices, an expansion of risky lending and funding of unprofitable projects as result of political 
pressures and moral hazard issues (Corsetti et al, 1998).  
Financial liberalisation policies initiated in the early 1990s are regarded as the major cause of 
the East Asian financial crises (Arestis & Demetriades, 1999). Until the late 1980s, Asian 
economies had repressed financial systems with controls on interest rates and capital flows, 
restrictions on the entry of banks in the financial sector, directed credit allocation and govern-
ment (state) ownership of banks (Bustelo, 1998). In an attempt to reduce the gap between 
savings and investments, Asian economies deregulated their financial systems by lifting all 
the financial repression policies. Financial deregulation in East Asia made it possible for 
banks to lend to domestic firms in foreign currency and allowed domestic firms to borrow 
abroad (Hussain et al, 1999). Domestic firms that borrowed in international capital markets at 
lower interest rates invested in the domestic economy where interest rates were higher. The 
lifting of controls on capital flows made Asian economies vulnerable to reversals of capital 
inflows (Arestis & Demetriades, 1999). 
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The removal of barriers to entry in the banking sector increased competition, which in turn 
resulted in a reduction of bank franchise values and lending margins (Chowdhury, 2010). 
Banks were thus encouraged to engage in risky lending in an attempt to earn more profits. 
Lending to the property sector increased substantially and thus investment returns reduced 
due to overinvestment (Chowdhury, 2010). The prices of real estate were also inflated, which 
initiated a banking crisis when property prices fell. Banking supervision weakened signifi-
cantly, and so reckless lending surged, which in turn led to a proliferation of non-performing 
loans (Bustelo, 1998). The major reason for the failure of the financial liberalisation policies 
was the absence of sound supervisory and regulatory frameworks to monitor dealings in the 
financial system (García-Páez & DelaCruz, 2012).  
Corsetti et al (1998) suggested that moral hazard problems in East Asia were evident in corp-
orate, financial and international levels. At corporate level, it was envisioned that troubled fi-
nancial institutions would be bailed out by the government, so investments were seen as in-
sured. Firms with political connections could borrow easily and so invested in risky projects 
without considering the risk-return profile of the projects. At financial level, financial institu-
tions were pressured into lending to corporations or individuals favoured by the state, a situa-
tion resembling a financially repressed system. Credit extended to corporations and individu-
als favoured by the state was viewed as less risky because of the assumption that it was gua-
ranteed by the government. At international level, moral hazard problems resulted from the 
bailouts in Mexico in 1995 as well as those from the IMF. Asian financial institutions could 
borrow from international banks which did not conduct major background checks on borrow-
ers, due to the belief that the financial institutions were guaranteed by their governments.  
Radelet & Sachs (1998) argued that the Asian financial crises were caused by a surge in capi-
tal outflows or reversals of capital inflows, which in turn resulted from panics in financial 
markets. The panics were often trigged by rational behaviour of investors as they formed ex-
pectations about the behaviour of other investors. Investors experiencing financial trouble in 
one country often ignore economic fundamentals and so treat countries in the same region 
equally (Bustelo, 1998). Capital inflows into East Asia were attracted by an educated and 
cheap labour force and high interest rates which were used to maintain the exchange rate peg. 
Between 1990 and ’96 net private capital inflows to East Asia increased from US$19.3 
billion to $108.7 billion, with FDI flows a major component of the capital inflows (Hussain et 
al, 1999). However, during the same period the growth of portfolio flows surpassed the 
growth in FDI inflows. Portfolio flows are more volatile compared with FDI inflows and are 
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usually invested for a short period, so increasing the chances of financial crises should there 
be reversals (Arestis & Demetriades, 1999). During the East Asian crises, the reversal of 
capital inflows was recorded at almost $100 billion, the bulk of which were bank loans 
(Hussain et al, 1999).  
3.5.8 The 2008 global financial crisis 
The global financial crisis was caused by the collapse of the mortgage market in the United 
States (Ramadham & Naseeb, 2009). The collapse of the mortgage market had its roots in the 
Fed’s decision to lower interest rates to 1% in 2001. The reduction in interest rates was done 
to curb the negative effects of the 11 September attack (known as 9/11) on the growth of the 
US economy (Bodie et al, 2011). The lower interest rates encouraged investors to seek alter-
native ways of achieving high returns on their investments. The US mortgage market provid-
ed investors with the prospect of earning higher yields on their investments, which was then 
exploited. 
During the early 2000s, there was a substantial inflow of funds to the US from China and the 
Middle East, which resulted in an increase in the amount of credit available (Merrouche & 
Nier, 2010). This increase in the availability of credit encouraged many US citizens to buy 
houses on credit by acquiring loans from mortgage lenders like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
In a typical mortgage contract, a homeowner borrows money from a mortgage lender to pur-
chase a house and then repays the borrowed amount with interest over a period, for example 
30 years (Bodie et al, 2011). However, this system began to change as mortgage lenders like 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac began to purchase mortgage loans from other loan mortgage 
lenders and pooling them into assets that could be traded like any other financial asset (Hor-
witz, 2012). These pools were dubbed mortgage-backed securities, as they were claims on the 
mortgages; this practice was called securitisation.    
Initially, the mortgage loans were guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and most of 
the mortgages were low-risk as households managed to pay the interest as required (Bodie et 
al, 2011). However, credit-worthy applicants started to diminish and as a result, mortgage 
lenders extended credit to risky applicants who had bad credit histories. The increase in the 
number of risky applicants resulted in securitisation of loans with high default risk, called 
“sub-prime” loans (Beachy, 2012). The loans were not guaranteed by the mortgage lenders, 
so the risk of non-payment by homeowners was borne by investors.  
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Investors were induced into purchasing sub-prime mortgages by the investment banks, which 
managed to produce AAA (highest-rated) securities from junk loans (Marshall, 2009). Of 
these sub-prime loans, 80% were rated AAA and 95% were rated A. As a result, the falsely 
rated sub-prime loans seemed attractive to investors. Investment bankers managed to create 
financial instruments called collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), which aimed to focus the 
credit risk of a number loans on some of the investors and ensuring that the other investors 
were protected from risk (Howells & Bain, 2008). The investors protected from risk were 
referred to as the senior tranches, while the other investors were called junior tranches. How-
ever, due to the inaccurate ratings created by the credit rating agencies, senior tranches were 
not devoid of risk (Allen & Carletti, 2009). 
Credit default swaps (CDSs) also encouraged investors to purchase sub-prime loans. A CDS 
is an insurance contract taken by an investor as protection against the default of one or more 
borrowers in exchange for an annual premium (Marshall, 2009). The CDS issuers, like AIG, 
issued a substantial number of CDSs without enough capital to back those issues; these CDSs 
were referred to as naked CDSs. For example, AIG sold more than $400 billion in CDS 
contracts on sub-prime mortgages. (Bodie et al, 2011) 
The originating mortgage lenders did not perform thorough checks on the ability of borrow-
ers’ ability to repay loans, which this led to an increase in the number of sub-prime loans 
(Beachy, 2012). The idea behind sub-prime loans was that defaults by some risky applicants 
would not be a problem as their houses could be sold to other households at a high price since 
house prices were increasing (Howells & Bain, 2008). From 2004, the ability of homeowners 
to refinance loans using the value of their houses declined, due to interest rate increases and a 
decrease in the growth rate of house prices from 2006.  
The default rates associated with sub-prime loans were substantial and as a result investment 
banks had many houses at their disposal, but no buyers for those houses (Horwitz, 2012). 
This situation of low demand and high supply resulted in a huge decline in house prices. The 
decline in house prices encouraged prime loan owners to default on their loans as well, as it 
was worthless to make payments on low-priced houses (Ramadham & Naseeb, 2009). As a 
result of these defaults, investment banks and investors had in their possession large loans 
and worthless houses, while mortgage lenders could not find new households to lend to. The 
whole financial system then collapsed, which led to bankruptcies in firms like Lehman Bro-
88 
 
thers, Merrill Lynch and AIG, and the closure of financial firms in the US and around the 
world. 
The Keynesians argue that the main cause of the 2008 global financial crisis was insufficient 
aggregate demand (Kotios & Galanos, 2012). This insufficient aggregate demand was caused 
by low levels of investment spending as a percentage of GDP, poor macroeconomic manage-
ment policies, lack of adequate consumption by consumers in general, and a lack of effective 
systematic regulation (Stojanov, 2009). Low levels of spending resulted in a decrease in em-
ployment and a further decrease in incomes.  
 
The Keynesian school of thought also explained the 2008 recession, using the theory on the 
savings glut and the imperfect capital market (Tridico, 2011). The savings glut was caused by 
an excess of savings in China and other Asian countries. Excess savings resulted in an in-
crease in production, which in turn led to disequilibrium between aggregate supply and ag-
gregate demand. The imperfect capital market was a result of the increased systematic risk, 
which was caused by the credit boom and the securitisation of mortgage-backed securities 
prior to 2008 (Kotios & Galanos, 2012).  
 
Monetarists believe that the economy is stable, as the price mechanism works well to clear 
the market – provided the government is prevented from manipulating the real interest rate 
(Hetzel, 2012). Monetarists view the real interest rate as an integral part of the price system, 
since it is the price of current consumption in terms of forgone future consumption. So the 
monetary authorities should avoid conducting monetary policies that prevent market forces 
from determining the appropriate real rate of interest (Hetzel, 2012).  
 
The monetarists suggest that the cause of the 2008 global financial crisis was the Fed’s deci-
sion to keep money, and hence credit, cheap for a long time (Tridico, 2011). This is referred 
to as the money glut theory, which contrasts to the savings glut theory proposed by the Key-
nesians. The monetarists claim that the savings glut theory does not give a good account of 
the financial crisis because if people save more in Asia, this will be balanced out by an in-
crease in spending in the US and other countries in Europe, and equilibrium will be restored 
(Tridico, 2011). The Fed reduced interest rates in the early 2000s, which resulted in an in-
crease in the borrowing, especially by households seeking to buy houses (Kates, 2010). The 
increase in the indebtedness of households and defaults on mortgage payments led to the 
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collapse of the US financial system, as financial institutions reduced the number of loans they 
made to the private sector – which represented a reduction in money supply – and hence the 
global financial crisis. 
 
Another interpretation of the 2008 recession provided by monetarists states that the persistent 
inflation shock in the US from 2007 onward caused a decline in real incomes and increased 
headline inflation (Hetzel, 2013). This resulted in low business and consumer confidence, 
which needed to be offset by a low real interest rate so as to maintain aggregate demand at 
high levels. The US monetary authorities focused their attention on the likely negative effects 
of a high headline inflation rate, like rising wage demands, and so increased the repurchase 
rate. The increase in the repurchase rate, coupled with the Fed’s decision not to reduce the 
funds rate, signified tight monetary policy – which then led to a recession (Hetzel, 2009).   
 
The Austrian school of thought suggests that the 2008 global financial crisis was caused by 
the Fed’s decision to reduce interest rates in the early 2000s, a move which resulted in an ex-
pansion of credit in the US (Bocutoglu & Ekinci, 2010). The expansion of credit led to an in-
crease in investments by households in mortgage-backed securities such as houses. The peri-
od 2002-’07 was characterised by a boom in residential real estate, but the boom was unsus-
tainable and so was preceded by a bust which had a substantial negative outcome on the US 
economy and the rest of the world (Templeman, 2012). 
 
The above analysis suggests that interest rate liberalisation has a positive effect on banking 
crises due to its association with higher interest rates, increases in non-performing loans, re-
laxation of banking supervision and monitoring, and higher levels of banking competition. 
However, financial repression policies such as exchange rate controls, high state ownership 
of banks and low interest rates can also result in banking crises.  
3.6 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to discuss theories of financial liberalisation. The chapter 
also discussed the theoretical arguments for and against the financial liberalisation hypothe-
sis. The study of financial liberalisation was initiated by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), 
who argued that government controls on economic activities retards economic growth. 
McKinnon (1973) suggested that real interest rates must be positive so as to encourage the 
accumulation of money balances, which is crucial for investments and economic growth. 
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Shaw (1973) argued that interest rate liberalisation is vital for financial deepening. McKinnon 
(1973) and Shaw (1973) also maintained that interest rate liberalisation has a positive effect 
on savings, which leads to higher investment and economic growth levels. 
The McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis is supported by authors like Kapur 1976), Mathieson 
(1980), Galbis (1977), Fry (1980) and Mishkin (2001), as well as the Austrian school, which 
argued that state control of economic activities should be minimised. On the other hand, the 
Neo-Structuralists, the Keynesians, New-Keynesians and the Post-Keynesians are of the view 
that government intervention in an economy is warranted and financial liberalisation would 
result in financial crises.  
Interest rate liberalisation may increase the likelihood of financial crises by encouraging 
banks to undertake risky lending practices as a result of the opportunity to earn higher re-
turns, more intense competition, moral hazard problems and a deterioration in balance sheets. 
Interest rate liberalisation is regarded as one of the causes of the 1997-’98 Asian financial 
crisis, as well as the 2008-’09 global financial crisis. So economies are encouraged to imple-
ment a sound regulatory and supervisory framework so as to reduce the likelihood of fi-
nancial crises. This chapter highlighted that interest rate liberalisation has a positive effect on 
economic growth through savings and investments, capital inflows and financial development 
channels. Chapter four discusses growth theories linked to these channels.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
LITERATURE REVIEW: GROWTH MODELS 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter three highlighted that interest rate liberalisation may influence economic growth 
through channels like savings and investments, financial development and capital inflows. 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature on growth theories, with emphasis 
placed on the different channels mentioned above. The savings and investment channel has 
been considered at length by growth models like those of Harrod-Domar, Solow-Swan and 
Romer (1986). These models emphasise that savings and investments are among the main 
drivers of economic growth. 
Financial development is regarded as another important determinant of economic growth (Le-
vine, 1997). Financial intermediaries play a crucial role in promoting investments, which in 
turn enhance economic growth. Capital inflows boost economic growth by augmenting in-
vestments and encouraging technological advancements. However, it should be noted that 
under certain conditions, capital inflows may not be growth-enhancing.  
The chapter is organised as follows: Section two discusses the models of savings, investments 
and economic growth, Section three reviews the literature on the effect of capital flows on 
economic growth, Section four discusses the theories of financial development and economic 
growth and lastly, Section five concludes the chapter.    
4.2 Models of savings, investments and economic growth 
The McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis is also supported by models of savings and economic 
growth like those of Harrod (1939), Domar (1946), Solow (1956), Swan (1956) and Romer 
(1986). These models suggest that higher levels of savings have a positive effect on 
investment as well as economic growth. The Harrod-Domar model emphasises the import-
ance of capital accumulation in boosting economic growth. The Solow-Swan model suggests 
that savings have a short-term influence on economic growth, while the Romer model sug-
gests that savings have a long-term or direct influence on economic growth. 
4.2.1 Harrod-Domar model 
 
The publication of Keynes’s general theory in 1936 led to a considerable amount of research 
by economists as they sought to examine long-run growth, which was in contrast with 
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Keynes’s short-run theory. Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946) developed similar models which 
suggested that investment spending had a positive impact on an economy’s productive 
capacity. For the purposes of this analysis, the differences in the models are ignored and so 
the model will be referred to as the Harrod-Domar model.  
The Harrod-Domar model assumes an exogenous rate of labour force growth (n), a given 
technology exhibiting fixed factor proportions (constant capital-labour ratio) and a fixed capi-
tal output ratio (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). The national income equation can be written:  
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡                                                                                                                                             4.1 
where: 𝑌𝑡 = GDP 
 𝐶𝑡 = consumption 
 𝑆𝑡 = savings 
Equilibrium in this closed economy can be written thus: 
𝐼𝑡 =  𝑆𝑡                                                                                                                                                      4.2 
where: 𝐼𝑡 = investment spending 
Based on the above equation, the national income equation can be written: 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡                                                                                                                                             4.3 
GDP is dependent on consumption and investment spending (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). In-
vestments in capital are required for economic growth, and the evolution of the capital stock 
over time can be written as follows: 
𝐾𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡                                                                                                                          4.4 
where: 𝛿 = depreciation rate of the capital stock 
 𝐾𝑡 = the capital stock 
The relationship between capital and output is referred to as the capital-output ratio and is de-
fined as follows: 
𝑣 =  𝐾 𝑌                                                                                                                                                  4.5⁄  
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where: 𝑣 = capital-output ratio 
The equation for the evolution of capital can be rewritten based on these assumptions:  
𝑆𝑡 = 𝑠𝑌𝑡                                                                                                                                                    4.6            
𝐾 = 𝑣𝑌                                                                                                                                                      4.7 
𝐼𝑡 =  𝑆𝑡                                                                                                                                                      4.8 
The first assumption states that total savings are equal to a fraction of GDP. 
The equation for the evolution of capital can thus be written as follows: 
𝑣𝑌𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛿)𝑣𝑌𝑡 + 𝑠𝑌𝑡                                                                                                                    4.9 
The equation can be simplified by dividing through by 𝑣 and subtracting 𝑌𝑡 from both sides 
of the equation, so writing it as follows: 
𝑌𝑡+1 −  𝑌𝑡 = [
𝑠
𝑣⁄ − 𝛿]𝑌𝑡                                                                                                                    4.10 
Dividing by 𝑌𝑡 results in the following equation: 
[𝑌𝑡+1 −  𝑌𝑡]
𝑌𝑡
⁄ = (𝑠 𝑣⁄ ) − 𝛿                                                                                                               4.11 
[𝑌𝑡+1 −  𝑌𝑡]
𝑌𝑡
⁄  is the growth rate of GDP 
Defining G = 
[𝑌𝑡+1 −  𝑌𝑡]
𝑌𝑡
⁄ , the Harrod-Domar growth equation can be written as follows: 
𝐺 =  (𝑠 𝑣⁄ ) − 𝛿                                                                                                                                     4.12 
The equation states that the growth rate of GDP is dependent on the savings ratio divided by 
the capital-output ratio (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). The greater the rate of savings and the low-
er the capital-output ratio and the depreciation rate, the quicker the growth rate in an econo-
my. The Harrod-Domar model thus emphasises the importance of capital accumulation in 
promoting higher economic growth (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). Capital accumulation is made 
possible by high savings and investments. 
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4.2.2 Solow-Swan Model 
The equation that describes the production function in the model devised by Solow (1956) 
and Swan (1956) is written as follows: 
𝑌(𝑡) =  𝐹(𝐾(𝑡), 𝐴(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡))                                                                                                                4.13 
where Y is output, K is capital, L is labour, A is the effectiveness of labour and t is time. 
The most important assumption of the model is that the production function has constant re-
turns to scale in capital and effectiveness of labour, implying that doubling either of the in-
puts while keeping A constant results in doubling of output produced.  
The model can be represented in labour-intensive form as follows: 
𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑘)                                                                                                                                                4.14 
where k is amount of capital per unit of effective labour (K/AL) and y is output per unit of ef-
fective labour (Y/AL).  
The marginal product of capital is positive but decreases as capital per unit of labour rises. 
This condition is outlined by the expression; 𝑓′(𝑘)  > 0, 𝑓′′(𝑘)  < 0.  Labour and knowledge 
grow at constant rates and their growth rates are represented by the following equations: 
?̇? = 𝑛𝐿(𝑡)                                                                                                                                               4.15 
?̇? = 𝑔𝐴(𝑡)                                                                                                                                              4.16 
where n and g are exogenous parameters while 𝐿 ̇ and ?̇? represent 
𝑑𝐿(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
 and 
𝑑𝐴(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
 re-
spectively.  
Output is split into consumption and investment. The fraction of output attributed to invest-
ment, s, is exogenous and constant. One unit of output devoted to investment yields one unit 
of new capital and capital depreciates at a rate of δ. The growth rate of capital is thus repre-
sented by this equation: 
?̇?(𝑡) = 𝑠𝑌(𝑡) −  𝛿𝐾(𝑡)                                                                                                                      4.17 
Given that Y/AL is equal to 𝑓(𝑘), the growth rate of capital can also be written as: 
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?̇?(𝑡) = 𝑠𝑓(𝑘(𝑡)) − (𝑛 + 𝑔 +  𝛿)𝑘(𝑡)                                                                                            4.18 
The first term of the equation 𝑠𝑓(𝑘(𝑡)) is the actual investment per unit of effective labour 
while the second term (𝑛 + 𝑔 +  𝛿)𝑘(𝑡) is the break-even investment – the level of invest-
ment is required to keep capital at existing levels. When actual investment per unit of effect-
ive labour is greater than the break-even investment, capital is rising. Capital is constant 
when the two terms are equal and decreasing when actual investment per unit of labour is less 
than break-even investment. This is outlined by Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1: Actual and break-even investment 
 
Source: Romer (2012) 
The Solow-Swan model implies that the economy converges into a balanced growth path 
which occurs when all the variables in the model are growing at a constant rate. The growth 
rate of output per worker is dependent only on the rate of technological progress. An increase 
in the savings rate shifts the actual investment line upwards, resulting in a rise in capital (k*). 
At the original k*, investment is greater than the break-even investment, so causing a rise in 
capital (k). Capital rises until a new value of k is reached where it remains constant. The 
growth rate of output per effective labour also increases until k reaches the new k* and then 
returns to its original growth rate. So a permanent increase in the savings rate results in an in-
crease in the growth rate of output per worker, but only temporarily. This is represented by 
Figure 4.2.  
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Figure 4.2: The effect of an increase in savings on investments 
 
Source: Romer (2012) 
4.2.3 The Romer model 
 
The Romer (1986) model differs from the Solow-Swan model in the sense that technology is 
endogenised, so a rise in savings results in an increase in both the per capita output and the 
growth rate of per capita output. The production function in the model is represented as 
follows: 
𝑌 = 𝑓(𝐾𝑓𝐾. 𝐿)                                                                                                                                      4.19 
where Y represents output, Kf represents the physical capital stock used by all firms in an eco-
nomy, L represents the labour input and K is the spill-over effect from investment. The model 
makes the assumption that there are positive returns to all factors of production although they 
are declining. It is also assumed that there are constant returns to scale in capital, Ki, which is 
the capital stock in each firm and labour for all firms, but at social level there are constant so-
cial returns in Ki and K for a given labour input. 
The production function can be written in labour-intensive form as follows: 
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𝑦 =  𝑌 𝐿⁄ = 𝑓(𝐾𝑓 , 𝐾)                                                                                                                           4.20 
The average product of capital can be represented as follows: 
𝑌
𝑘⁄ = 𝑓
𝐾
𝑘⁄ = 𝑓(𝐿)                                                                                                                           4.21 
There are constant marginal costs which can be written as follows: 
𝑦 = 𝐾𝑓(𝐿)                                                                                                                                             4.22 
𝑌 = 𝐾(𝑓(𝐿))                                                                                                                                         4.23 
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝐾
= 𝑓(𝐿) > 0                                                                                                                                     4.24 
𝜕𝑌2
𝜕2𝑌
= 0                                                                                                                                                  4.25 
The above equations imply that there is no change in marginal product of capital as the capi-
tal-labour ratio increases. 
The growth rate of capital can be represented as follows: 
?̇? =  
𝑠𝑦
𝑘
− 𝑔𝐿                                                                                                                                         4.26 
=  𝑠𝑓(𝐿) −  𝑔𝐿                                                                                                                                       4.27 
Since: 
𝜕𝑓(𝐿)
𝜕𝐾
= 0                                                                                                                                              4.28 
it follows that:  
𝜕?̇?
𝜕𝐾
= 0                                                                                                                                                   4.29 
The growth rate of the capital-labour ratio is not declining, so the growth rate of per capita 
output is not declining in the capital ratio either. So an increase in savings has a positive ef-
fect on the growth rate of the capital labour ratio and per capita output, but the increase in the 
growth rate would continue indefinitely.  
98 
 
The difference between the model by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) and the Romer (1986) 
model is the treatment of the capital stock. In the Romer model the social returns to capital as 
well as the marginal product of capital are constant, so the investment in capital continues as 
the capital-labour ratio increases.  
4.3 Capital flows and economic growth 
There are three main categories of capital flows: foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign 
portfolio flows and other foreign investments, like foreign loans, deposits between banks, 
companies and governments (Wesso, 2001). FDI flows are investments in firms where for-
eign investors have at least 10% voting rights, while portfolio flows include bonds and equi-
ties listed on stock exchanges. FDI flows are more resilient to external shocks than other 
types of capital inflows, while portfolio flows are subject to large reversals during financial 
crises and then have a negative influence on economic growth (Ahmed, Arezki & Funke, 
2005).   
Capital inflows are influenced by various factors, like GDP growth, real interest rates, the in-
vestment environment, macroeconomic performance, quality of institutions and financial de-
velopment (Wesso, 2001). An economy with a high economic growth rate receives a signif-
icant amount of capital as this indicates high current and future returns, and lower risks (Ah-
med et al, 2005). Higher real interest rates signify that returns to investments are high and 
since investors seek the highest possible returns, capital flows would be higher (McLean & 
Shrestha, 2002).  
The investment environment is characterised by the volatility of inflation and exchange rates 
as well as exchange rate controls (Ahmed et al, 2005). Exchange rate volatility has a negative 
influence on capital inflows, especially those that are directed at export-oriented industries, 
since it increases uncertainty with regard to the demand for exports. A high and volatile infla-
tion rate increases uncertainty with regard to investment returns due to its negative effect on 
the real value of domestic assets, and so discourages capital inflows (Wesso, 2001; Ahmed et 
al, 2005). High inflation can also depreciate the domestic currency and fuels capital outflows 
due to the fear of capital losses in terms of the domestic currency (Wesso, 2001). Capital con-
trols reduce capital inflows by placing restrictions on the movement of capital across borders. 
These controls limit the repatriation of profits and other capital outflows and so discourage 
foreign investors from investing in the domestic economy (Ahmed et al, 2005).  
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Developed financial markets attract more capital inflows compared with less developed mar-
kets (Ahmed et al, 2005). Financial development is a precondition for portfolio inflows and 
in particular FDI, as it improves access to finance for foreign firms to meet capital require-
ments. There is a growing strand of literature which suggests that the development of the fi-
nancial sector is crucial for FDI flows to have a positive influence on economic growth 
(McLean & Shrestha, 2002). Countries with developed financial sectors extract more benefits 
from FDI than countries with shallow financial systems. Lack of financial development also 
limits the number of financial instruments available for investment purposes in the financial 
markets (Mougani, Rivera, Zhang, Mezui & Kim, 2013).  
Economic theory suggests that capital inflows can have a positive influence on economic 
growth by supplementing domestic savings and investments, and through technological diffu-
sion (McLean & Shrestha, 2002). Barro, Mankiw & Salai-Martin (1995) developed a neo-
classical growth model in an open economy where capital is mobile between countries in 
search of higher returns. The model suggested that capital inflows boost the rate of capital ac-
cumulation and also enhance an economy’s speed of convergence on its steady-state level of 
output.  
Capital inflows can be used to finance a current account deficit. The determinants of the 
fluctuations in the current account can be represented by national accounting identities 
(Olivei, 2000). The starting point involves defining a nation’s gross national product in pe-
riod t: 
𝐺𝑁𝑃𝑡 =  𝑌𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡𝐵𝑡                                                                                                                                4.30 
where: 𝑌𝑡 = the country’s GDP 
𝑟𝑡𝐵𝑡 = is the net income from abroad which can also be regarded as the ex post return 
𝑟𝑡 earned on the stock 𝐵𝑡 of net foreign assets entering period t. 
Equilibrium in the economy can be specified as follows: 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝐶𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 + 𝑁𝑋𝑡                                                                                                                    4.31 
where: 𝐶𝑡 = private consumption 
 𝐺𝑡 = government expenditure 
 𝐼𝑡 = investments 
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 𝑁𝑋𝑡 = net exports 
Based on the above identities, the current account can be specified as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑡 =  𝑁𝑋𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡𝐵𝑡 = 𝐺𝑁𝑃𝑡 − (𝐶𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡)                                                                               4.32 
Since the difference between a country’s gross national product and private and government 
consumption is national savings, the current account can be written as the difference between 
savings and investments: 
𝐶𝐴𝑡 =  𝑆𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡                                                                                                                                       4.33 
Defining the current account as the difference between national savings and domestic invest-
ments is appropriate when analysing international capital flows (Higgins & Klitgaard, 1998). 
To balance the current account, savings and investments should be equal. If national savings 
are not sufficient to finance domestic investments, foreign savings are then required to fi-
nance the excess investments over savings. A high current account deficit has a negative ef-
fect on domestic firms and employment levels in a country as imports displace domestically 
produced goods (Higgins & Klitgaard, 1998). However, an inflow of capital could allow the 
economy to make investments that could maintain the level of employment. If domestic sav-
ings are greater than investments, the surplus in the current account would be invested abroad 
as net outflow of capital (Olivei, 2000). However, Feldstein (1992) argues that a current ac-
count deficit can be financed by capital inflows in the short run, but in the long run the cur-
rent account is balanced by changes in investments.  
The effect of capital inflows on economic growth through technological diffusion has re-
ceived considerable attention down the years. Solow’s (1957) neoclassical model initiated the 
analysis of the effect of foreign investments on economic growth through technological ad-
vancements. Solow’s model was developed by Findlay (1978), who constructed a dynamic 
model that captures the process of technological diffusion when FDI inflows are incorpor-
ated. In Findlay’s model the rate of technological progress in the “backward” region is depen-
dent on the degree of openness to foreign investments.  
The endogenous growth models of Romer (1990), Grossman & Helpman (1997), Barrel & 
Pain (1997) and Borensztein et al (1998) incorporate the role of technological progress in the 
production process and conclude that technological progress is an important determinant of 
economic growth. Romer (1990) argues that technological progress enhances human capital, 
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which promotes economic growth through higher levels of productivity. Grossman & Help-
man (1997) state that FDI promotes competition and innovation that boosts technological 
progress and productivity. Barrel & Pain (1997) focus on the effect of technological transfers 
on the rate of technical change and economic growth, and conclude that the rate of technical 
change is dependent on the rate of direct investments. Borensztein et al (1998) propose that 
FDI results in a reduction in the cost of introducing capital goods. Economic growth in coun-
tries that produce fewer capital goods will also be faster, due to the lower cost at which tech-
nology can be adopted. The authors conclude that the effect of technological progress on 
growth is dependent on the levels of human capital.  
Capital inflows in the form of portfolio flows often result in a surge in asset prices and an ap-
preciation in the exchange rate in a floating exchange rate regime (Kim & Yang, 2008). The 
increase in asset prices occurs due to the increased demand for stocks. The increase in stock 
prices can result in a reduction in the expected rate of return which increases the demand for 
other assets, like bonds and property (Kim & Yang, 2008). The increase in demand for bonds 
and property puts upward pressure on their prices. An appreciation of the exchange rate 
caused by capital inflows increases the demand for imports by making them cheaper, and 
reduces the demand for exports which in turn has a negative influence on the current account 
balance (Benes, Guajardo, Sandri & Simon, 2013; Sidaoui, Ramos-Francia & Cuadra, 2011). 
On the other hand, an appreciation of the currency has the benefit of reducing the cost of 
imported goods or raw materials, which reduces the cost of production as well as inflation. 
On the other hand, capital inflows may not be growth-enhancing and pose a significant 
amount of concern to policy-makers in developing countries (Benes et al, 2013). Under a 
floating exchange rate regime, capital inflows have a major effect on both the nominal and 
real exchange rates. A surge in capital inflows results in a sharp appreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate, while the real exchange rate appreciates if domestic prices are sticky (Sidaoui 
et al, 2011). The appreciation of the exchange rate disadvantages exporters as the prices for 
their goods increases, which in turn can result in business closures and a deterioration of the 
trade balance. The trade balance is further worsened by the increase in imports caused by the 
drop in the prices of imported goods resulting from the appreciation of the exchange rate (Si-
daoui et al, 2011).  
Capital inflows increase the availability of funds for borrowing purposes, which fosters a 
surge in credit expansion (Sidaoui et al, 2011). Credit expansion in an environment character-
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ised by a weak regulatory framework may increase the number of non-performing loans, as 
credit standards are sometimes reduced. Defaults in the repayment of credit results in finan-
cial instability in the economy and can result in financial crises. Another concern with regard 
to capital inflows is the possibility of sudden reversals, which cause a reduction in domestic 
expenditures and production, real exchange rate depreciation and a drop in asset prices 
(Benes et al, 2013). The concerns regarding capital inflows stem from the experiences of 
Asian countries during the 1997-’98 financial crisis when capital inflows increased 
substantially prior to the crisis and resulted in the growth of credit, appreciation of exchange 
rates and loss of competitiveness, as well as the 2008 global financial crisis.  
FDI inflows may retard economic growth under certain conditions. Reis (2001) postulated 
that despite the positive effect of foreign investments through technological advancements, 
there is a possibility that they may not boost domestic welfare, as investment returns are repa-
triated. Furthermore, domestic producers may not be able to operate in the research and de-
velopment sector, which has a negative effect on national income. The author concludes that 
foreign investments are welfare-enhancing only when the increase in productivity outweighs 
the loss of profits. Firebaugh (1992) argues that FDI inflows may not be growth-enhancing, 
as multinationals repatriate profits rather than invest in the domestic economy and use capi-
tal-intensive production processes which have no effect on employment levels. FDI inflows 
may also crown out, rather than supplement domestic investments.   
4.4 Financial development and economic growth 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) argued that financial repression policies, like controls on 
interest rates, promote a shallower financial system than one where the financial sector is lib-
eralised, hence having a negative influence on financial development. According to McKin-
non (1973), financial liberalisation results in financial deepening as more savers and investors 
enter the financial system and use financial intermediaries. So the flow of resources between 
individuals and institutions is more efficient, which in turn encourages savings and increases 
the availability of funds for capital accumulation. The role of financial development in pro-
moting economic growth is discussed to a large extent by Schumpeter (1912), Greenwood & 
Jovanovic (1990), Bencivenga & Smith (1991), Saint-Paul (1992) and Levine (1997).  
The discussion on the influence of financial development on economic growth was initiated 
by Schumpeter (1912), who suggested that the availability of credit encourages entrepreneurs 
to innovate and produce more goods and services. Financial intermediaries arise due to 
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problems created by information asymmetry. The cost of acquiring information for individual 
savers and investors is high, which may prevent mutually beneficial exchanges from taking 
place (Levine, 1997). Also, a financial system performs five broad functions: producing 
information about possible investments, mobilising and pooling savings and allocating 
capital, monitoring investments and exerting corporate governance after providing finance, 
facilitating the trading, diversification and management of risk, and easing the exchange of 
goods and services (Schumpeter, 1912; Levine, 1997). 
4.4.1 Acquiring investment information 
The ability of individuals to shift savings to investments is often hindered by the huge costs 
of obtaining information (Levine, 1997). So savers are discouraged from investing in proj-
ects, so increasing the possibility that savings may remain idle. Financial intermediaries have 
the ability to collect and process information on efficient investments, including the best 
firms and managers, more effectively than individual savers, which encourages savers to in-
vest (Hassan, Sanchez & Yu, 2011). The quality of investments is thus improved as financial 
intermediaries invest in profitable and productive firms. Also growth is enhanced, as funds 
will be channelled to effective managers, so ensuring an efficient allocation of capital (Green-
wood & Jovanovic, 1990).  
4.4.2 Monitoring investments 
Financial intermediaries as shareholders and creditors have the ability to monitor the behavi-
our of managers with regard to how they use the invested funds at a lower cost than individu-
al savers (FitzGerald, 2006). So managers are compelled to make decisions that maximise 
profits and firm value, which in turn improves resource allocation. Individual savers are pre-
vented from monitoring the behaviour of firms and exerting corporate governance due to the 
large information and transaction costs involved (Estranda et al, 2010). Without financial int-
ermediaries that monitor managers, savings mobilisation may be discouraged, which in turn 
reduces investments and economic growth (Stiglitz & Wiess, 1981). 
4.4.3 Risk management 
Financial intermediaries are crucial for trading, hedging and pooling of risk (Levine, 1997). 
The two most prominent types of risks are liquidity and idiosyncratic risks. Liquidity risk re-
fers to the ease with which assets can be converted to cash. Information asymmetries create 
uncertainties with regard to the conversion of assets into cash, which in turn discourages in-
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vestments. Developed financial markets enable the trading of financial assets at a low cost 
and reduce uncertainty. This encourages investors to hold long-term assets in the knowledge 
that they can easily be converted to cash. So financial development promotes investments in 
long-term projects – a major determinant of economic growth (Bencivenga & Smith, 1991).  
Financial intermediaries also mitigate risks associated with individual firms or projects. By 
investing in a variety of firms and industries, risk is diversified, which in turn has a positive 
effect on the allocation of resources and economic growth (Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990). 
Through risk diversification, financial intermediaries invest more in high-return projects 
(Saint-Paul, 1992). According to King and Levine (1993), innovation requires a substantial 
amount of investments. However they involve a great deal of risk on the part of investors. At 
the same time, individual savers are risk-averse and so prefer to invest in low-risk projects 
which have low returns (FitzGerald, 2006). This may prevent investments in risky or long-
term projects, which are the main drivers of economic growth. Financial institutions invest in 
both low-risk and high-risk investment projects, with more funds invested in high-risk proj-
ects with higher returns. Also through risk diversification, technological advancements are 
promoted, which enhances economic growth.  
4.4.4 Pooling savings 
Financial intermediaries aid in the pooling of savings which can be invested in a variety of 
projects. This enables individual savers to hold diversified instruments, which in turn boosts 
liquidity. Also, savings collected are used to create a large pool of funds, which results in 
higher levels of investments and faster capital accumulation (FitzGerald, 2006; Greenwood & 
Jovanovic, 1990). The rate of economic growth would thus be higher due to higher levels of 
investment.  
4.4.5 Exchange of goods and services 
Financial intermediaries aid in the exchange of goods and services by reducing transaction 
costs (FitzGerald, 2006). The reduction of transaction costs boosts economic growth by faci-
litating the specialisation of economic activities by workers. The specialisation of activities 
also has a positive influence on the ability of workers to produce more goods and services 
and more technologies (Estranda et al, 2010). Specialisation encourages inventions/innova-
tions in production of goods and services.  
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Financial development is the establishment and expansion of financial institutions, instru-
ments and markets, which has a positive impact on investment and economic growth (Ndeb-
bio, 2004). Financial development improves the efficiency of investments by shifting funds 
from less productive sectors to more productive ones (FitzGerald, 2006). A larger financial 
system enables an economy to take advantage of economies of scale due to the significant 
amount of fixed costs in operating financial intermediaries. An increase in the number of in-
dividuals in the financial system enhances available credit for investment purposes and also 
improves the performance of financial intermediaries (FitzGerald, 2006).  
The availability of financial services in rural or poorer communities can also have a positive 
effect on economic growth as the number of participants in the financial system increases 
(Estranda et al, 2010). The availability of financial services in rural communities can also 
boost farming production through the increase in funds which can be borrowed for the pur-
chase of high-yield seeds, fertilisers and farming equipment. Rural communities could be en-
couraged to use those financial services for savings and investment purposes, which would 
enable them to smooth lifetime consumption and provide a means for coping with negative 
income shocks. Poverty levels could thus be reduced by enhancing the availability of finan-
cial services to poor communities (Spratt, 2009). 
Another channel through which financial development can affect economic growth is the 
stability or lack of it in the financial system (Estranda et al, 2010). A stable financial system 
is characterised by sound financial markets and financial institutions which make an economy 
resilient to adverse shocks. Financial development also boosts economic growth by providing 
access to financial services. Lack of finance has a negative influence on investments and 
business activity. The growth and development of small business enterprises (SMEs) 
especially depends on the availability of funds for investment purposes. SMEs have an 
influence on growth through job creation, the production of goods and services and 
increasing competition in the economy.  
4.5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to review the literature on selected growth theories. The 
theories discussed stress the importance of investments in promoting economic growth. The 
savings and investment growth theories highlight the importance of savings in promoting in-
vestments. The Solow-Swann model suggests that savings have a short-term effect on eco-
nomic growth, while Romer (1986) argues that the relationship is long-term in nature.  
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Capital inflows have a positive effect on economic growth by supplementing domestic invest-
ments and enhancing technological progress. In a period of inadequate savings, capital in-
flows may allow economies to maintain high levels of investments. However, as suggested 
by Feldstein (1992), the effect of capital inflows on economic growth may be short-term in 
this regard. Foreign investments may enhance technological progress in the domestic econo-
my, which in turn boosts productivity and economic growth. However, foreign direct invest-
ments may under certain conditions not be growth-enhancing. The likelihood of financial cri-
ses in the case of reversals and currency appreciations may result from capital inflows which 
deteriorate the trade balance as exports are reduced. FDI inflows may not be growth-en-
hancing in countries with low levels of human capital, and multinational corporations are 
more likely to repatriate profits rather than invest in the domestic economy.   
Financial development has a positive effect on economic growth by creating an environment 
that is conducive for savings and investments. Without financial intermediaries, savings may 
be idle due to the cost of acquiring information, which discourages investments and economic 
growth. Chapter five surveys the existing empirical literature on the relationship between 
interest rate liberalisation and economic growth through the different channels as well as the 
empirical literature on the impact of interest rate liberalisation on financial crises.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
5.1  Introduction 
Based on the analysis in Chapters three and four, interest rates affect economic growth 
through a number of channels. These channels include savings and investments, financial 
deepening, capital flows, exchange rates and inflation and lastly financial crises. McKinnon 
and Shaw suggest that higher interest rates resulting from interest rate liberalisation 
encourage savings, which in turn increase the availability of loanable funds for investments 
(McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). According to Shaw (1973), interest rate liberalisation is vital 
for financial deepening, which promotes higher economic growth. Interest rates can have a 
positive effect on capital inflows in search of higher returns (Wesso, 2001; De Jager, 2012).  
Interest rate liberalisation increases the likelihood of financial crises by enhancing risk-taking 
on the part of banks (Demirgüҫ-Kunt & Detragiache 1998). On the other hand, interest rate 
liberalisation could reduce the likelihood of financial crises and promote stability in the bank-
ing sector (Triki & Maktour 2012). The purpose of this chapter is to present some of the ex-
isting empirical literature on the relationship between interest rate liberalisation and econom-
ic growth. The studies selected in this are mostly from developing countries in Asia, Latin 
America and African countries with only a few from developed countries. Furthermore, the 
chapter surveys the estimation techniques that can be employed in examining the effect of 
interest rates on economic growth.  
In what follows, Section 5.2 presents the empirical evidence on the effect of interest rate lib-
eralisation on savings, investments and economic growth. Section 5.3 presents a review of 
some empirical evidence on the effect of interest rates on capital flows and economic growth. 
Section 5.4 presents empirical evidence on the role played by interest rate reforms in 
promoting financial development and economic growth. Section 5.5 presents empirical 
evidence on the relationship between interest rate liberalisation and financial crises, while 
Section 5.6 identifies the gaps in the existing literature. Section 5.7 surveys the various 
estimation techniques that can be employed in the study, and Section 5.8 concludes the 
chapter.         
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5.2 Interest rate liberalisation, savings, investments and economic growth  
 This section includes studies that analysed the relationship between interest rates and savings, 
savings and investments as well as investments and economic growth.  
 Boskin (1978) examined the relationship between taxation, savings and interest rates in the 
United States for the period 1929-’69 using the ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental 
variables techniques. Boskin (1978) concluded that savings are highly interest-elastic, mean-
ing that an increase in interest rates has a positive effect on savings. This suggests that higher 
interest rates resulting from interest rate liberalisation boost savings. 
Fry (1978) investigated the effects of money, capital and financial deepening in economic de-
velopment in selected Asian countries for the period 1962-’72 using the TSLS technique as 
well as a least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model. Fry (1978) reported that the real int-
erest rate has a positive effect on savings and economic growth, a result which is line with 
Boskin (1978). In response to Fry (1978), Giovannini (1983) examined the interest elasticity 
of savings in selected Asian developing countries for the period 1964-’80 and suggested that 
the effect of interest rates on savings was insignificant, despite using the same empirical ap-
proach as Fry (1978). 
According to empirical literature studies by Gupta (1986), Athukorala & Rajapatirana (1993), 
Athukorala (1998), De Melo & Tybout (1986), Warman & Thirwall (1994) and Gupta 
(1987), the effect of interest rates on savings varies between different geographical regions. 
To a large extent, interest rates have a positive effect on savings in Asian countries. However 
for Latin American countries, empirical studies suggest that interest rates have an insignifi-
cant effect on savings. Empirical studies on Asian countries include that of Gupta (1986), 
who examined the relationship between financial development and economic growth in India 
and South Korea for the period 1960-’81. Using dynamic multiplier analysis, Gupta (1986) 
found that financial liberalisation had a positive impact on financial development and invest-
ments. An increase in nominal interest rates also has a positive effect on private savings, but 
the effect is larger in India. Athukorala & Rajapatirana (1993) concur with the results of Gup-
ta (1986) when examining the effect of domestic financial liberalisation on the Sri Lankan 
economy for the period 1960-’87. Athukorala & Rajapatirana (1993) reported that interest 
rates have a positive effect on savings in the post-liberalisation stage. Athukorala (1998) con-
cluded that higher interest rates promote both financial and total savings in India. 
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Furthermore, the impact of the higher real deposit rate on investments, outweighs the 
negative effect of higher real lending interest rate. 
As mentioned above, some empirical studies suggest that interest rates have an insignificant 
effect on savings in Latin American countries. One such study is by De Melo & Tybout 
(1986), who examined the impact of financial liberalisation on savings and investments in 
Uruguay for the period 1962-’83 using an instrumental variables model. De Melo & Tybout 
(1986) concluded that the real interest rate and savings have a positive but weak correlation. 
In the post-reform period there is no interest rate elasticity of savings. Warman & Thirwall 
(1994) are in agreement with De Melo & Tybout (1986) when examining the relationship be-
tween interest rates, savings, investments and economic growth in Mexico for the period 
1960-’90. Using the OLS technique, Warman & Thirwall (1994) found that the real interest 
rate is positively related to financial savings while total savings and the growth rate are in-
variant with respect to the real interest rate. Also, the real interest rate is negatively related to 
investments. 
In a study on the relationship between aggregate savings, financial intermediation and interest 
rates in 22 Latin American and Asian countries, Gupta (1987) concluded that interest rates 
are positively related to savings in Asia, while for Latin America, interest rates have no effect 
on savings. Bayoumi (1993) examined the effect of financial deregulation on household sav-
ings in the United Kingdom for the period 1971-’88 using the three-stage least squares mod-
el. The results suggest that financial deregulation reduced savings by 2.25% on average, 
while real interest rates have a positive but insignificant effect on savings.  
Bandiera et al (2000) investigated the effect of financial reforms on savings in Malaysia, 
Ghana, Zimbabwe, Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, Mexico and Chile for the period 1970-’94. A 
financial liberalisation index was constructed for each country using principal component 
analysis, and estimation techniques like the GMM, GLS, OLS and panel cointegration were 
used. Bandiera et al (2000) concluded that financial liberalisation has a positive effect on 
savings in Ghana and Turkey and a negative effect on savings in Korea, Mexico and Zimba-
bwe. Furthermore, the real interest rate has an insignificant effect on savings and in the long 
run affects savings negatively in Ghana and Indonesia. In contrast, Shrestha and Chowdhury 
(2007) found evidence supporting the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis when testing the 
validity of the financial liberalisation hypothesis in Nepal. The authors conclude that the real 
interest rate has a positive impact on investments through savings.   
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Ang and Sen (2011) investigated the roles of financial liberalisation and expected pension 
benefits in influencing private savings in India and Malaysia for the period 1950-2005. Ang 
& Sen (2011) constructed a financial liberalisation index and applied the ARDL and ECM 
estimation techniques. The results suggest that the real interest rate has a positive effect on 
savings in India but is negative towards savings in Malaysia. Also, financial liberalisation has 
a negative effect on savings in both countries, which is in line with the findings of Bayoumi 
(1993). 
The effect of interest rates on investments in ambiguous. A rise in interest rates has a positive 
effect on investments by increasing the availability of loanable funds for investment purpos-
es. A similar conclusion is reached by Khan & Hasan (1998) on examining the relationship 
between financial liberalisation, savings and economic development in Pakistan for the peri-
od 1959-’95. Laumas (1990) concurs with the findings of Khan and Hasan (1998) in the ex-
amination of the relationship between monetisation, financial liberalisation and economic de-
velopment in India for the period 1954-’75 using the TSLS technique. The results of Khan & 
Hasan (1998) and Laumas (1990) are in support of McKinnon’s complementary hypothesis.  
A rise in interest rates can impact negatively on investments through the rise in borrowing 
costs. Interest rates may also fail to significantly influence the level of investments. A study 
by Gelb (1989) investigated the relationship between financial policies, growth and efficiency 
in 34 countries for the period 1965-’85 using cross-country regressions. The results suggest 
that the real interest rate is positively related to economic growth through a rise in the 
efficiency of investments, not the quantity, suggesting that the real interest rate has no effect 
on the quantity of investments. Rittenberg (1991) examined the relationship between 
investment spending and interest rate policy in Turkey for the period 1964-’86 using OLS 
and a switching model. Rittenberg (1991) concluded that for below-equilibrium interest rates, 
an increase in real interest rates has a positive effect on real private investments. For above-
equilibrium interest rates, real interest rates have a negative effect on investments.  
Achy (2003), as well as Bandiera, Caprio, Honohan & Schiantarelli (2000) constructed finan-
cial liberalisation indices in their respective analysis and report contrasting results. Achy 
(2003) examined the relationship between financial liberalisation, savings, investments and 
economic growth in MENA countries using panel data modelling for the period 1970-’98. 
Achy (2003) constructed two financial liberalisation indices. The first was constructed using 
interest rates, reserve requirements, bank supervision, pro-competition measures, security of 
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markets, prudential regulation and capital account openness. The second financial liberalisa-
tion index was constructed using financial depth, total liquid liabilities, deposit money, bank 
assets and private credit. The results revealed that financial depth and financial liberalisation 
have a negative effect on private investments, while the real interest rate has a positive effect 
on investments. Also, interest rates have a positive effect on savings and economic growth, 
while private investments have a positive effect on economic growth. 
There is contrasting evidence on the effect of interest rate liberalisation on economic growth. 
Romero-Á vila (2009) examined the effect of capital account and interest rate liberalisation in 
EU-15 countries for the period 1960-2007. Using the GMM estimation technique and ANO-
VA analysis, Romero-Á vila (2009) found that lifting capital controls as well as liberalising 
interest rates has a positive effect on economic growth. Also, the growth effect of interest rate 
liberalisation is 0.3% a year. A similar conclusion is reached by Kendall (2000), who exam-
ined the relationship between interest rates, savings and economic growth in Guyana for the 
period 1965-’95 using the two-stage least squares (TSLS) technique. Kendall (2000) found 
that savings and the real deposit rate are positively correlated. Furthermore, savings and real 
deposit rates have a positive effect on economic growth. Other studies that report a positive 
relationship between interest rates and economic growth are those of Achy (2003) and Fry 
(1978).  
Hye & Wizarat (2013) reported that the real interest rate together with financial liberalisation 
have a negative effect on economic growth in a study of the effect of financial liberalisation 
on economic growth in Pakistan. Hye & Wizarat (2013) used the autoregressive distributed 
lag (ARDL) model as well as the ECM, and the period of the study is 1971-2009. The results 
also suggest that investments has a positive effect on economic growth.   
Empirical studies from African countries suggests that on average there is a positive 
relationship between interest rates, savings, investments and economic growth. Boadi, Li & 
Lartey (2015) examined whether interest rate liberalisation had an effect on bank deposits in 
Ghana for the period 1991-2012, using the OLS method. Boadi et al (2015) found that 
interest rate liberalisation had a positive effect on bank deposits. Opoku & Ackah (2015) 
concur with Boadi et al (2015) in a study of the responsiveness of private savings to changes 
in real interest rates in Ghana for the period 1970-2013. Using the ADF Engle Granger 
cointegration test and the ECM, Opoku & Ackah (2015) concluded that the real interest rate 
has a positive and significant effect on long-run savings during the reform period of 1988 to 
112 
 
2013 and pre-reform period of 1970 to 1987. Also, the real interest rate has a positive effect 
on short-run savings in the reform period, but an insignificant effect during the pre-reform 
periods. Owusu & Odhiambo (2015) examined the relationship between financial sector 
reforms and economic growth in Ghana for the period 1969-2008 using the ARDL 
cointegration test. Owusu & Odhiambo (2015) constructed a financial liberalisation index 
using principal components and concluded that financial sector reforms had a positive but 
insignificant effect on economic growth, while an increase in capital accumulation has a 
positive and significant effect on economic growth.  
Kargbo (2010), Mottelle & Masenyetse (2012) as well as Bouzid (2012) examined 
McKinnon’s complementary hypothesis in developing countries. Kargbo (2010) focused on 
Sierra Leone for the period 1977-2008 using the ARDL model and reported that the real 
interest rate is positively related to the demand for money balances, and savings have a 
positive but insignificant effect on demand for money balances. Mottelle & Masenyetse 
(2012)’s analysis was for Lesotho during the period 1990-2006. Estimation techniques used 
included the Granger causality test, the Johansen cointegration test and the vector error 
correlation model (VECM). The results were in support of the McKinnon and Shaw 
hypothesis, as money and demand and the ratio of savings to gross national income are 
positively correlated. Also, an increase in the real interest rate increases savings mobilisation. 
Bouzid (2012) focused on Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria for the period 1973-2003 using the 
OLS method. The author found that McKinnon’s complementary hypothesis holds only for 
Algeria, where the investment rate is positively related to real money demand and where the 
real interest rate is positively related to the accumulation of money balances. 
Orji, Ogbuabor & Anthony-Orji (2015) investigated the impact of financial liberalisation on 
economic growth in Nigeria for the period 1981-2012 using OLS, ECM and the Engle-Gran-
ger cointegration test. Orji et al (2015) constructed a financial liberalisation dummy variable 
index taking the value of 0 for the years before the reforms and 1 for years after the reforms. 
The results showed that financial liberalisation and savings have a positive effect on econom-
ic growth. Also, the lending rate is positively related to economic growth. In examining the 
relationship between financial reforms, interest rates and economic growth in Nigeria for the 
period 1970-2006, Obamuyi & Olaranfemi (2011) concur with Orji et al (2015) to a certain 
extent. Using the Johansen cointegration test as well as the error correction model (ECM), 
Obamuyi & Olaranfemi (2011) concluded that real deposit and lending rates are positively 
correlated with economic growth in both the long and the short run. However, savings are 
113 
 
negatively related to economic growth, suggesting that the positive influence of interest rates 
on economic growth is through another channel. This contrasts with the findings of Orji et al 
(2015), who report a positive link between savings and economic growth.  
Orji, Eigbirenmolen & Ogbuabor (2014) examined the impact of financial liberalisation on 
private investment in Nigeria for the period of 1970 to 2012. Using the Engle-Granger cointe-
gration test as well as the Granger causality test, Orji et al (2014) found that the real interest 
rate and savings have a positive impact on private investments.    
5.3 Interest rate liberalisation, capital flows and economic growth  
 This section includes studies that have examined the relationship between interest rates and 
FDI and those that have analysed the impact of FDI on economic growth.  
Calvo & Reinhart (1996) investigated the evidence of contagion effects in capital flows to 
Latin American countries for the period 1970-’93 using principal components analysis. Calvo 
& Reinhart (1996) reported that an increase in real short-term US interest rates has a negative 
effect on capital flows to Latin American countries and also increases capital outflows. Capi-
tal inflows and outflows in larger Latin American countries have an effect on capital inflows 
and outflows in smaller countries, suggesting the presence of contagion effects. Ahmed, 
Arezki & Funke (2005) reached a similar conclusion to that of Calvo & Reinhart (1996) 
when examining the determinants of capital flows to emerging economies. Ahmed et al 
(2005) concluded that higher international interest rates deter FDI inflows to emerging eco-
nomies. Also, a higher economic growth rate attracts FDI inflows, while financial develop-
ment attracts portfolio inflows. 
Jeanneau & Micu (2002) examined the trends in international bank lending to emerging mar-
ket countries for the period 1985-2000 using panel data modelling. The results showed that 
the real GDP growth rate in lending countries is positively correlated with bank lending. 
There is a positive relationship between real short-term interest rates in the lending countries 
and bank lending, which contradicts the findings of Calvo & Reinhart (1996) and Ahmed et 
al (2005). Higher economic growth in emerging countries is positively related to bank lend-
ing, which confirms the findings of Ahmed et al (2005). 
Ralhan (2006) examined the determinants of capital flows in Australia, India, Indonesia, Arg-
entina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Colombia for the period 1970-1995. Using the OLS and 
seemingly unrelated regression, Ralhan (2006) reported that there is a positive relationship 
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between GDP and capital flows, so confirming the findings of Jeanneau & Micu (2002) and 
Ahmed et al (2005). Ralhan (2006) also concluded that foreign interest rates measured by the 
London interbank offered rate have an insignificant effect on capital inflows in all countries, 
which contradicts the findings of Ahmed et al (2005) and Calvo & Reinhart (1996). 
Wesso (2001) examined the dynamics of capital flows in South Africa for the period 1991-
2000 using a VAR model as well as an ECM. The results showed that economic growth and 
the exchange rate adjusted interest rate have a positive effect on capital flows. Aw & Tang 
(2009) examined the determinants of inward FDI in Malaysia for the period of 1970-2005 
using the ARDL, Engle-Granger and Johansen cointegration tests as well as an ECM. Aw & 
Tang (2009) found that there is a positive long-run relationship between FDI and its 
determinants, like interest rates and GDP per capita.  
Verma & Prakash (2011) examined the sensitivity of capital flows to interest rate differentials 
in India for the period 1996-2001 using cointegration analysis, Granger causality and a VAR 
model. Using the difference between 91-day Government of India T-bill and three-month US 
Treasury bill rates, Verma & Prakash (2011) suggested that net capital flows as a whole are 
sensitive to interest rate differentials in both the short and long term. However, FDI is not 
sensitive to interest rate differentials. Ahmed & Zlante (2013) examined the determinants of 
capital flows to emerging market economies in Asia and Latin America for the period 2002-
’12 using panel data modelling. Ahmed & Zlante (2013) found that interest rate and econom-
ic growth differentials are positively related to net private inflows and portfolio flows. The 
results are to a large extent in line with those of Verma & Prakash (2011).  
Brana & Lahet (2008) examined the determinants of capital flows in four Asian economies 
for the period 1990-2007 using panel data modelling, OLS and GLS. The results showed that 
lower economic growth in OECD countries encourages capital flows to emerging economies. 
Also, the US federal funds rate is positively related to capital flowing to emerging economies, 
which contradicts the findings of Calvo & Reinhart (1996) as well as Ahmed et al (2005), 
who suggested that higher international interest rates have a negative effect on capital flows 
to emerging economies. Yang, Xiong & Ze (2013) examined the determinants of internation-
al capital flows to Asian and Latin American countries for the period 1981-2011 using the 
GMM estimation technique. Yang et al (2013) concluded that for Asian countries, FDI flows 
are positively correlated with domestic growth and negatively correlated with economic 
growth in developed countries. This result confirms the findings of Brana & Lahet (2008). 
115 
 
GDP in developed countries is positively correlated with FDI flows in Latin American econo-
mies, which contrasts with the findings of Brana & Lahet (2008). Also, GDP and interest 
rates have an insignificant effect on net portfolio investments in both regions, while financial 
development exerts a positive effect on net portfolio investments in Latin American 
countries. 
Byrne & Fiess (2011) investigated the global and national determinants of international 
capital flows to 78 emerging and developing countries for the period 1993-2009 using corre-
lation analysis, panel analysis of non-stationarity in idiosyncratic and common components 
(PANIC), OLS and Bivariate cointegration. The results showed that there is a negative corre-
lation between capital flows and long-term US interest rates, while short-term US interest 
rates have an insignificant effect on capital flows to emerging economies. Real GDP growth 
rates in OECD countries have an insignificant effect on capital flows to emerging economies. 
This contrasts with the findings of Brana & Lahet (2005) and Yang et al (2013), who 
concluded that growth in developed countries has a significant effect on capital flows to 
emerging countries. 
Olaberria (2014) examined the impact of US long-term interest rates on capital flows to 
emerging economies and reported that higher US long-term interest rates result in lower lev-
els of gross inflows in emerging economies, which confirms the findings of Byrne & Fiess 
(2011). High growth rates in advanced countries result in higher levels of gross inflows. This 
result confirms the findings of Yang et al (2013). Domestic growth has a positive effect on 
gross inflows while domestic interest rates have an insignificant effect on gross inflows. 
Higher US interest rates are also associated with lower levels of gross capital outflows from 
domestic investors, while domestic interest rates and growth have an insignificant effect on 
gross capital outflows. 
Khan & Hye (2013) examined the relationship between FDI and financial liberalisation in 
Pakistan for the period 1971-2009 and conclude that financial liberalisation and the real inter-
est rate have a negative effect on FDI. Faroh & Shen (2015) examined the impact of interest 
rates on FDI in Sierra Leone for the period 1985 to 2012 using the OLS method. The authors 
concluded that the real interest rate and GDP have an insignificant effect on FDI flows in 
Sierra Leone.  
Bailliu (2000) examined the relationship between private capital flows, financial develop-
ment and economic growth in 40 developing countries for the period 1975-’95 using GMM 
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estimations. Bailliu (2000) concluded that capital flows have a positive effect on economic 
growth for countries with developed banking sectors (high levels of financial development). 
Agbloyor, Abhor, Adjasi & Yawson (2014) reached a similar conclusion to that of Bailliu 
(2000) when examining the effect of domestic financial markets on private capital flow and 
economic growth in 14 African countries for the period 1990-2007. Agbloyor et al (2014) re-
ported that capital flows have a negative effect on economic growth in countries with under-
developed financial markets. 
Borensztein, Gregorio & Lee (1998) examined the effect of FDI on economic growth in de-
veloping countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America for the period 1970-’89. Using 
the seemingly unrelated regression techniques as well as the TSLS method, Borenszetein et al 
(1998) concluded that the effect of FDI on economic growth is dependent on human capital. 
In countries with high levels of human capital, FDI exerts a positive effect on economic 
growth. McLean & Shrestha (2002) examined the relationship between international financial 
liberalisation and economic growth in 40 developed and developing countries for the period 
1976-’95 using a panel data regression model. The results showed that FDI and portfolio 
flows have a positive effect on economic growth, while bank flows have a negative effect on 
economic growth. 
Aizenman & Jinjarak (2011) examined the relationship between capital flows and economic 
growth in more than 100 countries and reported that FDI flows have a positive effect on eco-
nomic growth, and that the effect becomes large with exchange rate stability and monetary 
independence. Also, portfolio flows and equity investments have no effect on economic 
growth. Cavallari & d’Addona (2013) examined the effect of nominal and real volatility in 
output, interest rates and exchange rates on FDI in 24 OECD countries for the period 1985-
2007 using panel data modelling. Cavallari & d’Addona (2013) concluded that interest rate 
volatility has a negative effect on FDI flows if it originates in the host country. Output vola-
tility is also negatively related to FDI, especially if it originates in the source country. The 
findings of Aizenman & Jinjarak (2011) and Cavallari & d’Addona (2013) suggest that FDI 
has a positive effect on economic growth provided there is macroeconomic stability in an 
economy. 
Ahmed and Mayowa (2012) investigated the determinants and effects of FDI in Nigeria for 
the period 1970-2009 using the VECM model and conclude that interest rates are among the 
major determinants of FDI inflows. However, FDI inflows have an insignificant effect on 
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economic growth. Uwubanmwen & Ogiemudia (2016) concur with the findings of Ahmed 
and Mayowa (2012). When examining the effect of foreign direct investment on economic 
growth in Nigeria using annual time series data covering the period 1979-2013, the authors 
conclude that FDI has both an immediate and time-lag effect on the Nigerian economy in the 
short run, but has a non-significant negative effect on the Nigerian economy in the long run. 
Edrees (2015) examined the effect of FDI and the business environment on economic growth 
in 39 sub-Saharan African countries for the period 1992-2012 using the PMG model. The re-
sults indicate that FDI inflows have a negative effect on economic growth in both low- and 
middle-income countries. Agrawal (2015) assessed the relationship between FDI and 
economic growth in the five BRICS economies over the period 1989-2012 and concluded 
that there is a long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables. Furthermore, the 
direction of causality is from FDI to economic growth.  
The relationship between interest rate liberalisation, capital flows and economic growth 
remains inconclusive based on the above empirical studies. Capital flows are responsive to 
interest rates in some emerging countries and unresponsive in others. With regards to the 
effect of capital flows on economic growth, studies show that capital flows have a positive 
impact on growth under certain conditions. Capital flows have a positive effect on countries 
with developed financial markets, high levels of human capital and macroeconomic stability.  
5.4 Interest rate liberalisation, financial development and economic growth  
 This section discusses studies have examined the relationship between interest rate 
liberalisation and financial development mostly from African countries and those that have 
investigated the impact of financial development on economic growth.  
Agrawal (2001) examined the relationship between interest rates, exchange rates and finan-
cial deepening in Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea and Thailand from the mid-1960s to the mid-
’90s. The estimation techniques used are the ECM as well as dynamic OLS. Agrawal (2001) 
reported that the real interest rate and real GDP have a positive effect on financial deepening 
in all countries. 
The relationship between interest rate liberalisation, financial deepening and economic 
growth in African countries has been examined by Nicholas Odhiambo, whose studies cover 
countries like Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana and South Africa. The estimation 
techniques used in those studies are the Johansen cointegration test, the Granger causality 
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test, the ECM and the VECM, while the period covered ranges from the late 1960s to 2006. 
Odhiambo (2009a) concluded that in Kenya, interest rate reforms have a positive effect on fi-
nancial deepening, however that effect is sensitive to the dependency ratio. Also, financial 
deepening Granger-causes economic growth. Odhiambo (2009b) concluded that in Zambia, 
the deposit rate and financial deepening are positively related, suggesting that interest rate 
liberalisation has a positive effect on financial development. There is also a short-run causal 
flow from economic growth to financial development and also from savings to financial 
development. There is a long-run causal flow from financial development to economic 
growth and from financial development to savings. 
For Tanzania, Odhiambo (2010b) concluded that there is a positive and significant relation-
ship between deposit rates and financial deepening. Furthermore, there is unidirectional caus-
ality from economic growth to financial depth. However, there is no causality between sav-
ings and financial development, nor between savings and economic growth. In the case of 
South Africa, interest rate reforms have a positive effect on financial development. However, 
financial development does not cause investments and economic growth under Granger con-
ditions. Odhiambo & Akinboade (2009) concluded that the effect of interest rate liberalisa-
tion on financial deepening is sensitive to the proxy used in Botswana. Nominal interest rates 
have a positive and significant relationship with the ratio of bank deposits to GDP. However, 
nominal interest rates have an insignificant relationship with the ratio of liquid liabilities to 
GDP and private sector credit as a percentage of GDP.  
Akinboade & Kinfack (2013) examined the relationship between interest rate reforms, finan-
cial deepening and economic growth in Cameroon for the period 1973-2007, using the Johan-
sen cointegration test and the ECM. The results showed that the effect of interest rates on fi-
nancial deepening is sensitive to the proxy used, similar to the conclusion that Odhiambo & 
Akinboade (2009) reached. Interest rate reforms have a negative effect on bank deposits as a 
ratio of GDP, on the domestic credit to GDP ratio, as well as credit to the private sector as a 
ratio of domestic credit. Interest rate reforms have a positive effect on liquid liabilities as a 
ratio of GDP as well as total credit. Also, financial development and economic growth are 
positively correlated. These results are in direct contrast with those of Odhiambo & Akinbo-
ade (2009) with regard to the effect of interest reforms on the different proxies of financial 
deepening. 
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Udoh & Ogbuagu (2012) examined the effects of interest rate liberalisation, financial devel-
opment and economic growth in Nigeria for the period 1970-2008 and concluded that the de-
posit rate is positively related to financial development and there is causality from financial 
development to economic growth. Ahmed (2013) investigated the effect of financial 
liberalisation on financial development and economic growth in sub-Saharan African 
countries for the period 1981-2009 using the GMM estimation technique. The Chinn-Ito 
index was used as a proxy for financial liberalisation as well as two other indices constructed 
from indicators, like interest rate deregulation, liberalisation of entry-exit rules for banking, 
prudential regulation measures, bank denationalisation and the abolition of directed credit 
allocation. Ahmed (2013) concluded that financial liberalisation has a positive effect on 
financial development and the availability of credit to the private sector for countries with 
strong legal institutions, protection of property rights and greater human capital. However, 
the overall effect of financial liberalisation on economic growth is negative through capital 
flight and risks of financial fragility. 
Mbulawa (2015) investigated the determinants of financial development in SADC countries 
for the period 1996-2010 using the GMM method. The researcher concluded that financial 
development is positively correlated with interest rates, while savings have a negative effect 
on financial development.  
The pioneering empirical study on the relationship between financial development and eco-
nomic growth was conducted by Goldsmith (1969). The study focused on 35 countries during 
the period 1860-1963 and concluded that financial intermediation has a positive effect on 
economic growth. King & Levine (1993) built on the study by Goldsmith (1969) and incorp-
orated 77 countries in a study covering the period 1960-1989. The results showed that finan-
cial development boosts economic growth regardless of the growth indicator used. Levine & 
Zervos (1998) investigated whether stock market and banking sector development are import-
ant determinants of economic growth in 47 countries and concluded that both indicators are 
positively related to economic growth. Levine, Loayza & Beck (2000) extended King & Le-
vine’s (1993) measures of financial intermediary development to 1995 and reached a similar 
conclusion.   
Dritsakis & Adamopolous (2004) examined the relationship between financial development 
and economic growth in Greece for the period 1960-2000. The estimation techniques used are 
the Johansen cointegration test, ECM, VAR model and the Granger causality test. Dritsakis & 
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Adamopolous (2004) concluded that there is a long-run relationship between financial devel-
opment captured by the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP and economic growth, and also that 
there is bilateral causality between the variables. Ndebbio (2004) concurs with Dritsakis & 
Adamopolous (2004) when examining the relationship between financial deepening, econom-
ic growth and development in sub-Saharan African countries for the period 1980-1989. Nde-
bbio (2004) found that financial deepening measured by financial intermediation and the 
growth rate of real and nominal money balances has a positive effect on economic growth. 
Habibullah & Eng (2006) examined the causal link between financial development and eco-
nomic growth in developing Asian countries for the period 1990-’98 using the GMM estima-
tion techniques, as well as causality testing. Habibullah & Eng (2006) reported that financial 
development captured by the ratio of domestic credit to GDP promotes economic growth. 
Gondo (2009) reached a similar conclusion when examining the relationship between finan-
cial development and economic growth in South Africa. Also, credit availability and stock 
market liquidity have a positive effect on economic growth. Cojocaru, Hoffman & Miller 
(2011) reached a similar conclusion to that of Habibullah & Eng (2006) and Gondo (2009) 
when examining the relationship between financial development and economic growth in 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS). Using the GMM estimation techniques, Cojocaru et al (2011) found that domestic 
credit to the private sector has a positive impact on economic growth. Also the quality and 
efficiency of the financial system are more important than the size. 
Ang & McKibbin (2007) and Bittencourt (2010) constructed financial development indices in 
their examination of the effect of financial development on economic growth and reached dif-
ferent conclusions. The study by Ang & McKibbin (2007) focused on Malaysia during the 
period 1960-2001 and uses the Johansen cointegration test, VAR models, principal compo-
nents and a VECM. Ang & McKibbin (2007) constructed a financial repression index based 
on interest rate controls, direct credit programmes and statutory reserve requirements, and a 
financial development index based on liquid liabilities and bank credit, as well as commercial 
and central bank assets. The results revealed that financial repression and higher real interest 
rates are negatively related to economic growth. Also, despite the positive correlation be-
tween financial development and economic growth, the direction of causality is from eco-
nomic growth to financial development. Financial sector reforms have resulted in financial 
deepening but have had no effect on economic growth.  
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Bittencourt (2010) focused on Latin American countries (Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia and Peru) 
for the period 1980-2007, using a dynamic panel data model with fixed effects. A financial 
development index is constructed by using liquid liabilities, private credit from deposit mon-
ey banks, and stock market capitalisation. Bittencourt (2010) concluded that financial devel-
opment has a positive effect on economic growth. Also, finance authorises the entrepreneur 
to invest in productive activities, so promoting economic growth, suggesting that the direc-
tion of causality is from financial development to economic growth. 
Ijeoma, Paramaiah & Moshoeshoe (2011) examined the relationship between financial devel-
opment, savings and economic growth in Lesotho for the period 1983-2007, using the Johan-
sen cointegration test, VECM and a trivariate causality test. Financial development is cap-
tured by the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP and credit by financial intermediaries to the fi-
nancial sector. The results showed that there is no relationship between financial develop-
ment and economic growth, due to restrictive lending practices and credit ceilings. Ince 
(2011) reached a different conclusion from that of Ijeoma et al (2011) when examining the 
relationship between financial liberalisation, financial development and economic growth in 
Turkey, despite using similar estimation techniques. Financial development is captured by 
domestic credit to the private sector as a ratio of GDP, total deposits as a ratio of GDP, 
commercial banks’ assets and stock market capitalisation. Ince (2011) reported that there is a 
short-run relationship between financial development and economic growth and there is bi-
directional causality between the two variables.  
Hassan, Sanchez & Yu (2011) examined the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth in developing and developed countries for the period 1980-2007. The esti-
mation techniques used are VAR modelling, Granger causality, OLS, panel data modelling 
and the weighted least squares method. The results revealed that savings and credit to the pri-
vate sector have a positive effect on economic growth only in Latin America, the Caribbean, 
East Asia and the Pacific. The Granger causality test suggests that there is bi-directional caus-
ality between financial development and economic growth in all regions with the exception 
of East Asia, the Pacific and sub-Saharan Africa, where the causality runs from economic 
growth to financial development. This suggests that in developing countries, economic 
growth leads to financial development. This contradicts the findings of Kumar (2014) and 
Omoruyi & Ede (2014) who also examined the effect of financial development on economic 
growth in developing countries.  
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Phakedi (2014) examined the effect of financial development on economic growth in SADC 
countries for the period 1990-2014 and concluded that financial development supports eco-
nomic growth in half the countries, while in the other half financial development is not 
growth-enhancing. Studies by Le Roux and Moyo (2015), as well as Bara, Mugano and Le 
Roux (2016) also found that financial development proxied by credit to the private sector 
impacts negatively on economic growth.  
Kumar (2014) investigated whether financial development is an instrument of economic 
growth in India for the period 1971-2012 and concluded that there is a long-run relationship 
between financial development captured by the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP and econom-
ic growth. What is more, the direction of causality runs from financial development to eco-
nomic growth. Omoruyi & Ede (2014) reached a similar conclusion to that of Kumar (2014) 
when examining the relationship between financial system development and economic 
growth in Nigeria for the period 1980-2011. The results showed that the direction of causality 
is from financial development to economic growth. Stock market development and private 
sector credit also have a positive effect on economic growth. The difference between the 
findings of Kumar (2014) and Omoruyi & Ede (2014) is the effect of liquid liabilities on eco-
nomic growth. Omoruyi & Ede (2014) concluded that liquid liabilities have an insignificant 
effect on economic growth, while Kumar (2014) suggested that the effect is positive and sig-
nificant.  
Estranda, Park & Ramayandi (2013) examined the relationship between financial develop-
ment and economic growth in Asian countries for the period 1987-2008 using a fixed effects 
model. Estranda et al (2013) reported that financial development captured by liquid liabili-
ties, private credit by deposit money banks and stock market capitalisation is positively corre-
lated with economic growth. Ayadi, Arbak, Ben-Naceur & De Groen (2013) reached a differ-
ent conclusion from that of Estranda et al (2013) when examining the relationship between 
financial development, bank efficiency and economic growth in Mediterranean countries for 
the period 1985-2009. Ayadi et al (2013) concluded that bank credit to the private sector has 
a negative effect on economic growth, while bank deposits have an insignificant effect on 
economic growth. The quality of the banking sector has an insignificant effect on growth, 
while stock market development has a positive effect on economic growth if institutional 
quality is improved. 
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Inove & Hamori (2016) examined the relationship between financial access and economic 
growth in 37 sub-Saharan African countries for the period 2004-’12 using the GMM estima-
tion technique. Financial access is captured by commercial banks per 1 000km and commer-
cial banks per 10 000 adults, while financial deepening is captured by outstanding deposits 
with commercial banks as a percentage of GDP, as well as outstanding loans from commer-
cial banks as a percentage of GDP. The results revealed that financial access and financial 
deepening have a positive effect on economic growth. 
5.5 Interest rate liberalisation and financial crises  
Glick & Hutchison (1990) examined the relationship between banking and currency crises in 
90 industrial and developing countries for the period 1975-’97 using a probit model. Banking 
and currency crises are captured by dummy variables. Glick & Hutchison (1990) concluded 
that currency and banking crises are positively correlated for both emerging and developed 
countries. Past banking crises help predict the onset of currency crises in emerging countries, 
but not in developing countries. Interest rate liberalisation also is correlated with banking 
crises. Kiminsky & Reinhart (1999) reached a similar conclusion when examining the causes 
of the twin crises of banking and balance of payment problems in 20 countries for the period 
1970 to mid-’95. Using conditional and unconditional probabilities, Kiminsky & Reinhart 
(1999) reported that banking crises increase the probability of currency crises. What is more, 
deregulation of the financial system increases the probability that crises will occur. Financial 
liberalisation indicators like real interest rates, the ratio of domestic credit to nominal GDP 
and the ratio of domestic lending to deposit rates show an upward trend prior to the twin 
crises.  
Demirgüҫ-Kunt & Detragiache (1998) examined the relationship between financial liberalisa-
tion and financial fragility in 53 countries for the period 1980-’95 using a multivariate logit 
model. A dummy variable was used for financial liberalisation capturing interest rate libe-
ralisation, as well as a banking crisis dummy variable. The results showed that banking crises 
are associated with higher interest rates, low GDP growth, and excessive credit growth, while 
GDP per capita is negatively related to banking crises. Financial liberalisation is also posi-
tively correlated with the probability of banking crises through lowering of bank profits due 
to higher capitalisation and foreign entry.  
Bonfliglioli & Mendicino (2004) assessed the link between financial liberalisation, banking 
crises and economic growth in 90 countries for the period 1975-’99 using GMM estimations. 
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Bonfliglioli & Mendicino (2004) found that banking crises have a negative effect on econom-
ic growth, while financial liberalisation has a positive impact on economic growth in coun-
tries with sound institutions. The cost of banking crises in terms of growth is reduced by 
sound institutions.  
Ranciere, Tornell & Westermann (2006) examined the growth and crises effects of financial 
liberalisation in 60 countries for the period 1980-2002 using a probit model. A financial liber-
alisation dummy variable to as well as a crisis dummy variable capturing banking and curren-
cy crises were constructed. The results revealed that despite the positive effect of financial 
liberalisation on economic growth, financial liberalisation increases the probability of finan-
cial crises. The growth effects of financial liberalisation in terms of financial development 
and investments outweigh the negative effects of financial fragility. In their examination of 
the relationship between financial liberalisation, crises and economic growth in 58 countries 
for the period 1980-’99, Lee & Shin (2007) also found that financial liberalisation increases 
the likelihood of financial crises.  
Misati & Nyamongo (2012) examined the relationship between financial liberalisation, finan-
cial fragility and economic growth in 34 sub-Saharan African countries for the period 1983-
2008 using a pooled model, a fixed effects model and causality analysis. The results showed 
that financial liberalisation captured by the Chinn-Ito- index, as well as a dummy variable, 
have a positive effect on economic growth but also increases the likelihood of banking crises. 
This result is in line with the findings of Ranciere et al (2006) and Lee & Shin (2007). 
Banking crises have a negative effect on economic growth, which confirms the findings of 
Bonfliglioli & Mendicino (2004). However, the researchers conclude that the growth-retard-
ing effects of financial liberalisation outweigh the growth-enhancing effects, which contrasts 
with the findings of Ranciere et al (2006) and Lee & Shin (2007). Enowbi, Mlambo and 
Asongu (2017) also found that financial liberalisation increases financial instability in in 41 
African countries during the period 1985 to 2010. Furthermore, financial development also 
increases financial stability.   
Shehzad & De Haan (2009) investigated the relationship between financial reforms and bank-
ing crises in 85 countries for the period 1973-2002 using a multivariate probit model. Dum-
my variables were used to capture systemic and non-systemic banking crises as well as finan-
cial liberalisation measures like interest rate controls, credit restrictions, entry barriers, super-
vision, securities policy, state ownership and capital flow restrictions. Shehzad & De Haan 
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(2009) concluded that financial reforms reduce the likelihood of systemic banking crises but 
increase the likelihood of non-systemic banking crises. Triki & Maktour (2012) also 
presented evidence suggesting that financial liberalisation can reduce the likelihood of finan-
cial crises. In examining the relationship between financial liberalisation and banking crises 
in 40 emerging and developed countries for the period 1989-2010, Triki & Maktour (2012) 
report that financial liberalisation increases the likelihood of banking crises, but reduces it in 
some countries. Economic growth reduces the likelihood of financial crises.  
Angkinand, Sawangngoenyuuang & Wihlborg (2010) examined the relationship between fi-
nancial liberalisation and banking crises in 21 developed and 27 developing countries for the 
period 1973-2005 using the random effect logit model. Banking crises are captured by a dum-
my variable. The results revealed that there is positive correlation between financial liberalis-
ation and banking crises for repressed financial markets in emerging economies. Financial 
liberalisation increases the likelihood of banking crises up to partial-level financial liberalisa-
tion, however beyond a certain level financial liberalisation reduces the likelihood of banking 
crises. Higher world interest rates and credit growth increase the chance of banking crises in 
both groups of countries, which is in line with the findings of Kiminsky & Reinhart (1999). 
Also institutional quality, capital regulation and supervision reduce the likelihood of banking 
crises.  
Altunbas, Gamboconta & Marqués-Ibáñez (2010) examined whether monetary policy has an 
effect on bank risk-taking in 1 100 banks across 16 countries for the period 1998-2008, using 
the dynamic GMM estimation technique. Altumbas et al (2010) reported that lower short-run 
interest rates for an extended period encourage banks to take more risks. The result suggests 
that higher interest rates resulting from interest rate liberalisation reduces bank risk-taking, 
which in turn reduces the likelihood of financial crises. 
Barrell, Karim & Ventouri (2013) assessed the role of financial liberalisation and capital 
adequacy in financial crises models in OECD countries for the period of 1980 to 2012 using a 
Logit model. Barrell et al (2013) concluded that less regulated markets are associated with 
lower crises frequency. Deposit rate liberalisation adds to the strength of capital in protecting 
against crises. Barrell, Karim and Ventouri (2016) examined the impact of interest rate 
liberalisation on OECD banking crises during the period 1980-2012 and conclude that 
interest rate liberalisation reduces the likelihood of financial crises. These results suggest that 
financial deregulation reduces the likelihood of financial crises which is in line with the 
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findings of Shehzad & De Haan (2008), Altunbus et al (2010) as well as Triki & Maktour 
(2012).  
Beju and Ciupac-Ulici (2012) investigated the impact of financial liberalisation on banking 
systems in developing countries in Central and Eastern Europe and concluded that financial 
liberalisation should be accompanied by prudential regulation in order to reduce the 
likelihood of banking crises. Hambi and Jlussi (2014) examined whether financial 
liberalisation triggers banking crises in developed countries during the period 1984-2007. The 
results show that financial liberalisation does not increase the probability of financial crises. 
However, foreign debt liabilities and foreign direct investment liabilities to total liabilities 
trigger banking crises. 
Boyd, De Nicolò & Jalal (2006) examined the relationship between bank risk-taking and 
competition in developed and developing countries for the period 1993-2004 using the OLS 
and GMM estimation techniques. Bank concentration is captured by the Herfindahl and 
Hirschman concentration index, while bank risk-taking is captured by the Z-score. The results 
revealed that banking concentration increases the likelihood of banking failures, while more 
competition reduces the probability of bank failures. Zaghdoudi, Hamdi, Dkhili & Hakimi 
(2015) reported results contrasting with those of Boyd et al (2006) when examining the rela-
tionship between bank competition and risk appetite in Tunisia for the period 1980-2009. 
Using a similar approach, Zaghdoudi et al (2015) concluded that bank competition enhances 
risk-taking and so increases the likelihood of bank failures.  
Jiménez, Lopez & Saurina (2007) investigated the effect of competition on bank risk-taking 
in Spain for the period 1998-2003 using the GMM estimation technique. The Lerner index 
captures market power, while bank risk is captured by commercial banks’ non-performing 
loan ratios. The results showed that market power decreases bank risk-taking and non-perfor-
ming loans, thus promoting stability. Yeyati & Micco (2007) concur to a large extent with the 
findings of Jiménez et al (2007). In examining the effect of competition and foreign penetra-
tion on Latin American banking sectors for the period 1993-2002, Yeyati & Micco (2007) 
concluded that foreign entry in the banking sector reduces competition and so has a positive 
effect on bank stability.  
Uhde & Heimeshoff (2009) examined the relationship between consolidation in banking and 
financial stability in European banks for the period 1977-2005 using the TSLS technique. 
Bank risk-taking is captured by the Z-score, which is the ratio of the sum of equity capital to 
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total assets and ROAA, as well as the standard deviation of ROAA. Concentration in the 
banking sector is captured by the proportion of the country’s banking assets held by the larg-
est five domestic banks in 1997. The results showed that national banking market concentra-
tion has a negative effect on financial stability. Banking markets with lower levels of com-
petition, higher proportions of government-owned banks and fewer opportunities for diver-
sification are prone to financial instability. This result is in contrast with those of Jiménez et 
al (2007), as well as those of Yeyati & Micco (2007). Deposit insurance encourages banks to 
take a cautious approach in lending activities. 
Ariss (2010) examined the implications of market power in the banking sectors of 60 devel-
oping countries for the period 1999-2005 using the tripod empirical approach. The Lerner in-
dex is used to capture market power while the Z-index captures bank risk-taking. Ariss 
(2010) reported that there is a positive relationship between bank market power and stability. 
Agoraki, Delis & Posiouras (2011), as well as Hope, Gwatidzo & Ntuli (2013) are in agree-
ment with Ariss (2010). In examining the relationship between regulation, competition and 
bank risk-taking in 546 banks across 13 CEE countries for the period 1998-2005, Agoraki et 
al (2011) concluded that market power reduces bank risk-taking and non-performing loans, 
so promoting stability. Also, capital requirements and supervisory power reduce credit risk. 
Hope et al (2013) investigated the effect of bank competition on financial stability in 10 
African countries for the period 2005-’10 and found that there is a positive relationship be-
tween market power and stability.  
Cubillas & Gonzalez (2014) investigated the relationship between financial liberalisation and 
bank risk-taking for 4 333 banks in 43 countries for the period 1991-2007 using the GMM 
and TSLS estimation techniques. The Lerner index was used as a proxy for market power and 
the Z-score as a proxy for bank risk-taking. Financial liberalisation is captured by an index of 
financial reforms, the financial freedom component of the index of economic freedom by the 
Heritage Foundation and the Chinn-Ito index. Cubillas & Gonzalez (2014) concluded that fi-
nancial liberalisation increases bank risk-taking through increased competition in developed 
countries and by expanding opportunities for risk-taking in developing countries. Capital re-
quirements reduce the negative effect of financial liberalisation on bank risk-taking in both 
developed and developing countries, while official supervision and financial transparency re-
duce bank risk-taking due to competition in developing countries. This result is in line with 
the findings of Ariss (2010). Deposit insurance encourages risk-taking behaviour by banks, a 
result which contradicts that of Uhde & Heimeshoff (2009).  
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Ali, Intissar & Zeitun (2015) assessed the relationship between banking competition and fi-
nancial stability in 173 developed and developing countries using the GMM estimation tech-
nique. Ali et al (2015) reported that banking concentration has a positive effect on financial 
stability through higher profitability and a negative effect through interest rates. Bank con-
centration has a positive effect on bank stability in developing countries. 
5.6 Identified gaps in literature 
In summary, according to the empirical literature the effect of interest rates on savings varies 
across different regions. So it is vital to isolate the SADC region when examining such a rela-
tionship, as the results could vary across the African regions. The study also constructs a fi-
nancial deepening index to capture financial development. Studies examining the effect of fi-
nancial development on economic growth differ on the effect of the different proxies of fi-
nancial development on economic growth. The financial development proxies are correlated, 
and since there is no consensus as to which proxy is most appropriate, the construction of an 
index of financial development is warranted (Ang & McKibbin, 2007; Bittencourt, 2010).  
Studies performed on the relationship between interest rate liberalisation and financial crises 
in African countries include Hope et al (2013) and Misati & Nyamongo (2012), who examine 
countries from different geographical regions. This study focuses on countries in the same re-
gion (SADC), which is vital for decisions pertaining to regional integration. Furthermore, this 
study examines the link between financial development and financial crises which has 
received very little attention in African countries.  
Most studies examining the relationship between interest rate liberalisation and economic 
growth in African countries analyse the countries individually using time series techniques 
(Odhiambo 2009; Tswamuno et al, 2007). Time series techniques do not take into account the 
issue of simultaneity and often suffer from issues of collinearity. This study uses panel data 
estimation techniques such as the PMG estimator which mitigate the problems of collinearity. 
This is discussed fully in the next section.   
5.7 Literature survey of estimation techniques 
The main approaches used in examining the relationship between interest rate and economic 
growth in existing literature are time series and panel data approaches. The time series ap-
proach makes use of time series data which is collected at different time periods (Hill, Grif-
fiths & Lim, 2012). With panel data, observations on different cross-sectional units are 
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pooled over several periods (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). The study uses the panel data approach 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, panel data control for the heterogeneity present in individu-
als, firms or countries, while time series and cross-sectional approaches do not take this het-
erogeneity into account and so increase the likelihood of generating biased estimates (Baltagi, 
2005). Panel data is ideal for this study, where country and time-invariant variables have to 
be controlled. Secondly, panel data is a combination of time series and cross-sectional data, 
which permits more degrees of freedom, less collinearity, and more variability and efficiency 
(Hsiao, 2003). Time series estimations are associated with problems like multicollinearity, 
which occurs when the explanatory variables are intercorrelated or when there is a perfect lin-
ear relationship among the explanatory variables. Panel data minimises the possibilities of 
multicollinearity by including a cross-sectional component which adds variability to the data. 
The increase in the degrees of freedom resulting from more data points also reduces colline-
arity and so improves the efficiency of the estimated parameters. Panel data also minimises 
the omitted variable bias (Brooks, 2008).  
A panel data model can be specified as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡       𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇                                                                        (5.1) 
 
where 𝑖 represents households, individuals, firms or countries while 𝑡 represents time. The 
panel data model contrasts with the time series and cross-sectional models because it posses-
ses a double subscript on its variables. The two subscripts 𝑖 and 𝑡 denote the cross-sectional 
and the time-series components respectively: 𝛼 is a scalar, 𝛽 is a slope coefficient and 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′  de-
notes the independent or explanatory variables in the model (Baltagi, 2005).  
The one-way error component model for the error terms is the most commonly used model in 
panel data analysis and is specified as follows: 
 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                         (5.2) 
 
where 𝜇𝑖 represents the unobservable, individual-specific and time-invariant disturbance, 
which caters for any individual-specific effect omitted from the regression model while 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is 
the remainder disturbance that is variant with respect to time, individuals, firms or countries 
(Baltagi, 2005). Both 𝜇𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 are identically and independently distributed as follows: 
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Ε(𝜇𝑖) = Ε(𝑣𝑖𝑡) = Ε(𝜇𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡)                                                                                                                (5.3) 
 
A number of relationships in economics are dynamic due to the strong persistent behaviour of 
most economic variables (Gorlach & Le Roux, 2013). Most of the models in the study are 
thus specified as dynamic panel models which include a lagged dependent variable as one of 
the explanatory variables. This way of researching is often referred to as the Cowles Com-
mission approach and dates back to the early work of Tinbergen in the late 1930s (Fair, 
2014). Including a lagged dependent variable as one of the explanatory variables is popular 
because it improves the fit of equations and also picks up partial adjustment effects (Fair, 
2014).  
A dynamic panel data model is specified as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛿𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                (5.4) 
 
The vector 𝑥𝑖𝑡 may comprise predetermined and strictly exogenous regressors, lags of these 
regressors and lags of the dependent variable. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable 
(𝑦𝑖𝑡−1) as one of the regressors brings about the dynamism in the model (Baltagi, 2005). The 
conventional panel data estimation techniques include the pooled OLS, fixed effects, random 
effects, and instrumental variables models like Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) and 
Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM).  
 
5.7.1 Pooled OLS model 
The pooled OLS technique pools all the observations in a model when estimating a regression 
without considering the cross-section and time series nature of the data (Gujarati & Porter, 
2009). This method assumes that all the estimated coefficients are the same for all cross-sec-
tional units. A pooled OLS model is specified as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                                             (5.5) 
 
where 𝛽0, 𝛽1, 𝛽2 and 𝛽𝑘 are the coefficients of the model. The coefficients do not have the 𝑖 
and 𝑡 subscripts, implying that they are the same for all units (Hill et al, 2012). The model is 
only appropriate when the cross-sectional units under consideration are homogenous – a situ-
ation which rarely occurs (Asteriou & Hall, 2007).  
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The pooled OLS model is based on the following assumptions: 
𝐸(𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 0                                                                                                                                             (5.6) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎
2                                                                                                                                      (5.7) 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑒𝑖𝑡, 𝑒𝑗𝑠) = 0                                                                                                                                  (5.8) 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑒𝑖𝑡, 𝑥𝑖𝑡) = 0                                                                                                                                  (5.9) 
These assumptions state that the expected value of the error term is equal to zero (Hill et al, 
2012). The variance of the error term is assumed to be constant (homoscedasticity). There 
should be no correlation between disturbances and regressors or between disturbances 
themselves (Gujarati & Porter, 2009).  
The major shortcoming of the pooled OLS model is that it does not differentiate between 
countries and so ignores the heterogeneity existing in different cross-sectional units (Hill et 
al, 2012). The differences are shifted to the error term, which may result in correlation be-
tween the error term and the regressors (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). This violates one of the as-
sumptions of the classical linear regression model and as such the estimated coefficients 
would be biased and inconsistent. In line with this statement, the pooled OLS method also 
performs poorly when estimating a dynamic panel data model, due to the dynamic panel bias 
caused by the correlation between the disturbance term and the lagged dependent variable 
(Baltagi, 2005). Another shortcoming of the pooled OLS method is that time-invariant vari-
ables are regarded as being identical between cross-sectional units, hence they are pooled into 
a single population. This assumption is unrealistic in most datasets, resulting in inaccurate 
standard errors (Bell & Jones, 2015).  
5.7.2 Fixed effects model 
The fixed effects model estimates different intercept coefficients for each one of the cross-
sections and so caters for individual specific effects which do not vary over time, like natural 
endowments and geographical factors (Asteriou & Hall, 2007). When using a fixed effects 
model, variables which are time-invariant should not be included as regressors, so as to avoid 
a case of perfect collinearity between variables and the fixed effects. 
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A fixed effects model is specified as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                                         (5.10) 
 
The intercept coefficients are different for the individual units as indicated by the 𝑖 subscripts 
next to the intercept, but the slope coefficients are the same (Baltagi, 2005). All differences 
between them are captured by the intercept coefficients.  
The fixed effects model can be estimated using two approaches, namely the least squares 
dummy variable (LSDV) technique and the fixed effects estimator (Hill et al, 2012).  
The LSDV method allows the intercepts to vary by employing the differential intercept 
dummy variable technique as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 =   ∑ 𝛽0𝑗  
𝑗
𝑗=1
𝐷𝑗 + 𝛽1 𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗                                                                                                    (5.11) 
 
where 𝐷𝑗 is a series of dummy variables, one for each cross-sectional unit j, 𝛽0𝑗  is the 
intercept, 𝑥𝑖𝑗  represents independent variables and 𝑒𝑖𝑗 is the error term.  
One shortcoming of the LSDV model is that when the number of cross-sectional units is large 
the estimator suffers from substantial loss of degrees of freedom (Baltagi, 2005). The extra 
parameters to be estimated also enhance the problem of collinearity among the independent 
variables. The LSDV method is most appropriate when the number of cross-sectional units is 
small (Brooks, 2008). When there is a large number of cross-sectional units, the LSDV meth-
od results in too many parameters being estimated, and so the fixed effects estimator is the 
ideal technique to estimate the fixed effects model (Hill et al, 2012). The fixed effects estima-
tor is often referred to as the within-group estimator and the technique expresses the depend-
ent and independent variable as deviations from their mean values as follows:  
 
(𝑦𝑖𝑗 − ?̅?𝑗 ) =  𝛽1 (𝑥𝑖𝑗 − ?̅?𝑗) + (𝑒𝑖𝑗 − ?̅?𝑗)                                                                                      (5.12) 
 
Time-invariant effects are assumed to be correlated with the variables included in the model 
and hence the fixed effect, 𝛽1𝑖, is eliminated (Greene, 2002). So the technique cannot be used 
to estimate the effect of time-invariant variables on the dependent variables – this is usually 
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the major downfall of the technique (Baltagi, 2005). By eliminating time-invariant effects, 
substantial amounts of information are lost, which becomes a problem when time-invariant 
variables are of particular interest (Bell & Jones, 2015). Another shortcoming of the fixed-ef-
fect within-group estimator is that it may eliminate long-run effects and so distort parameter 
estimates (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). The within-group estimator also does not resolve the dy-
namic panel bias (Baltagi, 2005). Despite the elimination of the individual effect, the lagged 
dependent variable is correlated with the error term and so underestimates the coefficients of 
a dynamic panel data model. 
5.7.3 Random effects model 
As with the fixed effects model, the random effects model uses the intercept coefficients to 
capture individual differences between cross-sectional units (Brooks, 2008). However, the 
random effects model assumes that the individual effects are random rather than fixed (Hill et 
al, 2012; Bell & Jones, 2015). The random effects model is specified as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽0𝑗 +  𝛽1 𝑥1𝑖𝑗 +  𝑒𝑖𝑗                                                                                                             (5.13) 
 
where: 
𝛽0𝑗 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽2  𝑧𝑗+ 𝑢𝑗                                                                                                                        (5.14) 
These equations are the macro and micro parts of the model respectively and are estimated as 
one equation by substituting the micro part into the macro part and estimating this equation: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽0𝑗 +  𝛽1 𝑥1𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽2  𝑧𝑗 + (𝑢𝑗  + 𝑒𝑖𝑗)                                                                               (5.15) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗  is the dependent variable, 𝛽0 is the intercept term in the fixed part of the model, 
𝑥1𝑖𝑗 is a series of time-variant covariates with coefficient 𝛽1 , and 𝑧𝑗 is a series of time-invari-
ant covariates with coefficient 𝛽2  . The random part of the model consists of 𝑢𝑗 ,, the disturb-
ance term of the time-invariant variables also known as the random effect, and 𝑒𝑖𝑗 the re-
gression disturbance term (Bell & Jones, 2015). So the random effects model is referred to as 
the error component model because the error term has two components (Brooks, 2008). The 
major advantage of a random effect model over the fixed effects model is that fewer para-
meters are estimated (Greene, 2002). The model assumes that there is no correlation between 
disturbances, or between disturbances and regressors (Bell & Jones, 2015). However, this as-
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sumption does not hold in most random effects models and as such the technique is not 
widely used in empirical studies. Due to the failure of the pooled OLS, fixed effects and ran-
dom effects models in dealing with the endogeneity of a regressor, instrumental variables 
models have been proposed. 
 
5.7.4 Two-stage least squares 
 
The TSLS technique is an instrumental variables estimator that provides a way of dealing 
with the problem of endogeneity of a regressor by using a proxy variable that is correlated 
with a particular regressor but orthogonal to the error term (Wooldridge, 2002). The proxy 
variable is referred to as an instrumental variable (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). The TSLS 
estimator, as the name suggests, involves two distinct stages. The first stage is a process of 
estimating a regression of each independent variable on all the predetermined variables inclu-
ding the instruments (Brooks, 2008). The second stage is a regression of the original equation 
with all the variables replaced by the fitted values from the first-stage regressions.   
So as to resolve the dynamic panel bias, Anderson & Hsiao (1981, 1982) proposed the TSLS 
estimator for a first difference model that uses deeper lags of the dependent variable as 
instruments. First differencing involves subtracting a panel data model by itself lagged by one 
period (Arrelano & Bond, 1991). To illustrate this process, a dynamic panel data model with 
only the lagged dependent variable as the regressor will be introduced as follows:   
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                          (5.16) 
 
 
First differencing the above equation involves subtracting from it the following model: 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 =  𝛼𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1                                                                                                                 (5.17) 
 
 
This yields the following: 
(𝑦𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) =  𝛼(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2) +  (𝜀𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1)                                                               (5.18) 
(𝑦𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) =  𝛼(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2) + (𝜇𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖) + (𝑢𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1)                                             (5.19) 
 (𝑦
𝑖,𝑡
− 𝑦
𝑖,𝑡−1
) = 𝛼(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2) + (𝑢𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1)                                                                 (5.20) 
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The number of equations resulting from the first difference transformation is 𝑇 − 1 as the 
first period observations are dropped from the model. A more compact specification of the 
first difference model is as follows: 
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + Δ𝑢𝑖𝑡    𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁;  𝑡 = 2, … , 𝑇                                                                   (5.21) 
Where Δ is the first difference operator. 
The first difference estimator is inconsistent when estimating a dynamic panel data model de-
spite the elimination of the individual effects (Han & Phillips, 2010). Anderson & Hsiao 
(1981, 1982) argue that 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2 can be used as an instrument for Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 since it is correlated 
with Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2 but not correlated with the error term Δ𝑢𝑖𝑡. The authors also sug-
gest that Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2 is orthogonal to the error term and so can be used as an instrument for 
Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, a strategy that is viewed as more efficient and consistent. The TSLS estimator does 
not use all the available instruments and so is not efficient (Baltagi, 2005). Moreover, using 
more of the available lags of the dependent variable instruments would improve the efficien-
cy of the TSLS estimator. However, the deeper the lags of the dependent variable used as in-
struments, the smaller the sample size. The estimator is also inefficient in the presence of het-
eroscedasticity.  
5.7.5 Generalised methods of moments 
Due to the inability of the pooled OLS, fixed effects, random effects and the TSLS to resolve 
the dynamic panel bias adequately, Arellano & Bond, (1991), Arellano & Bover, (1995) and 
Blundell & Bond (1998) proposed various GMM estimation techniques which are more effi-
cient than the other estimation techniques when estimating a dynamic panel data model. The 
GMM estimator is an instrumental variables technique generated from exploiting the sample 
moment counterparts present in population moment conditions of a data-generating model 
(Hansen 2007). The GMM estimator is popular because it can be used in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity by making use of the orthogonality conditions (Baum & Schaffer, 2003). 
The GMM estimators are designed for panels with a small number of time periods T and a 
large number of cross-sectional units (Roodman, 2009). 
A formal representation of the methods of moments begins with the specification of a linear 
regression model: 
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𝑦𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡
′𝛽0 + 𝜀𝑡         𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇                                                                                                (5.22)
                          
Where 𝑥𝑡
′ is a  𝐾 × 1 vector of explanatory variables, 𝜀𝑡 is the error term and 𝛽0 is a vector of 
coefficients (Greene, 2002). The conditional expectations of 𝑦𝑡 is 𝐸(𝑦𝑡 ∖ 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡
′𝛽0 meaning 
that 𝐸(𝜀𝑡\𝑥𝑡) = 0. The unconditional population moment condition is specified as follows: 
 
𝑔(𝛽0) = 𝐸[𝑥𝑡𝜀𝑡] = 𝐸[𝑥𝑡(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡
′𝛽0)] = 0                                                                                 (5.23)
  
The sample moment condition is as follows: 
 
   𝑔𝑇(?̂?) =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑥𝑡(𝑦𝑡 −
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑥𝑡
′?̂?) =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑥𝑡𝑥𝑡
′?̂?
𝑇
𝑡=1
= 0                                                                    (5.24) 
 
The method of moments estimator is found by solving the above sample moment condition 
which results in the following expression: 
?̂?𝑀𝑀 = (∑ 𝑥𝑡𝑥𝑡
′
𝑇
𝑡=1
)
−1
∑ 𝑥𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
                                                                                                       (5.25) 
 
If some of the explanatory variables are correlated with the error term (endogenous) the linear 
regression model would be specified as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑥1𝑡
′ Υ0 + 𝑥2𝑡
′ 𝛿0 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                                 (5.26) 
 
Where 𝑥1𝑡
′  are the exogenous regressors, 𝑥2𝑡
′  are the endogenous regressors while Υ0  and 𝛿0 
are the coefficients. In order to estimate the above equation, instruments are required. These 
are variables that are correlated with the endogenous regressors but uncorrelated with the 
error term. The unconditional moment condition is specified as follows: 
 
𝑔(𝛽0) = 𝐸[𝑧𝑡𝜀𝑡] = 𝐸[𝑧𝑡(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡
′𝛽0)] = 0                                                                                  (5.27) 
 
Where 𝑧𝑡 are the instruments. 
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The sample moment condition is given by: 
 
𝑔𝑇(?̂?) =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑧𝑡(𝑦𝑡 −
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑥𝑡
′?̂?) = 0                                                                                                  (5.28) 
The method of moments estimator is this case is thus: 
 
?̂?𝑀𝑀(𝐼𝑉) = (∑ 𝑧𝑡𝑥𝑡
′
𝑇
𝑡=1
)
−1
∑ 𝑧𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
                                                                                                  (5.29) 
If the number of instruments is greater than the number of parameters to be estimated then the 
equation is overidentified (Greene, 2002). The ideal estimator is the GMM technique which 
solves the equation by minimising the vector of empirical moments, 
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑧𝑡(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡
′𝛽)𝑇𝑡=1 . The 
GMM estimator minimises the weighted quadratic function of moments specified as follows: 
  
𝐽(?̂?) = [
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑧𝑡(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡
′𝛽)
𝑇
𝑡=1
]
′
𝑊 [
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑧𝑡(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡
′𝛽
𝑇
𝑡=1
]                                                              (5.30) 
 
Where W is the weighting matrix. 
 
5.7.6 Seemingly unrelated regression, mean group and pooled mean group estimators 
The conventional dynamic panel data estimations involved models with a large N and a small 
T (Pesaran & Smith, 1995). In such models, instrumental variables techniques like the TSLS 
and GMM are regarded as the best estimators compared with the pooled OLS, fixed effects 
and random effects models. However, these estimation techniques assume that the slope para-
meters are homogenous across groups, which could lead to inconsistent estimates if there is 
heterogeneity in a panel. Furthermore, as pointed out by Pesaran & Smith (1995), when T is 
large, such estimators can produce inconsistent estimates unless the slope coefficients are 
similar across groups. 
Due to the availability of data, there has been a rise in panel data models in which both N and 
T are large (Pesaran & Smith, 1995). A larger T enables the estimation of separate regression 
for each cross-sectional unit, so allowing for parameter heterogeneity, which is not suitable 
for models with a small T. Models with slope heterogeneity can be estimated using the mean 
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group (MG) estimator proposed by Pesaran & Smith (1995), Zellner’s (1962) seemingly un-
related regression (SUR) model, as well as the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator proposed 
by Pesaran, Shin & Smith (1999). The discussion of the MG estimator is initiated by con-
sidering a dynamic panel heterogenous model as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,    𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇                                                            (5.31) 
 
where 𝜙𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are parameters which are assumed to vary across groups. These parameters 
are independently distributed with 𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 for all 𝑡. 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a vector of explanatory vari-
ables which are assumed to be covariance stationary processes and uncorrelated with the 
error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
The MG estimator estimates separate regressions for each cross-sectional unit and averages 
the individual estimates over the cross-sectional units as follows: 
?̂?𝑀𝐺 = 𝑁
−1 ∑ ?̂?𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
                                                                                                                            (5.32) 
 
where ?̂?𝑖 is the OLS estimator of 𝛽𝑖. 
The SUR model was proposed by Zellner (1962) and estimates regression parameters in all 
equations simultaneously. The estimator yields more efficient estimates than single-equation 
least squares estimators. A SUR can be specified using the equation below: 
 
𝑦𝜇 = 𝑋𝜇𝛽𝜇 + 𝑢𝜇                                                                                                                                 (5.33) 
where 𝑦𝜇 is a vector of observations on the dependent variable, 𝑋𝜇 is a matrix of observations 
on explanatory variables, 𝛽𝜇 is a vector of regression parameters and 𝑢𝜇 is a vector of disturb-
ance terms.  
Equation (5.24) can be written in matrix form as follows: 
 
[   
𝑦1
𝑦2
⋮
𝑦𝑚
   ] = [
𝑋1 0 ⋯ 0
0 𝑋2 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 0 ⋯ 𝑋𝑚
] [    
𝛽1
𝛽2
⋮
𝛽𝑚
    ] + [   
𝑢1
𝑢2
⋮
𝑢𝑚
   ]                                                            (5.34) 
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The SUR and MG estimators do not take into account that some parameters could be similar 
across groups (Pesaran et al, 1999). Long-run relationships are likely to be similar in cross-
sectional units because of arbitrage conditions, common technologies and related budget or 
solvency constraints. With dynamic heterogenous panels, long-run relationships between va-
riables are less likely to be subject to slope heterogeneity compared with short-run relation-
ships. Long-run relationships in dynamic panels can be estimated using the PMG estimator 
(Pesaran et al, 1999). This technique involves pooling and averaging of individual estimates 
across groups in which the intercept and short-run slope coefficients and the error variance 
are assumed to differ across units while the long-run coefficients are constrained to be similar 
across groups. The estimator is discussed in detail in the next chapter, as it forms the basis for 
the estimation procedure used in the study. The logit model is used to examine the effect of 
interest rate liberalisation on financial crises. The dependent variable in the logit model is a 
dummy variable indicating the occurrence of financial crises in a particular year. Models of 
this nature with a binary dependent variable cannot be estimated using the conventional panel 
data methods discussed in this survey of estimation techniques (Hill et al, 2012; Gujarati & 
Porter, 2009).    
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter presented some of the existing empirical literature examining the relationship 
between interest rate liberalisation and economic growth. One channel through which interest 
rates can affect economic growth is through savings and investments. Based on the empirical 
literature presented in the chapter, interest rates and savings are to a large extent positively 
correlated. However, interest rates have an insignificant effect on savings in some countries, 
especially if incomes are low (De Melo & Tybout, 1986). The relationship between interest 
rates and investments is ambiguous. On the one side, interest rates increase borrowing costs, 
which affects investments negatively, while on the other side interest rates affect investments 
positively by increasing the availability of loanable funds (Laumas, 1990; Gelb, 1989). 
Interest rate reforms can also affect economic growth through financial development. How-
ever, some studies suggest that the direction of causality is from economic growth to finan-
cial development (Odhiambo, 2010). Higher interest rates resulting from interest rate liberal-
isation can encourage capital inflows, which in turn has a positive effect on economic growth 
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(Wesso, 2001). However, interest rates might have an insignificant effect on some types of 
capital flows, like FDI. 
Interest rates have an effect on inflation and exchange rates. Higher interest rates reduce in-
flation and also result in an appreciation of a currency through an increase in capital inflows 
(Batten & Thornton, 1985). Inflation and exchange rates have a negative relationship, and the 
empirical literature suggest that the direction of causality can be both ways. However, some 
studies suggest that interest rates have an insignificant effect on the exchange rate. 
Interest rate liberalisation can exert a negative influence on an economy through its associa-
tion with financial crises. Interest rate liberalisation encourages banks to take more risks in 
search of higher returns, as well as through entry of new banks, which promotes more bank-
ing competition (Ariss, 2010). On the other hand, some studies suggest that higher levels of 
bank competition promote financial stability and that the benefits of interest rate liberalisation 
through higher growth outweigh the negative effects associated with financial crises (Ran-
ciere et al, 2006).    
The chapter also highlighted the gaps in the literature on interest rate liberalisation and eco-
nomic growth. The gaps include examining the effect of interest rate reforms on economic 
growth in different regions – for instance the SADC – in an attempt to foster regional inte-
gration. Most studies use time series techniques which assess countries individually. This stu-
dy uses panel data techniques so as to evaluate the effect of interest rate reforms in selected 
SADC countries as a whole. Most studies on the effect of interest rate reforms on financial 
deepening and economic growth focus on the size of the financial system. However, the effi-
ciency of the financial system could be more vital than its size.  
The survey of estimation techniques indicated that models – like the pooled OLS, fixed ef-
fects and random effects – yield inconsistent results in a dynamic panel data model due to the 
dynamic panel bias (Baltagi, 2005). The estimators also assume that the slope parameters are 
homogenous across groups. The TSLS and the GMM estimators have been proposed as a 
way of dealing with the dynamic panel bias. The estimators also assume that the slope coeffi-
cients are similar in cross-sectional units and so could yield inconsistent estimates when the 
slope coefficients are in fact heterogenous. Furthermore, the TSLS and GMM estimators are 
designed for panels with a large N and small T and thus may produce inconsistent estimates if 
the T is large (Pesaran & Smith, 1995). The MG and SUR models may be used to estimate in-
dividual parameters for each cross-sectional unit. However, these estimators do not take into 
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consideration that parameters could be similar across groups. The dynamic models in the stu-
dy will be estimated using the PMG estimator, which estimates heterogenous short-run slope 
coefficients for the cross-sectional units and homogenous long-run slope coefficients. The 
PMG estimator is discussed in detail in the next chapter, along with the logit model. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
METHODOLOGY 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter five surveyed the existing empirical literature on the relationship between interest 
rate liberalisation and economic growth, as well as the available panel data estimation 
techniques. The chapter suggested that the PMG estimator is superior to the MG, SUR, 
GMM, pooled OLS, fixed effects, random effects and TSLS techniques when estimating a 
dynamic panel data model involving a large T. The PMG estimator assumes that the 
intercepts, short-run coefficients and error variances differ across groups, while the long-run 
coefficients are constrained to be homogenous.  
The objective of this chapter is to outline the methodology of the study, which includes a 
discussion of the estimation techniques used in analysing the channels in which interest rate 
liberalisation affects economic growth in eleven SADC countries for the period 1990-2015. 
The first channel is through savings and investments, as advocated by McKinnon (1973). The 
analysis follows a similar approach to Shrestha & Chowdhury (2007) and Fry (1978) among 
others, who employ a multiple equation specification. Shaw (1973) suggested that financial 
liberalisation has a positive influence on financial deepening, and so the relationship between 
interest rate liberalisation, financial development and economic growth is analysed. The ana-
lysis follows that of Odhiambo (2009), who used a two-equation specification. Interest rates 
affect the returns earned by investors, which in turn influences capital flows (McLean & 
Shrestha, 2002). The relationship between interest rate liberalisation, capital flows and 
economic growth is examined with the use of a two-equation specification. The 
abovementioned relationships are estimated using the PMG technique.  
There are concerns that interest rate liberalisation increases the likelihood of financial crises 
and as such the link between interest rate liberalisation and financial crises is explored. The 
logit model is used to estimate the parameters of the regression model, due to the binary na-
ture of the dependent variable (financial crises).  
The chapter is organised as follows: the next section discusses the methodological approach 
used, while the subsequent sections outline the specified models, the estimation techniques, 
the analysis of the data, including stationarity tests, and finally a conclusion.  
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6.2  Methodological approach 
The study examines the channels in which interest rate liberalisation affects economic 
growth. The first channel considered is through savings and investments. The McKinnon and 
Shaw hypothesis suggests that interest rate deregulation exerts a positive influence on savings 
by increasing the returns on savings (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). Higher savings levels 
promote higher investment levels, which in turn foster higher economic growth. This channel 
is examined using a multiple equation specification, an approach similar to those of Fry 
(1978), Giovannini (1985), De Melo & Tybout (1986), Wirman & Thirlwall (1999), Strestha 
& Chowdury (2007) and Achy (2003). In particular this study uses a three-equation 
specification, where the first equation surveys the relationship between interest rate 
liberalisation and gross domestic savings. The effect of interest rate liberalisation on 
investments through savings is examined by the second equation, while the third equation 
observes the effect of interest rate liberalisation on economic growth through savings and 
investments.  
Another channel in which interest rate liberalisation affects economic growth is through fi-
nancial deepening. Shaw (1973) argued that higher interest rates resulting from interest rate 
liberalisation increase the amount of loanable funds, which encourages capital accumulation 
and financial deepening. Capital accumulation operates through the rise in the level of finan-
cial intermediation, which in turn promotes economic growth. The analysis follows the ap-
proach of Odhiambo (2009a) in using a two-equation specification. The first equation 
examines the role of interest rate liberalisation in promoting financial deepening, while the 
second assesses the effect of financial deepening on economic growth.  
The study also analyses the effect of interest rates on capital flows. Higher interest rates re-
sulting from interest rate liberalisation increase the returns to investing and so encourage cap-
ital inflows and reduce capital outflows (McLean & Shrestha, 2002). However, higher inter-
est rates could signify macroeconomic instability, which discourages capital inflows. The ef-
fect of interest rate liberalisation on economic growth via savings and investments, financial 
development and capital flows is estimated using the PMG estimator, which is discussed in 
detail in Section 6.3.  
Interest rate liberalisation increases the likelihood of financial crises and in particular banking 
crises (Demirgüҫ-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998). This is because higher interest rates resulting 
from interest rate liberalisation encourage banks to take more risks in anticipation of earning 
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higher returns, and because of greater competition (Cubillas & González, 2014). This study 
observes whether interest rate liberalisation increases the likelihood of financial crises in 
SADC countries, using an approach similar to that of Demirgüҫ-Kunt & Detragiache (1998), 
Lee & Shin (2007) and Barrell et al (2013). This analysis also examines whether institutional 
quality mitigates the negative effect of interest rate liberalisation on financial crises. The ef-
fect of financial development on financial crises is also investigated so as to determine whe-
ther lending practices in SADC countries can trigger financial crises. The logit model is used 
to conduct the analysis and is discussed in greater detail in section 6.10.  
 
6.3 Pooled mean group estimator  
The PMG estimator was developed by Pesaran et al (1999). This technique involves pooling 
and averaging of individual estimates across groups so that the intercept and short-run slope 
coefficients and the error variance are assumed to differ across units while the long-run coef-
ficients are constrained to be similar across groups. The PMG estimator for a dynamic panel 
data model can be specified by extending the single time series ARDL model as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑗𝛿𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,    𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇,   𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁
𝑞
𝑗=0
𝑝
𝑗=1
                       (6.1) 
where 𝛼𝑖 represents the fixed effects, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a vector of explanatory variables, 𝜆𝑖𝑗 and 𝛿𝑖𝑗 are 
vectors of parameters.  
The error correction form of the above equation is: 
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑖 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑗
∗ Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ Δ𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑗𝛿𝑖𝑗
∗
𝑞−1
𝑗=0
+
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                      (6.2) 
where: 
𝜙𝑖 = −(1 − ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑗)
𝑝
𝑗=1
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽𝑖 = ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=0
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If time series observations for each cross-sectional unit are stacked, equation 6.2 can be spe-
cified as follows: 
Δ𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖𝑌𝑖,−1 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑖 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑗
∗ Δ𝑌𝑖,−1 + ∑ Δ𝑋𝑖,−𝑗𝛿𝑖𝑗
∗
𝑞−1
𝑗=0
+
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
𝜇𝑖𝜄𝑇 + 𝜀𝑖                                         (6.3)  
where: 
𝑌𝑖 = [ 
𝑦𝑖1
⋮
𝑦𝑖𝑇
 ]
𝑇 x 1
, 𝑋𝑖 = [ 
𝑥𝑖1
⋮
𝑥𝑖𝑇
 ]
𝑇 x 𝑘
, 𝜄𝑇 = [  
1
⋮
1
   ]
𝑇 x 1
, 𝜀𝑖 = [  
𝜀𝑖1
⋮
𝜀𝑖𝑇
 ]
𝑇 x 1
 
 The PMG technique makes the following assumptions: 
• 𝜀𝑖𝑡’s are serially uncorrelated across 𝑖 and 𝑡, have zero means, variances 𝜎𝑖
2 > 0, and 
finite fourth-order moment conditions. The 𝜀𝑖𝑡’s are also independent of the explana-
tory variables, an assumption required for consistent estimation of short-run coeffi-
cients.  
• The 𝐴𝑅𝐷𝐿 (𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑞, … , 𝑞) model is stable in that the roots of: 
 
∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑧
𝑗 = 1, 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁
𝑝
𝑗=1
                                                                                                     (6.4) 
lie outside the unit circle. This assumption ensures that 𝜙𝑖 < 0 for all 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁, so there 
exists a long-run relationship between 𝑦𝑖𝑡and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 defined by: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                   (6.5) 
 
where 𝜃𝑖 = −
𝛽𝑖
′
𝜙𝑖
⁄  are the long-run coefficients while 𝜂𝑖𝑡 is a stationary process. 
• The long-run coefficients 𝜃𝑖 are constrained to be the same for all cross-sectional 
units. 
 
When the assumptions of stability of the ARDL model and long-run heterogeneity hold, 
equation (6.3) can be written as follows: 
Δ𝑌𝑖 = 𝜙𝑖𝜉𝑖(𝜃) + 𝑊𝑖𝜅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁                                                                           (6.6) 
Where the dependence of the error correction term on 𝜃 is represented by the equation below: 
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 𝜉𝑖(𝜃) = 𝑦𝑖,−1 − 𝑋𝑖𝜃, 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁 
𝑊𝑖 = (Δ𝑦𝑖,−1, … , Δ𝑦𝑖,−𝑝+1, Δ𝑋𝑖, Δ𝑋𝑖,−1, … , Δ𝑋𝑖,−𝑞+1, 𝜄) and 𝜅𝑖 =
(𝜆𝑖1
∗ , … , 𝜆𝑖,𝑝−𝑖
∗ , 𝛿𝑖0
∗′ , 𝛿𝑖1
∗′ , … , 𝛿𝑖,𝑞−1
∗′ , 𝜇𝑖)
′ 
The PMG model is estimated using a likelihood approach which assumes that the error terms 
are normally distributed. The estimator of the long-run coefficient, 𝜃, is consistent as long as 
T  →  ∞, irrespective of whether N is large.   
6.4 Interest rate liberalisation, savings, investments and economic growth 
As mentioned in section 6.2, this relationship is analysed using a three-equation specification 
in an attempt to model the effect of interest rate liberalisation on economic growth through 
savings and investments. 
6.4.1 Interest rate liberalisation and savings 
The long-run relationship between savings, real deposit rate, age dependency and GDP per 
capita was specified in the form:  
 
𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃0𝑖 + 𝜃1𝑖𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑖𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑖 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                  (6.7) 
 
where: SAV = gross domestic savings 
 RDEP = real deposit rate 
 AGE = age dependency ratio 
 GDP = GDP per capita growth 
 𝜇𝑖 = the country-specific effect 
 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = error term 
An 𝐴𝑅𝐷𝐿(1,1,1,1) dynamic specification is used for this relationship as follows: 
 
𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆1𝑖𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿10𝑖𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿20𝑖𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿30𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿11𝑖𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿21𝑖𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛿31𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                       (6.8) 
 
The error correction form of equation (6.8) is specified as follows: 
 
Δ𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖(𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃0𝑖 − 𝜃1𝑖𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃2𝑖𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃3𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛿𝑖01Δ𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛿𝑖02Δ𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖03Δ𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1                                                          (6.9) 
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where: 𝜙 = −(1 − 𝜆𝑖),  
          𝜃0𝑖 =
𝜇𝑖
(1 − 𝜆𝑖),   
⁄  
𝜃1𝑖 =
𝛿10𝑖 + 𝛿11𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
𝜃2𝑖 =
𝛿20𝑖 + 𝛿21𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
𝜃3𝑖 =
𝛿30𝑖 + 𝛿31𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
 
Gross domestic savings are calculated as GDP less final consumption expenditure. The de-
posit rate is the rate paid by commercial banks for demand, time and savings deposits. Higher 
deposit rates enhance the returns to saving and also increase the opportunity cost of increased 
current consumption expenditure in terms of returns foregone. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973) argue that the deposit rate is positively correlated with savings. However, the effect of 
the deposit rate on savings depends on the substitution and income effect, so the variable can 
be negatively signed if the income effect outweighs the substitution effect (Ang & Sen, 
2011). Keynes (1936) also argued that interest rates have an insignificant effect on savings, as 
individuals save despite low or negative interest rates. The deposit rate has been included in 
specifications involving savings and interest rates in studies like those of Fry (1978), De Me-
lo & Tybout (1986) and Shrestha & Chowdhury (2007).  
The GDP per capita growth variable is the growth rate of gross domestic product divided by 
mid-year population, and captures the effect of income on savings. According to the life-
cycle hypothesis, higher income levels enhance savings as individuals in the labour force 
increase savings relative to those out of the labour force (Kargbo, 2010). However, the effect 
of income on savings would be insignificant if income levels are low and people spend most 
of their incomes on necessities (Opoku & Ackah, 2015). Age dependency ratio is the ratio of 
people younger than 15 or older than 64 to the working age population (those aged between 
15 and 64). The variable captures the effect of demographics on the saving rate and is 
expected to be negatively correlated with savings (Ang & Sen, 2011). In countries where age 
dependency ratios are high, the effect of income on savings would mostly likely be 
insignificant (Khan & Hasan, 1998). Households with more children are likely to save less 
compared with those with fewer children. As such, the dissaving patterns of the fraction of 
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the population that is dependent would outweigh the saving patterns of those in the labour 
force, the larger the proportion of the population that is not working (Achy, 2003).  
6.4.2 Savings and investments 
The long-run relationship between investments, credit to the private sector, lending rates and 
savings was specified as follows: 
 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃0𝑖 + 𝜃1𝑖𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑖𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑖 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑖𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                          (6.10) 
           
where: INV = investments 
 CRED = credit to the private sector 
 RINT = real interest rate 
 SAV = savings 
 FDI = foreign direct investments 
 𝜇𝑖 = the country-specific effect 
 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = error term 
An 𝐴𝑅𝐷𝐿(1,1,1,1,1) dynamic specification is used for this relationship as follows: 
 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆1𝑖𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿10𝑖𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿20𝑖𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿30𝑖𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿40𝑖𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿11𝑖𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛿21𝑖𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿31𝑖𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿41𝑖𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                            (6.11) 
 
The error correction form of equation (6.11) is specified as follows: 
 
Δ𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖(𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃0𝑖 − 𝜃1𝑖𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃2𝑖𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃3𝑖𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃4𝑖𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1)
+ 𝛿𝑖01ΔC𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖02Δ𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖03Δ𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖04Δ𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1                                                                                                                     (6.12) 
 
where: 𝜙 = −(1 − 𝜆𝑖),  
  𝜃0𝑖 =
𝜇𝑖
(1 − 𝜆𝑖),   
⁄  
𝜃1𝑖 =
𝛿10𝑖 + 𝛿11𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
𝜃2𝑖 =
𝛿20𝑖 + 𝛿21𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
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𝜃3𝑖 =
𝛿30𝑖 + 𝛿31𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
𝜃4𝑖 =
𝛿40𝑖 + 𝛿41𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
Investments are captured by gross fixed capital formation. Gross fixed capital formation in-
cludes land improvements, plant, and machinery and equipment purchases (World Develop-
ment Indicators, 2014). It also includes the construction of roads, railways, schools and in-
dustrial buildings. The real interest rate is the bank rate that usually meets the short- and me-
dium-term financial needs of the private sector. The variable is expected to have a negative 
effect on investments due to higher borrowing costs that are associated with higher lending 
rates (Shrestha & Chowdhury, 2007). The McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis suggests that sav-
ings are the largest determinant of investments. Shaw (1973) argued that investments are de-
termined by the amount of funds that financial intermediaries can lend, which in turn depends 
on the quantity of savings. Higher levels of savings enhance the amount of loanable funds 
available and so have a positive effect on investments (McKinnon, 1973). Various growth 
theories, like those of Harrod-Domar, Solow-Swann and the Romer models, also stress the 
importance of savings in promoting capital accumulation/investments.  
The availability of credit to the private sector encourages entrepreneurs to innovate and make 
investments that enable more production of goods and services (Bittencourt, 2010). Credit to 
the private sector is often used as an indicator of financial development. A developed finan-
cial sector has a positive effect on the quantity as well as the quality of investment (Levine, 
2001). McKinnon (1973) suggests that financial deepening resulting from financial market 
liberalisation is an indication of increased use of financial intermediaries by savers and inves-
tors, which improves capital accumulation and the efficiency of investments by transferring 
capital from less productive to more productive sectors.  
6.4.3 Investments and economic growth 
The long-run relationship between interest rate liberalisation and economic growth was speci-
fied as follows: 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃0𝑖 + 𝜃1𝑖𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑖𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑖𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑖𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                            (6.13) 
            
where: GDPG = GDP growth 
             GOV = government spending 
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             INV = investments 
 TR = trade in goods and services 
 INF = inflation  
𝜇𝑖 = the country-specific effect 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = error term 
An 𝐴𝑅𝐷𝐿(1,1,1,1,1) dynamic specification is used for this relationship as follows: 
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆1𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿10𝑖𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿20𝑖𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿30𝑖𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿40𝑖𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿11𝑖𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛿21𝑖𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿31𝑖𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿41𝑖𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                 (6.14) 
 
The error correction form of equation (6.14) is specified as follows: 
 
Δ𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃0𝑖 − 𝜃1𝑖𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃2𝑖𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃3𝑖𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃4𝑖𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡−1)
+ 𝛿𝑖01Δ𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖02Δ𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖03Δ𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖04Δ𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1        (6.15) 
 
Where: 𝜙 = −(1 − 𝜆𝑖),  
  𝜃0𝑖 =
𝜇𝑖
(1 − 𝜆𝑖),   
⁄  
𝜃1𝑖 =
𝛿10𝑖 + 𝛿11𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
𝜃2𝑖 =
𝛿20𝑖 + 𝛿21𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
𝜃3𝑖 =
𝛿30𝑖 + 𝛿31𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
𝜃4𝑖 =
𝛿40𝑖 + 𝛿41𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
Government spending includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods 
and services, including compensation to employees. It also includes most expenditure on 
national defence and security but excludes government military expenditures. Government 
expenditures may crowd out private investments by increasing the interest rate (Bonfiglioli, 
2005). However, government expenditures in the provision of public services to the economy 
can complement private investment and hence increase economic growth (Misati & 
Nyamongo 2012:152). So the variable can possess either a positive or a negative coefficient. 
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Based on the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis, interest rate liberalisation has a positive effect 
on GDP through savings and investments. If the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis holds, the 
investment should be positively related to GDP. Inflation captures the effect of macroeco-
nomic instability on economic growth. High and fluctuating inflation is an indication of mac-
roeconomic instability, which increases the uncertainty with regard to the profitability of in-
vestment projects (Misati & Nyamongo, 2012). The increase in uncertainty dampens both do-
mestic and foreign investments, which has a negative influence on economic growth. Trade 
openness is the sum of imports and exports of goods and services measured as a share of 
GDP. Trade openness may improve efficiency in an economy by promoting product special-
isation, as specified by the theory of comparative advantage (Bonfiglioli, 2005). Trade also 
provides a larger market for domestic output, increases competition and provides producers 
with access to a variety of capital goods which may enhance productivity (Misati & Nyamo-
ngo, 2012). However, as postulated by Ahmed and Suardi (2009) trade liberalisation has a 
positive influence on economic growth if an economy’s export structure is diversified. So the 
effect of trade openness on economic growth is ambiguous.  
6.5 Interest rate liberalisation, capital flows and economic growth 
The study assesses the link between interest rates, capital flows and economic growth using a 
two-equation specification. The first equation examines the effect of interest rates on capital 
flows, while the second equation examines the influence on capital flows on economic 
growth. 
6.5.1 Interest rate liberalisation and capital flows  
The long-run relationship between interest rate liberalisation and capital flows was specified 
as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃0𝑖 + 𝜃1𝑖𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑖 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑖𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑖𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃5𝑖𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 +
             𝜃6𝑖𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                       (6.16) 
 
where: CF = capital flows 
 RINT = the real interest rate 
 GDPC = GDP per capita 
 DIFF = interest rate differentials 
 CRED = credit to the private sector 
152 
 
 INF = inflation 
 CHINN = Chinn-Ito index 
𝜇𝑖 = the country-specific effect 
 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = error term 
An 𝐴𝑅𝐷𝐿(1,1,1,1,1,1,1) dynamic specification is used for this relationship as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆1𝑖𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿10𝑖𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿20𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿30𝑖𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿40𝑖𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿50𝑖𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛿60𝑖𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿11𝑖𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿21𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛿31𝑖𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿41𝑖𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿51𝑖𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿61𝑖𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖 
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                          (6.17) 
 
The error correction form of equation (6.17) is specified as follows: 
 
Δ𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖(𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃0𝑖 − 𝜃1𝑖𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃2𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃3𝑖𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃4𝑖𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝜃5𝑖𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜃6𝑖𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛿𝑖01𝛥𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖02Δ𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛿𝑖03Δ𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖04𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖05Δ𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖06Δ𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖   
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1                                                                                                                      (6.18) 
 
where: 𝜙 = −(1 − 𝜆𝑖),  
  𝜃0𝑖 =
𝜇𝑖
(1 − 𝜆𝑖),   
⁄  
𝜃1𝑖 =
𝛿10𝑖 + 𝛿11𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
𝜃2𝑖 =
𝛿20𝑖 + 𝛿21𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
𝜃3𝑖 =
𝛿30𝑖 + 𝛿31𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
𝜃4𝑖 =
𝛿40𝑖 + 𝛿41𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
𝜃5𝑖 =
𝛿50𝑖 + 𝛿51𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
𝜃6𝑖 =
𝛿60𝑖 + 𝛿61𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
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Capital flows are captured by FDI flows, which are net inflows of investment to acquire a 
lasting management interest (10% or more voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an eco-
nomy (World Bank, 2015). The real interest rate captures the effect of domestic interest rates 
on capital flows. Higher interest rates increase returns earned by investors and thus encourage 
capital inflows (McLean & Shrestha, 2002). However, high and volatile interest rates could 
be a sign of macroeconomic instability which discourages capital inflows, so the coefficient 
is ambiguous. Higher domestic GDP per capita is an indication of high current and future 
returns and so encourages capital inflows (Ahmed et al, 2005). Furthermore, higher levels of 
GDP per capita may represent higher levels of institutional quality which impact positively 
on capital inflows (Demirgüҫ-Kunt & Detragiache (1998).  
A high inflation rate is an indication of macroeconomic instability and also increases uncer-
tainty with regard to returns on investments. So the variable is expected to be correlated nega-
tively with capital inflows (Wesso, 2001). Financial openness is represented by the Chinn-Ito 
index which measures the degree of financial openness for a country in a certain period and is 
constructed using binary variables based upon the IMF’s Report on Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) (Chinn & Ito, 2013). The variable is expected to be 
positively related to capital inflows (Ahmed et al, 2005). The removal of capital controls 
which limit the repatriation of profits encourages capital inflows. Credit to the private sector 
captures the level of financial development. Financial development improves access to funds 
for foreign investors and so is expected to have a positive effect on capital inflows (McLean 
& Shrestha, 2002). A growing strand of literature suggests that financial development is a 
prerequisite for capital inflows and countries with shallow financial markets extract fewer 
benefits from capital inflows (Mougani et al, 2013; Agbloyor et al, 2014). A rise in foreign 
interest rates or a decrease in interest rate differentials between domestic and foreign interest 
rate has a negative effect on capital inflows and also encourages capital outflows as investors 
anticipate higher returns in the foreign countries (Arteta et al, 2015). Interest rate differentials 
is thus included in the analysis.  
6.5.2 Capital flows and economic growth 
The long-run relationship between capital flows and economic growth can be specified as 
follows: 
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃0𝑖 + 𝜃1𝑖𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑖𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑖 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑖𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃5𝑖𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (6.19) 
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where: GDPG = GDP growth rate 
 GOV = government spending  
 INV = investments  
 TR = trade in goods and services 
 CF = capital flows 
 EXCH = exchange rate 
 𝜇𝑖 = the country-specific effect 
 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = error term 
An 𝐴𝑅𝐷𝐿(1,1,1,1,1,1) dynamic specification is used for this relationship as follows: 
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆1𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿10𝑖𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿20𝑖𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿30𝑖𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿40𝑖𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛿50𝑖𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡+𝛿11𝑖𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿21𝑖𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛿31𝑖𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡−1+𝛿41𝑖𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿51𝑖𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                (6.20) 
 
The error correction form of equation (6.20) is specified as follows: 
 
Δ𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃0𝑖 − 𝜃1𝑖𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃2𝑖𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃3𝑖𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃4𝑖𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡−1)
+ 𝜃5𝑖𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑖01Δ𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖02Δ𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖03Δ𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖04Δ𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛿𝑖05Δ𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1                                                                               (6.21) 
 
where: 𝜙 = −(1 − 𝜆𝑖),  
  𝜃0𝑖 =
𝜇𝑖
(1 − 𝜆𝑖),   
⁄  
𝜃1𝑖 =
𝛿10𝑖 + 𝛿11𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
𝜃2𝑖 =
𝛿20𝑖 + 𝛿21𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
𝜃3𝑖 =
𝛿30𝑖 + 𝛿31𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
𝜃4𝑖 =
𝛿40𝑖 + 𝛿41𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
𝜃5𝑖 =
𝛿50𝑖 + 𝛿51𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
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Capital flows enhance savings and investment levels in an economy and so have a positive 
effect on economic growth (McLean & Shrestha, 2002). Capital inflows could also result in 
the transfer of technology and skills that are vital for the production of goods and services, so 
promoting economic growth (Agbloyor et al, 2014). Capital inflows in the form of foreign di-
rect investments increase the level of competition in an economy, which in turn improves the 
efficiency of domestic firms. The coefficient of capital flows is expected to be related posi-
tively to GDP. The exchange rate captures macroeconomic instability in an economy. The 
coefficient is ambiguous based on the traditional and structural approaches to the impact of 
the exchange rate on economic growth (Salvatore, 2013).  
 
6.6 Interest rate liberalisation, financial development and economic growth 
The relationship is modelled using a two-equation specification. The first equation assesses 
the link between interest rate liberalisation and financial development, while the second 
examines the effect of financial development on economic growth.   
6.6.1  Interest rate liberalisation and financial development 
The long-run relationship between interest rate liberalisation and financial development can 
be specified as follows: 
 
𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃0𝑖 + 𝜃1𝑖𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑖 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑖𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                        (6.22) 
 
where: FD = financial development    
 GDPC = GDP per capita 
 INF = inflation 
 CHINN = Chinn-Ito index 
 INT = Real interest rate 
 𝜇𝑖 = the country-specific effect 
 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = error term 
 
An 𝐴𝑅𝐷𝐿(1,1,1,1,1) dynamic specification is used for this relationship as follows: 
 
𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆1𝑖𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿10𝑖𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿20𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿30𝑖𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿40𝑖𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿11𝑖𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛿21𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿31𝑖𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿41𝑖𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖 +   𝜀𝑖𝑡                  (6.23) 
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The error correction form of equation (6.23) is specified as follows: 
 
Δ𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖(𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃0𝑖 − 𝜃1𝑖𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃2𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃3𝑖𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃4𝑖𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑡−1)
+ 𝛿𝑖01Δ𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖02Δ𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖03Δ𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖04Δ𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1                                                                                                                      (6.24) 
 
where: 𝜙 = −(1 − 𝜆𝑖),  
  𝜃0𝑖 =
𝜇𝑖
(1 − 𝜆𝑖),   
⁄  
𝜃1𝑖 =
𝛿10𝑖 + 𝛿11𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
              𝜃2𝑖 =
𝛿20𝑖 + 𝛿21𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
              𝜃3𝑖 =
𝛿30𝑖 + 𝛿31𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
𝜃4𝑖 =
𝛿40𝑖 + 𝛿41𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
Five indicators of financial development are used to construct an index. This is done due to 
the strong correlations between the individual measures of financial development. The first 
indicator is broad money as a percentage of GDP, which includes currency outside banks and 
demand deposits other than those of the central government. This indicator captures the level 
of monetisation of an economy (Akinboade & Kinfack, 2013). The second indicator is credit 
to the private sector as a percentage of GDP, which includes credit provided by deposit-
taking corporations excluding the central bank (World Bank 2016). The third indicator is 
deposit money bank assets as a percentage of GDP. This variable represents claims on the 
domestic real non-financial sector by banks (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009). The 
fourth indicator is liquid liabilities as a percentage of GDP representing a broad measure of 
the size of the financial sector (Cojocaru et al 2011). The fifth measure is deposit money 
bank credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP which represents banking sector 
development (Ayadi et al (2013).  
The real interest rate represents the effect of interest rate liberalisation on financial develop-
ment. In the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, higher real interest rates encourage savers to chan-
nel their saving from unproductive real assets to financial assets, so expanding the supply of 
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loanable funds. The expansion of loanable funds and the resulting expansion of the financial 
intermediation process have a positive influence on financial development. GDP per capita is 
a proxy for real income and expected to be positively related to financial development (Odhi-
ambo, 2010). The effect of inflation on financial development is ambiguous. English (1999) 
argued that higher inflation has a positive effect on financial development by encouraging 
households to switch from purchased transactions to money balances. So inflation affects fi-
nancial development positively through savings and investments. However, Azariadis & 
Smith (1996) argued that high inflation discourages savings by reducing the returns to sav-
ings, which in turn has a negative influence on the availability of credit. Moreover, high infla-
tion is an indication of macroeconomic instability which creates uncertainty in the financial 
sector. Ayadi et al (2013) and Bittencourt (2008) suggest that macroeconomic stability – for 
instance low inflation rates – is crucial for financial development. Rajan & Zingales (2003) 
suggested that financial openness has a positive influence on financial development by in-
creasing competition in the financial sector. Financial openness is captured by the Chinn-Ito 
index. 
6.6.2 Financial development and economic growth 
The long-run relationship between financial development and economic growth can be speci-
fied as follows: 
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃0𝑖 + 𝜃1𝑖𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑖𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑖 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑖𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃5𝑖𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (6.25) 
         
where: GDPG = GDP growth rate 
 GOV = government spending 
 INV = investments 
 TR = trade in goods and services 
 FD = financial development  
           EXCH = exchange rate 
 𝜇𝑖 = the country-specific effect 
 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = error term 
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An 𝐴𝑅𝐷𝐿(1,1,1,1,1,1) dynamic specification is used for this relationship as follows: 
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆1𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿10𝑖𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿20𝑖𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿30𝑖𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿40𝑖𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛿50𝑖𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡+𝛿11𝑖𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿21𝑖𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿31𝑖𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛿41𝑖𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿51𝑖𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                       (6.26) 
 
The error correction form of equation 6.26 is specified as follows: 
 
Δ𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃0𝑖 − 𝜃1𝑖𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃2𝑖𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃3𝑖𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃4𝑖𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝜃5𝑖𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛿𝑖01Δ𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖02Δ𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖03Δ𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖04Δ𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛿𝑖05Δ𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1                                                                               (6.27) 
 
where: 𝜙 = −(1 − 𝜆𝑖),  
  𝜃0𝑖 =
𝜇𝑖
(1 − 𝜆𝑖),   
⁄  
𝜃1𝑖 =
𝛿10𝑖 + 𝛿11𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
𝜃2𝑖 =
𝛿20𝑖 + 𝛿21𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
𝜃3𝑖 =
𝛿30𝑖 + 𝛿31𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
𝜃4𝑖 =
𝛿40𝑖 + 𝛿41𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
𝜃5𝑖 =
𝛿50𝑖 + 𝛿51𝑖
1 − 𝜆𝑖
 
Schumpeter (1912) initiated the research on financial development and economic growth and 
suggested that the availability of credit encourages entrepreneurs to innovate and produce 
more goods and services. Greenwood & Jovanovic (1990) and Levine (1991) argue that a de-
veloped financial system promotes economic growth by enhancing the quality of investments. 
Developed financial markets are effective in channelling funds to productive investment pro-
jects, thus promoting economic growth (FitzGerald, 2006). According to Bonfiglioli (2005), 
financial development spurs economic growth by increasing the availability of funds for in-
vestment purposes and enhancing productivity levels. Financial development is thus expected 
to be positively signed.  
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6.7 ARDL bounds testing approach 
The PMG technique assumes that variables have a long-run relationship. So prior to esti-
mating a model using the estimator, tests of cointegration are required. Cointegration refers to 
the notion that for a set of variables integrated of order one, some linear combination of the 
variables is stationary. Panel cointegration tests allow the pooling of information regarding 
common long-run relationships from across panels while allowing the short-run relationships 
and fixed effects to differ across members of a panel. The main approaches for conducting 
panel cointegration tests are the residual-based tests and the maximum-likelihood-based tests. 
The most popular residual-based tests are the McCoskey & Kao (1998), Kao (1999) and 
Pedroni (1995, 2004) tests while the maximum-likelihood-based tests are the Larsson & 
Lyhagen (1999), Groen & Kleibergen (2003) and Larsson et al (2001) tests. Most of the tests 
can only be applied when all variables are integrated of order one. 
The study uses the ARDL bounds testing approach for the existence of a long-run relation-
ship between variables developed by Pesaran, Shin & Smith (2001). The test can be used irre-
spective of whether variables are purely I(1), I(0) or a mixture of variables of different orders 
of integration. However, the technique cannot be used in the presence of I(2) variables.  
The bounds testing approach is based on a VAR model which can be specified as follows: 
𝑧𝑡 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑡 + ∑ 𝜑𝑖Δ𝑧𝑡𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑝
𝑖=1
                                                                                                       6.28 
where 𝑐0 is a vector of intercepts, 𝑐1 is a vector of trend coefficients and 𝑝 is the lag length. 
The vector error correction model (VECM) is specified as follows: 
Δ𝑧𝑡 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑡 + Π𝑧𝑡−1 + ∑ Γ𝑖Δ𝑧𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑝
𝑖=1
                                                                                  6.29 
Where  and  are the long-run and short-run coefficient matrices respectively.   
The null of no long-run relationship is tested against the alternative hypothesis using the 
Wald test (F-statistic). Pesaran et al (2001) provided critical values for the F-test. If the F-sta-
tistic is greater than the upper critical value, the null hypothesis is rejected. If the F-statistic is 
less than the lower critical value, the null hypothesis is not rejected irrespective of the order 
of integration of the variables. If the F-statistic falls between the upper and lower critical val-
ues, the result is inconclusive.  
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6.7.1  Diagnostic tests 
Diagnostic tests are performed on the ARDL bounds testing results for individual countries to 
determine the adequacy of the model. The tests include the Breusch (1978)-Godfrey (1978) 
LM test for autocorrelation, the Breusch & Pagan (1979) test of heteroscedasticity, as well as 
the Ramsey (1969) reset test for model stability. 
The Breusch-Godfrey LM test is selected over other tests such as the Durbin-Watson test be-
cause it allows for stochastic regressors such as lagged dependent variables (Gujarati & Port-
er, 2009). The null hypothesis of the test is that there is no serial correlation of any order. 
Ramsey (1969) proposed a test of model specification error under the null hypothesis that 
there is no misspecification. Rejection of the null suggests that the model is not correctly spe-
cified. 
The popular tests of heteroscedasticity are the White (1980) and Breusch & Pagan (1979) 
tests. So the Breusch & Pagan test is selected for this study due to its simplicity compared 
with the White test. The White (1980) test adds squares of regressors which could make it 
less powerful compared with the Breusch & Pagan (1979) test by consuming degrees of free-
dom. Also, the significance of the test statistic under the White test could be a result of speci-
fication error. The null hypothesis of the Breusch-Pagan test is that the error variance is 
constant: 
𝐻0: 𝛼𝑖
2 =  𝑓(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑧1 + 𝛼2𝑧2 + ⋯ + 𝛼𝑚𝑧𝑚)                                                                             6.30 
where the z variables are regressors. If the slope coefficients are all equal to zero, then   𝛼𝑖
2 =
 𝛼0 which is a constant. Therefore, the Breusch & Pagan test examines whether 𝛼𝑖
2 is 
homoscedastic by testing the hypothesis that  𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = ⋯ 𝛼𝑚 = 0. 
6.8 Principal components analysis 
Principal components analysis (PCA) is used to construct the financial development index. 
The technique is used to examine the variance-covariance structure of a number of variables 
using a few linear combinations of these variables (Johnson & Wichern, 2007). Except in the 
situation where the number of variables is small, or the structure of the variables is simple, 
examining variances and covariances of all the variables is not an ideal process. So the main 
objective of PCA is to reduce a number of correlated variables to fewer uncorrelated compo-
nents while retaining as much of the variation as possible (Jolliffe, 2002). Correlations be-
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tween regressors results in multicollinearity, which has a negative effect on the precision of 
estimates, hence PCA is useful in mitigating such problems. If the amount of information 
contained by the principal components is more or less equivalent to the information in the 
original variables, the data reduction process is useful as the fewer components would replace 
the original variables without much loss of the information (Johnson & Wichern, 2007).  
Principal components are weighted averages of the original variables generated in a way that 
maximises the total variation given the selected weights (Cudeck, 2000). The principal com-
ponents are uncorrelated, so the covariance between them should be equal to zero. The uncor-
related linear combinations of variables derived from PCA can be specified as follows: 
𝑦1 = 𝑤11𝑥1 + 𝑤12𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝑤1𝑝𝑥𝑝                                                                                   (6.31) 
𝑦2 = 𝑤21𝑥1 + 𝑤22𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝑤2𝑝𝑥𝑝                                                                                   (6.32) 
𝑦𝑝 = 𝑤𝑝1𝑥1 + 𝑤2𝑝𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑝                                                                                   (6.33) 
where y is the constructed principle component, while w and x represent the weights and 
original variables respectively  
The variance of the uncorrelated linear combinations can be specified as follows: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑌𝑖) = 𝑤𝑖
′ ∑ 𝑤𝑖       𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑝                                                                                (6.34) 
Principal components are organised in such a way that most of the variation is preserved by 
the first few components (Jolliffe, 2002). As a result, most of the variation in the data is ex-
plained by the first principal component while the second principal component, derived in a 
similar fashion, accounts for the second-largest variation in the data. Additional principal 
components are derived in an approach similar to the first two components and the process 
continues until the number of components is equal to the number of variables (Jolliffe, 2002). 
In this case all the variations in the data would be accounted for. 
Several criteria have been adopted for selecting the number of principal components to be 
analysed. Kaiser (1960) suggests that principal components with eigenvalues less than one 
contains less information than that provided by a single original variable and thus should be 
omitted from the analysis. Jolliffe (1972) argues that the criterion suggested by Kaiser (1960) 
is too large and proposed omitting principal components with less than 0.7 eigenvalues. How-
ever, omitting principal components with eigenvalues less than one may result in important 
components being overlooked if the largest eigenvalue is close to one, so caution should be 
exercised when using this criterion.  
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Another popular criterion for selecting the number of principal components is choosing the 
smallest number of principal components that account for the desired cumulative percentage 
of the total variation (Jolliffe, 2002). In practise, the cumulative percentage of the total vari-
ation selected is between 70% and 90% depending on the data set. In cases where the number 
of variables examined is small, a value greater than 90% may be required as the total varia-
tion is dominated by one or two principal components. In situations where the number of va-
riables examined is large, the practical cut-off point should be below 70% so as to limit the 
number of principal components selected (Jolliffe, 2002).  
Cattell (1966) suggested the use of a scree plot when selecting the number of principal com-
ponents. This consists of plotting the variance of the principal components against the total 
number of principal components. The number of principal components chosen is determined 
by the point on the graph at which the slope of the lines joining the plotted points is steep to 
the left and relatively flat to the right (Jolliffe, 2002). The number of principal components 
retained is the value at which the “elbow” on the scree plot is defined (Johnson & Wichern, 
2007).  
6.9 Interest rate liberalisation and financial crises   
The relationship between interest rate liberalisation and financial crises is specified as fol-
lows: 
 
𝐿𝑖 = 𝛽1 +𝛽2𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (6.35) 
 
where: 𝐿𝑖 = dummy variable capturing financial crises   
 RINT = real interest rate 
 GDPC = GDP per capita 
 FD = financial development 
 CHINN = Chinn-Ito index 
 CA = current account balance 
 INF = inflation 
  𝜀𝑖𝑡 = error term 
The financial crisis dummy variable takes the value of 1 in a crisis year and 0 if there is no 
crisis. The construction of the crisis dummy variable is discussed in detail in section 6.11. 
Critics of interest rate liberalisation argue that it increases the likelihood of financial crises, 
163 
 
and in particular banking crises (Misati & Nyamongo, 2012). Higher interest rates encourage 
banks to take more risks in their lending practices due to the availability of higher returns. 
Also, banks undertake risky projects following the entry of new banks and financial insti-
tutions due to reduced profits and franchise values (Demetriades, Fattouh & Shields, 2001). 
Risky lending practices may result in a surge in non-performing loans, causing bank failures. 
However, lower interest rates also encourage banks to take more risks in search of higher re-
turns and also result in excessive credit undertaking from consumers (Bocutoglu & Ekinci, 
2010; Altumbas et al, 2010). Interest rate liberalisation may reduce bank risk taking, so redu-
cing the likelihood of financial crises. The coefficient of the interest rate liberalisation index 
could be positive or negative, depending on the effect of interest rate liberalisation on the 
probability of banking crises.   
GDP per capita captures the effect of higher levels of institutional quality on the likelihood of 
financial crises. GDP per capita is used as a proxy for institutional quality in studies by De-
mirgüҫ-Kunt & Detragiache (1998) and Angkinand et al (2010) who suggest that interest rate 
liberalisation reduces the likelihood of financial crises in countries with higher levels of insti-
tutional quality. So the coefficient of GDP per capita is expected to be negative (Triki & 
Maktour 2012). Financial development may increase the probability of financial crises. A rise 
in credit growth is expected to increase the number of non-performing loans and therefore is 
expected to increase the likelihood of banking crises (Angkinand et al, 2010). Financial 
openness is represented by the Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness. Critics of 
financial openness argue that it increases a country’s exposure to external shocks and the 
reversal of capital inflows. Also, lending booms initiated by capital inflows also increase the 
risk of banking crises by widening the maturity mismatch between banks’ assets and 
liabilities, as well as increasing the risks associated with movements in exchange rates 
(Demetriades et al, 2001). According to Barell et al, (2016), current account imbalances 
usually precede financial crises. Inflation is an indicator of macroeconomic instability, which 
enhances the likelihood of banking crises (Bonfiglioli, 2005). The relationship between 
interest rate liberalisation and banking crises is estimated using the logit model.  
6.10 Logit model 
In most empirical economic models, dependent variables are ratio scale variables. However, 
there are a number of econometric models where the dependent variable is a binary variable 
which takes the value of 1 or 0 (Johnson & Wichern, 2007). The values 1 and 0 indicate the 
presence or absence of a characteristic respectively. Binary variables are measured in nomi-
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nal scale and represent categories such as male or female, employed or unemployed, or in the 
labour force or not in the labour force (Hill et al, 2012). This study examines whether interest 
rate liberalisation increases the likelihood of financial crises or not. Financial crisis, the de-
pendent variable, is a binary variable specified as follows:  
 
𝑦 = {
1  if a financial crisis takes place     
 0  otherwise                                             
                                                                              (6.36) 
Models with nominal scale dependent variables are referred to as qualitative response mod-
els. Such models can be estimated using a number of techniques one of which is OLS (Guja-
rati & Porter, 2009). The application of OLS to qualitative regression models produces a lin-
ear probability model (LPM) which is specified as follows: 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝐵𝑋 + 𝑢𝑖                                                                                                                                       (6.37) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖  is the dependent variable, X is a set of explanatory variables and 𝑢𝑖 is the error term. 
The expected value of the dependent variable conditional on the value of the explanatory va-
riables is the conditional probability that the event will take place, hence the model is called 
an LPM. The LPM is not the ideal method for estimating qualitative response models, for a 
number of reasons (Nagler, 1994). Firstly, the model is based on the assumption that the pro-
bability of an event taking place is linearly related to the value of the independent variables 
regardless of the size of the variables. Secondly, due to the inability of the OLS method to re-
strict the values of the estimated probabilities, the probability values from the LPM may not 
lie between 0 and 1 (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). Thirdly, the due to the fact that the dependent 
variable is a nominal scale variable, the disturbances follow as a Bernoulli distribution, so 
violating the assumption that the disturbance term is normally distributed. Lastly, the model 
is plagued by problems of heteroscedasticity which renders the significance tests invalid (Hill 
et al, 2012).   
Due to the abovementioned limitations of the LPM, qualitative response models are usually 
estimated using logit and probit models (Nagler, 1994). These models ensure that the proba-
bility values of an event taking place always lie between 0 and 1 as the value of the depend-
ent variable(s) changes. The relationship between the explanatory variables and the probabil-
ity of an event is non-linear under the logit and probit models, unlike with the LPM. These 
models produce roughly the same estimation results, and due to its mathematical simplicity, 
the logit model is preferred in this study.    
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The probability that an event takes place is dependent on the probability distribution of 𝑌𝑖, 
which in turn depends on the probability distribution of the disturbance term (Cakmakyapan 
& Goktas, 2013). The disturbance term under the logit model is assumed to follow a logistic 
probability distribution which can be specified as follows: 
𝑃𝑖 =
1
1 + 𝑒−𝑍𝑖
                                                                                                                                    (6.38) 
where 𝑃𝑖 is the probability that an event takes place and: 
 
𝑍𝑖 = 𝐵𝑋 + 𝑢𝑖                                                                                                                                       (6.39) 
 
The probability that an event does not take place can be specified as follows: 
 
1 − 𝑃𝑖 =
1
1 + 𝑒−𝑍𝑖
                                                                                                                            (6.40) 
 
The ratio of the probability that an event takes place against the probability that it does not 
take place produces the following equation: 
 
𝑃𝑖
1 − 𝑃𝑖
=
1 + 𝑒𝑍𝑖
1 + 𝑒−𝑍𝑖
= 𝑒𝑍𝑖                                                                                                                 (6.41) 
 
where: 𝑃𝑖 1 − 𝑃𝑖⁄  is the odds ratio of an event taking place. 
 
Taking the natural log of the equation above produces the following equation: 
 
𝐿𝑖 = ln (
𝑃𝑖
1 − 𝑃𝑖
) = 𝑍𝑖 = 𝐵𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                                                                                                (6.42) 
 
where 𝐿𝑖 is the log of odds ratio and is also referred to as the logit. A positive value of 𝐿𝑖 im-
plies that an increase in the value of the explanatory variables enhances the likelihood of an 
event taking place while a negative 𝐿𝑖 value means that the probability of an event taking 
place decreases with an increase in the value of the explanatory variables (Gujarati & Porter, 
2009). The equation above shows that 𝐿𝑖 is a linear function of the independent variables and 
the slope coefficients measure the change in 𝐿𝑖 resulting from a unit change in the independ-
ent variables. 
166 
 
6.11 Data sources 
Table 6.1: Description of the variables 
Variable description 
GDP annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices 
SAV GDP less consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
INVS gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP 
RINT lending rate minus inflation 
RDEP deposit rate minus inflation 
CRED domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP 
GDPP GDP per capita (GDP divided by mid-year population) 
GDPC GDP per capita growth 
TRA sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP 
GOV current government purchases of goods and services as a percentage of 
GDP 
AGE ratio of people younger than 15 and older than 64 as a ratio of the working 
age population 
INF annual percentages of consumer prices 
FDI foreign direct investments net inflows as a percentage of GDP 
CHINN Chinn-Ito-index, a measure of a nation’s financial openness 
DIFF interest rate differentials (domestic real interest rate minus the US real 
interest rate) 
EXCH domestic currency per US$ exchange rate 
BROAD broad money as a ratio of GDP 
LIQ liquid liabilities as a ratio of GDP 
BA deposit money bank assets as a ratio of GDP 
BC private credit provided by the banking sector as a ratio of GDP 
FD index financial development index created using principal components analysis 
FD index2 financial development index created using principal components analysis 
CA current account balance as a percentage of GDP 
Source: World Bank (2016), IMF (2016) 
167 
 
A description of all the variables used in the study is provided on Table 6.1. Most of the data 
on the variables is obtained from the World Bank’s world development indicators and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Chinn-Ito index is taken from Chinn & Ito (2006) 
and measures the degree of financial openness for a country at a particular period of time. 
The index is constructed using binary variables based upon the IMF’s Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Furthermore, the index encompasses 
the period from 1970 to 2015 in 182 countries and has a range of scores from 2.44 which 
represents the most financially open score to -1.86 which is the least financially open score. 
The financial development indicators are compiled by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
(2000), Beck et al (2009) and Čihák, Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen and Levine (2012). The data 
covers the period 1990-2015 and 115 of the 15 SADC countries were selected due to the 
unavailability of data for Angola, DRC, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. 
 Financial crises dates used to construct the financial crises dummy variable are sourced from 
Laeven & Valencia (2008, 2012), Reinhart & Rogoff (2011) and Caprio & Klingebiel (2003). 
The variable is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if a financial crisis occurred and 0 
otherwise. Literature suggests that banking crises usually precede currency crises (Kaminsky 
& Reinhart, 1999; Glick & Hutchison, 1999). Both crises have common causes, like current 
account imbalances, high real interest rates, high inflation rates and financial liberalisation. 
Banking sector credit is sometimes financed by capital inflows in a liberal regime and as 
such, uncertainties in the domestic economy, like high inflation and low growth, may result 
in an attack against the domestic currency as capital outflows increase. Banking crises may 
occur as creditors have to be repaid in foreign currency, and because of the diminishing 
liquidity in the banking sector. 
So as to increase the sample of crisis observations, the study combines data on banking and 
currency crises so that the binary variable 1 indicates the presence of a crisis, regardless of 
whether it involves banking or currency. Based on this strategy there are 44 total financial 
crises. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 present the banking and currency crises dates for the SADC coun-
tries. In Table 6.3 the crisis dates are those that are within the period of the study.  
 
 
                                                          
5 Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania 
and Zambia 
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 Table 6.2: Crises dates 
Country banking crisis currency crisis 
 
Botswana 1994, 1995 1984-1986, 1996 
 
Lesotho 1988, 1995-1996, 1998-
1999 
1981, 1984-1985, 1988, 
1996, 1998, 2000-2001, 
2008 
Madagascar 1988 1984, 1994, 2004 
 
Malawi 1994 1982, 1985-1987, 1992, 
1994 
Mauritius   
 
Namibia 1984 1981, 1984-1986, 1988, 
1996, 1998, 2000-2001, 
2008 
Seychelles  2008 
 
South Africa 1977-1978, 1984, 1989, 
1990 
1981, 1984-1986, 1988, 
1996, 1998, 2000-2001, 
2008 
Swaziland 1995-1999 1981, 1984-1986, 1988, 
1996, 1998, 2000-2001, 
2008 
Tanzania 1987, 1988 1985, 1990-1995 
 
Zambia 1995-1998 1983, 1985, 1988-1996, 
2000, 2008-2009 
 Source: Caprio & Klingebiel (2003), Reinhart & Rogoff (2011) and Laeven & Valencia 
(2008, 2012) 
According to Laeven & Valencia (2008, 2012), a banking crisis is defined as a significant 
sign of financial distress in the banking system as shown by bank runs, losses in the banking 
system, a large number of defaults and liquidations. Also, any noteworthy banking policy 
intervention measures in response to significant losses in the banking system also indicate a 
banking crisis. Caprio & Klingebiel (2003) define a banking crisis as a situation of financial 
distress in which the banking system has a negative net worth.   
Reinhart & Rogoff (2011) state that banking crises are periods of bank runs that result in clo-
sure, mergers or takeovers by the public sector of one or more financial institutions. If there 
are no bank runs, the closure, takeover, or large scale government assistance of an important 
financial institution or a group of institutions can be classified as a banking crisis. 
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A currency crisis is defined as a nominal depreciation of the currency of at least 30% that is 
also at least 10% increase in the rate of depreciation compared with the previous year (Lae-
ven & Valencia 2008, 2012). The exchange rate depreciations are measured as a percentage 
change at the end-of-period official nominal bilateral dollar exchange rate from the World 
Economic Outlook (WEO) database of the IMF.  
Table 6.3: Crisis dates: 1990-2015   
Country banking crisis currency crisis 
 
Botswana 1994, 1995 1996 
 
Lesotho 1995-1996, 1998-1999 1996, 1998, 2000-2001, 
2008 
Madagascar  1994, 2004 
 
Malawi 1994 1992, 1994 
 
Mauritius   
 
Namibia  1996, 1998, 2000-2001, 
2008 
Seychelles  2008 
 
South Africa 1990 1996, 1998, 2000-2001, 
2008 
Swaziland 1995-1999 1996, 1998, 2000-2001, 
2008 
Tanzania  1990-1995 
 
Zambia 1995-1998 1990-1996, 2000, 2008-
2009 
Source: Caprio & Klingebiel (2003), Reinhart & Rogoff (2011) and Laeven & Valencia 
(2012) 
6.12 Unit root testing 
To initiate the discussion of unit root testing, a first order autoregressive model is considered 
as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                             (6.43) 
where: 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the variable being tested, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a stationary error term and 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′  represents panel-
specific means or panel-specific means and a time trend.   
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The hypothesis tested in panel unit root tests is: 
𝐻0: 𝜌𝑖 = 1 
𝐻1: 𝜌𝑖 < 1 
Equation (6.43) can be specified as follows: 
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∅𝑖𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                          (6.44) 
With this type of specification, the null hypothesis is 𝐻0: ∅𝑖 = 0 for all cross-sectional units, 
while the alternative hypothesis is 𝐻1: ∅𝑖 < 0. There are a number of panel unit root tests 
available, like the Im Pesaran & Shin (2003) (IPS) test, the Levin, Lin & Chu (2002) (LLC) 
test, the residual-based LM test, Breitung’s test and the combining p-value test. The most 
popular unit root testing methods for panel data are the Im, Pesaran & Shin (IPS) (2003) and 
the Levin, Li & Chu (LLC) (2002) tests, which are used in this study.  
6.12.1  LLC test 
Levin et al (2002) argue that individual unit root tests have limited power against alternative 
hypotheses which have highly persistent deviations from equilibrium, so they propose a panel 
unit root test which is more powerful than performing individual unit root tests for each 
cross-section. The starting point for the LLC test is equation 6.44 with the restriction that all 
panels share a common autoregressive parameter. The test assumes that the error term is seri-
ally correlated, so additional lags of the dependent variable are added to mitigate the problem. 
The model is thus specified as follows: 
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∅𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛾𝑖 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑗Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑝
𝑗=1
                                                                          (6.45) 
The test assumes that the error term is independently distributed across panels and follows a 
stationary invertible autoregressive moving-average process for each panel. The null hypo-
thesis of the test is that 𝑦𝑖𝑡 has a unit root that is, non-stationary, and the alternative hypo-
thesis that the time series is stationary (Bresson 2002).   
If √𝑁/𝑇 → 0, meaning that the time dimension T grows more slowly than the cross-sectional 
dimension N, the test should be conducted without panel-specific intercepts or time trends. 
According to Levine et al (2002) such a specification is relevant mostly for microeconomic 
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data sets. If 𝑁/𝑇 → 0, meaning that the time dimension grows faster than the cross-sectional 
dimension, the test should be conducted with panel-specific means or time trends. This 
should be the approach followed for macroeconomic datasets where N is relatively smaller 
than T. The LLC test assumes homogenous first-order autoregressive parameters, which is a 
major limitation. Maddala & Wu (1999) argued that the assumption of the alternative hypo-
thesis of the LLC test requiring every cross-sectional unit to converge at the same rate rarely 
holds in empirical analysis. The test also assumes independence across cross-sectional units, 
which makes it inappropriate if cross-sectional correlation is present (Barbieri, 2006). 
6.12.2  IPS test 
The LLC test assumes that all panels have a common autoregressive parameter. However, 
due to cultural and institutional differences, such an assumption is unrealistic, so Im et al, 
(2003) developed an alternative unit root test which assumes that there is heterogeneity for 
each unit in a dynamic panel and thus corrects for any serial correlation. So the test is flexible 
and can be used in the presence of residual serial correlation across cross-sectional units (Bal-
tagi, 2005). The equation for the IPS test is as follows:  
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∅𝑖𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                          (6.46) 
where: ∅𝑖 is panel-specific. The error term is assumed to be independently distributed normal 
and is allowed to have heterogenous variances across panels. The null hypothesis is that each 
series in the panel contains a unit root, while the alternative hypothesis allows for some of the 
individual series to have unit roots (Baltagi 2005). 
 
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show the order of integration of the variables in the study. The results in 
Table 6.4 include an individual intercept only, while those in Table 6.5 contain an individual 
intercept and trend. The variables are either stationary in levels or at first difference and, due 
to the different orders of integration, the PMG model is appropriate for the analysis. There 
are also no variables that are integrated of order two which would affect the results of the 
ARDL models negatively. 
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Table 6.4: Unit root tests. Intercept only 
 LLC IPS 
Variable levels 1st difference levels 1st difference 
CRED -1.48* -7.43** -0.37 -7.24*** 
GDPC -1.43* -7.68*** -6.05*** -14.55*** 
AGE -2.16** -2.97*** 1.30 -3.91*** 
SAV -1.31* -14.63*** -2.64*** -14.77*** 
TRA -1.36* -8.31*** -1.43* -8.92*** 
GDP -1.61* -8.31*** -6.01*** -14.83*** 
INVS -0.58 -4.16*** -0.43 -8.13*** 
GOV -2.34*** -14.63*** -2.64*** -14.09*** 
INF -5.96*** -16.15*** -4.82*** -15.32*** 
RDEP -4.86*** -9.74*** -5.76*** -11.17*** 
FDI -2.78*** -11.16*** -3.16*** -13.25*** 
RINT -2.70*** -9.93*** -4.47*** -12.31*** 
GDPP 0.06 -5.50*** 2.54 -6.13*** 
DIFF -2.81*** -7.96*** -5.13*** -11.72*** 
EXCH 3.04 -5.03*** 4.96 -5.75*** 
CHINN -2.73*** -5.53*** -2.46*** -7.41*** 
BA -1.40* -5.37** -0.16 -5.66*** 
LIQ -0.75 -3.03*** -0.67 -4.82*** 
BC -4.88*** -6.03*** -3.22*** -6.81*** 
BROAD -0.51 -4.34*** -0.18 -6.66*** 
FD index -1.44* -3.39*** 0.02 -4.53*** 
FD index2 -5.19*** -5.52*** -4.23*** -5.41*** 
CA -0.82 -8.73*** -1.17 -9.14*** 
Source: Researcher’s own computations 
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Table 6.5: Unit root tests. With trend and intercept 
 LLC IPS 
Variable levels 1st difference levels 1st difference 
CRED -3.13*** -6.84*** -1.21 -6.20*** 
GDPC 0.40 -4.87*** -4.42 -12.78*** 
AGE -0.48 -2.79*** 0.47 -5.25*** 
SAV 0.13 -12.39*** -0.95 -13.00*** 
TRA -0.25 -6.86*** -0.94 -7.44*** 
GDP 0.12 -5.66*** -4.92*** -13.08*** 
INVS 1.37 -2.14** 0.26 -6.18*** 
GOV 0.41 -1.80** -1.47* -10.43*** 
INF -7.04*** -14.11*** -5.71*** -13.64*** 
RDEP -4.21*** -7.02*** -4.40*** -9.07*** 
FDI -3.04*** -9.01*** -4.63*** -11.29*** 
RINT -3.36*** -7.52*** -4.03*** -10.26*** 
GDPP -0.56 -3.75*** -0.48 -3.51*** 
EXCH 2.28 -4.20*** -0.51 -3.72*** 
DIFF -3.31*** -5.27*** -4.25*** -9.62*** 
CHINN -0.38 -6.06*** -0.09 -6.22*** 
BA -2.19** -3.90*** -1.55* -4.01*** 
LIQ -0.38 -4.72*** -1.19 -5.48*** 
BC -5.51*** -4.27*** -3.40*** -5.22*** 
BROAD -0.42 -2.07** -0.54 -4.48*** 
FD index -2.03** -2.39*** -0.93 -3.30*** 
FD index2 -5.01*** -3.60*** -3.39*** -3.58*** 
CA 0.56 -7.34*** -0.15 -7.39*** 
Source: Researcher’s own computations 
 
6.13 Conclusion 
The chapter discussed the methodology used in the study, the estimation techniques and the 
data. The methodology involves examining the relationship between interest rate liberalisa-
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tion and economic growth in SADC countries using the panel data approach, which has the 
advantages of minimising multicollinearity and the omitted variable bias, and increasing the 
degrees of freedom (Baltagi, 2005). The channels through which interest rate liberalisation 
affects economic growth, like savings and investments, financial development and capital 
flows, are estimated using the PMG technique, which produces more accurate estimates in a 
dynamic model with a large T compared with the GMM, OLS, LSDV and TSLS techniques. 
The study constructs a financial development index using PCA, based on five indicators of 
financial development. PCA reduces the number of correlated variables into fewer uncorrelat-
ed variables, so mitigating problems associated with multicollinearity. 
The link between interest rate liberalisation and financial crises is examined with the use of a 
logit model due to the binary nature of the dependent variable. The model tests whether inter-
est rate liberalisation increases the probability of financial crises.  
Data are obtained from a variety of sources: the IMF, World Bank, Chinn & Ito (2014), Lae-
ven & Valencia (2012) and Caprio & Klingebiel (2003), and cover the period 1990-2015.  
The variables are either I(0) or I(1), so the PMG model is appropriate for the analysis. The 
next chapters present the results of the study based on the application of the estimation tech-
niques and the specified models discussed above. Chapter seven presents the results of the 
relationship between interest rate liberalisation, savings, investments and economic growth.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTEREST RATE LIBERALISATION, 
SAVINGS, INVESTMENTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
7.1  Introduction 
According to McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), interest rate liberalisation has a positive ef-
fect on economic growth through savings and investments. Higher real deposit rates encour-
age savings which in turn increase the availability of loanable funds, so boosting investments. 
Critics of interest rate liberalisation argue that savings are not sensitive to real deposit rates 
and that higher real interest rates discourage investments by increasing borrowing costs.  
This chapter presents the results of the relationship between interest rate liberalisation, sav-
ings, investments and economic growth. The link between the variables is examined empiric-
ally, based on the models specified in Chapter six, using the PMG estimation technique. The 
analysis is based on a three-equation specification, the first of which examines the effect of 
real deposit rate on savings. The second equation surveys the link between savings and 
investments, while the third model observes the relationship between investments and 
economic growth. The results of the PMG models are presented along with those of the MG 
and dynamic fixed effects (DFE) models for comparison purposes.        
The chapter starts with a description of the data, which includes stationarity tests and descrip-
tive statistics. After that, the results of the relationship between interest rate liberalisation and 
savings are analysed. The link between interest rate liberalisation and investments is also sur-
veyed and it indicates whether this link is through savings. Lastly, the link between interest 
rate liberalisation and economic growth through savings and investments is also analysed. 
7.2 Descriptive statistics    
Table 7.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the relationship between interest rate liberalisa-
tion, savings, investments and economic growth for the period 1990-2015. Savings and in-
vestment ratios average 20.46% and 24.86% respectively, which are lower than the targets set 
by the SADC region. Savings and investments are crucial for higher economic growth and 
job creation and, as such, targets of 35% for savings and 30% for investments have been set. 
The averages for the savings and investment ratio in the SADC region are lower than in other 
emerging countries. According to the IMF (2016), the savings ratio averaged close to 37% in 
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emerging and developing countries in Asia, 28% in the ASEAN Five countries and just over 
31% in the Middle East and North African countries between 1990 and 2015. The investment 
ratio in emerging and developing Asian countries averages close to 36%, while those in 
ASEAN and the Middle East and North African countries are 29% and 26% respectively. The 
GDP growth rate averages just below 4%, which is lower than the target of 7%. The mean for 
the real deposit rate averages -0.82%, which could be one of the reasons for the low savings 
ratio. 
The major reason for the negative real deposit rate is the long history of high inflation in 
SADC countries. Inflation averaged 12.49% over the period under consideration – higher 
than the mean value of the deposit rate. Income growth as measured by GDP per capita 
growth averages a low 1.91%. Developing countries have had a history of low incomes, 
which is one of the reasons for low savings rates, as a large proportion of the income is used 
for subsistence consumption. The mean value for trade as percentage of GDP is close to 96%, 
indicating high levels of trade openness among SADC countries. Government expenditure 
and credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP average 19.77% and 31.76% respect-
ively. The mean values for the age dependency rate and the real interest rate are 76.53% and 
7.99% respectively.  FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP average 4.08%.  
Table 7.1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable mean maximum minimum std. dev. observations 
SAV 20.46 51.05 -3.14 11.40 286 
INVS 24.86 69.03 4.56 10.84 286 
RDEP -0.82 15.54 -117.23 10.72 276 
AGE 76.53 103.82 40.62 18.59 286 
INF 12.59 183.31 -9.62 18.57 281 
CRED 31.76 160.12 3.09 36.47 282 
TRA 95.78 225.02 33.49 44.94 276 
GOV 19.77 47.19 6.71 8.22 277 
GDP 3.97 21.02 -12.67 3.61 285 
GDPC 1.91 16.96 -15.28 3.60 285 
RINT 7.99 52.10 -41.79 10.34 279 
FDI 4.08 54.06 -6.90 5.84 285 
Source: Researcher’s own computations 
7.3 Correlation analysis 
Covariance analysis is used to measure the strength of correlations between the variables. The 
most popular methods of testing for correlations are the Spearman’s rank order and the Pear-
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son correlation coefficient. Spearman’s rank order test is selected for this study because it 
does not make assumptions with regard to the distribution of the variables (Hauke & Kossow-
ski, 2011). Furthermore, unlike the Pearson coefficient, the rank order test can be used with-
out making the assumption that the relationship between the variables is linear (Hauke & 
Kossowski, 2011).  
Table 7.2: Correlation analysis: interest rate liberalisation and savings 
Variable GDP AGE RDEP SAV 
GDP 1    
AGE -0.11* 1   
RDEP 0.01 -0.27*** 1  
SAV 0.35*** -0.23*** -0.002 1 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), and (*) indicate significance at 
1% and 10% levels respectively 
Tables 7.2 to 7.4 show the results of the correlation analysis. Savings are positively correlated 
with income growth and significant at the 1% level of significance, which confirms a priori 
expectations. Age dependency is correlated negatively with savings, which is in line with 
theoretical expectations. The real deposit rate is correlated negatively with savings. However 
the result is insignificant.  
Table 7.3: Correlation analysis: savings and investment 
Variable INVS SAV CRED RINT FDI 
INVS 1     
SAV 0.68*** 1    
CRED 0.13** 0.18*** 1   
RINT -0.05 -0.13*** -0.22*** 1  
FDI 0.36*** 0.07 -0.15** 0.10* 1 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
According to Table 7.3, investments are highly correlated with savings and significant at the 
1% level of significance. This is in line with a priori expectations, as savings increase the 
availability of funds for investment purposes. Investments are correlated positively with 
credit to the private sector. Investments and the real interest rate are correlated negatively, 
although insignificantly. FDI and investments are correlated positively, which provides initial 
support for the hypothesis that FDI inflows supplement domestic investments. 
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Table 7.4: Correlation analysis: investment and economic growth 
Variable GDPG GOV INF INVS TRADE 
GDPG 1     
GOV -0.02 1    
INF -0.11* -0.25*** 1   
INVS 0.25*** 0.51*** -0.27*** 1  
TRA -0.03 0.46*** -0.20*** 0.45*** 1 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***) and (*) indicate significance at 1% 
and 10% levels respectively 
According to Table 7.4 the growth rate of GDP is positively correlated with investments. This 
confirms a priori expectations, as investments are regarded as one of the major determinants 
of economic growth. Inflation and government expenditure are correlated negatively with 
GDP, with GDP significant at 10%. GDP is negatively correlated with trade, however the 
result is insignificant. Tables 7.2 to 7.4 show no strong correlations between variables. The 
correlations are lower than 0.8, which implies that multicollinearity is not a problem, as 
suggested by Gujarati & Porter (2009). 
7.4 Empirical results 
This section presents the empirical results of the relationship between interest rate liberalisa-
tion, savings, investments and economic growth. The analysis follows that of Fry (1978), 
Giovannini (1985), De Melo & Tybout (1986), Wirman & Thirlwall (1999), Strestha & 
Chowdury (2007) and Achy (2003), who use a three-equation specification. The first part of 
the analysis is on the relationship between interest rate liberalisation and savings. The second 
and third parts of the section present the results of the relationship between interest rate liber-
alisation and investments, as well as the effect of investments on economic growth.  
7.4.1 Interest rate liberalisation and savings 
The results of the relationship between interest rate liberalisation and savings are presented in 
this section. Estimation of a model using the PMG estimator is preceded by the selection of 
an appropriate lag length. An ARDL model with appropriate lags overcomes the problems as-
sociated with serial correlation and endogeneity. The study uses a single lag, as proposed by 
Pesaran et al (1999), who argue that the coefficients of a model estimated by the PMG esti-
mator are robust to the choice of lag order when T is large.   
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Table 7.5: ARDL bounds testing results. Dependent variable: Savings 
Country F-stat critical values 
1% 5% 10% 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
Botswana 11.52*** 4.29 5.61 3.23 4.35 2.72 3.77 
Lesotho 8.94*** 4.29 5.61 3.23 4.35 2.72 3.77 
Madagascar 6.61*** 4.29 5.61 3.23 4.35 2.72 3.77 
Malawi 3.13 4.29 5.61 3.23 4.35 2.72 3.77 
Mauritius 2.11 4.29 5.61 3.23 4.35 2.72 3.77 
Namibia 5.37*** 4.29 5.61 3.23 4.35 2.72 3.77 
Seychelles 4.14* 4.29 5.61 3.23 4.35 2.72 3.77 
South Africa 7.16*** 4.29 5.61 3.23 4.35 2.72 3.77 
Swaziland 2.42 4.29 5.61 3.23 4.35 2.72 3.77 
Tanzania 2.23 4.29 5.61 3.23 4.35 2.72 3.77 
Zambia 8.67*** 4.29 5.61 3.23 4.35 2.72 3.77 
Source: Researcher’s own computations 
The PMG estimator is based on the assumption that there is cointegration between variables 
in the model. The study follows the approach of Pesaran et al (1999) which involves testing 
the existence of a long-run relationship in the individual countries using the ARDL bound 
testing method prior to estimating the model using the PMG technique. Table 7.5 presents the 
results of the ARDL bounds testing approach for existence of a level long-run relationship 
between variables. The test is ideal for this study because it can be used in when variables 
have different orders of integration. The null of no long-run relationship is rejected in seven 
countries. The hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level for Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
South Africa and Zambia. A long-run relationship is detected in Namibia at the 5% level and 
Seychelles at the 10% level.  
Diagnostic tests were conducted on the ARDL models for individual countries and the results 
are shown in Table 7.6. Serial correlation is detected in Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa 
and Zambia, while heteroscedasticity is present only in Botswana and Malawi. Only Mada-
gascar, Malawi and Zambia show evidence of model misspecification. The results indicate 
that most of the individual ARDL models pass the diagnostic tests, which signals that the 
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PMG model is adequate. Pesaran et al (1999) also suggest that the PMG analysis may 
proceed if cointegration is detected in most countries in a panel and if most countries pass the 
diagnostic tests.  
Table 7.6: Diagnostic tests. Dependent variable: savings 
Country serial correlation heteroscedasticity Ramsey’s reset test 
Botswana 0.01 4.39** 0.22 
Lesotho 0.02 0.33 0.14 
Madagascar 1.42 1.02 3.37** 
Malawi 0.004 3.64* 7.93*** 
Mauritius 1.72 1.90 0.05 
Namibia 7.50*** 0.04 0.46 
Seychelles 6.40*** 0.11 0.73 
South Africa 6.40*** 0.33 0.12 
Swaziland 1.65 0.08 1.58 
Tanzania 0.27 0.14 2.28 
Zambia 11.23*** 1.97 16.51*** 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. 
Table 7.7 reports the results of the PMG, MG and DFE estimation techniques. The adjust-
ment coefficients show the speed adjustment from the short run to the long run equilibrium 
and, as expected, they are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in all the 
models. The adjustment coefficients range from -0.36 in the DFE model to -0.52 in the MG 
model. So the results confirm a priori that the MG estimator error correction indicates faster 
adjustment compared with the PMG and DFE error correction estimates (Pesaran et al, 1999). 
The Hausman test is used to indicate the superior estimator between the MG and the PMG 
techniques. The test reveals that the PMG estimator is the most appropriate technique, as the 
null of homogenous long-run coefficients is not rejected. Imposing homogenous long-run 
coefficients reduces standard errors and, as such, the PMG estimator has lower standard 
errors compared with the MG and DFE techniques (Pesaran et al, 1999). So the PMG 
estimator is more efficient and as a result forms the basis for the interpretations of the slope 
coefficients. Based on the error correction term of the PMG model, short-run disequilibrium 
is corrected as a speed of 42%.  
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Table 7.7: Empirical results: PMG, MG and DFE. Dependent variable: Savings 
Variable PMG MG Hausman 
test 
DFE 
adjustment 
coefficient 
-0.42 
(-6.61)*** 
-0.52 
(-8.57)*** 
 -0.36 
(-7.58)*** 
long-run 
coefficients 
  2.18 
[0.53] 
 
GDP 1.55 
(6.08)*** 
1.28* 
(1.74) 
 1.50 
(3.59)*** 
AGE 0.36 
(2.98)*** 
0.09 
(0.17) 
 0.12 
(0.84) 
RDEP 0.30 
(2.83)*** 
-0.003 
(-0.01) 
 0.18 
(0.94) 
short-run 
coefficients 
    
d.GDP -0.23 
(-2.49)** 
-0.06 
(-0.38) 
 -0.14 
(-1.36) 
d.AGE 0.26 
(0.27) 
0.17 
(0.13) 
 -0.45 
(-0.70) 
d.RDEP -0.02 
(-0.28) 
-0.06 
(-0.64) 
 0.03 
(0.55) 
No of observations 262 262  262 
No of countries 11 11  11 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate 10%, 5% and 
1% significance level, respectively. Figures in parentheses ( ) are T-statistics, figures in 
parentheses [ ] are p-values.  
The long-run slope coefficients are all positive and significant at the 1% level. The real de-
posit rate has a positive effect on savings. A 1-percentage-point increase in the real deposit 
rate increases the savings to GDP ratio by 0.3 percentage points. The result lends support to 
the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis and squares well with those of Fry (1978), Strestha & 
Chowdury (2007), Boadi et al (2015), Opuku & Ackah (2015), Kargbo (2010) and Mottelle 
& Masenyetse (2012). The results contradict those of De Melo & Tybout (1986) as well as 
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Warman & Thirwall (1994), who argued that interest rates have an insignificant effect on 
savings.  
Table 7.8: Empirical results: PMG. Dependent variable: savings 
Country RDEP AGE GDP adjustment 
Botswana 0.22 
(0.72) 
5.54 
(2.73)*** 
-0.71 
(-3.93) 
-0.82 
(-5.97)*** 
Lesotho -0.60 
(-1.06) 
-6.22 
(-1.41) 
0.48 
(0.78) 
-0.49 
(2.89)*** 
Madagascar 0.01 
(0.14) 
-1.29 
(1.21) 
-0.15 
(-1.06) 
-0.40 
(-3.90)*** 
Malawi -0.15 
(-1.47) 
-1.78 
(-0,85) 
-0.36 
(-1.70)* 
-0.57 
(-3.22)*** 
Mauritius 0.30 
(2.06)** 
1.65 
(0.71) 
-0.41 
(-1.42) 
-0.30 
(-2.20)** 
Namibia 0.01 
(0.03) 
-2.07 
(-0.85) 
-0.11 
(-0.46) 
-0.49 
(-3.33)*** 
Seychelles 0.32 
(1.63) 
1.27 
(0.77) 
-0.55 
(-1.46) 
-0.46 
(-2.78)*** 
South Africa -0.01 
(-0.09) 
0.48 
(1.26) 
-0.03 
(-0.35) 
-0.06 
(-1.23) 
Swaziland -0.07 
(-0.23) 
-1.57 
(0.84) 
-0.14 
(-0.38) 
-0.29 
(1.99)** 
Tanzania -0.38 
(-2.44)** 
3.73 
(2.11)** 
-0.41 
(-1.34) 
-0.56 
(-4.87)*** 
Zambia 0.10 
(0.42) 
3.14 
(0.67) 
-0.19 
(-0.39) 
-0.18 
(-1.46) 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate 10%, 5% and 
1% significance level, respectively. Figures in parentheses are T-statistics 
Income captured by GDP per capita growth affects savings positively. The income coefficient 
is significant in all three models. This confirms a priori expectations, as higher incomes are 
expected to increase savings. The result is in line with those of Bandiera et al (2000), Kargbo 
(2010) and Ang & Sen (2011). The PMG coefficient suggests that a percentage-point increase 
in GDP per capita growth leads to 1.55-percentage-point increases in savings. Age dependen-
cy has a positive effect on savings in SADC countries. This is against a priori expectations, 
as higher age dependency rates are associated with lower savings rates (Achy, 2003; Ang & 
Sen, 2011). A close inspection of the data reveals that a number of countries achieved higher 
savings rates during the period when age dependency rates were at their highest. A study by 
Keho (2012) reported that age dependency has a positive and significant influence on savings 
in Cameroon, Zambia, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Niger. According to these results, income is 
the most important long-run determinant of savings in SADC countries.   
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The short-run coefficients which reflect the adjustment of the economy to past shocks are 
largely insignificant in all the models. The income variable is the only significant coefficient. 
However it is against a priori expectations. According to the result, a percentage-point in-
crease in income decreases the savings-to-GDP ratio by 0.23 percentage points in the short 
run. A shock to income leads to greater consumption in the short run. Table 7.8 presents the 
heterogenous short-run results for each country in the study. Most of the heterogenous short-
run coefficients are insignificant, as with the homogenous coefficients. The adjustment coef-
ficients are negative and statistically significant in nine of the 11 countries, so confirming the 
long-run relationships between the variables in the study. 
7.4.2 Savings and investments 
Prior to applying the PMG technique, ARDL models for individual countries were estimated 
and the results are presented in Table 7.9.  
Table 7.9: ARDL bounds testing results: Dependent variable: investments 
Country F-stat critical values 
1% 5% 10% 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
Botswana 7.80*** 3.74 5.06 2.86 4.01 2.45 3.52 
Lesotho 2.39 3.74 5.06 2.86 4.01 2.45 3.52 
Madagascar 13.22*** 3.74 5.06 2.86 4.01 2.45 3.52 
Malawi 0.78 3.74 5.06 2.86 4.01 2.45 3.52 
Mauritius 4.55** 3.74 5.06 2.86 4.01 2.45 3.52 
Namibia 0.83 3.74 5.06 2.86 4.01 2.45 3.52 
Seychelles 5.31*** 3.74 5.06 2.86 4.01 2.45 3.52 
South Africa 1.70 3.74 5.06 2.86 4.01 2.45 3.52 
Swaziland 0.36 3.74 5.06 2.86 4.01 2.45 3.52 
Tanzania 5.72*** 3.74 5.06 2.86 4.01 2.45 3.52 
Zambia 4.23** 3.74 5.06 2.86 4.01 2.45 3.52 
Source: Researcher’s own computations 
The null of no long-run relationship is rejected in six countries at 10% level of significance. 
The diagnostic tests presented in Table 7.10 reveal that most of the ARDL models are 
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adequate. Serial correlation is detected only in five countries, heteroscedasticity is present in 
only one country, while there is evidence of model misspecification in only two countries. 
Table 7.10: Diagnostic tests: Dependent variable: investments 
Country serial correlation test heteroscedasticity test Ramsey’s reset test 
Botswana 2.56 0.01 1.36 
Lesotho 13.30*** 1.79 0.71 
Madagascar 1.62 4.54** 5.93*** 
Malawi 2.60 0.07 1.51 
Mauritius 1.09 0.92 4.19** 
Namibia 7.41*** 1.65 0.66 
Seychelles 0.58 0.47 0.47 
South Africa 5.65*** 0.53 1.52 
Swaziland 9.98*** 0.10 2.62* 
Tanzania 5.25** 0.16 1.49 
Zambia 0.33 1.85 1.61 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. 
The empirical results of the relationship between interest rate liberalisation and investments 
are shown in Table 7.11. The adjustment coefficients range from -0.18 for the DFE model to 
-0.48 for the MG estimator. The MG error correction term indicates faster adjustment, as ex-
pected. The Hausman test suggests that the PMG model is adequate for the analysis, as the 
null that there is no difference between the PMG and MG models is not rejected. The real 
interest rate has a negative but insignificant effect on investments. The result is consistent in 
all three models, and confirms the findings of Shrestha & Chowdhury (2007), who report an 
insignificant influence of the real lending rate on investments in Nepal. This finding 
contradicts the view that higher real interest rates raise borrowing costs and so negatively 
affect investments, as proposed by Keynesians. Savings have a positive and statistically sig-
nificant effect on investments in all three models, which confirms theoretical expectations, as 
savings increase the availability of funds for investment purposes. According to the PMG 
model, a percentage-point increase in the savings-to-GDP ratio leads to a 0.31-percentage-
point increase in the investments-to-GDP ratio. The result is in line with the findings of Athu-
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korala (1998), Shrestha & Chowdhury (2007) and Orji et al (2014), who found that savings 
play a crucial role in determining investments.  
Table 7.11: Empirical results: PMG, MG and DFE. Dependent variable: investments 
Variable PMG MG Hausman 
test 
DFE 
adjustment 
coefficient 
-0.29 
(-4.18)*** 
-0.48 
(-4.58)*** 
 -0.18 
(-4.51)*** 
long-run 
coefficients 
  1.58 
[0.81] 
 
SAV 0.31 
(3.09)*** 
0.31 
(1.80)* 
 0.60 
(2.84)*** 
CRED 0.09 
(3.38)*** 
0.60 
(1.40) 
 0.08 
(0.52) 
RINT -0.001 
(-0.01) 
1.18 
(0.94) 
 -0.16 
(-0.74) 
FDI 0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.23 
(-0.51) 
 0.18 
(0.53) 
short-run 
coefficients 
    
d.SAV 0.22 
(3.55)*** 
0.28 
(3.25)*** 
 0.20 
(3.97)*** 
d.CRED 0.47 
(2.55)** 
0.41 
(1.57) 
 0.06 
(0.90) 
d.RINT -0.03 
(-0.80) 
0.02 
(0.33) 
 0.04 
(1.03) 
FDI 0.29 
(2.05)** 
0.31 
(3.54)*** 
 0.09 
(1.49) 
No of observations 264 264  264 
No of countries 11 11  11 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***) and (**) indicate 1% and 5% 
significance level, respectively. Figures in parentheses ( ) are T-statistics, figures in 
parentheses [ ] are p-values.  
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The significant relationship between savings and investments provides further support for 
McKinnon’s complementary hypothesis, as higher real interest rates (real deposit rates) have 
a positive effect on investments through higher savings. According to the results, the positive 
effect of higher deposit rates outweighs the negative effect of higher real lending rates on in-
vestments, which supports the findings of Athukorala (1998) and Shrestha & Chowdhury 
(2007). Financial development has a positive and statistically significant influence on in-
vestments in the long run, a result which confirms a priori expectations. According to Mc-
Kinnon (1973) and Levine (1997, 2001) financial development is expected to have a positive 
effect on investments. The results above imply that the positive effect of higher savings on in-
vestments outweighs the negative effect of higher lending rates, which contrasts with the 
views of Lewis (1992) and Warman & Thirlwall (1994), who argued that the negative effect 
of higher real interest rates on investments outweighs that of higher deposit rates on savings. 
FDI inflows have a positive but insignificant effect on investments in the long run, which 
suggests that foreign investments do not supplement domestic investments in the SADC 
region.  
The homogenous short-run results reveal that savings have a positive and significant effect on 
investments in all models, while financial development is correlated positively with invest-
ments in the PMG model. The real interest rate and financial development variables are both 
insignificant in the short run, suggesting that shocks to these variables exert no effect on in-
vestments in SADC countries. According to the PMG and MG models, FDI inflows are posi-
tively related to investments in the short run. 
Table 7.12 presents the result of the short-run PMG model, which has differing coefficients 
for each country. The adjustment coefficients are negatively signed and statistically signifi-
cant in six countries. The real interest rate has an insignificant short-run effect on investments 
in all countries with the exceptions of South Africa, Mauritius and Botswana at 10% level. 
Real interest rates have a positive effect on investments in South Africa, while in Botswana 
and Mauritius, higher real interest rates rate reduce investments. Credit to the private sector 
(financial development) has a positive and significant short-run influence on investments in 
Botswana, Malawi and Tanzania. In Mauritius and Zambia, the coefficient is significant at 
10% level. Savings have a positive and statistically significant effect on investments in Mada-
gascar, Malawi, Namibia and Swaziland. FDI inflows boost investments only in Madagascar, 
Mauritius and Zambia.  
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Table 7.12: Empirical results: PMG short-run coefficients.  
Country RINT CRED SAV FDI adjustment 
Botswana -0.20 
(-1.72)* 
1.52 
(3.21)*** 
0.18 
(1.21) 
0.35 
(1.46) 
-0.63 
(-4.93)*** 
Lesotho 0.03 
(0.16) 
0.14 
(0.50) 
-0.13 
(-1.26) 
0.20 
(1.67)* 
-0.06 
(-1.19) 
Madagascar -0.06 
(-0.96) 
0.64 
(1.21) 
0.41 
(2.71)*** 
1.31 
(5.35)*** 
-0.17 
(-1.93)* 
Malawi -0.03 
(-1.05) 
0.45 
(2.18)*** 
0.24 
(2.89)*** 
-0.005 
(-0.05) 
-0.23 
(-1.98)** 
Mauritius -0.25 
(-1.99)** 
0.15 
(1.82)* 
0.003 
(0.03) 
0.55 
(2.68)** 
-0.10 
(-1.36) 
Namibia -0.04 
(-0.43) 
0.02 
(0.11) 
0.47 
(2.60)*** 
0.28 
(1.38) 
-0.17 
(-0.92) 
Seychelles 0.14 
(1.23) 
-0.33 
(-0.77) 
0.21 
(1.36) 
0.03 
(0.33) 
-0.53 
(-2.87)*** 
South Africa 0.18 
(2.49)** 
-0.01 
(-0.52) 
0.28 
(0.99) 
-0.03 
(-0.27) 
-0.48 
(-2.97)*** 
Swaziland 0.01 
(0.07) 
0.13 
(0.34) 
0.53 
(3.77)*** 
0.04 
(0.21) 
-0.09 
(-0.91) 
Tanzania -0.08 
(-0.87) 
1.36 
(2.70)*** 
-0.02 
(-0.15) 
-0.38 
(-0.97) 
-0.09 
(-0.73) 
Zambia -0.03 
(-0.27) 
1.05 
(1.91)* 
0.24 
(1.83)* 
0.80 
(2.69)** 
-0.61 
(-3.41)*** 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate 10%, 5% and 
1% significance level, respectively. Figures in parentheses are T-statistics. 
7.4.3 Investments and economic growth 
The ARDL bounds testing results presented in Table 7.13 indicate that the null of no long-run 
relationship is rejected in all countries. The null is rejected at 1% level of significance in Bo-
tswana, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania and Zambia, and at 5% for the remaining 
countries.  
Table 7.14 reports the diagnostic test results which reveal that serial correlation is detected in 
only two countries, while heteroscedasticity is present in one country. The Ramsey reset test 
indicates lack of misspecification in all countries with the exception of Botswana and 
Madagascar. Most of the individual country ARDL models pass the diagnostic tests, which 
implies that the PMG model is adequate. 
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Table 7.13: ARDL bounds testing result. Dependent variable: GDP growth 
Country F-stat critical values 
1% 5% 10% 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
Botswana 9.00*** 3.74 5.06 2.86 4.01 2.45 3.52 
Lesotho 4.66** 3.74 5.06 2.86 4.01 2.45 3.52 
Madagascar 6.64*** 3.74 5.06 2.86 4.01 2.45 3.52 
Malawi 22.74*** 3.74 5.06 2.86 4.01 2.45 3.52 
Mauritius 8.62*** 3.74 5.06 2.86 4.01 2.45 3.52 
Namibia 6.14*** 3.74 5.06 2.86 4.01 2.45 3.52 
Seychelles 5.01** 3.74 5.06 2.86 4.01 2.45 3.52 
South Africa 4.21** 3.74 5.06 2.86 4.01 2.45 3.52 
Swaziland 4.38** 3.74 5.06 2.86 4.01 2.45 3.52 
Tanzania 15.08*** 3.74 5.06 2.86 4.01 2.45 3.52 
Zambia 11.22*** 3.74 5.06 2.86 4.01 2.45 3.52 
Source: Researcher’s own computations 
Table 7.14: Diagnostic tests. Dependent variable: GDP growth 
Country serial correlation heteroscedasticity reset test 
Botswana 0.56 0.52 2.90* 
Lesotho 1.83 0.53 2.59 
Madagascar 0.04 3.00 15.41*** 
Malawi 1.50 0.07 0.18 
Mauritius 7.64** 7.06** 0.01 
Namibia 1.96 0.20 0.73 
Seychelles 0.19 1.11 0.76 
South Africa 0.05 0.79 0.74 
Swaziland 1.66 0.02 1.76 
Tanzania 2.72* 0.00 0.83 
Zambia 0.89 0.06 1.58 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. 
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Table 7.15 presents the results of the PMG, MG and DFE models. Based on the Hausman 
test, the PMG technique is adequate for the analysis. The long-run results suggest that invest-
ments have a positive effect on economic growth and the coefficient is significant at the 1% 
level. A percentage-point increase in the investment-to-GDP ratio increases economic growth 
by 0.14 percentage points. The result confirms a priori expectations, as investments are 
viewed as one of the main drivers of economic growth. The result provides support for the 
McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis, as higher real interest rates (real deposit rates) have a posi-
tive effect on savings. Savings promote higher investment levels which are then translated to 
faster economic growth. The results are in line with those of Hye & Wizarat (2013) and Orji 
et al (2015). 
Trade has a negative long-run effect on economic growth and the coefficient is significant at 
the 1% level. The results square well with those of Ahmed (2013) and Yanikkaya (2003), 
who report that trade openness is detrimental to economic growth in developing countries. 
According to Ahmed & Suardi (2009), trade has a positive effect on economic growth if the 
export structure is diversified. However, most SADC countries export mostly primary prod-
ucts and fewer manufactured goods (Hausman, Hwang & Rodrik, 2006).  
Government expenditure has a negative and significant influence on economic growth. The 
results are in line with the findings of Misati & Nyamongo (2012), Gorlach & Le Roux 
(2015) and Le Roux & Moyo (2015). Government expenditures directed towards consump-
tion, or wasteful expenditure, is detrimental to economic growth. Also, government expendi-
tures could crowd out investments, one of the main drivers of economic growth, by increas-
ing interest rates. Inflation has a negative effect on economic growth, as expected, and the co-
efficient is significant at the 10% level. The result squares well with those of Ahmed (2013), 
Misati & Nyamongo (2012) and Owusu & Odhiambo (2015). High inflation is an indicator of 
macroeconomic instability, which increases uncertainty with regard to savings and invest-
ment decisions. SADC countries have had a history of high inflation, which has often hind-
ered economic growth. The pooled short-run coefficients are insignificant in all models, with 
the exception of inflation in the DFE model, which indicates a positive relationship between 
inflation and economic growth.  
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Table 7.15: Empirical results: PMG, MG and DFE. Dependent variable: GDP growth 
Variable PMG MG Hausman 
test 
DFE 
adjustment 
coefficient 
-0.80 
(-8.21)*** 
-1.09 
(-14.56)*** 
 -1.05 
(0.06)*** 
long-run 
coefficients 
  1.75 
[0.78] 
 
INVS 0.14 
(6.68)*** 
0.09 
(1.46) 
 0.07 
(2.33)** 
TRA -0.02 
(-3.77)*** 
0.02 
(0.71) 
 0.001 
(0.08) 
GOV -0.17 
(-3.22)*** 
-0.32 
(-3.10)*** 
 -0.08 
(-1.13) 
INF -0.02 
(-1.94)* 
-0.10 
(-1.43) 
 -0.05 
(-3.40)*** 
short-run 
coefficients 
    
d.INVS -0.02 
(-0.24) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
 0.03 
(0.65) 
d.TRA 0.04 
(0.94) 
0.01 
(0.20) 
 -0.03 
(-1.51) 
d.GOV -0.01 
(-0.09) 
0.09 
(0.51) 
 -0.10 
(-1.14) 
d.INF 0.03 
(0.49) 
0.09 
(1.44) 
 0.05 
(2.81)*** 
No of observations 260 260  260 
No of countries 11 11  11 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (*), and (***) indicate 10% and 1% 
significance levels, respectively. Figures in parentheses ( ) are T-statistics, figures in 
parentheses [ ] are p-values.  
 The country-specific short-run coefficients estimated using the PMG estimator are presented 
in Table 7.16. The adjustment coefficients are negative and statistically significant in all 
countries. Investments have a negative and statistically significant effect on economic growth 
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in Botswana and Swaziland. In Madagascar, investments are positively related to economic 
growth in the short run. Trade has a positive and significant effect on economic growth in 
Botswana, Madagascar and South Africa. The coefficient is negatively signed and statistic-
ally significant in Namibia and Swaziland. Government expenditure has a negative and statis-
tically significant effect on economic growth in Mauritius, while in Swaziland and Zambia 
the coefficient indicates a positive relationship. Inflation has a positive and significant effect 
on economic growth in Botswana, Namibia and Zambia, and a negative effect on economic 
growth in South Africa. 
Table 7.16. Empirical results: PMG short-run coefficients 
Country INVS TRA GOV INF adjustment 
Botswana -0.35 
(-2.99)*** 
0.34 
(5.63)*** 
-0.17 
(-0.57) 
0.59 
(2.96)*** 
-0.85 
(6.07)*** 
Lesotho -0.15 
(-1.21) 
0.003 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.08 
(-1.54) 
-0.31 
(-1.71)* 
Madagascar 0.38 
(2.42)** 
0.22 
(3.00)*** 
0.46 
(1.28) 
-0.09 
(-1.45) 
-1.22 
(-8.21)*** 
Malawi -0.30 
(-1.10) 
-0.09 
(-0.95) 
-0.40 
(-1.69) 
0.08 
(1.14) 
-1.03 
(-5.33)*** 
Mauritius -0.12 
(-0.78) 
-0.05 
(-1.03) 
-1.24 
(-2.47)** 
0.04 
(0.34) 
-1.18 
(-5.88)*** 
Namibia -0.02 
(-0.142) 
-0.16 
(-2.45)** 
0.48 
(1.63) 
0.22 
(1.74)* 
-0.88 
(-5.15)*** 
Seychelles 0.14 
(1.22) 
-0.03 
(-0.63) 
0.19 
(0.93) 
-0.11 
(-1.10) 
-0.48 
(-2.22)** 
South Africa 0.20 
(0.80) 
0.25 
(3.52)*** 
0.05 
(0.11) 
-0.33 
(-2.00)** 
-0.50 
(-3.06)*** 
Swaziland -0.06 
(-2.01)** 
-0.02 
(-1.70)* 
0.14 
(1.69)* 
-0.02 
(-0.48) 
-1.06 
(-31.84)*** 
Tanzania 0.13 
(1.07) 
0.01 
(0.21) 
-0.01 
(-0.08) 
-0.01 
(-0.13) 
-0.41 
(-2.24)*** 
Zambia -0.02 
(-0.21) 
-0.001 
(-0.02) 
0.35 
(3.31)*** 
0.08 
(5.14)*** 
-0.85 
(-5.32)*** 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate 10%, 5% and 
1% significance level, respectively. Figures in parentheses are T-statistics. 
7.5 Conclusion 
The chapter provided an empirical analysis of the effect of interest rate liberalisation on eco-
nomic growth in SADC countries for the period 1990-2015. The analysis sought to determine 
whether the effect of interest rate on economic growth is through savings and investments. 
The PMG, MG and DFE estimators were used in the analysis, involving a three-equation 
specification. The chapter first examined the effect of higher real deposit rates on savings. 
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This was followed by the analysis of the relationship between savings and investments, and 
lastly the effect of investments on economic growth.  
The results reveal that higher real deposit rates have a positive and significant effect on sav-
ings, in line with the proposition by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). The substitution ef-
fect outweighs the income effect and the result contradicts the views of the Keynesians that 
savings are not responsive to changes in interest rates. However, based on the results, in-
comes are the largest determinant of savings.  
Savings are crucial for investments in both the long and short run, which confirms theoretical 
propositions of McKinnon and Shaw. The real interest rate has an insignificant effect on in-
vestments in both the long and short run, signalling that the rise in borrowing costs does not 
play much of a role in determining investments. The result suggests that the effect of higher 
deposit rates outweighs the negative effect of higher borrowing costs. 
Investments are positively related to economic growth in the long run, which confirms a 
priori expectations that investments are one of the main drivers of economic growth. 
Inflation, government expenditure and trade openness have a negative effect on economic 
growth. The results imply that interest rate liberalisation has a positive effect on economic 
growth through savings and investments. Lower interest rates used to boost economic growth 
result in a decrease in savings and investments, which are the main drivers of long-term 
growth. The next chapter looks at the effect of interest rates on growth through capital 
inflows. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTEREST RATE LIBERALISATION, 
CAPITAL FLOWS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
8.1  Introduction 
Chapter seven revealed that investments are a major driver of economic growth in SADC 
countries. So policies that boost investment levels are crucial for future economic growth.  
SADC countries have had a history of low investment levels and, as such, capital inflows are 
regarded as one way of supplementing or complementing domestic investments. Policies that 
enhance market size (GDP), improve institutional quality, increase openness, promote finan-
cial development, create a stable macroeconomic environment and maintain or increase re-
turns, are crucial in attracting capital inflows like FDI (Walsh & Yu, 2010). 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the effect of interest rate liberalisation on capital in-
flows. Higher interest rates are an indication of higher returns which may boost capital in-
flows. Higher foreign interest rates may encourage capital outflows and, as such, the chapter 
also investigates whether interest rate differentials between SADC countries and US interest 
rates influence capital flows. The role of capital flows in influencing economic growth is also 
surveyed. Higher levels of capital inflows encourage technological advancements, which in 
turn increase productivity and boost employment levels (Borensztein et al, 1998, Edrees, 
2015).   
The chapter is organised as follows: Section two provides a description of the variables used 
in the chapter. Section three provides the empirical results of the relationship between interest 
rate liberalisation and capital flows, and section four provides the result of the relationship 
between capital flows and economic growth. Section five concludes the chapter. 
8.2 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 8.1. These show that the mean for FDI net in-
flows is 4.08%. FDI inflows have increased over the years, however the levels are lower than 
those in other developing regions, like Asia. Interest rate differentials average 3.84%, which 
implies that real interest rates have been higher in SADC countries compared with those in 
the US on average. The descriptive statistics for the other variables were discussed in Chapter 
seven and so are not discussed in this chapter.  
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Table 8.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable mean maximum minimum std. dev. obs 
CRED 31.76 160.12 3.09 36.47 282 
CHINN -0.24 2.39 -1.89 1.41 275 
GDPG 1.91 16.96 -15.28 3.60 285 
GDPC 2919.58 15695.90 121.51 3153.22 285 
GOV 19.77 47.19 6.71 8.22 277 
TRA 95.78 225.02 33.49 44.94 276 
INF 12.59 183.31 -9.62 18.57 281 
RDEP -0.82 15.54 -117.23 10.72 276 
INVS 24.86 69.03 4.56 10.84 286 
EXCH 237.33 2933.51 0.03 542.40 285 
FDI 4.08 54.06 -6.90 5.84 285 
DIFF 3.84 50.49 -45.67 10.49 286 
Source: Researcher’s own computations 
8.3 Correlation analysis 
Correlation analyses are presented on Tables 8.2 and 8.3. FDI and GDP per capita are posi-
tively correlated and significant at the 1% level a result which is in line with a priori 
expectations. FDI and the indicators of interest rate liberalisation have insignificant 
correlations. The correlation between credit to the private sector and FDI inflows is negative 
and significant, which is against a priori expectations. FDI is positively correlated with int-
erest rate differentials. FDI is negatively correlated with inflation, which confirms a priori 
expectations. FDI is positively correlated with GDP growth and significant at the 1% level. 
This is in line with a priori expectations. The correlations between the independent variables 
are less than 0.8, which indicates that multicollinearity is not a problem.  
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Table 8.2: Correlation analysis 
Variable FDI CRED CHINN RINT RDEP INF GDPC DIFF 
FDI 1        
CRED -0.16** 1       
CHINN 0.33*** 0.02 1      
RINT 0.09 -0.24*** 0.16*** 1     
RDEP -0.08 0.22*** 0.17*** 0.43*** 1    
INF -0.12* -0.36*** -0.14** -0.06 -0.49*** 1   
GDPC 0.17*** 0.71*** 0.37*** -0.23*** 0.20*** -0.56*** 1  
DIFF 0.14** -0.19*** 0.19*** 0.94** 0.37*** -0.14*** -0.17*** 1 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Table 8.3: Correlation analysis 
Variable FDI GDPG GOV INVS TRA EXCH 
FDI 1      
GDPG 0.16*** 1     
GOV 0.17*** -0.03 1    
INVS 0.30*** 0.24*** 0.43*** 1   
TRA 0.28*** 0.02 0.46*** 0.53*** 1  
EXCH -0.03 0.04 -0.55*** -0.14** -0.27*** 1 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***) and (**) indicate significance at 
1% and 5% level of significance respectively. 
8.4 Empirical results 
The empirical results are presented in this section. The strategy involves two specifications, 
one examining the effect of interest rate liberalisation on capital flows, the other surveying 
the effect of capital flows on economic growth. To investigate the relationship between inter-
est rate liberalisation and capital flows, four specifications are estimated. The first specifica-
tion is a baseline model which does not include the interest rate variables. The other specifi-
cations include the different measures of interest rate liberalisations and the interest rate dif-
ferential variables. ARDL models for the individual countries are estimated, and the bounds 
and diagnostic tests are reported. The PMG model is then estimated for the panel study.  
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8.4.1 Interest rate liberalisation and capital flows 
The bounds test results are presented in Table 8.4. The bounds test results for the baseline 
model show that cointegration is present in seven countries. In the model with real interest 
rates, cointegration is present in nine countries. In the models with the real deposit rate and 
interest rate differentials, cointegration is detected in eight countries.   
Table 8.4: Bounds test results: baseline regression 
Country Baseline model RINT model RDEP model DIFF model 
 
Botswana 4.99** 5.19*** 4.28** 4.79** 
Lesotho 3.43 3.04 4.95** 3.39 
Madagascar 2.21 6.03*** 2.74 4.31** 
Malawi 2.29 4.45** 3.28 4.20** 
Mauritius 8.75*** 8.81*** 8.55*** 6.90*** 
Namibia 2.60 3.07 2.32 2.68 
Seychelles 8.27*** 28.95*** 7.31*** 30.92*** 
South Africa 8.00*** 7.61*** 7.32*** 7.32*** 
Swaziland 13.14*** 13.99*** 18.76*** 12.54*** 
Tanzania 7.30*** 6.79*** 5.08*** 5.92*** 
Zambia 7.06*** 5.53*** 16.54*** 2.54 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***) and (**) indicate significance at 
1% and 5% level of significance respectively. 
The individual country diagnostic tests results presented in Table 8.5 reveal that most models 
are specified correctly, and the error terms are not serially correlated. However, heteroscedas-
ticity is detected in several models, so estimations are conducted using robust standard errors 
in order to mitigate the problem. 
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 Table 8.5: Diagnostic tests 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Model test Botswana Lesotho Madag Malawi Mauritius Namibia Seychelles S Africa          Swazi Tanzania Zambia 
Baseline serial correlation 0.07 5.50** 9.84*** 0.49 0.60 0.66 1.66 1.09 0.80 0.68 2.41 
 heteroscedasticity 1.40 11.65** 18.43*** 12.05*** 0.96 6.96*** 17.23*** 12.52*** 0.39 1.73 0.03 
 RESET test 2.18 1.14 4.14** 4.55 1.21 0.63 2.21 0.04 1.91 2.64* 0.98 
RINT serial correlation 0.21 5.23** 6.58** 1.30 0.17 0.71 1.38 0.97 0.96 0.09 1.01 
 heteroscedasticity 1.46 4.18*** 14.93*** 9.44*** 0.05 7.32*** 20.31*** 12.01*** 0.56 0.22 0.58 
 RESET test 2.15 3.11* 1.71 14.20*** 2.67* 0.08 0.51 1.80 1.43 0.37 0.03 
RDEP serial correlation 0.25 0.02 10.13*** 0.35 0.52 0.82 1.72 1.08 0.68 0.08 0.52 
 heteroscedasticity 2.73* 2.00 17.26*** 11.02*** 0.47 8.33*** 17.83*** 10.55*** 0.24 0.08 0.80 
 RESET test 0.88 11.03*** 3.84** 4.86** 1.10 0.32 1.55 2.13 0.93 2.97* 1.16 
DIFF serial correlation 0.34 4.74** 5.11** 1.24 0.55 0.64 1.49 0.84 0.92 0.23 1.10 
 heteroscedasticity 2.36 5.18** 14.65*** 9.47*** 0.74 8.84*** 19.96*** 11.68*** 0.58 1.43 0.02 
 RESET test 0.87 1.59 2.04 14.79*** 1.76 0.07 0.51 1.72 1.44 1.02 0.43 
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The long-run results for the PMG model are presented in Table 8.6. Due to the close 
association between the inflation rate and the real interest rate variables, different 
specifications are employed for each variable. This is done so that they are not used as 
regressors in the same model. The homogenous short-run results are all insignificant and so 
are omitted from the analysis.  
Table 8.6: PMG results. Dependent variable: FDI inflows 
Variable PMG1 PMG2 PMG3 PMG4 
adjustment 
coefficient 
-0.92 
(-6.49)*** 
-0.78 
(-6.94)*** 
-0.80 
(-6.65)*** 
-0.77 
(-6.79)*** 
long-run 
coefficients 
    
GDPC 
 
0.001 
(3.73)*** 
0.001 
(5.73)*** 
0.001 
(5.49)*** 
0.001 
(5.60)*** 
CHINN 
 
0.40 
(2.26)** 
0.41 
(2.53)** 
0.51 
(3.48)*** 
0.47 
(2.96)*** 
CRED 
 
-0.06 
(-2.26)** 
-0.10 
(-3.86)*** 
-0.10 
(-3.81)*** 
-0.10 
(-3.90)*** 
INF 
 
-0.05 
(-2.38)** 
   
RINT  
 
0.07 
(1.97)** 
  
RDEP  
 
 0.14 
(-3.12)*** 
 
DIFF  
 
  0.05 
(1.57) 
No of obs 
 
255 255 251 255 
No of countries 
 
11 11 11 11 
Source: Researcher’s own computations, Note: (***) and (**) indicate significance at 
1% and 5% level of significance respectively. 
 
199 
 
The adjustment coefficients of the baseline models are negative and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. The coefficients range from -0.77 to -0.92, indicating the short-run 
disequilibrium corrected in the long-run ranges from 77% to 92%. GDP per capita is 
positively related to capital flows and significant at 1% level in all models. Higher GDP per 
capita levels as a measure of market size encourage capital flows, so the result is in line with 
a priori expectations. The results confirm those of Demirhan & Masca (2008), Verma & 
Prakash (2011) and Olaberria (2014), who found that GDP has a positive effect on capital 
flows in developing and emerging economies. 
Inflation has a negative effect on capital flows and the coefficient is significant at the 5% 
level. The result is in line with theoretical expectations, as higher inflation levels imply that 
there is macroeconomic instability. The result supports the findings of Wesso (2001), Ahmed 
et al (2005) and Aw & Teng (2009). Financial openness and capital flows are positively 
related, which confirms a priori expectations, as capital account restrictions create 
uncertainty, which discourages capital inflows. The result is in line with those of Ahmed et al 
(2005), Ahmed & Zlante (2013) and Gammoudi & Cherif (2015), who found that capital 
account liberalisation encourages capital inflows in developing countries. Credit to the 
private sector as a measure of financial development is negatively related to capital flows, 
which is against a priori expectations. The negative effect of financial development on 
capital flows could be the result of a rise in bad debts associated with excessive credit to 
unworthy borrowers. The rise in bad debts causes financial crises, which in turn discourage 
capital inflows. Also, SADC countries have low levels of institutional quality, and high 
institutional quality is a requirement if financial development is to encourage capital inflows.  
The interest rate liberalisation measures are positively related to capital inflows and both co-
efficients are significant. This indicates that the prospect of earning higher returns encourages 
capital inflows, which supports theoretical expectations. The results are in line with those of 
Aw & Teng (2009), who concluded that the real interest rate is a significant determinant of 
FDI inflows in Malaysia, as well as Ahmed & Mayowa (2012), who found that the real 
deposit rate has a Granger cause effect on FDI inflows in Nigeria. Interest rate differentials 
have a positive but insignificant effect on capital inflows. This is because the measure of 
capital flows chosen for this analysis (FDI) is not sensitive to interest rate differentials com-
pared with other forms of capital flows, like portfolio flows. The result confirms the findings 
of Verma & Prakash (2011) who found that FDI inflows are not sensitive to interest rate 
differentials in India. 
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Table 8.7: MG and DFE results 
 
Variable 
Baseline regression RINT equation RDEP equation DIFF equation 
 MG DFE MG DFE MG DFE MG DFE 
Adjustment 
 
-1.07 
(-9.97)*** 
-0.67 
(-9.44)*** 
-1.00 
(-8.28)*** 
-0.56 
(-9.33)*** 
-1.03 
(-9.07)*** 
-0.54 
(-9.09)*** 
-1.00 
(-8.99)*** 
-0.55 
(-9.38)*** 
GDPC 
 
0.002 
(0.54) 
0.001 
(1.26) 
0.01 
(1.20) 
0.004 
(0.68) 
-0.001 
(-0.13) 
0.004 
(0.67) 
0.01 
(1.33) 
0.004 
(0.67) 
CHINN 
 
6.95 
(1.71)* 
0.84 
(1.36) 
0.24 
(0.06) 
0.82 
(1.07) 
4.64 
(1.30) 
0.80 
(0.96) 
1.15 
(0.39) 
0.90 
(1.18) 
CRED 
 
0.38 
(1.08) 
0.03 
(0.46) 
-0.57 
(1.49) 
0.10 
(1.13) 
0.42 
(1.16) 
0.09 
(1.01) 
0.36 
(1.23) 
0.08 
(0.93) 
INF 
 
-0.05 
(-0.42) 
-0.05 
(-1.07) 
      
RINT 
 
  -0.34 
(-0.88) 
0.11 
(1.34) 
    
RDEP 
 
    0.44 
(1.65)* 
0.13 
(1.14) 
  
DIFF 
 
      0.05 
(1.55) 
-0.59 
(-0.86) 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***) and (*) indicate significance at 1% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 8.7 presents the long-run result of the MG and DFE models. The results are largely in-
significant, which lends support to the hypothesis that the PMG model is superior. Also, the 
MG model has adjustment coefficients that are equal to one or greater, which is an indication 
of model instability, so the PMG model is suitable for the analysis.  
The short-run heterogenous coefficients for the models with the interest rate liberalisation va-
riables are presented in the appendix. These are largely insignificant, which implies that the 
relationships between the variables are not a short-run phenomenon. However, the adjustment 
coefficients for most of the individual countries are negative, are statistically significant and 
are less than one, so indicating the presence of a long-run relationship between the variables.  
8.4.2 Capital flows on economic growth  
The bounds test results are presented in Table 8.8, and these show that cointegration is pres-
ent in all countries except Malawi, where the null of no cointegration is rejected only at the 
10% level of significance. 
Table 8.8: Bounds test results  
Country F-stat critical values 
1% 5% 10% 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
Botswana 20.06*** 3.41 4.68 2.62 3.79 2.26 3.35 
Lesotho 36.70*** 3.41 4.68 2.62 3.79 2.26 3.35 
Madagascar 25.33*** 3.41 4.68 2.62 3.79 2.26 3.35 
Malawi 3.44* 3.41 4.68 2.62 3.79 2.26 3.35 
Mauritius 10.05*** 3.41 4.68 2.62 3.79 2.26 3.35 
Namibia 15.06*** 3.41 4.68 2.62 3.79 2.26 3.35 
Seychelles 18.29*** 3.41 4.68 2.62 3.79 2.26 3.35 
South Africa 4.18** 3.41 4.68 2.62 3.79 2.26 3.35 
Swaziland 4.15** 3.41 4.68 2.62 3.79 2.26 3.35 
Tanzania 9.23*** 3.41 4.68 2.62 3.79 2.26 3.35 
Zambia 25.02*** 3.41 4.68 2.62 3.79 2.26 3.35 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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The diagnostic tests shown in Table 8.9 reveal that serial correlation is detected in one 
country, heteroscedasticity in five countries and model misspecification in three countries. As 
with the previous specifications, the models are estimated using robust standard errors to 
correct for heteroscedasticity.  
Table 8.9: Diagnostic tests 
Country serial correlation heteroscedasticity Ramsey’s reset test 
Botswana 2.95* 7.39*** 1.87 
Lesotho 3.60* 0.38 0.03 
Madagascar 4.95** 2.97* 5.63*** 
Malawi 0.81 15.86*** 7.28*** 
Mauritius 0.63 0.65 0.27 
Namibia 0.07 0.64 1.37 
Seychelles 1.72 0.62 1.97 
South Africa 3.36* 2.13 1.71 
Swaziland 0.34 26.97*** 6.96*** 
Tanzania 0.02 5.60** 1.79 
Zambia 0.04 6.52** 3.15* 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
The PMG results are presented in Table 8.10. The adjustment coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, and implies that 80% of the disequilibrium in the short 
run is corrected in the long run. Capital inflows have a negative but insignificant effect on 
economic growth. The findings confirm those of Agbloyor et al (2014), who found that capi-
tal inflows have a negative effect on economic growth in African countries with under-devel-
oped financial markets. Bailliu (2000) also concludes that capital inflows have a positive ef-
fect on economic growth in countries with highly developed banking sectors. Edrees (2015) 
found that FDI flows have a negative effect on economic growth in low- and middle-income 
sub-Saharan African countries. Capital inflows in SADC countries have not boosted product-
ivity and employment levels significantly as expected.  
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Table 8.10: PMG, MG and DFE results 
Variable PMG MG DFE 
adjustment 
coefficient 
-0.80 
(-8.61)*** 
-1.08 
(-13.94)*** 
-1.04 
(-17.27)*** 
long-run 
coefficients 
   
FDI -0.07 
(-1.36) 
-0.03 
(-0.37) 
-0.06 
(-1.05) 
TRA -0.03 
(-5.16)*** 
0.03 
(0.72) 
-0.001 
(-0.10) 
GOV -0.20 
(-3.93)*** 
-0.36 
(-2.07)** 
-0.13 
(-1.87)* 
INVS 0.15 
(7.67)*** 
0.06 
(0.89) 
0.08 
(2.50)** 
EXCH 0.002 
(3.34)*** 
-0.33 
(-0.88) 
0.002 
(2.78)*** 
short-run 
coefficients 
   
d.FDI 0.11 
(1.34) 
0.12 
(1.86)* 
0.06 
(1.34) 
d.TRA 0.05 
(1.25) 
-0.01 
(-0.16) 
-0.02 
(-0.90) 
d.GOV 0.04 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.29) 
-0.07 
(-0.78) 
d.INV -0.04 
(-0.53) 
0.01 
(0.13)** 
0.01 
(0.29) 
d.EXCH -0.37 
(-2.97)*** 
-0.25 
(-1.80)* 
-0.005 
(-1.38) 
No of obs 264 264 264 
No of countries 11 11 11 
Source: Researcher’s own computations, Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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There is a possibility that capital inflows crowd out domestic investments, which in turn 
affects economic growth negatively. And as alluded to by Borensztein et al (1998), the effect 
of FDI inflows on economic growth is dependent on the levels of human capital. In SADC 
countries, human capital levels are low, which could be one of the explanations for the insig-
nificant effect of FDI on economic growth. 
The coefficient of the exchange rate is positively signed and significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting that a depreciation in the exchange rate has a positive effect on economic growth 
in the long run. An exchange rate depreciation could boost economic growth by encouraging 
exports of goods and services. A depreciation of the exchange rate also makes imports expen-
sive, which in turn could increase the consumption of domestically produced goods. This re-
sult is in line with the traditional approach to exchange rates (Salvatore 2013). The other co-
efficients are similar to those found in Chapter seven. Investment is positively related to 
GDP, while trade and government expenditure have a negative effect on economic growth. 
Table 8.11: PMG short-run coefficients  
Country FDI TRA GOV INVS EXCH adjust 
Botswana 0.24 
(1.23) 
0.31 
(4.26)*** 
-0.07 
(-0.22) 
-0.43 
(-3.21)*** 
-0.64 
(-0.55) 
-0.75 
(-4.85)*** 
Lesotho -0.13 
(-2.16)** 
0.03 
(0.72) 
-0.22 
(-1.03) 
-0.05 
(-0.50) 
-1.04 
(-2.14)*** 
-0.35 
(-2.45)** 
Madagascar -0.37 
(-1.11) 
0.22 
(-2.95)*** 
0.48 
(1.35) 
0.51 
(2.82)*** 
-0.004 
(-1.29) 
-1.27 
(-8.40)*** 
Malawi -0.01 
(0.09) 
-0.03 
(-0.33) 
-0.39 
(-1.54) 
-0.42 
(-1.52) 
0.003 
(0.09) 
-1.16 
(-7.67)*** 
Mauritius 0.31 
(2.00)** 
-0.04 
(-1.07) 
-1.18 
(-2.43)** 
-0.08 
(-0.59) 
0.03 
(0.21) 
-0.98 
(-4.28)*** 
Namibia 0.23 
(1.37) 
-0.14 
(-1.82)* 
0.67 
(2.09)** 
-0.09 
(-0.87) 
-0.08 
(-0.15) 
-0.96 
(-5.46)*** 
Seychelles 0.06 
(0.85) 
-0.05 
(-1.10) 
0.29 
(1.46) 
0.17 
(1.48) 
-0.40 
(-0.47) 
-0.47 
(-2.54)** 
South 
Africa 
-0.08 
(-0.56) 
0.25 
(4.00)*** 
-0.04 
(-3.08)*** 
-0.09 
(-0.35) 
-0.72 
(-2.67)*** 
-0.51 
(-3.35)*** 
Swaziland 0.03 
(0.75) 
-0.004 
(-0.29) 
0.10 
(1.35) 
-0.09 
(-2.85)*** 
-0.22 
(-1.66)* 
-1.07 
(-36.08)*** 
Tanzania 0.24 
(1.02) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.08 
(0.44) 
0.13 
(1.15) 
-0.002 
(-0.04) 
-0.52 
(-2.82)*** 
Zambia 0.67 
(4.42)*** 
0.03 
(0.35) 
0.33 
(3.03)*** 
-0.01 
(-0.12) 
-0.98 
(-0.83) 
-0.75 
(-4.71)*** 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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The MG and DFE models in Table 8.10 have adjustment coefficients greater than one, which 
is an indication of model instability. So the PMG model is the superior model. The short-run 
heterogenous coefficients are presented in Table 8.11. Adjustment coefficients in eight coun-
tries are negative, statistically significant and less than one in absolute terms, which is an in-
dication of a stable long-run relationship between the variables.  
8.5  Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the relationship between interest rate liberalisa-
tion and economic growth through capital inflows. Higher real interest rates are expected to 
increase returns for investors, which in turn encourages capital inflows. Capital inflows like 
FDI are viewed as one way of supplementing domestic investments, which are a major driver 
of economic growth. Also, capital inflows promote technological advancements, which en-
hance productivity and employment levels.  
The method of analysis selected was the PMG model which assumes homogenous long-run 
coefficients and heterogenous short-run coefficients for each country in a panel. The PG 
model assumes that there is cointegration between the variables and so, ARDL bounds tests 
are conducted for the individual countries in the sample. The results reveal that there is co-
integration in most of the countries, and most models pass the diagnostic tests.  
The long-run PMG results showed that domestic real interest rates have a positive effect on 
capital inflows, which provides support for the interest rate liberalisation hypothesis. How-
ever, interest rate differentials between the SADC countries and real US interest rates have a 
positive but insignificant relationship. Capital inflows are negatively related to inflation and 
financial development. The negative association between inflation and capital inflows is in 
line with a priori expectations. However the negative relationship with financial development 
is against theoretical expectations. Financial crises that arise as a result of excessive growth 
may be the reason for the negative relationship.  
Capital inflows have an insignificant effect on economic growth in SADC countries, which is 
against a priori expectations. However, as stated by Borensztein et al (1998), the effect of 
capital inflows on economic growth is dependent on the levels of human capital. SADC 
countries have low levels of human capital to some extent, which is a possible explanation of 
the insignificant relationship between capital inflows and economic growth. Also, Agbloyor 
et al (2014) and Bailliu (2000) conclude that capital inflows have a positive effect on eco-
nomic growth in countries with developed financial markets or banking sectors. The level of 
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financial development is low in SADC countries, which could be the reason for the insignifi-
cant association between capital inflows and economic growth. The next chapter investigates 
the effect of interest rates on economic growth through financial development. This will shed 
more light on whether real interest rates have a positive effect on financial development and 
whether financial development boosts economic growth.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
INTEREST RATE LIBERALISATION, FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an empirical analysis of the relationship between interest rate 
liberalisation, financial development and economic growth in SADC countries. According to 
the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis, interest rate liberalisation promotes financial 
development through a rise in savings and investments in the economy. Shaw (1973) states 
that a rise in savings encourages financial intermediation, which in turn leads to financial 
deepening.  
The analysis involves a two-equation specification, the first of which examines the effect of 
savings on financial development. The second model surveys whether financial development 
promotes economic growth. According to Schumpeter (1912) and Levine (1997), a developed 
financial system is vital for economic performance through functions like savings mobilisa-
tion and capital allocation, exerting corporate governance, diversification and management of 
risk and easing the exchange of goods and services.  
However, financial development coupled with financial instability hinders economic growth 
(Estranda et al, 2010). Banking sector development may result in a surge in bad debts, which 
in turn affects growth negatively. Due to the unavailability of data, this study focuses on 
banking sector development and uses measures like credit to the private sector, liquid liabili-
ties, bank credit, commercial bank assets and broad money as proxies for financial develop-
ment.  
Financial development indices are created using the five measures of banking sector develop-
ment mentioned above. Principal component analysis is the technique used to create the in-
dex. The empirical analysis is conducted using the PMG estimator in order to examine the 
long- and short-run relationships between the variables. 
The chapter starts with a description of the data which includes descriptive statistics, stationa-
rity tests, correlation analysis and the creation of the index of financial development. After 
that, the effect of interest rate liberalisation on growth through savings and financial develop-
ment is examined.  
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9.2 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 9.1. Higher values of the financial development 
indicators signal greater financial resources available to the private sector to grow and devel-
op. The ratios for the financial development indicators average between 30% and 60% for the 
SADC region – except for bank credit, which averages just shy of 70%. The most financially 
developed economies are South Africa, Mauritius and Seychelles and, based on the data, fi-
nancial development has been on an upward trend in most countries. GDP per capita averages 
close to $3 000. Countries with higher levels of GDP per capita are Botswana, Mauritius, 
Seychelles and South Africa. The data indicates that there is a link between GDP per capita 
and financial development, as the most financially developed countries are those with higher 
GDP per capita levels.  
Table 9.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable mean maximum minimum std dev obs 
BA 33.49 122.79 4.57 27.60 283 
CRED 31.76 160.12 3.09 36.47 282 
BROAD 40.29 110.77 10.48 24.85 283 
CHINN -0.24 2.39 -1.89 1.41 275 
GDPG 1.91 16.96 -15.28 3.60 285 
BC 69.36 137.33 16.88 29.78 285 
GDPC 2919.58 15695.90 121.51 3153.22 285 
GOV 19.77 47.19 6.71 8.22 277 
TRA 95.78 225.02 33.49 44.94 276 
INF 12.59 183.31 -9.62 18.57 281 
RDEP -0.82 15.54 -117.23 10.72 276 
SAV 20.46 51.05 -3.14 11.40 286 
INVS 24.86 69.03 4.56 10.84 286 
LIQ 36.78 108.55 11.71 22.68 281 
EXCH 237.33 2933.51 0.03 542.40 285 
Source: Researcher’s own computations 
The level of financial openness in the region averages -0.24, indicating relatively low levels 
of financial openness in SADC countries. A few countries are financially open, like Mauri-
tius, Zambia and Seychelles, but most have low levels of financial openness, as indicated by 
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the negative scores (Chinn & Ito, 2013). The data signals that there could be a link between 
financial development and financial openness, as two of the most financially developed coun-
tries in the region are also among the most financially open. The exchange rate averages 
237.33 to the US dollar with a standard deviation of 542.40, indicating high levels of vol-
atility.  
9.3  Correlation analysis 
Tables 9.2 and 9.3 present the correlations between the variables. Financial development in-
dicators are highly correlated, which lends support for the construction of the financial devel-
opment index. Most of the correlations between financial development indicators are greater 
than 0.8, which is an indication of severe collinearity (Gujarati & Porter, 2009; Stunden-
mund, 2014).  
The financial development indicators are highly correlated with the first financial develop-
ment indicator (FD index), apart from BC. The correlations between LIQ, BROAD, BA and 
CRED and FD Index are all greater than 0.91, while that for BC is 0.48. BC is highly cor-
related with the second financial development index (FD index2). The financial development 
indicators as well as the indices are positively correlated with RDEP and SAV and are 
significant at the 1% level. GDP per capita is positively correlated with financial 
development, which is in line with a priori expectations. Inflation is negatively correlated 
with financial development, which supports theoretical expectations. Financial openness is 
positively correlated with most of the financial development indicators, except for BC and 
FD index2.  
The financial development indicators, including the indices, are negatively correlated with 
the growth rate of GDP, which is against a priori expectations. This indicates that financial 
development is associated with a slowdown in economic growth in the SADC region. The ex-
change rate is positively correlated with GDP growth, although the correlation is 
insignificant.  
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Table 9.2: Correlation analysis 
Source: Researcher’s own computations 
 BA CRED BROAD CHINN SAV INF RDEP GDPC BC LIQ FD index FD 
index2 
BA 1            
CRED 0.87*** 1           
BROAD 0.91*** 0.79*** 1          
CHINN 0.20*** 0.03 0.28*** 1         
SAV 0.15** 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.17*** 1        
INF -0.49*** -0.36*** -0.55*** -0.16** -0.22*** 1       
RDEP 0.27*** 0.22*** 0.27*** 0.17*** -0.01 -0.50*** 1      
GDPC 0.81*** 0.70*** 0.82*** 0.39*** 0.21*** -0.57*** 0.21*** 1     
BC 0.44*** 0.71*** 0.23*** -0.24*** 0.19*** -0.03 0.19*** 0.70*** 1    
LIQ 0.89*** 0.75*** 0.96*** 0.31*** 0.20*** -0.49*** 0.27**** 0.78*** 0.21*** 1   
FD index 0.97*** 0.91*** 0.94*** 0.18*** 0.17*** -0.50*** 0.30*** 0.81*** 0.48*** 0.92*** 1  
FD 
index2 
-0.002 0.30*** -0.24*** -0.47*** -0.09*** 0.19*** 0.04 -0.14** 0.81*** -0.27*** 0 1 
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Table 9.3: Correlation analysis 
 BA CRED BROAD LIQ BC GDPG GOV TRA INV EXCH FD index FD index2 
BA 1            
CRED 0.87*** 1           
BROAD 0.91*** 0.79*** 1          
LIQ 0.89*** 0.75*** 0.96*** 1         
BC 0.44*** 0.71*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 1        
GDPG -0.13** -0.17*** -0.09 -0.09 -0.21*** 1       
GOV 0.38*** 0.25*** 0.42*** 0.42*** -0.17*** -0.02 1      
TRA 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.37*** 0.47*** -0.09 -0.03 0.46*** 1     
INV 0.20*** 0.14** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.25*** 0.51*** 0.45*** 1    
EXCH -0.14** -0.12* -0.04 -0.07 -0.02 0.03 -0.55*** -0.25*** -0.19*** 1   
FD index 0.91*** 0.91*** 0.94*** 0.92*** 0.48*** -0.16*** 0.36*** 0.32*** 0.19*** -0.11* 1  
FD 
index2 
-0.002 0.30*** -0.24*** -0.27*** 0.81*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.11* 0 1 
Source: Researcher’s own computations 
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9.4 Financial development indices 
Financial development indices are required due to the severe correlations between the finan-
cial development indicators. The indices are constructed using principal components analysis 
(PCA), which is a data reduction technique used to turn correlated variables into uncorrelated 
components while retaining most of the variation (Jolliffe 2002). Tables 9.4 and 9.5 show the 
results of PCA. According to table 9.4, the first principal component explains more than 70% 
of the variation, while the second component explains close to 25% of the variation. The re-
maining three components explain just below 5% of the variation.   
Based on the criteria for selecting the number of principal components, only the first two 
principal components are retained. These principal components explain over 95% of the total 
variation and have eigenvalues greater than one. The last three components have eigenvalues 
less than one and are thus omitted from the analysis. Table 9.5 outlines the proportion of each 
variable in the five components. The scree plot shown on figure 8.1 also suggests that only 
the first two components should be retained for the analysis. So two indices are constructed 
for financial development.  
Table 9.4: Principal components 
Component eigenvalue difference proportion cumulative 
component 1 3.51294 2.26789 0.7026 0.7026 
component 2 1.24506 1.05557 0.2490 0.9516 
component 3 0.189487 0.156076 0.0379 0.9895 
component 4 0.033411 0.0143122 0.0067 0.9952 
component 5 0.190988 . 0.0038 1.0000 
Source: Researcher’s own computations 
Table 9.5: Eigenvectors 
Variable comp 1 comp 2 comp 3 comp 4 comp 5 unexplained 
BROAD 0.4993 -0.2943 -0.0289 0.5029 -0.6406 0 
CRED 0.4407 0.4146 -0.7329 0.1257 0.2847 0 
BA 0.5253 -0.0747 0.0538 -0.8211 -0.2034 0 
LIQ 0.4704 -0.3886 0.3598 0.1915 0.6794 0 
BC 0.2436 0.7648 0.5742 0.1425 -0.0755 0 
Source: Researcher’s own computations 
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Figure 9.1: Scree plot 
 
Source: Researcher’s own computations 
9.5  Empirical results 
This section presents the results of the relationship between interest rate liberalisation, fi-
nancial development and economic growth. The first part of the analysis examines the effect 
of interest rate liberalisation on financial development through savings. The second part of 
the analysis surveys the effect of financial development on economic growth.    
9.5.1  Interest rate liberalisation and financial development 
The PMG estimator assumes that there is cointegration between the variables. To test for co-
integration, the bounds test approach is employed for the individual countries, in line with 
Pesaran et al (1999). The bounds test results are presented in Table 9.6, where the dependent 
variables are FD index and FD index2. 
According to the bounds test results in Table 9.6, the null of no cointegration is rejected in 
the cases of Botswana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Swaziland and Tanzania, 
implying that there is a long-run relationship between the variables. For Lesotho the cointe-
gration is found only at the 10% level of significance, while for South Africa, Seychelles and 
Zambia there is no long-run relationship between the variables. The result is puzzling, given 
that South Africa and Seychelles are two of the most financially developed countries in the 
SADC region. Financial development for these countries seems to be driven by other vari-
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ables in the long run. The bounds test results found when the FD index2 is used as a measure 
of financial development, show that the null of no cointegration is rejected in Lesotho, Mala-
wi, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia at the 5% level of significance. 
Cointegration is detected in South Africa at the 10% level of significance, while for 
Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and Madagascar there is no cointegration.  
Table 9.6: Bounds test results 
Country FD index FD index2 
Botswana 5.85*** 0.61 
Lesotho 3.68* 8.13*** 
Madagascar 16.07*** 3.00 
Malawi 14.39*** 5.33*** 
Mauritius 6.32*** 1.47 
Namibia 8.94*** 1.75 
Seychelles 1.92 4.89** 
South Africa 2.63 3.56* 
Swaziland 7.92*** 5.56*** 
Tanzania 33.70*** 7.16*** 
Zambia 2.54 4.44** 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
To check the robustness of the bounds testing results, cointegration tests are conducted using 
the individual financial development indicators. The results are presented in Table 9.7. 
Cointegration is found for Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa, Tanzania and 
Zambia when broad money is used a measure of financial development. Cointegration is 
present in all countries except for Zambia, Namibia and Seychelles when credit to the private 
sector is the indicator of financial development. And for Zambia and Namibia, cointegration 
is found only at the 10% level of significance.  
Cointegration is found only for Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania and Zambia when 
liquid liabilities are used a measure of financial development. When banking assets are used 
as a measure of financial development, cointegration is present in all countries except South 
Africa and Seychelles. Cointegration is found for Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Swazi-
land, Tanzania and Zambia when bank credit is used as a measure of financial development. 
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Table 9.7: Bounds test results 
Country CRED BROAD LIQ BA BC 
Botswana 4.23** 2.51 1.29 7.88*** 7.25*** 
Lesotho 7.96*** 3.07 3.62* 4.09** 7.11*** 
Madagascar 6.86*** 5.63*** 6.96*** 4.10** 20.80*** 
Malawi 5.29*** 7.50*** 6.31*** 31.89*** 2.74 
Mauritius 4.44** 4.80** 3.68* 9.60*** 3.64* 
Namibia 3.91* 2.21 4.17** 11.00*** 3.23 
Seychelles 2.64 3.06 3.86* 3.26 3.24 
South Africa 5.53*** 5.04** 2.39 2.96 2.86 
Swaziland 5.24*** 0.84 3.27 8.56*** 8.72*** 
Tanzania 16.76*** 16.45*** 9.76*** 19.89*** 23.60*** 
Zambia 3.55* 6.54*** 14.00*** 7.99*** 4.66** 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Diagnostic tests are conducted on the individual country ARDL models and the results are 
presented in Tables 9.8 and 9.9. In Table 9.8 the indices are used as measures of financial 
development, while in Table 9.9 the individual indicators of financial development are used. 
Serial correlation is present for four countries, heteroscedasticity for two countries, and there 
is no model misspecification when the FD index is used as a proxy for financial development. 
When FD index2 is used as an indicator of financial development, serial correlation is present 
for two countries, heteroscedasticity for two countries and model misspecification for three 
countries.    
When broad money is an indicator of financial development, serial correlation is present for 
two countries, heteroscedasticity for four countries and model misspecification for four coun-
tries. Using credit to the private sector, serial correlation is present for three countries and 
there is no heteroscedasticity or model misspecification for all countries. There is evidence of 
serial correlation for four countries, no heteroscedasticity or model misspecification for one 
country when liquid liabilities are the measure of financial development. Serial correlation is 
present for four countries, heteroscedasticity and model instability for one country when bank 
assets are the indicator of financial development. When bank credit is used as a proxy for fi-
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nancial development, serial correlation is present for two countries, heteroscedasticity for one 
and model misspecification for two countries.  
Table 9.8: Diagnostic tests. Dependent variable: FD Indices 
Country serial correlation heteroscedasticity Ramsey’s reset test 
 FD index FD 
index2 
FD index FD 
index2 
FD index FD index2 
Botswana 0.03 15.31*** 0.25 0.11 0.75 0.80 
Lesotho 0.68 4.12** 0.05 0.26 0.17 0.98 
Madagascar 0.64 0.29 0.01 9.15*** 0.76 4.19* 
Malawi 3.95** 0.19 0.57 0.41 1.12 0.96 
Mauritius 0.30 0.02 1.35 0.41 0.44 0.57 
Namibia 2.60 0.47 0.21 12.92*** 5.66* 0.69 
Seychelles 4.62** 1.08 0.01 1.32 1.57 0.09 
SA 8.79*** 0.25 6.29** 1.91 1.00 4.72** 
Swaziland 7.18*** 1.27 5.29** 0.24 0.51 1.91 
Tanzania 2.93* 1.32 2.13 5.09** 0.46 8.51*** 
Zambia 1.99 1.94 0.50 0.28 0.58 3.86* 
 Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. 
Most of the individual country ARDL models pass the diagnostic tests regardless of the fi-
nancial development indicator used. So the researcher concludes that the PMG model is 
adequate for the analysis. 
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 Table 9.9: Diagnostic tests 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Variable test Botswana Lesotho Madagascar Malawi Mauritius Namibia Seychelles SA          Swaziland Tanzania Zambia 
BROAD serial correlation 0.63 3.19* 0.008 4.49** 1.45 3.21* 0.30 4.56** 1.78 3.91* 3.09* 
 heteroscedasticity 4.23** 3.85** 0.05 3.75* 0.03 20.10*** 0.89 1.21 0.24 4.75** 0.90 
 RESET test 3.10* 4.14** 4.08** 0.17 0.24 14.90*** 2.85* 0.20 1.14 1.15 5.71** 
CRED serial correlation 1.50 5.18** 0.68 5.10** 0.20 1.23 0.10 2.52 8.94*** 2.49 0.10 
 heteroscedasticity 0.86 0.16 0.82 0.06 0.24 0.001 0.12 1.47 2.53 0.77 1.07 
 RESET test 1.42 0.81 0.41 1.25 0.60 2.83 1.07 0.87 0.22 0.74 0.39 
LIQ serial correlation 2.63 0.08 1.05 11.10*** 1.89 13.91*** 8.67*** 0.37 0.33 0.69 16.00*** 
 heteroscedasticity 0.86 0.16 0.82 0.06 0.24 0.001 0.12 1.47 2.53 0.77 1.07 
 RESET test 3.58* 0.04 0.36 0.34 0.45 11.27*** 1.13 0.92 2.50 0.34 1.19 
BA serial correlation 3.54* 0.20 0.57 0.24 0.006 3.93** 7.40*** 3.20* 6.97*** 10.88*** 0.53 
 heteroscedasticity 0.09 2.60 0.02 0.25 0.26 6.41** 1.11 0.57 2.67 1.38 0.31 
 RESET test 0.32 0.59 1.65 1.6 0.71 4.72** 0.46 3.39 0.50 0.79 0.88 
BC serial correlation 0.33 2.58 0.50 7.52*** 8.70*** 1.15 0.04 0.08 0.60 0.04 1.47 
 heteroscedasticity 0.16 4.64** 0.76 0.001 0.65 3.21* 0.38 1.68 1.92 0.99 0.64 
 RESET test 0.69 4.56** 0.89 0.68 5.66** 2.42 1.65 1.92 0.99 0.64 0.48 
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Table 9.10: Empirical results: PMG, MG and DFE. Dependent variable: FD Index 
Variable PMG MG Hausman DFE 
adjustment 
coefficient 
-0.13 
(-2.73)*** 
-0.27 
(-3.63)*** 
 -0.05 
(-2.18)*** 
long-run 
coefficients 
  3.20 
[0.53] 
 
SAV 0.03 
(3.21)*** 
0.06 
(0.83) 
 0.04 
(0.91) 
GDPC 0.0002 
(4.66)*** 
0.005 
(0.95) 
 -0.004 
(-1.18) 
CHINN -0.63 
(-4.32)*** 
0.89 
(1.15) 
 0.67 
(1.42) 
INF -0.04 
(-3.87)*** 
-0.11 
(-1.19) 
 -0.11 
(-1.88)* 
short-run 
coefficients 
    
d.SAV 0.003 
(0.25) 
0.001 
(0.10) 
 -0.01 
(-2.88)*** 
d.GDPC -0.0003 
(-1.58) 
-0.0005 
(-1.96)** 
 -0.0001 
(-0.33) 
d.INF -0.003 
(-0.25) 
-0.05 
(-1.97)** 
 0.001 
(0.55) 
d.CHINN 0.14 
(2.21)** 
0.02 
(0.41) 
 0.03 
(1.02) 
No of 
observations 
252 252  252 
No of 
countries 
11 11  11 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate 10%, 5% and 
1% significance level, respectively. Figures in parentheses ( ) are t-statistics, figures in 
parentheses [ ] are p-values.  
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This section presents the results of the PMG, MG and DFE models. The indices of financial 
development are used as the dependent variables in the first specifications and the results are 
presented in Tables 9.10 to 9.13. For robustness checks, the individual measures of financial 
development are used as dependent variables and the results are presented in Table 9.14. The 
real deposit rate is introduced in the specification as part of the robustness checks. The vari-
ables could not be included in the previous specification because of its strong correlation with 
inflation. 
In Table 9.10, the FD index is used as the indicator of financial development. The Hausman 
test suggests that the PMG model is appropriate for the analysis, as the hypothesis of 
homogenous long-run coefficients is not rejected. Also, the results of both the MG and the 
DFE models are largely insignificant, so the interpretation focuses on the results of the PMG 
model. The adjustment coefficients of all the models have the expected negative signs and are 
significant at the 1% level, indicating their presence in a long-run relationship. As expected, 
the MG model shows faster adjustment compared with the PMG and DFE models. Savings 
has a positive and significant effect on financial development, which supports the McKinnon 
and Shaw hypothesis that interest rate liberalisation has a positive effect on savings, which in 
turn promotes financial development. The results are in line with those of Agrawal (2001), 
Odhiambo (2009, 2010) and Mbulawa (2015), who found that real interest rates have a 
positive effect on financial deepening in developing countries, including SADC countries. 
GDP per capita and financial development have a positive and significant relationship in the 
long run, which confirms a priori expectations and squares well with the findings of 
Mbulawa (2015) and Ayadi et al (2013). As a proxy for income and GDP, the coefficient of 
GDP per capita implies that higher incomes and greater economic activity promote financial 
development in SADC countries. Higher GDP promotes financial development by 
encouraging savings and capital accumulation, and also boosts banking activity as more 
goods and services are produced. Also, GDP per capita can be used as a proxy for 
institutional quality due to its strong correlation with variables measuring the strength of 
institutions. This is suggested by La Porta et al (1997), Beck et al (2003), Ayadi et al (2013) 
and David, Mlachila & Moheeput (2014). This result implies that institutional quality is 
crucial for financial development.   
Financial openness is negatively related to financial development in the long run. This is 
against a priori expectations, as financial openness is expected to increase the availability of 
funds in the economy and reduce the cost of capital. A possible reason for the negative co-
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efficient could be the surge in capital outflows in search of higher returns, which reduces 
savings and the availability of funds for credit and investment purposes. Also, as advocated 
by Balagi, Demitriades & Law (2007) and Mbulawa (2015), financial openness has a positive 
effect on financial development in the presence of higher institutional quality. The level of in-
stitutional quality in most SADC countries is low, based on GDP per capita which may 
possibly be another reason for the negative effect of financial openness on financial develop-
ment. Inflation has a negative and significant effect on financial development, which con-
firms theoretical expectations. High inflation rates as measures of macroeconomic instability 
create uncertainty in the economy and discourage savings by reducing purchasing power. The 
result confirms the findings of Bittencourt (2008) and Ayadi et al (2013), who found that in-
flation is detrimental to financial development in developing countries.   
Table 9.11: PMG short-run estimates 
Country SAV GDPC CHINN INF adjustment 
Botswana -0.004 
(-0.70) 
-0.002 
(-2.62)*** 
0.04 
(0.92) 
-0.01 
(-0.90) 
0.04 
(1.44) 
Lesotho -0.004 
(-1.01) 
-0.009 
(-2.45)** 
0.67 
(1.63) 
0.002 
(0.69) 
-0.05 
(-1.02) 
Madagascar -0.007 
(-3.03)*** 
-0.007 
(-2.99)*** 
0.04 
(1.19) 
0.002 
(2.00)** 
-0.16 
(-3.64)*** 
Malawi -0.008 
(-2.36)** 
-0.002 
(-3.85)*** 
-0.07 
(-0.89) 
0.004 
(1.81)* 
-0.13 
(-4.14)*** 
Mauritius -0.02 
(-1.96)** 
0.001 
(1.72)* 
0.22 
(3.22)*** 
-0.03 
(-3.05)*** 
0.02 
(0.91) 
Namibia -0.02 
(-2.82)*** 
0.003 
(0.38) 
0.41 
(2.42)*** 
-0.01 
(-0.84) 
-0.40 
(-6.33)*** 
Seychelles -0.01 
(-1.27) 
-0.0001 
(-0.58) 
0.02 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(-1.31) 
-0.05 
(-0.70) 
South Africa 0.11 
(1.48) 
0.0001 
(-0.88) 
-0.03 
(-0.24) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
-0.47 
(-2.68)*** 
Swaziland -0.004 
(-1.11) 
-0.0002 
(-0.03) 
0.13 
(1.19) 
-0.01 
(-1.23) 
-0.06 
(-1.69)* 
Tanzania -0.005 
(-1.25) 
0.002 
(0.66) 
0.12 
(2.51)** 
0.01 
(1.87)* 
-0.13 
(-3.72)*** 
Zambia -0.003 
(-1.12) 
0.0002 
(0.94) 
0.05 
(1.58) 
0.005 
(1.28) 
-0.08 
(-2.55)** 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
The homogenous short-run coefficients are insignificant, except for financial openness. Ac-
cording to the results, financial openness has a positive effect on financial development in the 
short run. However, the PMG model assumes that long-run coefficients are homogenous 
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while the short-run coefficients are heterogenous or individually specific (Pesaran et al, 
1999).  
Table 9.12: Empirical results: PMG, MG and DFE. Dependent variable: FD index2 
Variable PMG MG Hausman DFE 
adjustment 
coefficient 
-0.04 
(-1.28) 
-0.17 
(-2.20)** 
 -0.14 
(-4.91)** 
long-run 
coefficients 
  6.87 
[0.14] 
 
SAV 0.06 
(3.26)*** 
-0.34 
(-0.80) 
 0.004 
(0.29) 
GDPC 0.00001 
(0.02) 
0.005 
(0.89) 
 0.0002 
(2.34)** 
CHINN 1.30 
(4.13)*** 
0.07 
(0.03) 
 -0.13 
(-0.97) 
INF -0.08 
(-2.53)** 
-0.23 
(-0.76) 
 -0.21 
(-1.67)* 
short-run 
coefficients 
    
d.SAV -0.001 
(-0.19) 
0.005 
(0.91) 
 0.003 
(1.35) 
d.GDPC 0.0002 
(0.92) 
0.0003 
(0.12) 
 -0.00003 
(-0.09) 
d.CHINN 0.03 
(0.30) 
0.002 
(0.05) 
 0.02 
(0.55) 
d.INF -0.001 
(-0.33) 
0.004 
(1.67) 
 0.005 
(2.57)** 
No of 
observations 
252 252  252 
No of 
countries 
11 11  11 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate 10%, 5% and 
1% significance level, respectively. Figures in parentheses ( ) are t-statistics, figures in 
parentheses [ ] are p-values.  
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The individual specific short-run coefficients, presented in Table 9.11, show that the adjust-
ment coefficients are negative and significant in all the countries, except Botswana, Lesotho, 
Mauritius and Seychelles. The results imply that the effect of interest rate liberalisation on 
financial development is not a short-run phenomenon, as most of the coefficients are insignif-
icant.  
In Table 9.12, FD index2 is used as the measure of financial development. The Hausman test 
suggests that the PMG model is the best of the three models. However, according to the re-
sults, no long-run relationship is detected, as the adjustment coefficient is negative but not 
significant. The adjustment coefficients for the MG and DFE models are negative and signifi-
cant, but the coefficients are insignificant. This is not surprising, given that FD index2 cap-
tures only 25% of the variation of the individual financial development indicators. 
Table 9.13: Short-run estimates 
Country SAV GDPC CHINN INF adjustment 
Botswana -0.01 
(-0.75) 
-0.0001 
(-1.41) 
-0.11 
(-1.80)* 
-0.002 
(-0.14) 
-0.01 
(-0.76) 
Lesotho -0.001 
(-0.22) 
-0.001 
(-2.04)** 
0.97 
(1.91)* 
0.003 
(0.84) 
-0.02 
(-0.28) 
Madagascar -0.001 
(0.11) 
-0.0004 
(-0.43) 
-0.09 
(-0.87) 
-0.0002 
(-0.05) 
-0.06 
(-2.98)*** 
Malawi 0.01 
(1.62) 
0.001 
(1.68)* 
-0.15 
(-1.88)* 
0.008 
(4.31)*** 
-0.09 
(-2.25)** 
Mauritius -0.01 
(-0.83 
0.00003 
(0.49) 
-0.01 
(-0.14) 
0.01 
(0.93) 
-0.01 
(-0.30) 
Namibia 0.03 
(2.36)** 
-0.0002 
(1.28) 
-0.20 
(0.47) 
-0.01 
(-0.77) 
0.03 
(0.38) 
Seychelles -0.01 
(-1.31) 
0.0001 
(1.67)* 
0.02 
(0.21) 
0.01 
(1.43) 
0.19 
(2.57)*** 
South Africa -0.04 
(-0.85) 
-0.0001 
(-1.15) 
-0.01 
(-0.07) 
-0.03 
(-1.62) 
-0.15 
(-1.56) 
Swaziland 0.004 
(0.66) 
0.0003 
(3.03)*** 
0.002 
(0.01) 
0.002 
(0.22) 
-0.12 
(-2.62)*** 
Tanzania -0.02 
(-2.50)** 
0.002 
(2.83)*** 
-0.15 
(-1.50) 
0.001 
(0.13) 
-0.20 
(-2.94)*** 
Zambia -0.005 
(-1.00) 
0.001 
(1.95)* 
0.06 
(0.96) 
-0.002 
(-0.20) 
-0.01 
(-0.95) 
Source: Researcher’s own computations, Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
The short-run heterogenous coefficients presented in Table 9.13 further support the idea that 
there is no long-run relationship between FD index2 and the independent variables. Only four 
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of the adjustment coefficients for the individual countries are negative and statistically signif-
icant. Most of the other short-run coefficients are insignificant.    
Table 9.14: PMG models 
Variable Broad LIQ CRED BA BC 
ADJ -0.18 
(-3.28)*** 
-0.09 
(-3.27)*** 
-0.09 
(-1.66)* 
-0.10 
(-2.33)** 
-0.06 
(-1.96)** 
LR      
SAV 0.32 
(3.32)*** 
1.13 
(3.52)*** 
-0.04 
(-0.39) 
0.61 
(4.07)*** 
3.00 
(4.45)*** 
GDPC 0.004 
(3.78)*** 
0.004 
(3.59)*** 
0.002 
(2.82)*** 
0.002 
(3.01)*** 
0.03 
(4.88)*** 
CHINN -5.41 
(-3.40)*** 
5.40 
(2.89)*** 
-9.05 
(-5.08)*** 
-8.86 
(-3.86)*** 
55.28 
(3.99)*** 
INF -0.18 
(-2.83)*** 
0.03 
(0.33) 
0.04 
(0.70) 
-0.57 
(-3.30)*** 
-2.64 
(-2.94)*** 
SR      
d.SAV 0.04 
(0.22) 
-0.18 
(-3.57)*** 
-0.25 
(-1.10) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
-0.08 
(0.61) 
d.GDPC -0.007 
(-2.13)** 
-0.005 
(-1.39) 
-0.002 
(-0.71) 
-0.002 
(-1.40) 
-0.001 
(-0.23) 
d.INF -0.05 
(-0.57) 
-0.05 
(-1.14) 
-0.18 
(-1.36) 
-0.04 
(0.74) 
-0.03 
(-0.32) 
d.CHINN 1.20 
(2.07)** 
0.84 
(1.20) 
2.37 
(2.49)** 
1.82 
(1.89)* 
1.05 
(0.28) 
No of obs 257 254 255 255 257 
No of 
countries 
11 11 11 11 11 
Source: Researcher’s own computations, Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Tables 9.14 and 9.15 present robustness checks which involve estimating PMG models using 
each indicator of financial development, as well as adding the real deposit rate in the specifi-
cation respectively. According to Table 9.14, the adjustment coefficients are negative and 
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significant at 5% level for all models except the model with CRED used as the measure of fi-
nancial development, which is only significant at the 10 % level. The coefficients indicate 
that there is a long-run relationship between the variables. However the adjustment from 
short-run disequilibrium is slow (ranging from 6% to 18%).  
Table 9.15: PMG models 
Variable Broad LIQ CRED BA BC FD index FD index2 
ADJ -0.19 
(-3.54)*** 
-0.18 
(-3.18)*** 
-0.14 
(-3.46)*** 
-0.12 
(2.31)** 
-0.02 
(-0.72) 
-0.12 
(-2.93)*** 
0.05 
(-1.42) 
LR        
SAV 0.45 
(4.49)*** 
0.23 
(2.72)*** 
0.44 
(3.28)*** 
0.35 
(4.94)*** 
7.49 
(2.86)*** 
0.07 
(5.29)*** 
-0.02 
(-2.66)*** 
GDPC 0.005 
(5.31)*** 
0.01 
(7.55)*** 
0.003 
(4.26)*** 
0.01 
(13.98)*** 
0.003 
(0.55) 
0.0003 
(5.04)*** 
-0.0001 
(-0.61) 
CHINN -6.60 
(-3.66)*** 
-0.97 
(-0.63) 
-7.26 
(-4.12)*** 
-4.82 
(-3.06)*** 
49.06 
(1.90)* 
-0.84 
(-4.73)*** 
1.63 
(4.49)*** 
RDEP 0.21 
(2.14)** 
-0.04 
(-0.60) 
0.43 
(3.69)*** 
0.25 
(3.04)*** 
1.92 
(1.73)* 
0.05 
(4.14)*** 
0.07 
(2.52)** 
SR        
d.SAV 0.09 
(0.40) 
-0.15 
(-3.47)*** 
-0.32 
(1.19) 
-0.06 
(-0.57) 
-0.06 
(-0.38) 
-0.002 
(-0.026) 
-0.003 
(-0.37) 
d.GDPC -0.01 
(-2.14)** 
-0.01 
(-1.77)* 
-0.003 
(-1.22) 
-0.004 
(-2.33)** 
-0.01 
(-1.04) 
-0.0004 
(-1.87)* 
0.0001 
(0.62) 
d.CHINN 1.23 
(2.06)** 
1.11 
(1.64)* 
2.10 
(2.31)** 
1.77 
(1.99)** 
2.26 
(0.74) 
0.14 
(2.17)** 
0.05 
(0.55) 
d.RDEP 0.10 
(1.61) 
0.08 
(1.88)* 
0.04 
(1.16) 
0.10 
(2.25)** 
0.08 
(0.95) 
0.05 
(2.41)** 
-0.002 
(-0.52) 
No of obs 253 249 251 247 251 247 247 
No of 
countries 
11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Savings have a positive and significant effect on all financial development indicators except 
credit to the private sector. This is in line with the findings of Odhiambo & Akinboade 
(2009), who report that interest rate reforms have an insignificant effect on credit to the pri-
vate sector in Botswana. 
GDP per capita is positively related to all the financial development indicators and the coeffi-
cient is significant at the 1% level. The results for financial openness are mixed. Financial 
openness has a negative effect on broad money, credit to the private sector and banking assets 
in the long run, while its effect on liquid liabilities and bank credit is positive. Inflation has a 
negative and significant effect on broad money, bank assets and bank credit, while its effect 
on liquid liabilities and credit is insignificant. Financial openness is positively related to 
broad money and credit to the private sector in the short run, while most of the other short-
run coefficients are insignificant.  
In Table 9.15, the real deposit rate is introduced in the specification. The inflation rate is 
omitted from this model due to its strong correlation with the real deposit rate. The adjust-
ment coefficients for all models are negative and significant, except for when bank credit and 
FD index2 are the indicators of financial development. The real deposit rate has a positive 
and significant effect on the financial development indicators in the long run, except for liq-
uid liabilities and bank credit, which are significant only at the 10% level. Furthermore, the 
real deposit rate is positively correlated with the FD index, as well as banking assets in the 
short run. The other coefficients mirror those of the previous specifications to a large extent.  
9.5.2 Financial development and economic growth 
The second part of the analysis examines the effect of financial development on economic 
growth. The analysis follows a similar approach to the one on interest rate liberalisation and 
financial development. Firstly, bounds testing is conducted on the individual country ARDLs, 
together with the diagnostic tests. Secondly, the PMG model will be estimated where the in-
dex is used as a proxy for financial development.  
Figure 9.16 presents the results of the bounds test, where FD indices are used as indicators of 
financial development. When FD index is the indicator, the null of no cointegration is reject-
ed at the 1% level in all countries except Malawi, Mauritius and Swaziland, where the null 
hypothesis is rejected only at the 10% level. Cointegration is detected in all countries at the 
1% level when FD index2 is used as a measure of financial development.  
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Table 9.16: Bounds test results 
Country FD index FD index2 
Botswana 9.50*** 13.51*** 
Lesotho 5.25*** 8.45*** 
Madagascar 28.33*** 23.75*** 
Malawi 3.51* 9.57*** 
Mauritius 3.35* 9.27*** 
Namibia 15.88*** 4.91*** 
Seychelles 7.68*** 4.80*** 
South Africa 8.98*** 11.16*** 
Swaziland 3.57* 187.35*** 
Tanzania 10.42*** 10.41*** 
Zambia 14.32*** 12.16*** 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***) and (*) indicate significance at 1% 
and 10% levels respectively. 
Table 9.17: Bounds test results 
Country CRED BROAD LIQ BA BC 
Botswana 11.26*** 11.45*** 16.70*** 7.75*** 20.47*** 
Lesotho 49.07*** 31.57*** 8.50*** 5.30*** 27.47*** 
Madagascar 22.91*** 9.13*** 21.20*** 30.99*** 26.39*** 
Malawi 4.24** 4.63** 6.73*** 17.32*** 5.43*** 
Mauritius 8.71*** 17.48*** 4.25** 10.38*** 6.44*** 
Namibia 12.99*** 5.56** 16.71*** 10.94*** 13.28*** 
Seychelles 8.51*** 4.45** 9.79*** 5.64*** 5.30*** 
South Africa 5.85*** 6.40*** 4.78*** 4.47** 1.52 
Swaziland 4.58** 10.15*** 6.53*** 5.04*** 4.88*** 
Tanzania 9.72*** 6.49*** 8.11*** 9.46*** 8.09*** 
Zambia 7.93*** 10.22*** 10.05*** 9.41*** 8.17*** 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 9.17 presents the results of the bound test procedure when the measures of financial de-
velopment are used individually. Cointegration is present in all countries for every indicator 
of financial development, with the exception of South Africa when bank credit is a proxy for 
financial development.  
Tables 9.18 and 9.19 present the diagnostic tests for the individual country ARDL models for 
the different proxies of financial development. In Table 9.18, the indices are used a measure 
of financial development and, based on the results, serial correlation is detected in three coun-
tries, heteroscedasticity in two countries and model misspecification in one country.    
Table 9.18: Diagnostic tests: financial development indices 
Country serial correlation heteroscedasticity Ramsey’s reset test 
 FD index FD index2 FD index FD index2 FD index FD index2 
Botswana 2.91* 1.81 0.54 1.80 2.85* 0.17 
Lesotho 0.49 6.81*** 0.13 0.01 0.11 0.21 
Madagascar 0.04 0.01 4.73** 4.39** 27.49*** 38.82*** 
Malawi 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.18 0.35 0.25 
Mauritius 0.74 0.10 11.01*** 3.98** 3.35* 0.41 
Namibia 0.19 9.37*** 0.06 2.35 1.28 3.07* 
Seychelles 8.28*** 1.01 0.19 0.03 0.32 0.42 
SA 4.26** 5.08** 0.30 0.06 1.21 0.29 
Swaziland 1.11 0.15 0.14 0.71 2.77 1.12 
Tanzania 0.26 9.15*** 0.09 0.15 3.41** 0.77 
Zambia 6.84*** 0.51 0.85 1.64 0.39 0.04 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Table 9.19 shows the diagnostic tests for the individual country ARDL models. Most of the 
models pass the diagnostic tests, which suggests that the PMG model is suitable for the ana-
lysis. Serial correlation is detected for no more than four countries, while heteroscedasticity 
and model misspecification are detected in two countries at the most in all specifications.           
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Table 9.19: Diagnostic tests 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Variable test Botswana Lesotho Madagascar Malawi Mauritius Namibia Seychelles S Africa          Swaziland Tanzania Zambia 
BROAD serial correlation 0.40 16.28*** 8.34*** 0.47 0.66 3.83* 7.27 4.21** 4.31** 0.65 0.52 
 heteroscedasticity 2.87* 1.51 1.00 1.94 1.35 0.001 0.05 0.85 2.98* 0.90 8.42*** 
 RESET test 0.83 13.80*** 17.90*** 0.75 3.08* 0.06 0.33 0.22 0.24 0.84 3.37* 
CRED serial correlation 1.17 5.19** 3.01* 6.15** 1.05 2.04 6.14*** 5.09*** 7.58*** 1.26 1.12 
 heteroscedasticity 1.09 0.47 5.43*** 0.19 7.98*** 0.51 2.54 0.85 0.23 0.16 0.71 
 RESET test 0.79 1.09 21.71*** 1.73 2.91* 1.20 1.00 1.53 0.17 2.39 0.86 
LIQ serial correlation 3.56* 7.12*** 0.04 0.004 4.34** 0.001 4.89** 0.03 4.16** 9.34*** 1.13 
 heteroscedasticity 7.08*** 0.11 1.73 0.0001 1.04 0.02 0.99 0.45 0.84 1.22 1.46 
 RESET test 6.69*** 0.22 13.26*** 0.50 1.46 0.02 0.35 0.14 0.14 1.15 1.69 
BA serial correlation 4.95** 0.42 1.43 0.06 2.13 0.77 3.89** 8.31*** 0.001 0.26 2.26 
 heteroscedasticity 0.29 0.27 5.22** 0.02 4.44*** 0.34 0.81 0.13 2.11 0.51 0.06 
 RESET test 2.01 0.26 34.33*** 0.66 3.45* 0.86 0.31 1.41 40.17*** 3.56 2.67 
BC serial correlation 1.53 2.57 0.001 0.09 11.52*** 5.20** 7.44*** 2.71 0.29 0.19 2.97* 
 heteroscedasticity 4.46** 0.20  3.14* 0.1 4.57** 0.001 0.82 0.02 0.53 0.49 1.01 
 RESET test 2.93 2.02 19.35*** 0.01 2.75 1.78 0.66 0.43 3.64* 3.09 4.34** 
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Table 9.20. PMG, MG and DFE. Dependent variable: GDP 
Variable PMG MG Hausman DFE 
ADJ -0.87 
(-10.96)*** 
-1.04 
(-13.35)*** 
 -1.02 
(-17.52)*** 
LR   6.70 
[0.24] 
 
TRA -0.03 
(-4.68)*** 
-0.04 
(-0.09) 
 -0.01 
(-1.34) 
GOV -0.28 
(-5.61)*** 
-0.35 
(-3.30)*** 
 -0.09 
(-1.34) 
INV 0.14 
(7.72)*** 
0.17 
(1.91)* 
 0.05 
(1.84)* 
EXCH 0.002 
(3.70)*** 
0.12 
(0.62) 
 0.003 
(3.31)*** 
FD index -0.36 
(-2.72)*** 
-2.89 
(-2.74)*** 
 -0.58 
(-1.96)** 
SR     
d.TRA 0.07 
(1.75)* 
0.04 
(0.81) 
 0.006 
(0.33) 
d.GOV 0.07 
(0.59) 
0.16 
(1.21) 
 -0.18 
(-2.04)** 
d.INV -0.12 
(-1.66)* 
-0.12 
(-1.20) 
 0.003 
(0.07) 
d.EXCH -0.72 
(-2.74)*** 
-0.99 
(-2.53)** 
 -0.005 
(-1.63) 
d.FD Index -1.84 
(-0.89) 
0.11 
(0.08) 
 -2.61 
(-2.62)*** 
No of obs 255 255  255 
No of 
countries 
11 11  11 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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This section presents the results of the panel data analysis. The results are presented in Tables 
9.20 to 9.23, where the measures of financial development are the indices, as well as Tables 
9.24 and 9.25, which tests for robustness by using the individual indicators of financial devel-
opment.  
The adjustment coefficient of the PMG model implies that 87% of the disequilibrium in the 
short run is corrected in the first year, which represents a very quick adjustment. The Haus-
man test suggests that the PMG model is superior to the MG model, so the interpretation of 
the results is centred on the PMG model. Also, the adjustment coefficients of the MG and 
DFE models are greater than one, which is an indication of model instability. So the MG and 
DFE models are used for comparison purposes. According to the results, financial 
development has a negative effect on economic growth in the long run in SADC countries. 
The coefficient of the financial development is negative and significant at 1% level. The 
result is against theoretical expectations, as a more developed financial system is expected to 
promote economic growth. A possible explanation of the result is that a number of SADC 
countries have experienced financial crises caused by bank failures. The stability of a 
financial system is an alternative channel in which financial development has an effect on 
economic growth. As such, financial development may have a negative influence on 
economic growth if financial systems lack stability. The result provides support to the 
findings of Iheanacho (2016) and Kenza & Eddine (2016), who report a negative correlation 
between financial development and economic growth in Nigeria and MENA countries 
respectively. The coefficient of financial development is negative and significant in the MG 
and DFE models as well. However, the models show signs of instability, as the adjustment 
coefficients are greater than one in absolute terms. 
Trade and government expenditure are negatively related to economic growth in the long run, 
while investment and the exchange rate have a positive effect on economic growth. The co-
efficients are significant at the 1% level and are in line with those found in the previous 
chapters. According to the PMG and MG models, the homogenous short-run coefficient of 
financial development is insignificant. The coefficient is however, negative and significant in 
the DFE model. Exchange rate depreciation has a negative effect on economic growth in the 
short run, based on the PMG and MG results.  
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Table 9.21. PMG model. Short-run coefficients 
Country TRA GOV INV EXCH FD index ADJ 
Botswana 0.30 
(4.03)*** 
0.03 
(0.08) 
-0.39 
(-2.98)*** 
-0.37 
(-0.31) 
-3.50 
(-0.98) 
-0.75 
(-4.70)*** 
Lesotho 0.07 
(1.60) 
-0.16 
(-0.65) 
-0.25 
(-2.20)** 
-1.71 
(-3.10)*** 
6.88 
(2.89)*** 
-0.33 
(-2.44)*** 
Madagascar 0.23 
(3.30)*** 
0.32 
(1.00) 
0.33 
(2.21)** 
-0.005 
(-1.57) 
-15.16 
(-2.25)** 
-1.17 
(-7.61)*** 
Malawi 0.04 
(0.37) 
-0.35 
(-1.39) 
-0.54 
(-1.91)* 
-0.02 
(-0.51) 
-6.79 
(1.23) 
-1.10 
(-6.96)*** 
Mauritius -0.03 
(-0.84) 
-0.76 
(-1.50) 
-0.07 
(-0.52) 
-0.03 
(-0.22) 
-1.73 
(-1.16) 
-1.25 
(-5.98)*** 
Namibia -0.14 
(-1.93)* 
0.68 
(2.26)** 
-0.06 
(-0.65) 
-0.37 
(-0.74) 
-4.53 
(-1.95)* 
-0.85 
(-4.80)*** 
Seychelles 0.01 
(0.32) 
0.28 
(1.90)* 
0.01 
(0.11) 
-1.98 
(-2.86)*** 
-7.55 
(-4.32)*** 
-0.66 
(-4.42)*** 
South Africa 0.28 
(5.57)*** 
0.29 
(0.81) 
-0.21 
(-1.06) 
-0.80 
(-3.92)*** 
0.60 
(0.65) 
-0.76 
(-6.29)*** 
Swaziland -0.01 
(-1.22) 
0.16 
(2.27)** 
-0.06 
-(2.29)** 
-0.28 
(-2.29)** 
-1.09 
(-0.81) 
-1.06 
(-28.94)*** 
Tanzania -0.01 
(-0.22) 
0.07 
(0.42) 
1.00 
(1.01) 
-0.005 
(-1.01) 
4.59 
(1.22) 
-0.76 
(-4.13)*** 
Zambia 0.08 
(1.30) 
0.19 
(1.90)* 
-0.16 
(-2.52)** 
-2.29 
(-2.59)*** 
8.05 
(3.01)*** 
-0.91 
(-10.06)*** 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Table 9.21 presents the results of the short-run heterogenous coefficients of the PMG model. 
The adjustment coefficients are negative and significant at 1% level for all countries, which 
proves that there is a long-run relationship between the variables.  
Table 9.22 presents the PMG, MG and DFE models where FD index2 is used as the measure 
of financial development. The adjustment coefficient is negative and significant, and implies 
that 92% of the disequilibrium in the short run is corrected in the first year. The Hausman test 
suggests that the PMG model is the best. FD index2 has a negative but insignificant effect on 
economic growth. 
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Table 9.22: PMG, MG and DFE results. Dependent variable: GDP 
Variable PMG MG Hausman DFE 
ADJ -0.92 
(-9.90)*** 
-1.14 
(-16.54)*** 
 -1.06 
(-17.89)*** 
LR   0.70 
[0.98] 
 
TRA -0.03 
(-5.56)*** 
0.003 
(0.09) 
 -0.01 
(-0.84) 
GOV -0.25 
(-5.13)*** 
-0.33 
(-2.89)*** 
 -0.11 
(-1.60) 
INV 0.15 
(8.89)*** 
0.15 
(1.71)* 
 0.05 
(1.59) 
EXCH 0.002 
(2.22)** 
-0.15 
(-0.63) 
 0.002 
(2.49)** 
FD index2 -0.06 
(-0.21) 
-0.06 
(-0.06) 
 -0.09 
(-0.18) 
SR     
d.TRA 0.07 
(1.64) 
0.02 
(0.44) 
 -0.001 
(-0.04) 
d.GOV 0.04 
(0.23) 
0.08 
(0.34) 
 0.08 
(0.34) 
d.INV -0.10 
(-1.47) 
-0.10 
(-1.04) 
 -0.10 
(-1.04) 
d.EXCH -0.52 
(-3.11)*** 
-0.54 
(-2.84) 
 -0.54 
(-2.84)*** 
d.FD index2 1.74 
(1.25) 
1.77 
(1.98)* 
 1.59 
(1.59) 
No of obs 255 255  255 
No of 
countries 
11 11  11 
Source: Researcher’s own computations, Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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The results further support the conclusion that financial development has a negative effect on 
economic growth in the long run in SADC countries. The other coefficients are in line with 
those found in the specification above.  
The short-run heterogenous coefficients are presented in Table 9.23. The individual adjust-
ment coefficients are negative and significant, which indicates that there is a long-run rela-
tionship between the variables.  
Table 9.23. PMG model: short-run coefficients 
Country TRA GOV INV EXCH FD index2 ADJ 
Botswana 0.32 
(4.76)*** 
-0.13 
(-0.39) 
-0.47 
(-3.67)*** 
-1.33 
(-1.14) 
-5.90 
(-2.14)** 
-0.79 
(-5.24)*** 
Lesotho 0.05 
(0.84) 
-0.08 
(-0.11) 
-0.23 
(-1.67)* 
-1.20 
(-1.53) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.28 
(-1.87)* 
Madagascar 0.21 
(2.66)*** 
0.46 
(1.29) 
0.42 
(2.67)*** 
-0.03 
(-0.92) 
-0.69 
(0.18)** 
-1.32 
(-8.45)*** 
Malawi -0.001 
(-0.01) 
-0.48 
(-1.72) 
-0.33 
(-1.13) 
-0.01 
(-0.22) 
-4.01 
(-0.69) 
-1.17 
(-7.46)*** 
Mauritius -0.03 
(-0.78) 
-1.27 
(-2.53)** 
-0.15 
(-1.04) 
0.06 
(0.40) 
-1.47 
(0.87) 
-1.23 
(-5.97)*** 
Namibia -0.12 
(-1.53) 
0.78 
(2.40)** 
-0.12 
(-1.15) 
-0.32 
(-0.63) 
2.81 
(1.71)* 
-1.10 
(-5.98)*** 
Seychelles -0.03 
(-0.81) 
0.42 
(2.47)** 
0.05 
(0.50) 
-1.25 
(-1.75)* 
-10.93 
(-3.36)*** 
-0.77 
(-4.34)*** 
South Africa 0.27 
(5.86)*** 
0.30 
(0.93) 
-0.13 
(-0.63) 
-0.79 
(-4.00)*** 
1.59 
(1.51) 
-0.72 
(-6.35)*** 
Swaziland -0.001 
(-0.04) 
0.23 
(2.37)** 
-0.10 
-(2.67)** 
-0.15 
(-1.10) 
1.30 
(1.23) 
-1.12 
(-24.05)*** 
Tanzania 0.04 
(0.72) 
0.04 
(0.26) 
0.06 
(0.52) 
-0.002 
(-0.50) 
3.09 
(1.85)* 
-0.68 
(-3.78)*** 
Zambia 0.03 
(0.59) 
0.10 
(1.19) 
-0.13 
(-2.30)** 
-0.75 
(-0.77) 
7.16 
(3.80)*** 
-0.91 
(-10.93)*** 
Source: Researcher’s own computations, Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Robustness checks are conducted by using the individual financial development indicators as 
proxies for financial development in PMG models. The long-run and short-run results are 
presented in Tables 9.24 and 9.25 respectively. The adjustment coefficients are negative and 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that there is a long-run relationship between the 
variables. The coefficients of the individual financial development indicators are negative and 
significant, which confirms the results obtained when the index is used as a proxy of financial 
development. The negative coefficient of credit to the private sector confirms the results of 
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Phakedi (2014) Le Roux & Moyo (2015) and Bara et al (2016), who report a negative 
relationship between credit to the private sector and economic growth in SADC countries. 
Ayadi et al (2013) also report a negative relationship between the variables in Mediterranean 
countries. Bara et al (2016) also report a negative association between bank credit to the pri-
vate sector and economic growth.   
Table 9.24: Long-run PMG model. Dependent variable: GDP 
Variable PMG1 PMG2 PMG3 PMG4 PMG5 
ADJ -0.88 
(-9.94)*** 
-0.85 
(-9.20)*** 
-0.87 
(-9.07)*** 
-0.83 
(-8.28)*** 
-0.94 
(-12.42)*** 
TRA -0.03 
(-5.69)*** 
-0.03 
(-3.83)*** 
-0.03 
(-6.69)*** 
-0.03 
(-4.80)*** 
0.06 
(-0.63) 
GOV -0.23 
(-4.38)*** 
-0.23 
(-4.33)*** 
-0.26 
(-5.67)*** 
-0.26 
(-4.95)*** 
-0.08 
(-1.38) 
INV 0.14 
(7.17)*** 
0.14 
(7.00)*** 
0.16 
(9.18)*** 
0.15 
(7.92)*** 
0.02 
(1.61) 
EXCH 0.002 
(3.62)*** 
0.0002 
(3.63)*** 
0.002 
(3.26) 
0.003 
(4.06)*** 
0.002 
(3.77)*** 
BROAD -0.003 
(-2.55)** 
    
CRED  -0.02 
(-2.11)** 
   
LIQ   -0.03 
(-2.32)** 
  
BA    -0.02 
(-2.56)** 
 
BC     -0.02 
(-2.72)*** 
No of obs 262 260  258 262 
No of 
countries 
11 11 11 11 11 
Source: Researcher’s own computations, Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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According to Table 9.25, liquid liabilities are negatively related to GDP in the short run and 
the coefficient is significant at 5% level. Credit to the private sector has a negative but weak-
ly significant coefficient. The result confirms the findings of Iheanacho (2013), who reports a 
negative correlation between liquid liabilities, credit to the private sector and economic 
growth in Nigeria. The rest of the financial development indicators are insignificant. A depre-
ciation on the exchange rate affects economic growth negatively in the short run, which is in 
line with the results above. 
Table 9.25: PMG homogenous short-run coefficients. Dependent variable: GDP 
Variable PMG1 PMG2 PMG3 PMG4 PMG5 
d.TRA 0.06 
(1.48) 
0.08 
(1.75)* 
0.08 
(1.92)* 
0.06 
(1.46) 
0.05 
(-1.25) 
d.GOV -0.003 
(-0.02) 
0.03 
(0.21) 
0.04 
(0.28) 
0.08 
(0.66) 
-0.05 
(-0.37) 
d.INV -0.06 
(-0.83) 
-0.05 
(-0.78) 
-0.12 
(-1.38) 
-0.11 
(-1.38) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
d.EXCH -0.50 
(-2.62)** 
-0.38 
(-2.79)** 
-0.68 
(-2.44)** 
-0.63 
(-2.74)*** 
-0.26 
(-1.57) 
d.BROAD -0.05 
(-0.76) 
    
d.CRED  -0.21 
(-1.94)* 
   
d.LIQ   -0.21 
(-2.01)** 
  
d.BA    -0.25 
(-1.30) 
 
d.BC     0.02 
(0.86) 
No of obs 262 260  258 262 
No of 
countries 
11 11 11 11 11 
Source: Researcher’s own computations, Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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9.6 Conclusion 
The purpose of the chapter was to examine the effect of interest rate liberalisation on eco-
nomic growth through financial development. The empirical analysis involved two equation 
specifications, the first of which surveyed the relationship between interest rate liberalisation 
and financial development through savings. According to the McKinnon and Shaw hypothe-
sis, liberalising interest rates encourages savings, which in turn promote financial develop-
ment. The effect of financial development on economic growth was observed in the second 
part of the empirical analysis. Financial development is regarded as one of the crucial deter-
minants of economic growth (Levin 1997).  
The analysis was conducted using the PMG estimator, which assumes homogenous long-run 
and heterogenous short-run coefficients (Pesaran et al, 2001). Also, the technique is based on 
the assumption that there is cointegration between variables in a model. To test for cointegra-
tion, individual ARDL models were estimated for each country and the results highlighted 
that the presence of cointegration in most countries for both equation specifications employed 
on the study. Most of the individual ARDL models passed the diagnostic tests which provid-
ed indication that the PMG models were adequate. The MG and DFE estimators were used 
for robustness checks. 
The indicators of financial development used in the study were broad money, credit to the 
private sector, liquid liabilities, bank credit and bank assets. Two indices of financial devel-
opment were constructed using PCA due to high correlation between the individual financial 
development indicators. The first financial development index, which explains over 70% of 
the total variation, is highly correlated with all the individual indicators except for bank 
credit, which is correlated with the second index to a large extent. The second index explains 
close to 25% of the total variation, while the remaining components explain minimal varia-
tion and so were excluded from the analysis.  
The results indicated that interest rate liberalisation has a positive effect on financial develop-
ment through savings, which supports the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis. A long-run rela-
tionship between most of the financial development measures was found. However, a long-
run association was not detected between the second index and interest rate liberalisation. 
The study also found that the long-run effect of financial development on economic growth 
was negative, which contradicts most of the theories and empirical studies regarding the role 
of financial development in influencing economic growth. However, it should be noted that 
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financial development in some SADC countries has caused financial crises, which in turn 
hinders economic growth. The next chapter will survey the effect of interest rate liberalisation 
on financial crises in SADC countries, which would shed light on the negative effect of finan-
cial development on economic growth. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
INTEREST RATE LIBERALISATION AND FINANCIAL CRISES 
10.1 Introduction 
 In Chapter eight, the effect of interest rate liberalisation on economic growth through 
financial development was investigated and the results suggested that interest rate 
liberalisation promotes financial development in the long term. However, financial 
development has a negative effect on economic growth, which could be a result of the 
emergence of financial crises. Critics of interest rate liberalisation argue that it increases the 
likelihood of financial crises by encouraging excessive lending by financial institutions in an 
attempt to take advantage of high interest rates (Demirgüҫ-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998; 
Kaufman, 2000).  Others argue that higher interest rates encourage the entry of banks into the 
financial system, which increases competition, so promoting risky lending practices (Ariss, 
2010; Agoraki et al, 2011; Hope et al, 2013). 
 Proponents of interest rate liberalisation argue that negative interest rates also encourage ex-
cessive risk-taking as banks attempt to earn higher returns, so causing financial crises (Bocu-
toglu & Ekinci, 2010). Also, interest rate liberalisation provides liquidity buffers which re-
duce the likelihood of financial crises (Barrell et al, 2016). 
 The purpose of this chapter is to examine the effect of interest rate liberalisation on financial 
crises for the period 1990-2015. Also, the effect of financial development and institutional 
quality on financial crises is also investigated. The estimation technique chosen for the ana-
lysis is the logit model, due to the binary nature of the endogenous variable. The chapter is 
organised as follows: Section two provides a description of the data as well as data sources. 
Section three discusses the empirical results, while Section four concludes the chapter.  
10.2 Descriptive statistics 
 The descriptive statistics and correlation analysis of most of the variables were presented in 
Chapters 7 and 8 and so are not repeated in this chapter. The other new variable in the chapter 
besides financial crises, is the current account balance as a percentage of GDP. The variable 
averages -4.19%, indicating that current accounts have largely been in deficit in the SADC 
region over the period of the study.  
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10.3 Empirical results 
 The empirical strategy involves answering three questions. Firstly, does interest rate liberalis-
ation increase or decrease the likelihood of financial crises? Secondly, what is the role of fi-
nancial development in causing financial crises? As mentioned earlier, the results of Chapter 
nine suggest that financial development has a negative effect on economic growth, so this 
chapter seeks to find evidence of whether this negative effect is because of financial crises. 
The last question to be answered is whether institutional quality reduces the likelihood of fi-
nancial crises. Due to the unavailability of data on institutions in SADC, GDP per capita will 
be used as the proxy for institutional quality, in line with studies like those by Demirgüҫ-
Kunt & Detragiache (1998) and Angkinand et al (2010). Also, probabilities of different crises 
in the sample are estimated. To ensure that the results are robust, the explanatory variables 
are lagged by one period, which provides a true early warning model (Barrell et al, 2016) and 
to cater for potential endogeneity of the regressors (Demirgüҫ-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998).  
10.3.1 Baseline regression  
 The baseline regression model includes only four explanatory variables: GDP growth, finan-
cial openness, current account balance and the inflation rate. The results are presented in 
Tables 10.1 and 10.2. The coefficient of inflation is positive and significant at the 5% level, 
indicating that financial crises are associated with higher levels of inflation. High inflation 
rates signify macroeconomic instability, which increases uncertainty in the economy, so the 
result is in line with a priori expectations. The result confirms the findings of Demirgüҫ-Kunt 
& Detragiache (1998), Ranciere et al (2006), Angkinand et al (2010) and Hamdi & Jlassi 
(2014).  
 Financial openness reduces the likelihood of financial crises, although the coefficient is 
weakly significant. One of the causes of banking crises is the diminishing of liquidity to meet 
depositors’ needs. So capital inflows may mitigate liquidity problems faced by domestic fi-
nancial institutions, thus reducing the possibility of banking crises. The result supports the 
findings of Beju & Ciupac-Ulici (2012), Hamdi & Jlassi (2014) and Barrell et al (2016). The 
finding is against the view that financial openness increases the likelihood of financial crises 
through an increase in capital outflows.  
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 Table 10.1: Baseline results 
Variable logit probit LPM 
INF 0.04 
(2.94)*** 
0.03 
(3.06)*** 
0.01 
(4.35)*** 
CHINN -0.31 
(-1.87)* 
-0.17 
(-1.96)** 
-0.02 
(-1.62) 
GDP -0.10 
(-2.03)** 
-0.06 
(-2.01)** 
-0.01 
(-2.14)** 
CA -0.03 
(-1.36) 
-0.01 
(-1.11) 
-0.003 
(-1.29) 
C -2.36 
(-6.61)*** 
-1.36 
(-6.98)*** 
0.09 
(2.34)** 
pseudo R-squared 0.13 0.13  
R-squared   0.13 
chi-square 28.45*** 28.79***  
F-statistic   9.42*** 
No of observations 265 265 265 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 As expected, GDP growth is negatively signed and significant at the 5% level, indicating that 
higher economic growth levels are associated with lower crisis probabilities. The result is in 
line with those of Demirgüҫ-Kunt & Detragiache (1998), Shehzad & De Haan (2008), Angki-
nand et al (2010), Hamdi & Jlassi (2014), Barrell et al (2016) and Enowbi et al (2017). The 
current account balance has the expected negative sign; however the coefficient is insignifi-
cant. According to the literature, current account imbalances are one of the precursors of fi-
nancial crises, so positive current account balances are necessary to reduce the likelihood of 
financial crises (Barrell et al, 2016).  
 The probit model, and also the linear probability model (LPM), is estimated for robustness 
checks, and the results mirror those of the logit model to a large extent. However, the finan-
cial openness variable is negative and significant at the 5% in the probit model, but 
insignificant in the LPM. 
 Table 10.2 shows the marginal effects which measure the probability that each explanatory 
variable contributes to the likelihood of financial crises. Inflation increases the probability of 
financial crises by 0.5% in both the logit and probit models. The probability is slightly higher 
in the LPM. Financial openness reduces the probability of financial crises by 3% in both the 
logit and probit models, which makes it the most important explanatory variable. GDP 
growth reduces the probability of financial crises by 1%.  
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 Table 10.2: Marginal effects 
Variable logit probit LPM 
INF 0.005 
(3.06)*** 
0.005 
(3.19)*** 
0.007 
(4.35)*** 
CHINN -0.03 
(-1.86)* 
-0.03 
(-1.97)** 
-0.02 
(-1.62) 
GDP -0.01 
(-2.06)** 
-0.01 
(-2.04)** 
-0.01 
(-2.14)** 
CA -0.003 
(-1.36) 
-0.003 
(-1.11) 
-0.003 
(-1.29) 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
10.3.2 Interest rate liberalisation and financial crises 
 The effect of interest rate liberalisation is introduced in the specification and the results are 
presented in Table 10.3. Due to the strong links between the inflation rate and interest rate 
liberalisation measures (real deposit rate and real interest rate), the inflation rate is omitted 
from the specification. The two measures of interest rate liberalisation are used separately in 
regression models. The coefficient of the real deposit rate is negative but insignificant, while 
that of the real interest rate is negative and significant at the 10% level. The results imply that 
interest rate liberalisation does not directly increase the likelihood of financial crises in 
SADC countries. The result supports the findings of Barrell et al (2013, 2016) who found that 
liberalisation of the deposit and lending rates adds to the strength of capital in protecting 
against banking crises. The results provide support to the view that higher interest rates do 
not result in bank risk-taking behaviour that often causes financial crises. Furthermore, 
financial repression policies that maintain low real interest rates may increase the likelihood 
of financial crises rather than cure it. In most SADC countries real interest rates were low 
during the 1990s, the period in which most financial crises occurred. 
 The coefficients of the other explanatory variables are similar to those of the baseline model. 
However, the coefficient of the capital account balance becomes significant at 5% level in the 
specification with the real interest rate, which implies that after the adoption of interest rate 
liberalisation, the current account balance significantly reduces the likelihood of financial 
crises.  
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Table 10.3: Interest rate liberalisation and financial crises 
Variable logit logit2 
CHINN -0.30 
(-1.78)* 
-0.31 
(-1.81)* 
GDP -0.10 
(-2.22)** 
-0.11 
(-2.22)** 
CA -0.03 
(-1.40) 
-0.05 
(-2.32)** 
RDEP -0.03 
(-1.54) 
 
RINT  -0.04 
(-1.90)* 
C -1.90 
(-6.09)*** 
-1.64 
(-4.97)*** 
pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.10 
chi-square 16.64*** 21.09*** 
No of observations 261 264 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Table 10.4 shows the marginal effects of the explanatory variables, including the interest rate 
liberalisation measures. The real interest rate reduces the likelihood of financial crises by 
0.4%. The current account balance reduces the likelihood of financial crises by 1%. The coef-
ficient of GDP growth suggests that higher economic growth reduces the probability of finan-
cial crises by 12% when the real interest rate is introduced into the specification. The coeffi-
cient of financial openness still retains its value of 3%. 
Table 10.4: Marginal effects 
Variable logit logit2 
CHINN -0.03 
(-1.77)* 
-0.03 
(-1.86)* 
GDP -0.01 
(-2.24)** 
-0.12 
(-2.26)** 
CA -0.003 
(-1.40) 
-0.01 
(-2.35)** 
RDEP -0.003 
(-1.56) 
 
RINT  -0.004 
(-1.92)* 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (**) and (*) indicate significance at 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 10.5 presents the results of the probit model as well as the LPM for robustness checks. 
The results mirror those of the logit model to a large extent, as the real interest rate is nega-
tively signed and significant at the 10% and 5% levels for the probit and LPM models respec-
tively. The coefficient of the real deposit rate is negative in both models, but only significant 
in the LPM specification.  
Table 10.5: Probit and LPM models 
Variable probit1 probit2 LPM1 LPM2 
CHINN -0.16 
(-1.82)* 
-0.16 
(-1.85)* 
-0.02 
(-1.54) 
-0.02 
(-1.58) 
GDP -0.06 
(-2.20)** 
-0.06 
(-2.21)** 
-0.01 
(-2.43)** 
-0.01 
(-2.46)** 
CA -0.01 
(-1.27) 
-0.02 
(-2.14)** 
-0.003 
(-1.41) 
-0.01 
(-2.48)** 
RDEP -0.02 
(-1.60) 
 -0.01 
(-2.36)** 
 
RINT  -0.02 
(-1.92)* 
 -0.01 
(-2.37)** 
constant -1.08 
(-6.41)*** 
-0.92 
(-5.03)*** 
0.16 
(4.88)*** 
0.20 
(5.48)*** 
pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.10   
R-squared   0.06 0.07 
chi-square 16.58*** 20.90***   
F-statistic   4.90*** 5.74*** 
No of observatns 261 264 261 264 
 Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
10.3.3 Financial development and financial crises 
 Literature suggests that excessive bank lending to unworthy borrowers and the subsequent 
rise in non-performing loans is one of the major causes of financial crises. Banking sector 
growth, fuelled by rising credit to the private sector, growth in broad money, liquid liabilities 
and banking assets constitutes one of the measures of financial development as discussed in 
Chapter nine. According to the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis, interest rate liberalisation 
promotes financial development, which in turn increases economic growth. However, the 
findings of Chapter nine suggest that banking sector development has a negative long-term 
effect on financial development in the region. So investigating the effect of banking sector 
development on financial crises is crucial, as the SADC region has experienced a number of 
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bank failures, which also suggests that financial development might not be growth-
enhancing.  
  Table: 10.6. Financial development and financial crises 
Variable logit1 logit2 logit3 logit4 logit5 
INF 0.05 
(3.05)*** 
0.04 
(2.54)** 
0.05 
(2.87)*** 
0.05 
(3.29)*** 
0.04 
(2.55)** 
CHINN -0.31 
(-1.85)* 
-0.25 
(-1.39) 
-0.33 
(-1.89)* 
-0.18 
(-1.01) 
-0.26 
(-1.48) 
GDP -0.10 
(-1.98)** 
-0.10 
(-2.10)** 
-0.10 
(-2.03)** 
-0.09 
(-1.67)* 
-0.10 
(-2.11)** 
CA -0.03 
(-1.42) 
-0.03 
(-1.32) 
-0.03 
(-1.32) 
-0.05 
(-1.81)* 
-0.03 
(-1.33) 
CRED 0.01 
(1.03) 
    
LIQ  -0.01 
(-0.92) 
   
BA   0.003 
(0.33) 
  
BC    0.02 
(2.58)*** 
 
BROAD     -0.01 
(-0.88) 
constant -2.59 
(-5.85)*** 
-1.88 
(-3.07)*** 
-2.47 
(-4.71)*** 
-3.96 
(-5.15)*** 
-1.93 
(-3.26)*** 
pseudo 𝑹𝟐 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.14 
chi-squared 29.77*** 29.10*** 28.63*** 35.88*** 29.26*** 
No of obs 264 264 263 264 265 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
The empirical strategy involves using the five indicators of financial development introduced 
in Chapter nine as explanatory variables in separate regression specifications, as well as the 
indices created by principal components analysis. Tables 10.6 to 10.9 present the results of 
the analysis.   
Bank credit to the private sector is positive and significant at the 1% level, meaning that it in-
creases the likelihood of financial crises. The coefficient is in line with a priori expectations 
and confirms the findings of Angkinand et al (2010), Hamdi & Jlassi (2014) and Enowbi et al 
(2017). Credit to the private sector and bank assets are positively signed but insignificant, 
while liquid liabilities and broad money are negative and insignificant. 
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Table 10.7 presents the marginal effects. The results suggest that bank credit increases the 
likelihood of financial crises by 0.2%. Table 10.8 shows the effect of the financial develop-
ment indices on financial crises. The first index of financial development is positively signed 
but insignificant, while the second index is positive and significant at the 5% level. The result 
provides support for the proposition that the long-term effect of financial development on 
economic growth in SADC could be negative because of financial crises. 
Table 10.7: Marginal effects 
Variable logit 
INF 0.01 
(3.46)*** 
CHINN -0.02 
(-1.01) 
GDP -0.01 
(-1.68)* 
CA -0.005 
(-1.82)* 
BC 0.002 
(2.61)** 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Table 10.8: Financial development and financial crises 
Variable logit1 logit2 
INF 0.05 
(2.87)*** 
0.05 
(3.11)*** 
CHINN -0.33 
(-1.90)* 
-0.06 
(-0.30) 
GDP -0.10 
(-2.02)** 
-0.09 
(-1.73)* 
CA -0.03 
(-1.33) 
-0.05 
(-1.84)* 
FD Index 0.04 
(0.34) 
 
FD Index2  0.68 
(2.83)*** 
constant -2.38 
(-6.35)*** 
-2.61 
(-6.46)*** 
pseudo R-squared 0.13 0.18 
chi-square 28.63*** 37.58*** 
No of observations 263 263 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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The marginal effects presented on Table 10.9 suggest that the second financial development 
index increases the likelihood of financial crises by 7%, making it one of the main drivers of 
financial crises. 
Table 10.11: Marginal effects 
Variable logit 
INF 0.005 
(3.26)*** 
Chinn -0.01 
(-0.30) 
GDP -0.01 
(-1.75)* 
FD Index2 0.07 
(2.86)*** 
constant -0.005 
(-1.85)* 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***) and (*) indicate significance at 1% 
and 10% levels respectively. 
10.3.4 Institutions and financial crises 
 The role of institutions in reducing the likelihood of financial crises is well documented in the 
literature (Demirgüҫ-Kunt & Detragiache 1998). Institutional quality mitigates the negative 
effects of bank lending by ensuring that less credit is extended to unworthy borrowers. Exces-
sive lending practices are also curtailed, which reduces the likelihood of bank failures. The 
low quality of institutions in the SADC region has been a cause for concern over the years, so 
this section attempts to analyse the effect institutional quality has on the probability of 
financial crises. Due to the unavailability of data on institutions for the period of the study, 
GDP per capita is used as a proxy, in line with Demirgüҫ-Kunt & Detragiache (1998), 
Shehzad & De Haan (2008) and Angkinand et al (2010). 
 Due to the correlation between GDP growth and GDP per capita, GDP growth is omitted 
from the regression model. The results are presented in Table 10.10; these reveal limited sup-
port for the role of institutional quality in reducing financial crises. The coefficient of GDP 
per capita is negative but significant only at the 10% level. The negative coefficient is in line 
with the findings of Demirgüҫ-Kunt & Detragiache (1998), Shehzad & De Haan (2008) and 
Angkinand et al (2010). An interesting point to note is that the coefficients of the selected 
financial development indicators remain positive and significant. The first financial develop-
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ment index becomes significant at 10% level. The low institutional quality in the SADC re-
gion means that financial development will most likely be associated with financial crises. 
Table 10.10: Institutional quality and financial crises 
Variable logit1 logit2 logit3 
INF 0.05 
(2.86)*** 
0.04 
(2.70)*** 
0.04 
(2.75)*** 
CHINN -0.004 
(-0.02) 
-0.21 
(-1.18) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
GDPP -0.0002 
(-1.76)* 
-0.0003 
(-1.68)* 
-0.0001 
(-1.14) 
CA -0.06 
(-2.20)** 
-0.04 
(-1.76)* 
-0.06 
(2.13)** 
BC 0.03 
(3.21)*** 
  
FD Index  0.33 
(1.76)* 
 
FD Index2   0.80 
(3.11)*** 
constant -4.32 
(-5.73)*** 
-2.08 
(-4.11)*** 
-2.65 
(-5.96)*** 
pseudo R-squared 0.17 0.13 0.17 
chi-square 36.86*** 28.13*** 36.09*** 
No of observations 264 263 263 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
10.3.5  Sensitivity analysis 
 Sensitivity analysis involving the use of lagged explanatory variables was conducted and due 
to the small sample size, only the first lags are considered. Lagging the regressors provides a 
true early warning system and deals with issues of endogeneity (Demirgüҫ-Kunt & Detragi-
ache, 1998; Barrell et al, 2016). The results showing the baseline regression, the effect of int-
erest rate liberalisation on financial crises and the role of financial development and institu-
tional quality on financial crises are presented in Tables 10.11 to 10.13 respectively. In the 
baseline regression, inflation and financial openness retain their respective positive and nega-
tive signs, as well as their significance. GDP growth and the current account balance are in-
significant.  
The introduction of interest rate liberalisation in the specification does not alter the result of 
financial openness as shown in Table 10.12. The coefficient remains negative and significant. 
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The other coefficients are similar to those in the baseline regression. The interest rate liberal-
isation variables are negative but insignificant.    
Table 10.11: Sensitivity analysis: baseline model 
Variable logit probit LPM 
INF 0.03 
(2.58)*** 
0.02 
(2.68)*** 
0.01 
(3.38)*** 
GDP 0.02 
(0.37) 
0.01 
(0.51) 
0.02 
(0.45) 
CA 0.01 
(0.22) 
0.003 
(0.25) 
0.001 
(0.30) 
CHINN -0.40 
(-2.25)** 
-0.22 
(-2.42)** 
-0.03 
(-2.28)** 
constant -2.57 
(-6.90)*** 
-1.52 
(-7.50)*** 
0.05 
(1.35) 
pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.08  
R-squared   0.07 
chi-squared 15.39*** 16.04***  
F-statistic   4.67*** 
No of observations 265 265 265 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***) and (**) indicate significance at 
1% and 5% levels respectively. 
Table: 10.12: Sensitivity analysis: Interest rate liberalisation and financial crises 
Variable logit probit 
GDP 0.02 
(0.39) 
0.03 
(0.56) 
CA -0.01 
(0.68) 
-0.002 
(-0.10) 
CHINN -0.38 
(-2.22)** 
-0.40 
(-2.22)** 
RINT -0.02 
(-0.92) 
 
RDEP  -0.005 
(-0.22) 
constant -2.14 
(-5.85)*** 
-2.33 
(-6.57)*** 
pseudo R-squared 0.04 0.03 
chi-square 7.57 6.36 
No of observations 264 261 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***) and (**) indicate significance at 
1% and 10% levels respectively. 
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The coefficients of financial development represented by bank credit and the second financial 
development index remain positive and significant, while the coefficient of GDP per capita is 
negative but insignificant.  
Table 10.13: Sensitivity analysis: financial development, institutional quality and finan-
cial crises 
Variable logit probit 
INF 0.03 
(2.50)** 
0.04 
(2.59)*** 
GDPP -0.0001 
(-0.98) 
-0.0001 
(-1.40) 
CA 0.001 
(0.33) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
CHINN -0.11 
(-0.54) 
-0.14 
(-0.68) 
FD Index2 0.66 
(2.68)*** 
 
BC  0.02 
(2.76)*** 
constant -2.32 
(-5.51)*** 
-3.67 
(-5.56)*** 
pseudo R-squared 0.11 0.12 
chi-square 23.70*** 24.03*** 
No of observations 263 264 
Source: Researcher’s own computations. Note: (***) and (*) indicate significance at 1% 
and 10% levels respectively. 
10.3.6 Crises probabilities 
 The last part of the empirical analysis involves estimating the probability of financial crises in 
the sample using the different model specifications in order to determine the predictive power 
of the logit model. A crisis is correctly predicted if the estimated probability is greater than 
the ratio of the number of crisis observations to the total number of observations (Demirgüҫ-
Kunt & Detragiache 1998). The frequency of crises in the study is 0.106. The results are 
presented on tables 10.14 and 10.15. The baseline model correctly classified 22 of the 25 
crises, while the models with interest rate liberalisation and financial development indicators 
both correctly classified 23 crises. A point to note is that the probabilities of financial crises 
are much higher in the model with financial development indicators, which further reiterates 
that the largest contributors to financial crises stem from banking sector growth.  
                                                          
6 25 crisis start dates divided by 263 observations 
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Table 10.14: Crises probabilities: Baseline model 
Country Start date Logit Probit LPM 
Botswana 1994 0.11 0.12 0.14 
Lesotho 1995 0.30 0.26 0.26 
 2000 0.05 0.05 -0.01 
 2008 0.06 0.07 0.07 
Madagascar 1994 0.51 0.50 0.43 
 2004 0.13 0.13 0.16 
Malawi 1994 0.74 0.71 0.54 
Namibia 1996 0.12 0.13 0.13 
 1998 0.10 0.11 0.11 
 2000 0.12 0.12 0.14 
 2008 0.14 0.14 0.15 
Seychelles 2008 0.42 0.40 0.42 
South Africa 1996 0.11 0.12 0.12 
 1998 0.16 0.16 0.17 
 2000 0.10 0.11 0.11 
 2008 0.17 0.17 0.18 
Swaziland 1996 0.12 0.12 0.13 
 1998 0.15 0.16 0.16 
 2000 0.18 0.19 0.19 
 2008 0.19 0.20 0.20 
Tanzania 1990 0.33 0.33 0.34 
Zambia 1990 0.97 0.97 0.97 
 2000 0.15 0.15 0.23 
 2008 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Source: Researcher’s own computations 
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Table 10.15: Crises probabilities: Interest rate liberalisation model 
Country Start date Logit Probit LPM 
Botswana 1994 0.11 0.12 0.13 
Lesotho 1995 0.47 0.43 0.36 
 1998 0.44 0.40 0.34 
 2000 0.11 0.11 0.12 
Madagascar 1994 0.38 0.37 0.32 
 2004 0.11 0.11 0.13 
Malawi 1994 0.62 0.59 0.44 
Namibia 1996 0.13 0.14 0.15 
 1998 0.09 0.10 0.10 
 2000 0.12 0.13 0.14 
 2008 0.16 0.17 0.18 
Seychelles 2008 0.48 0.47 0.42 
South Africa 1996 0.11 0.11 0.12 
 1998 0.15 0.16 0.17 
 2000 0.13 0.13 0.15 
 2008 0.17 0.18 0.19 
Swaziland 1996 0.13 0.13 0.14 
 1998 0.16 0.16 0.17 
 2008 0.19 0.20 0.20 
Zambia 1990 0.73 0.70 0.52 
 2000 0.11 0.11 0.17 
 2008 0.03 0.03 0.02 
Source: Researcher’s own computations 
10.4 Conclusion 
 The purpose of this chapter was to examine the effect of interest rate liberalisation on the 
likelihood of financial crises. The empirical strategy involved estimating the effect of real 
deposit rate and real interest rate on a financial crisis dummy variable. The chapter also 
investigated whether the negative relationship between financial development and economic 
growth observed in Chapter nine is because of financial crises. Also, the effect of institutional 
quality captured by GDP per capita on financial crises was analysed.  
 The analysis was conducted using the logit model due to the binary nature of the dependent 
variable. The probit model, as well as the LPM, were used for comparison purposes and these 
produced results largely similar to those of the logit model.  
 The empirical results suggest that interest rate liberalisation reduces the likelihood of finan-
cial crises. However, only the coefficient of the real interest rate was significant. This implies 
that higher real interest rates may reduce the risk-taking behaviour of financial institutions 
and financial repression policies that maintain negative real interest rates might increase the 
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likelihood of financial crises. Also, interest rate liberalisation may increase the strength of 
capital in mitigating financial crises. 
 Inflation increases the probability of financial crises and the result was robust to different 
specifications. SADC countries have had a history of high inflation rates which have contrib-
uted to the cause of financial crises by lowering real interest rates to negative territory and 
creating macroeconomic instability. GDP growth and financial openness are associated with 
lower crisis probabilities. Higher economic growth rates reduce uncertainty in an economy, 
which in turn lowers the likelihood of financial crises as expected, while financial openness 
boosts liquidity in the domestic economy due to higher capital inflows, which mitigates 
banking crises.  
 The results provide support for the hypothesis that financial development increases the likeli-
hood of financial crises. Among the financial development indicators, only bank credit has a 
positive and significant coefficient. The financial development indices are positively signed, 
however, only the second index is statistically significant. Institutional quality reduces the 
likelihood of financial crises, but the coefficient is weakly significant. This could be the result 
of low levels of institutional quality in the SADC region, which have played a minimal role 
in mitigating the effects of financial development on financial crises. The next chapter 
provides a summary of the study as well as policy recommendations.  
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
11.1 Introduction 
 The purpose of this chapter is to provide concluding remarks on the study. The chapter also 
provides a summary of the issues discussed as well as policy recommendations. The study 
examined the channels through which interest rate liberalisation has an effect on economic 
growth in SADC countries over the period 1990-2015. The channels comprise savings and in-
vestment, capital inflows, financial development and financial crises.  
The period of the study coincides with the time when most SADC countries liberalised inter-
est rates so as to boost economic growth, as proposed by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). 
Most SADC countries introduced financial reforms during the late 1980s to ’90s. Prior to the 
reforms, the financial systems in most countries were largely controlled by the respective 
governments. Real interest rates were negative and there was lack of competition in the eco-
nomies, especially in the banking sector. Financial liberalisation policies had a positive effect 
on the performance of the banking industries in most of the SADC countries as more banks 
entered the financial systems and increased the level of competition. Financial reforms also 
had a positive effect in turning real interest rates from negative to positive territory despite 
the obstacles of high inflation and increasing savings and investments in several countries.  
The period of the study also coincides with the period after the 2008-’09 global financial 
crises, which prompted most countries to reduce interest rates in an attempt to boost con-
sumption, investment and economic growth. However, the reduction in real interest rates has 
a negative effect on savings, which are a major driver of investments. Also, capital inflows – 
which supplement domestic investments – might be curtailed by the reduction in interest 
rates, as returns for investors are lowered. Financial repression policies, like keeping interest 
rates low, discourage the development of the financial sector as alluded to by Shaw (1973). 
Low real interest rates also encourage banks to take more risks in their lending practices in an 
attempt to earn higher returns, which increases the likelihood of financial crises. And, as put 
forward by the Austrian school, low real interest rates were one of the major causes of the 
2008-’09 global financial crises, and reducing interest rates during a crisis period prolongs 
the crisis. 
 The chapter is organised as follows: Section two summarises the issues discussed in the 
study, including the empirical findings. Section three provides a conclusion on the major 
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findings of the study while Section four provides policy recommendations. Lastly, Section 
five discusses areas of future research.  
11.2 Summary of issues 
 This section summarises the issues discussed in the study. It combines the theoretical argu-
ments on interest rate liberalisation with the empirical findings. The estimation technique 
used for the first three channels in which interest rate liberalisation affects economic growth 
was the PMG model, which assumes that long-run coefficients are homogenous while short-
run coefficients are heterogenous. The effect of interest rate liberalisation on financial crises 
was estimated using the logit model.  
11.2.1 Summary of overview of interest rate liberalisation 
The interest rate liberalisation hypothesis was initiated by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973) who argued that financial repression polices that kept real interest rates at negative 
levels or below equilibrium were responsible for retarding economic growth by discouraging 
savings and investments. Financial repression encourages savings in unproductive assets, and 
results in funds being shifted to the informal sector which is not regulated. Savings are one of 
the most crucial determinants of investments, so financial repression policies reduce the 
availability of funds for investment purposes. Also, financial repression policies like high re-
serve requirements and credit rationing also discourage investments. Investments play a cru-
cial role in enhancing economic growth, so policies that retard investments have a negative 
effect on economic growth. 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) argued that the real interest rate plays an important role 
in the accumulation of financial capital, which is necessary for investments. Low or negative 
interest rates prevent the capital accumulation process and so reduce the amount of invest-
ments undertaken. Interest rate liberalisation results in higher real interest rates, which equate 
the demand for and supply of savings. McKinnon (1973) argued that reforms in interest rates 
boost savings by increasing the opportunity cost of current consumption. Shaw (1973) put 
forward the idea that the substitution effect of a rise in interest rates which increases savings, 
outweighs the income effect. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) also suggest that interest 
rate reforms are necessary for encouraging capital inflows which supplement domestic in-
vestments, and minimising capital flight.  
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The McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis received theoretical support from researchers like Ka-
pur (1976), Mathieson (1980), Galbis (1977), Fry (1980) and Mishkin (2001). The hypothesis 
is also in line with the recommendation made by the Austrian school of thought. Models de-
veloped by Kapur (1972), Mathieson (1980), Galbis (1977) and Fry (1980) stress the import-
ance of allowing market forces to determine prices in the financial sector. Also, deposit rates 
determined by market forces have a significant effect on economic growth by boosting 
savings and investments. The Austrian school of thought also supports the McKinnon and 
Shaw hypothesis. The Austrians argue that interest rates should be determined in the market 
for loanable funds, which equates the demand for to the supply of funds (Oppers, 2002). 
Interest rates artificially kept below equilibrium result in malinvestments, which increase the 
likelihood of financial crises. 
Critics of the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis stem from the Neo-Structuralist school of thought 
as well as the Keynesians, including the New-Keynesians and the Post-Keynesians. The Neo-
Structuralists argue that interest rate liberalisation may result in a reduction of funds in the fi-
nancial system. Banks are subject to reserve requirements, so a shift in funds to the banking 
sector reduces the supply of funds in the economy. Keynesians suggest that a rise in interest 
rates and the subsequent increase in savings causes a reduction in aggregate demand in the 
economy, leading to a decline in economic growth. The New-Keynesians, including Stiglitz 
& Weiss (1981), Mankiw (1986), Stiglitz (1994) and Arestis & Demetriades (1999), argue 
that financial markets are prone to market failures due to imperfect information. So govern-
ment intervention in the market is necessary to prevent financial crises. The Post-Keynesians 
argue that the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis omits the role that institutional quality plays 
in the functioning of the financial sector. Without adequate institutional quality, interest rate 
liberalisation has a negative effect on economic growth.  
11.2.2 Summary of interest rate liberalisation, savings, investments and economic growth 
 The study examines the channels in which interest rate liberalisation impacts on economic 
growth. The first channel considered is through savings and investments. This channel is ex-
amined using a multiple equation specification, an approach similar to that of Fry (1978), 
Giovannini (1985), De Melo & Tybout (1986), Wirman & Thirlwall (1999), Achy (2003) and 
Strestha & Chowdury (2007). 
 The real deposit rate has a positive effect on savings, which supports the McKinnon and 
Shaw hypothesis. Savings in the SADC region are responsive to higher real deposit rates, so 
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interest rate liberalisation plays an important role in mobilising savings. The important deter-
minants for savings are income and the age dependency rate, which have a positive effect on 
savings. The results imply that income is the most important determinant of savings.  
The real lending rate has a negative but insignificant impact on investments. Lending rates 
are not a significant determinant of savings in the SADC region. Savings have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on investments. This supports the view that interest rate liberal-
isation boosts investments through a rise in savings, put forward by McKinnon (1973) and 
Shaw (1973). The results suggests that the positive effect of higher deposit rates on 
investments outweighs the negative effect of higher borrowing costs. Financial development 
captured by credit to the private sector has a positive effect on investments, which suggests 
that financial reforms that abolish credit rationing have a positive effect on investments. 
Investments have a positive and significant effect on economic growth, which confirms that 
investments are one of the main drivers of economic growth. The other determinants of eco-
nomic growth, like trade, inflation and government expenditure, are negatively related to eco-
nomic growth in the long-run.  
11.2.3 Summary of interest rate liberalisation, capital flows and economic growth 
 The second channel in which interest rate liberalisation may affect economic growth is 
through capital flows. The analysis was conducted using a two-equation specification which 
involved investigating the effect of interest rates on capital flows as well as the relationship 
between economic growth and capital flows. The interest rate liberalisation measures are 
positively related to capital inflows and both coefficients are significant. This indicates that 
the prospect of earning higher returns encourages capital inflows, which supports theoretical 
expectations. Interest rate differentials have a positive but insignificant effect on capital 
inflows. This is because the measure of capital flows chosen for this analysis (FDI) is not 
sensitive to interest rate differentials compared with other forms of capital flows, like 
portfolio flows. 
 The other determinants of capital inflows are financial openness and financial development. 
Financial openness encourages the inflow of capital, while financial development has a nega-
tive effect on capital inflows. This could be the result of financial crises, which usually occur 
due to a rise in bad debts.  
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 Capital inflows have a negative but insignificant effect on economic growth. Capital inflows 
in SADC countries have not boosted productivity and employment levels significantly as 
expected. In this analysis the positive effect of interest rate liberalisation is not realised fully.  
11.2.4 Summary of interest rate liberalisation, financial development and economic growth 
 The analysis estimated the effect of interest rate liberalisation on financial development, as 
well as the relationship between financial development and economic growth. Five proxies 
for financial development are used, and to avoid severe collinearity, financial development 
indices are constructed. Two indices accounting for over 95% of the total variation are con-
structed using the PCA technique.  
The McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis suggests that interest rate liberalisation has a positive 
effect on savings, which in turn promotes financial development. So savings are used as a 
channel through which interest rates affect financial development. Savings have a positive 
effect on the financial development indices, as well as the individual financial development 
indicators – except for credit to the private sector. Also, the real deposit rate is positively re-
lated to most of the financial development indicators, including the indices. GDP per capita, 
as a proxy for economic activity and institutional quality, promotes financial development in 
SADC countries. So higher levels of institutional quality are crucial for financial develop-
ment.   
The effect of financial openness on financial development is sensitive to the proxy used. Fi-
nancial openness boosts liquid liabilities and bank credit, and deters broad money, credit to 
the private sector and banking assets. Inflation as a measure of macroeconomic instability has 
a negative effect on financial development.  
The analysis suggests that financial development has a negative effect on economic growth in 
SADC countries in the long run. The stability of a financial system is an alternative channel 
in which financial development has an effect on economic growth. As such, financial devel-
opment may have a negative effect on economic growth if financial systems lack stability.  
11.2.5 Summary of interest rate liberalisation and financial crises   
 Interest rate liberalisation also affects economic growth through financial crises. Higher inter-
est rates may encourage excessive risk-taking on the part of banks, which increases the likeli-
hood of financial crises. However, real interest rates below equilibrium may also cause finan-
cial crises. The analysis involves regressing a financial crisis dummy variable on interest rate 
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liberalisation indicators as well as macroeconomic variables. The empirical strategy involved 
answering three questions: Firstly, does interest rate liberalisation increase or decrease the 
likelihood of financial crises? Secondly, what is the role of financial development in causing 
financial crises? Lastly, does institutional quality reduce the likelihood of financial crises? 
 The results imply that interest rate liberalisation does not directly increase the likelihood of 
financial crises in SADC countries and support the view that higher interest rates do not 
result in bank risk-taking behaviour that often causes financial crises. Also, financial repres-
sion policies that maintain low real interest rates may increase the likelihood of financial cri-
ses rather than cure them. In most SADC countries, real interest rates were low during the 
1990s, the period when the most financial crises occurred. High inflation indicates macroeco-
nomic instability, which increases the likelihood of financial crises. 
 Financial openness reduces the likelihood of financial crises, although the coefficient is 
weakly significant. One of the causes of banking crises is diminishing of liquidity to meet de-
positors’ needs. So capital inflows may mitigate liquidity problems faced by domestic fi-
nancial institutions, so reducing the possibility of banking crises. Economic growth is asso-
ciated with lower crisis probabilities. There is some evidence that current account imbalances 
increase the likelihood of financial crises. 
 There is evidence that financial development increases the likelihood of financial crises in 
SADC countries, although the result is not robust to different indicators of financial develop-
ment. Bank credit to the private sector and the second financial development index are both 
associated with higher financial crisis probabilities. There is scant evidence that institutional 
quality reduces financial crises, possibly due to the low levels of institutional quality in the 
SADC region. So financial development will most likely be associated with financial crises 
unless there is an improvement in the levels of institutional quality. 
11.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the study contributes to literature by providing an analysis of the different 
channels through which interest rate liberalisation impact on economic growth. The results 
suggest that the interest rate liberalisation hypothesis is beneficial to some extent in SADC 
countries. The results of the study show that the impact of interest rate reforms on growth 
differs according to the channel that is investigated. Higher real interest rates may boost 
economic growth by encouraging savings and investments. And higher real lending and 
deposit interest rates reduce the likelihood of financial crises, possibly by mitigating risks 
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taken by banks and adding to the strength of capital in protecting against banking crises. 
However, the positive effect of interest rate liberalisation on growth through financial 
development and capital inflows is not realised fully. Interest rate liberalisation has a positive 
effect on financial development and capital inflows. However the development of the 
financial sector hinders economic growth. The study constructed financial development 
indices instead of relying on a single measure of financial development and the results 
showed that both indices are negatively related to GDP. Capital inflows have a negative but 
insignificant effect on economic growth.  
The study also examines whether interest rate liberalisation increases the likelihood of 
financial crises. Very few studies have examined this relationship in African countries and 
therefore, the study contributes to literature by showing that interest rate reforms reduce the 
likelihood of financial crises. Financial repression policies that maintain artificially low 
interest rates increases the likelihood of financial crises. On the other hand, the study shows 
that interest rate liberalisation is associated with financial crises through financial 
development. SADC countries should exercise caution with regards to financial development 
policies.  Strengthening the quality of the financial system is more crucial than increasing the 
its size.  
A possible explanation for the adverse effect of financial development and capital inflows on 
economic growth is the low levels of institutional quality, which play a minimal role in 
protecting against financial crises. The study provided some evidence that institutional 
quality reduces the likelihood of financial crises. However, the effect is weakly significant. 
Overall the results imply that the negative effect of interest rate liberalisation through 
financial crises outweighs the positive impact of higher savings and investments.    
11.4 Policy recommendations  
 The conclusions drawn from the study have policy implications for the SADC region. The 
main driver of economic growth in the long run is investments, so policies that boost invest-
ments like savings are a necessity. Liberalisation of real interest rates is crucial for savings 
mobilisation, which in turn would enhance investment levels. Policies that reduce interest 
rates to very low levels may discourage savings, which in turn decreases investment levels. 
High savings rates would also minimise the dependence of the region on the foreign capital 
inflows that are required alleviate the shortage of funds for investment purposes.  
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 There is evidence to support the policy of interest rate liberalisation to a limited extent. 
Interest rate liberalisation has a positive effect on savings, capital inflows and financial 
development in the long run. Interest rate liberalisation also reduces the likelihood of 
financial crises directly.  
However, there are certain conditions that should be put in place to ensure that the full ben-
efits of interest rate liberalisation are realised. Despite the positive effect of interest rate liber-
alisation on capital inflows, the study found that the relationship between economic growth 
and capital inflows is insignificant. Capital inflows have not supplemented domestic invest-
ments, nor boosted productivity and employment levels, which could be a result of low levels 
of human capital. So investment in education, training and research and development is a 
necessity to increase levels of human capital, which in turn may allow the region to reap the 
benefits of capital inflows.  
The study has shown that financial development has a negative effect on economic growth in 
SADC countries. Policy-makers should ensure that there is adequate institutional quality, for 
instance improvements in property rights and a sound prudential framework, to monitor the 
operation of the financial sector. This would minimise the number of non-performing loans or 
bad debts, which are a precursor of financial crises.   
The study concluded that financial development has a negative effect on economic growth 
due to financial crises that are associated largely with bank credit. Higher levels of institu-
tional quality would mitigate the negative effect of financial development on financial crises. 
As shown by the study, institutional quality reduces financial crises. However, due to the low 
levels of institutional quality in the region, the negative influence of financial development on 
economic growth will persist. Interest rate liberalisation reduces the likelihood of financial 
crises, indicating that higher real interest rates are not the direct cause of financial crises. 
Financial repression policies that maintain low or negative real interest rates may increase the 
likelihood of financial crises. This was evident during the 2008-’09 global financial crises.  
The SADC region should introduce measures to reduce inflation rates. Inflation has a nega-
tive effect on domestic and foreign investment, financial development and economic growth. 
Inflation also increases the likelihood of financial crises in the region.  
The study showed that trade openness and government expenditure have a negative effect on 
economic growth in the long run. Government expenditure has to be confined to areas that 
will boost economic growth, for instance investment in infrastructure, instead of wasteful act-
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ivities that reduce economic growth. Diversifying the export structure should be one of the 
goals of policy-makers. Trade openness has a positive effect on economic growth in eco-
nomies with a diversified export structure. Trade openness might be hurting domestic 
industries in the region, and so having a negative influence on economic growth. Most SADC 
countries export raw materials that are low in value, but import manufactured goods. This has 
resulted in negative current account balances, which are detrimental to economic growth and 
increase the likelihood of financial crises.  
11.5 Areas of future research 
 Due to data limitations the study does not completely cover the channels that interest rates 
may affect with regard to economic growth. Lack of adequate time series data after the 2008-
’09 financial crisis prevented a comparison between pre- and post-crisis periods. Future re-
search should make a comparison between the two periods so as to determine whether the re-
lationship between interest rate liberalisation and economic growth has changed since the on-
set of that crisis.  
 Data permitting, the role played by institutional quality on the relationship between interest 
rate liberalisation and economic growth should be examined extensively. The research pro-
vided support for the hypothesis that institutional quality reduces the likelihood of financial 
crises. However only one proxy of institutional quality was used, which limited the scope of 
the analysis.  
 Determining the optimal range of real interest rates in the region would be a worthwhile pro-
cess. This will provide a benchmark against which policy-makers can make comparisons. An-
other area of future research is examining the effect of interest rate liberalisation on bank 
risk-taking and competition. This can also be used to identify whether competition in the 
banking sector resulting from financial reforms has a positive effect on economic growth. 
Also, the effects of bank risk-taking and competition on financial crises would determine 
whether interest rate liberalisation encourages or reduces the likelihood of financial crises 
through bank risk-taking and banking sector competition.   
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ANNEXURES 
Annexure 1: Summary of empirical literature 
Interest rate liberalisation, savings, investments and economic growth 
Variables Impact Source 
Interest rate liberalisation and 
savings 
Positive Boskin (1978) 
Fry (1978) 
Gupta (1986) 
Athukorala & Rajapatirana (1993) 
Athukorala (1998) 
Boadi et al (2015) 
Opuku & Ackah (2015) 
Kargbo (2010) 
Mottelle & Masenyetse (2012) 
Achy (2003) 
Shrestha & Chowdhury (2007) 
 Insignificant Giovanini (1983) 
De Melo & Tybout (1986) 
Warman & Thirwall (1994) 
Bayoumi (1993) 
   
Interest rate liberalisation and 
investments 
Positive Khan & Hasan (1998) 
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Orji et al (2014) 
Achy (2003) 
 Negative/Insignificant Rittenberg (1991) 
Gelb (1986) 
Warman & Thirwall (1994) 
   
Interest rate liberalisation and 
economic growth 
Positive Romero-Á vila (2009) 
Kendall (2000) 
Achy (2003) 
Fry (1973) 
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Orje et al (2014) 
Obamuyi & Olaranfemi (2011) 
 Negative/Insignificant Owusu & Odhiambo (2015) 
Hye & Wizarat (2013) 
   
Savings to investments Positive  
 
 
 Negative/insignificant  
 
 
   
Investments to growth Positive  
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Interest rate liberalisation, capital flows and economic growth 
Variables Impact Source 
Domestic interest rates and 
capital flows 
Positive Wesso (2001) 
Verma & Prakash (2011) 
Ahmed & Zlante (2013) 
Aw & Tang (2009) 
Ahmed and Mayowa (2012) 
 Negative/Insignificant Byrne & Feiss (2011) 
Yang et al (2013) 
Cavallari & d’Addona (2013) 
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Khan and Hye (2013) 
Faroh and Shen (2015) 
 
   
Foreign interest rates/ 
interest rate differentials 
and capital flows 
Negative/Insignificant Calvo & Reinhart (1996) 
Ahmed et al (2005) 
Byrne & Fiess (2011) 
Olaberria (2014) 
Ralhan (2006) 
 Positive Jeanneau & Micu (2012) 
Brana & Lahet (2008) 
   
Capital flows and economic 
growth 
Positive Borensztein et al (1998) 
McLean & Strestha (2002) 
Aizenman & Jinjarak (2011) 
Agbloyor et al (2014) 
Agrawal (2015) 
 Negative/Insignificant Edrees (2015) 
Ahmed and Mayowa (2012) 
Uwubanmwen and Ogiemudia 
(2016) 
Interest rate liberalisation, financial development and economic growth 
Variables Impact Source 
Interest rate liberalisation and 
financial development 
Positive Odhiambo (2009a) 
Odhiambo (2009b) 
Ahmed (2013) 
Agrawal (2001) 
Mbulawa (2015) 
   
Financial development and 
economic growth 
Positive (From 
financial development 
to economic growth) 
Odhiambo (2009a) 
Odhiambo (2009b) 
Ndebbio (2004) 
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Habibullah & Eng (2006) 
Gondo (2009) 
Cojocaru et al (2011) 
Bittencourt (2010) 
Kumar (2014) 
Omaruyi & Ede (2014) 
Inove & Hamori (2016 
Goldsmith (1969) 
King and Levine (1993) 
Levine and Zervos (1998) 
Levine et al (2000) 
 Positive (bi-
directional causality) 
Dritsaki & Adamopolous (2004) 
Ince (2011) 
Hassan et al (2011) 
   
Financial development and 
economic growth 
Positive (From 
economic growth to 
financial 
development) 
Odhiambo (2010) 
Ang & McKibbin (2007) 
Hassan et al (2011) 
 Negative/Insignificant Ijeoma et al (2011) 
Ayadi et al (2013) 
Phakedi (2014) 
Le Roux & Moyo (2015) 
Bara et al (2016) 
 
Interest rate liberalisation and financial crises  
Variables Impact Source 
Interest rate liberalisation and 
financial crises 
Positive Glich & Hutchison (1990) 
Kiminsky & Reinhart (1999) 
Demirgüҫ-Kunt & Detragiache 
(1998) 
Ranciere et al (2006) 
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Misati & Nyamongo (2012) 
Enowbi et al (2017) 
 Negative Barrell et al (2013, 2016) 
Shehzad & De Hann (2008) 
Altunbus et al (2010) 
Triki & Maktour (2012) 
Angkiand et al (2010) 
Hambi and Jlussi (2014) 
   
Bank competition and risk- 
taking 
Positive Zaghdoudi et al (2015) 
Jiménez, Lopez & Saurina 
(2007) 
Yeyati & Micco (2007) 
Ariss (2010) 
Agoraki et al (2011) 
Hope et al (2013) 
Cubillas & Gonzalez (2014) 
Ali et al (2015) 
 Negative Uhde & Heimeshoff (2009) 
Boyd et al (2006) 
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Annexure 2: Unit root tests 
CRED 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  D(CREDP)   
Date: 12/04/17   Time: 11:20  
Sample: 1990 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
User-specified lags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -6.83921  0.0000  11  246 
Breitung t-stat -5.27556  0.0000  11  235 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -6.20206  0.0000  11  246 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  76.9615  0.0000  11  246 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  207.046  0.0000  11  257 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
BA 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  D(BA)   
Date: 12/04/17   Time: 11:23  
Sample: 1990 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
User-specified lags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -3.90398  0.0000  11  243 
Breitung t-stat -3.67473  0.0001  11  232 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -4.00696  0.0000  11  243 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  56.3483  0.0001  11  243 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  86.3439  0.0000  11  256 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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BC 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  BC    
Date: 12/04/17   Time: 11:24  
Sample: 1990 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
User-specified lags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -5.51063  0.0000  11  262 
Breitung t-stat  1.22779  0.8902  11  251 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -3.39748  0.0003  11  262 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  49.9403  0.0006  11  262 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  19.0023  0.6452  11  273 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
BROAD 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  D(BROAD)   
Date: 12/04/17   Time: 11:24  
Sample: 1990 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
User-specified lags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -2.06586  0.0194  11  248 
Breitung t-stat -3.53514  0.0002  11  237 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -4.48101  0.0000  11  248 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  58.5429  0.0000  11  248 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  118.404  0.0000  11  259 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
 
 
 
299 
 
CHINN 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  D(CHINN)   
Date: 12/04/17   Time: 11:28  
Sample: 1990 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
User-specified lags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
Balanced observations for each test   
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -6.06484  0.0000  10  220 
Breitung t-stat -7.74995  0.0000  10  210 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -5.93696  0.0000  10  220 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  69.6483  0.0000  10  220 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  166.591  0.0000  10  230 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
EXCH 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  D(EXCHANGE)   
Date: 12/04/17   Time: 11:29  
Sample: 1990 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
User-specified lags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -4.19527  0.0000  11  252 
Breitung t-stat  0.41669  0.6615  11  241 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -3.71631  0.0001  11  252 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  52.1231  0.0003  11  252 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  55.7456  0.0001  11  263 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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FD Index 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  D(FD_INDEX)   
Date: 12/04/17   Time: 11:32  
Sample: 1990 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
User-specified lags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -2.38927  0.0084  11  237 
Breitung t-stat -3.27255  0.0005  11  226 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -3.29580  0.0005  11  237 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  46.9871  0.0015  11  237 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  72.8554  0.0000  11  250 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
FD Index2 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  FD_INDEX2   
Date: 12/04/17   Time: 11:32  
Sample: 1990 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
User-specified lags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -5.00847  0.0000  11  250 
Breitung t-stat  0.36994  0.6443  11  239 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -3.39197  0.0003  11  250 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  50.9261  0.0004  11  250 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  25.1457  0.2902  11  264 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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GDP 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  D(GDP)   
Date: 12/04/17   Time: 11:33  
Sample: 1990 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
User-specified lags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -5.66234  0.0000  11  252 
Breitung t-stat -8.42074  0.0000  11  241 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -13.0774  0.0000  11  252 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  161.730  0.0000  11  252 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  2200.82  0.0000  11  263 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
GDPC 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  D(GDPC)   
Date: 12/04/17   Time: 11:35  
Sample: 1990 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
User-specified lags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -4.87083  0.0000  11  252 
Breitung t-stat -8.30165  0.0000  11  241 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -12.7844  0.0000  11  252 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  157.958  0.0000  11  252 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  2218.25  0.0000  11  263 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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GDPP 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  D(GDPP)   
Date: 12/04/17   Time: 11:36  
Sample: 1990 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
User-specified lags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -3.75258  0.0001  11  252 
Breitung t-stat  0.83975  0.7995  11  241 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -3.50730  0.0002  11  252 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  52.5001  0.0003  11  252 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  69.8250  0.0000  11  263 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
 
GOV 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  D(GOV)   
Date: 12/04/17   Time: 11:39  
Sample: 1990 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 3 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -1.79657  0.0362  11  243 
Breitung t-stat -8.63301  0.0000  11  232 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -10.4275  0.0000  11  243 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  126.998  0.0000  11  243 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  566.269  0.0000  11  255 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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INF 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  INF    
Date: 12/04/17   Time: 11:42  
Sample: 1990 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
User-specified lags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -7.03635  0.0000  11  257 
Breitung t-stat -3.87577  0.0001  11  246 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -5.71467  0.0000  11  257 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  72.7939  0.0000  11  257 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  141.030  0.0000  11  269 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
INVS 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  D(INVS)   
Date: 12/04/17   Time: 11:42  
Sample: 1990 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
User-specified lags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
Balanced observations for each test   
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -2.14169  0.0161  11  253 
Breitung t-stat -6.29512  0.0000  11  242 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -6.17790  0.0000  11  253 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  76.2166  0.0000  11  253 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  205.649  0.0000  11  264 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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LIQ 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  D(LIQ)   
Date: 12/04/17   Time: 11:47  
Sample: 1990 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 3 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -4.72264  0.0000  11  247 
Breitung t-stat -4.05398  0.0000  11  236 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -5.48478  0.0000  11  247 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  68.4248  0.0000  11  247 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  74.7508  0.0000  11  253 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
RDEP 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  RDEP   
Date: 12/04/17   Time: 11:48  
Sample: 1990 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
User-specified lags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -4.20911  0.0000  11  252 
Breitung t-stat -4.60162  0.0000  11  241 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -4.40164  0.0000  11  252 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  57.6308  0.0000  11  252 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  67.9790  0.0000  11  263 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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RINT 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  RINT   
Date: 12/04/17   Time: 11:50  
Sample: 1990 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
User-specified lags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -3.36452  0.0004  11  256 
Breitung t-stat -3.31581  0.0005  11  245 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -4.03423  0.0000  11  256 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  53.7289  0.0002  11  256 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  342.431  0.0000  11  267 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
SAV 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  D(SAVINGS)   
Date: 12/04/17   Time: 11:51  
Sample: 1990 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -12.3932  0.0000  11  263 
Breitung t-stat -8.98903  0.0000  11  252 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -12.9959  0.0000  11  263 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  156.028  0.0000  11  263 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  160.122  0.0000  11  264 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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TRA 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  D(TRA)   
Date: 12/04/17   Time: 11:52  
Sample: 1990 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
User-specified lags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -6.86358  0.0000  11  243 
Breitung t-stat -3.83141  0.0001  11  232 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -7.43871  0.0000  11  243 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  92.8378  0.0000  11  243 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  242.897  0.0000  11  254 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
CA 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  D(CURRENT_ACCOUNT)  
Date: 12/04/17   Time: 11:54  
Sample: 1990 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
User-specified lags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -7.33577  0.0000  11  244 
Breitung t-stat -4.74866  0.0000  11  233 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -7.38639  0.0000  11  244 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  92.7617  0.0000  11  244 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  317.664  0.0000  11  255 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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FDI 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  FDI    
Date: 12/04/17   Time: 11:56  
Sample: 1990 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
User-specified lags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -3.04053  0.0012  11  263 
Breitung t-stat -4.08353  0.0000  11  252 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -4.62781  0.0000  11  263 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  61.8854  0.0000  11  263 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  233.923  0.0000  11  274 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
DIFF 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  DIFF   
Date: 12/04/17   Time: 12:04  
Sample: 1990 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
User-specified lags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -3.30862  0.0005  11  256 
Breitung t-stat -3.71043  0.0001  11  245 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -4.25043  0.0000  11  256 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  55.3830  0.0001  11  256 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  157.613  0.0000  11  267 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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AGE 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  D(AGE)   
Date: 12/04/17   Time: 12:12  
Sample: 1990 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 4 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -2.79301  0.0026  11  255 
Breitung t-stat -0.35227  0.3623  11  244 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -5.25113  0.0000  11  255 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  67.2161  0.0000  11  255 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  37.6166  0.0202  11  264 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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Annexure 3: PMG regression results 
Interest rate liberalisation, savings and economic growth 
Interest rate liberalisation and savings 
xtpmg d.Savings d.AGE d.RDEP d.GDP, lr(l.Savings AGE RDEP GDP) ec(ec5) pmg 
Pooled Mean Group Regression 
Panel Variable (i): id                          Number of obs      =       262 
Time Variable (t): Year                         Number of groups   =        11 
                                                Obs per group: min =        19 
                                                               avg =      23.8 
                                                               max =        25 
                                                Log Likelihood     =  -707.484 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   D.Savings |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ec5          | 
         AGE |   .3640346   .1221744     2.98   0.003     .1245772    .6034919 
        RDEP |   .3032677   .1070761     2.83   0.005     .0934023     .513133 
         GDP |    1.55235   .2554969     6.08   0.000     1.051585    2.053115 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
SR           | 
         ec5 |   -.418627   .0633581    -6.61   0.000    -.5428067   -.2944473 
         AGE | 
       D1. |   .2633587   .9935423     0.27   0.791    -1.683948    2.210666 
        RDEP | 
         D1. |  -.0236136   .0846434    -0.28   0.780    -.1895117    .1422846 
         GDP | 
         D1. |  -.2346252   .0943509    -2.49   0.013    -.4195497   -.0497008 
       _cons |  -4.005273   2.556556    -1.57   0.117    -9.016032    1.005485 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Savings and investments 
xtpmg d.INVS d.Savings d.CRED d.FDI d.RINT, lr(l.INVS Savings CRED FDI RINT) 
ec(ec5) replace pmg 
Pooled Mean Group Regression 
Panel Variable (i): id                          Number of obs      =       264 
Time Variable (t): Year                         Number of groups   =        11 
                                                Obs per group: min =        22 
                                                               avg =      24.0 
                                                               max =        25 
                                                Log Likelihood     = -641.2018 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      D.INVS |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ec5          | 
     Savings |   .3078323   .0996946     3.09   0.002     .1124345    .5032301 
        CRED |   .0945831    .027944     3.38   0.001     .0398139    .1493523 
         FDI |   .0116656   .2206803     0.05   0.958    -.4208598     .444191 
        RINT |   -.001246   .0978642    -0.01   0.990    -.1930564    .1905643 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
SR           | 
         ec5 |  -.2877412   .0687745    -4.18   0.000    -.4225367   -.1529457 
     Savings | 
         D1. |   .2207955   .0622434     3.55   0.000     .0988008    .3427903 
        CRED | 
         D1. |   .4657522   .1823961     2.55   0.011     .1082625     .823242 
         FDI | 
         D1. |   .2856456   .1396622     2.05   0.041     .0119127    .5593784 
        RINT | 
         D1. |  -.0307719   .0386598    -0.80   0.426    -.1065437    .0449999 
       _cons |   3.959973   1.332844     2.97   0.003     1.347648    6.572299 
311 
 
Investments and economic growth 
xtpmg d.GDPG d.INVS d.INF d.GOV d.TRA , lr(l.GDPG INVS INF GOV TRA) ec(ec5) replace 
pmg 
Pooled Mean Group Regression 
Panel Variable (i): id                          Number of obs      =       260 
Time Variable (t): Year                         Number of groups   =        11 
                                                Obs per group: min =        19 
                                                               avg =      23.6 
                                                               max =        25 
                                                Log Likelihood     =  -539.729 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      D.GDPG |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ec5          | 
        INVS |    .137062   .0205336     6.68   0.000     .0968169     .177307 
         INF |  -.0226338   .0116929    -1.94   0.053    -.0455514    .0002839 
         GOV |  -.1724526   .0536114    -3.22   0.001    -.2775289   -.0673762 
         TRA |  -.0234501   .0062237    -3.77   0.000    -.0356483   -.0112519 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
SR           | 
         ec5 |  -.7974905   .0971406    -8.21   0.000    -.9878826   -.6070985 
        INVS | 
         D1. |  -.0157337   .0653316    -0.24   0.810    -.1437814     .112314 
         INF | 
         D1. |   .0342715    .069405     0.49   0.621    -.1017598    .1703027 
         GOV | 
         D1. |  -.0133384   .1464239    -0.09   0.927     -.300324    .2736471 
         TRA | 
         D1. |   .0442594    .047323     0.94   0.350    -.0484921    .1370108 
       _cons |   4.940442   .6130691     8.06   0.000     3.738849    6.142035 
312 
 
Interest rates liberalisation, capital flows and economic growth 
Interest rate liberalisation and capital flows 
 xtpmg d.FDI d.GDPC d.RInt d.Chinn d.CredP, lr(l.FDI GDPC RInt Chinn CredP) ec(ec5) 
replace pmg 
Pooled Mean Group Regression 
Panel Variable (i): id                          Number of obs      =       255 
Time Variable (t): Year                         Number of groups   =        11 
                                                Obs per group: min =        21 
                                                               avg =      23.2 
                                                               max =        24 
                                                Log Likelihood     = -581.7971 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       D.FDI |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ec5          | 
        GDPC |   .0012589   .0002199     5.73   0.000     .0008279    .0016899 
        RInt |   .0739854   .0375688     1.97   0.049      .000352    .1476189 
       Chinn |   .4087581    .161569     2.53   0.011     .0920887    .7254276 
       CredP |  -.0963573   .0249632    -3.86   0.000    -.1452842   -.0474303 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
SR           | 
         ec5 |  -.7775068   .1119569    -6.94   0.000    -.9969383   -.5580753 
        GDPC | 
         D1. |   .0027204   .0027398     0.99   0.321    -.0026495    .0080903 
        RInt | 
         D1. |  -.0574213   .0392858    -1.46   0.144    -.1344201    .0195775 
       Chinn | 
         D1. |  -1.304908   3.262577    -0.40   0.689    -7.699442    5.089626 
       CredP | 
         D1. |  -.1112359   .1436617    -0.77   0.439    -.3928076    .1703358 
       _cons |   1.596278   .5282776     3.02   0.003     .5608729    2.631683 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
313 
 
Capital inflows and economic growth 
. xtpmg d.GDP d.FDI d.Tra d.Gov d.INVS d.EXC, lr(l.GDP FDI Tra Gov INVS EXC) 
ec(ec5) replace pmg 
Pooled Mean Group Regression 
(Estimate results saved as pmg) 
Panel Variable (i): id                          Number of obs      =       264 
Time Variable (t): Year                         Number of groups   =        11 
                                                Obs per group: min =        21 
                                                               avg =      24.0 
                                                               max =        25 
                                                Log Likelihood     = -545.0185 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       D.GDP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ec5          | 
         FDI |  -.0690213   .0508626    -1.36   0.175    -.1687102    .0306677 
         Tra |  -.0335603   .0064979    -5.16   0.000    -.0462961   -.0208246 
         Gov |  -.1970928   .0501059    -3.93   0.000    -.2952986    -.098887 
        INVS |   .1498314   .0195361     7.67   0.000     .1115413    .1881215 
         EXC |   .0021567    .000645     3.34   0.001     .0008925    .0034209 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
SR           | 
         ec5 |  -.8006214   .0929595    -8.61   0.000    -.9828186   -.6184241 
         FDI | 
         D1. |     .11024   .0823822     1.34   0.181    -.0512261    .2717061 
         Tra | 
         D1. |   .0532525   .0426479     1.25   0.212    -.0303359    .1368409 
         Gov | 
         D1. |   .0044782   .1504157     0.03   0.976    -.2903311    .2992875 
        INVS | 
         D1. |  -.0426301    .079882    -0.53   0.594    -.1991961    .1139358 
         EXC | 
         D1. |   -.369011   .1243024    -2.97   0.003    -.6126391   -.1253828 
       _cons |   5.407542   .8040928     6.73   0.000     3.831549    6.983535 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
314 
 
Interest rate liberalisation, financial development and economic growth 
Interest rate liberalisation and financial development 
xtpmg d.pc1 d.GDPpercapita d.Savings d.Inf d.Chinn, lr(l.pc1 GDPpercapita Savings 
Inf Chinn) ec(ec5) replace pmg 
Pooled Mean Group Regression 
(Estimate results saved as pmg) 
 
Panel Variable (i): id                          Number of obs      =       252 
Time Variable (t): Year                         Number of groups   =        11 
                                                Obs per group: min =        19 
                                                               avg =      22.9 
                                                               max =        24 
                                                Log Likelihood     =  177.6686 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       D.pc1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ec5          | 
GDPpercapita |   .0001791   .0000385     4.66   0.000     .0001037    .0002545 
     Savings |   .0321541   .0100027     3.21   0.001     .0125492    .0517589 
         Inf |  -.0433118   .0112021    -3.87   0.000    -.0652675    -.021356 
       Chinn |  -.6261899   .1449987    -4.32   0.000    -.9103821   -.3419976 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
SR           | 
         ec5 |  -.1325184   .0485894    -2.73   0.006    -.2277519   -.0372849 
GDPpercapita | 
         D1. |  -.0002672   .0001693    -1.58   0.114     -.000599    .0000645 
     Savings | 
         D1. |   .0027877   .0112201     0.25   0.804    -.0192032    .0247786 
         Inf | 
         D1. |   -.003181   .0041513    -0.77   0.444    -.0113174    .0049553 
       Chinn | 
         D1. |   .1447485   .0654027     2.21   0.027     .0165615    .2729355 
       _cons |  -.0336277   .0808359    -0.42   0.677    -.1920632    .1248078 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
315 
 
xtpmg d.pc2 d.GDPpercapita d.Savings d.Inf d.Chinn, lr(l.pc2 GDPpercapita Savings 
Inf Chinn) ec(ec5) replace pmg 
Pooled Mean Group Regression 
(Estimate results saved as pmg) 
Panel Variable (i): id                          Number of obs      =       252 
Time Variable (t): Year                         Number of groups   =        11 
                                                Obs per group: min =        19 
                                                               avg =      22.9 
                                                               max =        24 
                                                Log Likelihood     =  114.8307 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       D.pc2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ec5          | 
GDPpercapita |   1.12e-06   .0000737     0.02   0.988    -.0001434    .0001456 
     Savings |   .0593592   .0181817     3.26   0.001     .0237237    .0949947 
         Inf |  -.0811515   .0320129    -2.53   0.011    -.1438956   -.0184074 
       Chinn |   1.300589   .3147388     4.13   0.000     .6837122    1.917466 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
SR           | 
         ec5 |  -.0403865   .0316507    -1.28   0.202    -.1024206    .0216477 
GDPpercapita | 
         D1. |   .0002166   .0002364     0.92   0.359    -.0002466    .0006799 
     Savings | 
         D1. |  -.0010148   .0053575    -0.19   0.850    -.0115153    .0094857 
         Inf | 
         D1. |  -.0010825    .003238    -0.33   0.738    -.0074289    .0052639 
       Chinn | 
         D1. |   .0294498   .0974333     0.30   0.762     -.161516    .2204155 
       _cons |   .1681817   .0834889     2.01   0.044     .0045465    .3318169 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
 
316 
 
Financial development and economic growth 
xtpmg d.GDP d.Gov d.INVS d.Exchange d.pc1 d.Tra, lr(l.GDP Gov Tra INVS pc1 
Exchange) ec(ec8) replace pmg 
Pooled Mean Group Regression 
(Estimate results saved as pmg) 
Panel Variable (i): id                          Number of obs      =       255 
Time Variable (t): Year                         Number of groups   =        11 
                                                Obs per group: min =        17 
                                                               avg =      23.2 
                                                               max =        25 
                                                Log Likelihood     = -493.0074 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       D.GDP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ec8          | 
         Gov |  -.2760385   .0491623    -5.61   0.000    -.3723948   -.1796822 
         Tra |  -.0300539   .0064153    -4.68   0.000    -.0426276   -.0174802 
        INVS |   .1422127   .0184168     7.72   0.000     .1061165    .1783089 
         pc1 |  -.3579581   .1317274    -2.72   0.007    -.6161391   -.0997772 
    Exchange |    .002516   .0006808     3.70   0.000     .0011816    .0038504 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
SR           | 
         ec8 |  -.8740313   .0797585   -10.96   0.000    -1.030355   -.7177075 
         Gov | 
         D1. |   .0681795   .1156749     0.59   0.556    -.1585391    .2948981 
        INVS | 
         D1. |  -.1181139   .0709457    -1.66   0.096    -.2571651    .0209372 
    Exchange | 
         D1. |  -.7156046   .2608939    -2.74   0.006    -1.226947    -.204262 
         pc1 | 
         D1. |  -1.837498    2.05895    -0.89   0.372    -5.872966    2.197971 
         Tra | 
         D1. |   .0734927   .0420993     1.75   0.081    -.0090204    .1560059 
       _cons |   7.014346   1.010118     6.94   0.000     5.034552    8.994141 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
317 
 
xtpmg d.GDP d.Gov d.INVS d.Exchange d.PC2 d.Tra, lr(l.GDP Gov Tra INVS PC2 
Exchange) ec(ec8) replace pmg 
Pooled Mean Group Regression 
(Estimate results saved as pmg) 
 
Panel Variable (i): id                          Number of obs      =       255 
Time Variable (t): Year                         Number of groups   =        11 
                                                Obs per group: min =        17 
                                                               avg =      23.2 
                                                               max =        25 
                                                Log Likelihood     = -499.4978 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       D.GDP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ec8          | 
         Gov |  -.2457497   .0478921    -5.13   0.000    -.3396165   -.1518829 
         Tra |  -.0349842   .0062951    -5.56   0.000    -.0473223   -.0226461 
        INVS |   .1505626   .0169385     8.89   0.000     .1173638    .1837614 
         PC2 |  -.0593686   .2768251    -0.21   0.830    -.6019359    .4831987 
    Exchange |    .001605   .0007241     2.22   0.027     .0001857    .0030242 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
SR           | 
         ec8 |  -.9178801   .0927319    -9.90   0.000    -1.099631   -.7361289 
         Gov | 
         D1. |   .0384406   .1646349     0.23   0.815     -.284238    .3611192 
        INVS | 
         D1. |  -.1024451   .0697255    -1.47   0.142    -.2391046    .0342144 
    Exchange | 
         D1. |  -.5216968   .1676911    -3.11   0.002    -.8503653   -.1930283 
         PC2 | 
         D1. |   1.739436   1.390384     1.25   0.211    -.9856671    4.464538 
         Tra | 
         D1. |   .0677963   .0413896     1.64   0.101    -.0133257    .1489184 
       _cons |   7.192396   .9266787     7.76   0.000     5.376139    9.008652 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
318 
 
Interest rate liberalisation and financial crises 
logit Financialcrises RInt Chinn GDP Currentaccount 
Logistic regression                             Number of obs     =        264 
                                                LR chi2(4)        =      21.09 
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0003 
Log likelihood = -92.743717                     Pseudo R2         =     0.1021 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Financialcrises |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           RInt |  -.0381097   .0200973    -1.90   0.058    -.0774997    .0012803 
          Chinn |  -.3112432   .1665358    -1.87   0.062    -.6376474     .015161 
            GDP |  -.1109662   .0499284    -2.22   0.026    -.2088241   -.0131082 
 Currentaccount |  -.0487878   .0210428    -2.32   0.020     -.090031   -.0075446 
          _cons |  -1.635174   .3291323    -4.97   0.000    -2.280261   -.9900864 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
logit Financialcrises RDEP Chinn GDP Currentaccount 
Logistic regression                             Number of obs     =        261 
                                                LR chi2(4)        =      16.64 
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0023 
Log likelihood = -88.794957                     Pseudo R2         =     0.0857 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Financialcrises |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           RDEP |  -.0333502   .0216215    -1.54   0.123    -.0757277    .0090272 
          Chinn |   -.300218   .1685778    -1.78   0.075    -.6306245    .0301885 
            GDP |  -.1120452   .0505631    -2.22   0.027    -.2111471   -.0129434 
 Currentaccount |  -.0311887    .022269    -1.40   0.161    -.0748352    .0124577 
          _cons |  -1.906081   .3131459    -6.09   0.000    -2.519836   -1.292326 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
319 
 
logit Financialcrises Inf Chinn GDP Currentaccount BC 
Logistic regression                             Number of obs     =        264 
                                                LR chi2(5)        =      35.88 
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -89.042429                     Pseudo R2         =     0.1677 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Financialcrises |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            Inf |   .0528221   .0160688     3.29   0.001     .0213279    .0843163 
          Chinn |  -.1780677   .1769846    -1.01   0.314    -.5249511    .1688157 
            GDP |  -.0852078   .0511278    -1.67   0.096    -.1854165    .0150008 
 Currentaccount |  -.0469262   .0259818    -1.81   0.071    -.0978496    .0039972 
             BC |   .0189298   .0073409     2.58   0.010     .0045418    .0333178 
          _cons |  -3.962254   .7698992    -5.15   0.000    -5.471228   -2.453279 
 
 
 
logit Financialcrises Inf Chinn GDP Currentaccount Index2 
Logistic regression                             Number of obs     =        263 
                                                LR chi2(5)        =      37.58 
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -88.041817                     Pseudo R2         =     0.1759 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Financialcrises |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            Inf |   .0486178   .0156509     3.11   0.002     .0179425    .0792931 
          Chinn |  -.0565809   .1888487    -0.30   0.764    -.4267175    .3135557 
            GDP |  -.0887753   .0513278    -1.73   0.084    -.1893759    .0118253 
 Currentaccount |  -.0482336   .0262034    -1.84   0.066    -.0995914    .0031242 
         Index2 |   .6775385   .2396889     2.83   0.005     .2077569     1.14732 
          _cons |  -2.612127   .4043226    -6.46   0.000    -3.404585   -1.819669 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
